Does America's GBU-44/B Viper Micro Missile Have A Future? Lethality was a problem for the GBU-44/B and led to its eventual withdrawal from usage. by Charlie Gao

The need for a better UAV munition drove the development of the first micro munitions. 

As Western militaries shift back into a conventional focus after spending more than a decade fighting insurgencies, they are bringing along some tech developed for counterinsurgency that has applications in a peer or near-peer conflict. One important innovation that is looking to change how air-to-ground support can occur is the development of a new class of “micro precision munitions”: guided rockets, bombs, and missiles that weigh around 20 kg or less. The GBU-44/B Viper Strike was one of the first of this new class of weapon. But does it have a future?

At the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the smallest precision munition available to aerial platforms was the AGM-114 Hellfire. As a result, the MQ-1 Predator with Hellfires became an ubiquitous light close air support (CAS) platform. But in this role the limitations of the Hellfire became clear. While it was light, the Hellfire was overkill for many point targets it was fired on. The High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warhead also was found to have a lackluster anti-personnel effect due to being optimized for taking out Soviet tanks, rather than infantry formations. On the other hand, the Hellfire’s warhead was too powerful for other precision targets, especially in urban environments.

The need for a better UAV munition drove the development of the first micro munitions. One of the very early ones was the GBU-44/B Viper Strike, an adapted version of the Brilliant Anti-Tank submunition. The Brilliant Anti-Tank was originally meant to be carried by a missile and dropped over formations of Soviet armor to destroy them, while ignoring “lower” priority targets such as trucks. As such, it already had advanced sensors and guidance on board, making it easily adapted for the micro munition role.

To make a BAT submunition into a GBU-44/B Viper Strike, the original BAT seeker was removed and the Alternate Semi-Active Laser (ASAL) seeker was installed in its place, which made it fully laser-guided as opposed to the IR seeker on the BAT. GPS capability was also later added to the seeker, which allowed the GBU-44/B to be fired from increased standoff to glide to the target. The directional microphones on the BAT wingtips were also removed and replaced by simple rods. Finally, the “precursor” warhead of the BAT was removed, as the GBU-44/B was not designed to strike heavy armor.

The resulting weapon was half the weight of the Hellfire and could be used on the lighter RQ-5 Hunter UAVs. It also had a smaller blast radius, enabling safe use close to enemy troops. The GBU-44/B was actually the first weapon used from an Army UAV in combat.

But lethality was a problem for the GBU-44/B and led to its eventual withdrawal from usage. Probably due to the small warhead, USSOCOM phased out usage of the weapon due to “failure to achieve lethality performance”. Northrop Grumman sold the design to MBDA in 2012. The Army retired its fleet of Hunter UAVs in 2015.

MBDA still markets the GBU-44/B under the name “Viper-E”, but it’s weapon probably won’t generate any sales. The latest press releases about the weapon are over six years old, and it is no longer displayed at trade shows. But it remains an interesting predecessor to modern micro munitions, having proved that the concept has value and can be effective on the battlefield. 

Russia Hopes This Weapon Will Stop Insurgents' Armed Pickup Trucks In Their Tracks Gun trucks. by Michael Peck

The Russian army isn’t well prepared for this sort of threat. 

Armed pickup trucks, or “technicals,” have become the poor man’s tank.  

Across Africa and Central Asia, insurgents and warlords have found that a Toyota pickup can become a formidable weapon when armed with a machine gun, cannon or rocket launcher. They’re fast and nimble to swarm a bigger opponent like a tank, and far, far cheaper to buy and maintain than an armored vehicle. 

Fearing attacks by technicals in Central Asia, Russia is deploying a weapon to stop them: armed trucks. 

“Russian military bases in Central Asia will be strengthened by ‘trucks with guns,’” according to Russian newspaper Izvestia. “Special vehicles on the chassis of the Ural and KamAZ vehicles received additional protection against bullets and fragments. On board, the military will be able to place an impressive arsenal - machine guns, automatic grenade launchers and even anti-tank missile systems.” 

Izvestia pointed to the widespread use of technicals by ISIS in Iraq, in which swarms of armed pickups surprised and routed Iraqi government troops who were well-armed with American-made M1 tanks and other heavy weapons. 

But the Russian army isn’t well prepared for this sort of threat, either. “The problem of equipping our army with armored trucks has long been relevant,” a Russian military expert told Izvestia. “Unfortunately, we had a certain bias - either completely unprotected vehicles or heavier armored personnel carriers.” 

The protection of armored personnel carriers isn’t much stronger than that of an armored truck, the expert said. “At the same time, they are much heavier and more expensive. And in terms of firepower, trucks even surpass light armored vehicles - in their body you can install several machine guns, an automatic grenade launcher, an anti-aircraft gun or an anti-tank missile system.” 

Gun trucks enjoy other advantages over armored vehicles. “They are much faster if it in rough terrain or impassable dirt,” Izvestia pointed out. “In the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, wheeled vehicles can most of the year drive off-road. Another strength of automobiles is that they are cheaper to manufacture and operate and have almost double the power reserve.” 

The subtext to buying gun trucks is fear that Russia’s backyard in Central Asia is about to become a lot more dangerous. “The need to cover the Central Asian direction is becoming especially urgent against the backdrop of the U.S. decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan,” Izvestia noted. 

These won’t be the first Russian gun trucks. During the Afghan War, Soviet troops tried to repel mujahideen ambushes by mounting twin-barreled 23-millimeter anti-aircraft guns on truck beds. Though the cannon’s high rate of fire and ability to elevate to hit high-angle targets were welcome, the unarmored gun trucks proved dangerous for the gun crews. 

Gun trucks also have a history with the U.S. Army. During the Vietnam War, convoys of supply trucks faced constant ambushes by the Viet Cong. Tired of being hit, resourceful GIs in logistics units devised their own convoy escorts.  

They turned whatever wood and steel they could scrounge into homemade armor plate. For armament, they outfitted 2.5- and 5-ton trucks with 7.62-mm and .50-caliber machine guns, quadruple .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, and even 40-mm cannon. In the Iraq War, fiberglass armor and .50-caliber machine guns also turned 5-ton trucks into improvised convoy escorts that could resist small arms fire and IEDs – and dish out some fire of their own. 

Gordon Rottman, a Vietnam veteran who wrote a book about gun trucks in that war, pointed to multiple lessons from that conflict. For example, the most useful ammunition for gun trucks was armor piercing/incendiary (AP/I) rounds fired by larger-caliber weapons.” he told the National Interest. “7.62mm and smaller caliber weapons were marginal, but useful at short ranges for close-in attacks. AP/I will be necessary to defeat enemy technicals, even if they are lightly armored or no armor at all.” 

Gun trucks also need to carry spare parts, extra tires and qualified mechanics for convoy escort. “Reinforced suspension systems and trucks of sufficiently heavy duty for off-road use are needed,” Rottman said. “The U.S. found 2-1/2-ton trucks battered themselves to death because the extra armor, guns, ammo, and other equipment proved to be too much weight. They went to 5-ton gun trucks.” 

Why the Coronavirus Harms Athletes' Metal Health They still need ways to exercise. by Jo Batey and Keith Parry

The spread of COVID-19 is changing life for billions of people around the world. Many are adapting to periods of self-isolation and finding creative ways to stay fit, but the enforced changes may also result in increased sedentary behaviours – which can contribute to anxiety and depression. 

This may be especially the case for athletes, who are already more likely than the general population to experience a mental health disorder during interruptions to their career – usually due to injuries or retirement. So given that most sport has now been cancelled or postponed and athletes are having to train by themselves – sometimes using novel methods – the current restrictions may be more difficult for athletes to handle.

Blogs designed to help athletes cope during these emotionally challenging times have skyrocketed. Specifically, football clubs have been urged to support their players’ mental health and some national governing bodies – organisations that govern and administer a sport on a national basis – have created videos to help coaches and athletes deal with self-isolation. Sport psychologists in the UK and abroad have also been inundated with athletes contacting them for support.

But so far none of these responses have identified why athletes might be more at risk than the general population during self-isolation.

Why are athletes vulnerable?

What all of us are experiencing right now is a transition. Defined as a critical life event, a transition challenges our assumptions about ourselves and requires us to make changes in our behaviours and relationships.

Elite athletes spend many years forming an “athletic identity”. This is defined as: “the degree to which an individual identifies with the athlete role”. This athletic identity serves athletes when they are fit, healthy and able to pursue their goals and ambitions. But when they are unable to engage in such self-defining activities, this over-identification with the role of athlete can make them vulnerable.

As former England rugby player Jonny Wilkinson once explained:

When you’re not doing what you are known for, not achieving the goals you set for yourself, what value do you have? My whole identity used to be through rugby, so as soon as you cut the rugby, you have no identity left. I didn’t know what I was, who I was. If affirmation comes from points you kick, what are you when you can’t kick? Who are you?

 The athletic self

This commitment to an athletic self often begins at a young age. Athletes begin to sacrifice other types of identities available to them in their pursuit of sporting success. So, over time, they become what’s known as “role engulfed” as other identities, that might have helped to create a more multidimensional self, are sacrificed.

This habit was noted by former footballer turned film star Eric Cantona, who said:

Often there are players who have only football as a way of expressing themselves and never develop other interests. And when they no longer play football, they no longer do anything; they no longer exist, or rather they have the sensation of no longer existing.

 There are currently many thousands of elite athletes worldwide who can no longer use sport to support their athletic identity. These athletes are unable to train to the same intensity and access the same equipment and facilities required for them to maintain elite levels of physical and technical performance. They are unable to achieve their goals.

They are also socially isolated from teammates, staff, entourages, and a fan base who support their sense of athletic identity. And as research has identified, it is likely that as a result of becoming “role engulfed” many of them have not spent time developing interests or friendships outside sport. So they may not be as able to adapt as well to online cocktail hour or birthday parties via Zoom.

Most athletes spend their time developing physical and technical components of their performance to the exclusion of their mental skills. Though the current enforced isolation may feel difficult it is also the ideal time for athletes to develop mental resilience.

This doesn’t just apply to sport stars though, the same goes for everyone – we should all try to develop our own mental health and resilience right now. So as well as staying in touch with friends, family (and teammates) digitally, it might also be worth taking a course to teach yourself some coping strategies – for use now and in the future.

China and Trump Step Up Propaganda War Over Coronavirus Beijing is portraying itself as a benign global hero, and Trump is hitting back. by Klaus W. Larres

A new “red scare” is developing in the U.S.

While Beijing is busy with a global propaganda crusade following the spread of the coronavirus from China to around the world, foreign policy hawks in Washington are seething.

Donald Trump lashes out at Beijing’s response to the crisis at daily press conferences amid growing reports of anti-Chinese sentiment among Americans. As a scholar of international affairs and former policy advisor to the German Embassy in Beijing, it is clear to me that China is turning the crisis into an opportunity. It is touting its role in the world and praising its governmental system and enormous countrywide surveillance network for successfully battling the coronavirus.

Yet, this is the nature of international relationships. The U.S. or any other great power would be tempted to do the same. China is exploiting the situation while the U.S. and the Western world are occupied with their own problems and have little time for anything else.

Trading insults

During most of Trump’s years in office, relations between China and the U.S. have been tense. Much of this has centered on the huge American trade deficit with China which Trump strongly criticized even before he became president.

In the 2016 election campaign, Trump accused Beijing of “raping” the U.S. and talked about “the greatest theft [of American jobs] in the history of the world.” While referring to Chinese President Xi Jinping as a good friend, Trump has accused China of intellectual property theft, unfair trade practices and lack of market access for U.S. companies.

In late 2018, the U.S. president unleashed a painful trade war with sharply escalating tariffs, but it did little to resolve Trump’s grievances. Neither the U.S. nor China could win this harmful conflict and a provisional trade deal was signed on Jan. 15, 2020.

The truce lasted exactly two weeks. On Jan. 31, Trump announced a travel ban on visitors from China.

Conspiracy theories

In his many remarks on the crisis since, Trump has not hesitated to resort to language criticized as xenophobic and anti-Chinese, such as referring to the coronavirus as the “Wuhan virus” or “Chinese virus.”

Meanwhile, the administration has done little to discourage a conspiracy theory that has the virus originating from a Chinese research laboratory near Wuhan and not from a live animal market in the city – which most scientists believe. On April 15, Trump said the U.S. was investigating the lab claim and ratcheted up the rhetoric further a few days later by suggesting that China would face consequences if it was “knowingly responsible” for the pandemic. Meanwhile Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said China needs to “come clean” over the emergence of the virus and how it spread.

Certainly there are many questions that need to be answered over the true extent of the disease in China – on April 17 Beijing revised the number of fatalities in Wuhan up by 50% – but the rhetoric from the White House may be contributing to anti-Chinese sentiment directed not at the government in Beijing, but at people in China and of Chinese descent.

On the ground in U.S. cities and towns, Asian Americans are reporting being subjected to verbal and even physical abuse.

Tit-for-tat measures

The Chinese government isn’t blameless when it comes to conspiracy theories. With the likely nod of Beijing’s all-powerful seven-member Standing Committee of the Politbureau, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian speculated wildly on Twitter that it might well have been the U.S. army which brought the virus to Wuhan.

There have also been plenty of reports that foreigners, in particular Africans who live in China, have faced severe discrimination and abuse since the coronavirus crisis broke. They are unfairly accused of having imported the virus to China.

Meanwhile, both Washington and Beijing have put in place tit-for-tat restrictions on each others’ media outlets, severely limiting the number of journalists who are allowed to work in their respective countries.

It accompanied growing reports in the western media about China’s slow initial response to the virus and the silencing of the late Dr. Li Wenliang and other doctors who had attempted to alert Chinese authorities about the looming pandemic as early as December 2019.

Saving face

Despite a sluggish start which contributed to the initial spread of the virus, China has since trumpeted the success of its policy of locking down entire cities and provinces. The country has now been able to open up for business again.

Beijing is also praising itself as a benign global hero by donating and selling huge amounts of much-needed face masks, ventilators and other protective gear to countries round the world, including the U.S.

In so doing, China is subtly using the opportunity to expand its global influence, not least its soft power appeal. Beijing has embarked on a global “charm offensive.”

While this may be regrettable from a Western perspective, would any other big country behave differently? If the roles were reversed, I believe the U.S. would also be tempted to exploit its position for political advantage.

It seems this is the instinctive reaction of any great power. But there is no reason for panic about this. Without doubt, relations between China and many of the countries it is helping have become closer. But they still need to be cemented in the long run – this may or may not happen.

Ruling the world?

China, like many great powers, has a track record of not following through with its promises of financial help.

Just ask the countries who have signed up to Beijing’s huge and creative Belt and Road initiative that seeks to pump Chinese money into infrastructure projects around the world, or the 17+1 China-Central Eastern Europe initiative linking China with governments in central and eastern Europe, including many EU countries. There is much disappointment about broken or semi-fulfilled financial promises and agreements.

And some of the face masks and other gear donated to European countries have proven faulty or of inferior quality.

For the time being, the world should be pleased that China is able and willing to help out with much needed equipment as well as doctors and nurses to help fight the coronavirus crisis in the U.S. and elsewhere.

It does not mean that once the crisis is over, China will be able to run the world. In fact, the U.S. should build on Beijing and Washington’s haphazard and sporadic cooperation during the current crisis to improve relations with China in a more lasting way.

How Diseases Like the Coronavirus Change Our Lives It's not just about our health. by Maxine Whittaker

Despite being so small they can’t be seen with the naked eye, pathogens that cause human disease have greatly affected the way humans live for centuries. Many infectious diseases have been significant enough to affect how and where we live, our economies, our cultures and daily habits. And many of these effects continue long after the diseases have been eliminated.

Infectious diseases have changed the structure and numbers of people living in communities.

The European bubonic plague, or “Black Death” (1348-1350), identified by painful swollen lymph nodes and dark blotches on the skin, killed 80% of those infected. At least 20 million people died, which was about two-thirds of the European population at the time. It slowed urbanisation, industrial development and economic growth as people left cities and reverted to rural and agricultural life. Those who survived, however, were highly sought after for work.

The accidental introduction of measles to Fiji (1875) by people travelling between Fiji and the West caused massive numbers of deaths in communities previously not exposed to the disease. In a few months 20-25% of Fijians and nearly all of the 69 chiefs died. The leadership vacuum and loss of working-age population became an opportunity for the colonial government to import labourers from other nations to work in the agricultural industries.

In the Caribbean island Hispaniola it’s estimated that within 50 years of the arrival of Columbus, his crew and their “pathogens” (like measles, influenza and smallpox), the indigenous Taino people were virtually extinct. This pattern of large death tolls among Indigenous populations in the Americas is repeated in many locations, causing loss of traditional ways of life and cultural identity, and changing the course of their history.

Unfortunately, introduction of an infectious disease into a susceptible population was not always accidental. “Germ warfare” was a strategy used in many colonisation and war efforts. This includes North American Indigenous populations (there are reports of blankets from smallpox-infected corpses being deliberately distributed in the late 1700s); bodies of dead animals or humans being thrown into water supplies during warfare in Italy in the 12th century; and saliva from rabid dogs or the blood of leprosy patients being used by the Spanish against French enemies in Italy in the 15th century.

Changing global economics

Infectious diseases, as well as the search for cures, have had many influences on economies over the centuries. In 1623, the death of ten cardinals and hundreds of their attendants led Pope Urban VII to declare that a cure for malaria must be found.

This was a common risk in Rome, where mala aria (“bad air” from marshes thought to be its origin) had existed since late antiquity. Jesuit priests travelled from Europe to South America to learn about local treatments. In 1631, they identified quinine, made from the bark of the local cinchona tree in Peru, as a cure.

After that discovery there was a race to control quinine in order to keep armies fighting European wars, including the Napoleonic, and attempting to capture territories. At this time quinine became a commodity more precious than gold.

In the late 1880s Tunisia experienced severe infectious disease epidemics of cholera and typhoid, and famines, which so badly depleted its economy that it was unable to pay off its debts. This made it vulnerable to French occupation and then colonisation.

In recent times, it has been estimated that the HIV epidemic in South Africa may have reduced its gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% (from 1997 to 2010) and that SARS cost East Asia around $US15 billion, (0.5% of GDP).

Changing the foods we eat

The origins of many food taboos appear to be linked to infectious diseases. These include prohibitions on drinking raw animal blood, on sharing cooking and eating utensils and plates between meat and other foods, and on eating pork in Judaism and Islam (most likely concerned about dangerous pig tapeworms).

Newer examples of these food exclusions that are still the norm today include:

• consumption of raw milk being illegal in many countries, to prevent spread of bovine (cow) tuberculosis
• • not eating soft cheeses when pregnant to avoid contracting listeria, which can cause miscarriages and stillbirths
  • trying to stop people licking the cake bowl because of the risk of egg-borne salmonella bacteria.
  • Adding words to our languages
    Many words and expressions commonly used in English have origins linked to an infectious disease. One such common phrase, used for a person who may not have symptoms of an infectious disease but can transmit it, is to call them a Typhoid Mary. In 1906 Mary Mallon, a cook, was the first healthy person identified in the USA as a carrier of the typhoid bacilli that causes typhoid fever, a serious disease for the Western world in the 19th century (but which globally exists and has often existed in poor communities).
  • One public health engineer traced an outbreak in Oyster Bay and a path of outbreaks wherever Mary worked. In New York, she was put into isolation where she stayed until she died nearly three decades later.
    Other such additions to our everyday conversations include:
    • “God bless you” after someone sneezes is said as it signalled that someone was unwell, perhaps seriously. It’s credited to St Gregory the Great, although words wishing the sneezer safety from disease have been found in ancient Greek and Roman.
    • the phrase “off colour” appears to have derived from the late 1800s where a diamond and then other items that were not their natural or acceptable colour were “off colour”, or defective. It soon extended to describe being unwell.
    • • feeling lousy means feeling poorly. A person infested with lice often scratches, may be anaemic from the lice feeding on their blood, and doesn’t feel well.
      The 14th-century French brought us two terms used in infectious diseases: “contagion” meaning touching/contact; and disease from des (lack of) ease (comfort). And the 16th-century term epidemic is from the French epi – among, demos – people.
      So pathogens evolve with us and have shaped our lives and will remain one of the forces that we adapt to as we progress through human history.

South Africa Should Base Its Coronavirus Strategy On South Korea Here's how. by The Conversation

What strategy should South Africa follow to contain the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 virus after the current 35-day lockdown? Any strategy should be informed by the trajectory of the disease, the effectiveness – or otherwise – of the current lockdown and how the particularities of the country will interact with the virus. These include high levels of HIV infections and the complexities of social distancing in lower-income neighbourhoods. 

It must also be informed by economic considerations as these have their own, real impact on public health. South Africa has this far relied exclusively on epidemiological criteria for ending the lockdown.

What is clear is that the lockdown has an extremely high economic cost. The country should be looking to alternatives that will be less costly and also more effective in the long term at protecting its communities, its health system and its economy.

We have developed a model that draws on the experiences of other countries, particularly South Korea. We argue that South Africa needs to urgently prioritise its mass testing and contact tracing capacity, which gives it the best chance of saving the nation’s health and economy.

The cost of this programme, even at its most expensive, would be a tiny fraction of the costs of a prolonged lockdown. The South Korean programme had the benefit of attacking the epidemic when it was still small and containable. South Africa retains this advantage over the worst hit European countries. The question now is how to effectively use the time under lockdown to ensure that it is able to contain the spread of SARS-Cov-2, manage the health risks and minimise the economic costs.

Early responses

The implementation of the country-wide lockdown on 27 March 2020 was timeous and necessary. It bought the country valuable time to increase its testing and contact tracing capacity, and to prepare its health system. But South Africa’s initial response to the emergent epidemic in Wuhan, China, in January 2020 was similar to much of the rest of the world – watchful waiting but, with hindsight, perhaps insufficient contingency planning.

South Korea is a notable exception. Due to its experience of the MERS outbreak in 2015, it was better prepared. Instead of embarking on a total lockdown, the country had a more nuanced approach by enforcing, with citizen buy-in, extensive social distancing coupled with scaling up of other preventative and precautionary measures.

Crucially, at the centre of that strategy is aggressive screening for the SARS-CoV-2 infection and isolation of infected individuals, and the tracing and quarantining of their contacts. This enabled South Korea to keep a substantial proportion of its economy open. It did, however, rapidly close its borders, thereby minimising imported infections.

Mass testing and contact tracing work best when the epidemic is still at a relatively low level. This is because the reproduction rate of the disease, often referred to as R or Ro, is so high that a country needs only to be off guard for around two weeks before effective public health intervention options seriously narrow.

Roughly speaking, the R for SARS-CoV-2 is estimated to be about 2.5 every four days. That is, one person infected by the virus infects approximately another 2.5 people over a period of four days. That may not appear fast – but at that rate everyone in this country will get infected within the space of a couple of months, if no prevention to reduce this infection rate is implemented.

Where transmission of the virus becomes widespread, at the community level, the scale of the infections severely limits the effectiveness of mass testing and contact tracing. This is because the infected population is so widespread and growing all the time, while many of those infected are asymptomatic – by some estimates up to 80%.

The only option then is to drag the infection rate down to manageable levels by severely limiting the movements of the population for a period of up to two to three months – a generalised and long-term lockdown.

Mass testing and contact tracing

South Africa’s saving grace is that it implemented the lockdown at a much earlier stage of the epidemic than many other countries. At that point most new infections were those who had returned from international travel and at the time it seemed that community-based infections were confined to the affluent population.

As the country then did not have the capacity to undertake mass testing and contact tracing, precious time was bought with a lockdown that was gradually scaled up. But it came at a very high economic cost.

We have developed a COVID-19 intervention model which is able to analyse some possibilities for the course of the epidemic, and to assess possible responses and costs. Models are a useful and effective tool (although of course not infallible), under conditions of uncertainty, for providing us with an informed and systematic way to compare the impact of a range of policy interventions.

We estimate that if South Africa were to rely exclusively on lockdowns to keep the epidemic under control during 2020, approximately 192 days of lockdown would be required, divided into three episodes. This is because the epidemic is likely to resurge the moment any lockdown is removed unless there are strong public health interventions in place. These interventions include testing at scale, isolation of infectious cases, and high levels of tracing and quarantine of their close contacts.

The cost of lockdown

Given that the lockdown effectively closes down both the supply and demand sides of the economy, the loss of gross domestic product (GDP) is nearly complete – by our estimates roughly R13 billion per day. Over 192 days, the loss of GDP is of the order of R2.5 trillion – almost 50% of GDP.

The lockdown strategy will clearly lead to an economic collapse of a magnitude that will impact health, lives and livelihoods. This is why it is so important that the next stage in the country’s COVID-19 strategy is informed by both health and economic considerations because the two are so tightly intertwined. It would be a grave mistake to rely only on epidemiological factors and ignore the looming economic catastrophe and its dire impact on public health.

Our projections are based on South Korea’s successful prevention strategy of mass testing and contact tracing. Early evidence shows this is also working in Hong Kong. If successful, this strategy reduces the probability of having to resort to repeated and extended generalised lockdowns. Lockdowns would only need to be implemented selectively if localised outbreaks were identified and could be contained.

The opening of the economy would, however, still be subject to:

• continued social distancing;
• • strict implementation of health protocols for employers;
  • ongoing self-isolation of high risk groups; and
  • measures to mitigate the risk of viral spread in the country’s mass transport systems.
  It would also require very careful systems and support to manage risk and spread within health care facilities.
  At the South Korean levels of testing of around 17,000 per day, the annual cost of this strategy would be around R5 billion. At 36,000 a day (the Department of Health target for 30 April), this grows to R10.5 billion. At the target set by the UK of 100,000 per day, the cost would be R29.2 billion per year. This is cheap if it is considered that these annual costs represent respectively 0.4, 0.8, and 2.2 times the single-day cost of a lockdown.
  A programme of mass testing and contact tracing is challenging, particularly in the South African context. The persistence of spatial apartheid, and a large number of multigenerational households, and concerns about our state’s capacity, mean that South Africa faces a number of challenges not present in South Korea.

The U.S. Military's Biggest Enemy Isn't Russia or China Here's how to stop them. by Samuel Arlington Page

Here's What You Need To Remember: “You go to war with the army you have, not the one you might want or wish to have at a later time.” 

Our military is faced with a conflicting dichotomy. On one hand, we tout that we are the most technologically advanced military force on the planet. On the other, the Pentagon states that we need to upgrade our defenses to keep up with the looming threats. Depending on which briefing you attend, you may hear that the Department of Defense (DoD) is operating under a very tight budget; meanwhile, the news media points out the United States spends more on defense than any other nation in the world.

So what gives? What is really happening?

To fully grasp the intricacies of the U.S. military’s budget and expenditures, we must take a holistic look at the budgetary process.

Who’s Really in Charge of the Military?

Each year, the service components draft their needs and submit them in a prioritized list to the Secretary of Defense. These lists are consolidated and given over to the president. The president, not being a military man, relies on the suggestions and vision of the service chiefs. In January of every year, the president submits his budget proposal (for the next year) to Congress. 

The House and Senate each have their own Armed Services Committee, who eventually reconcile the two agendas; they determine what the military is authorized (how much they’re allowed to have) and what the military is appropriated (what they’re allowed to purchase that year). Once reconciled, Congress votes on the National Defense Authorization Act late in the calendar year. The NDAA then becomes law; the military must purchase those designated items. 

This begs the question: who determines what the U.S. military will be comprised of? Sadly, it appears that the commander-in-chief merely makes recommendations; it is the Congress who has the final say.

Unfortunately, two flaws can be spotted in this system. First, it may be possible that a member of Congress may skew military appropriations in order to curry favor with their constituents. For example, Senator Susan Collins from Maine successfully petitioned to build the third Zumwalt-class destroyer to keep her state’s Bath Iron Works shipyard in business; at the time, it was a ship the Navy did not want. Second, once the appropriations are issued, it becomes a monumental fight to change them. What if a service realized that they need to change what they are purchasing because of a new threat? It would face the huge task of convincing Congress of the need to change the purchasing strategy mid-stream. It may prove more difficult than the effort itself.

The Push for Technology

There’s a consensus among military analysts that posits the technological advantages of our adversaries. They assert that Russia and China have already surpassed the United States in terms of technological abilities. In these analyses, they credit foreign missiles with absolute reliability and perfect accuracy while discrediting our own. 

This trend has spurned the admirals and generals into action; there is a palpable emphasis in developing futuristic weapons to not only meet the challenge, but to far exceed it. At this point, I will concede that there is value in developing weaponry for the future. However, I will dispute the overwhelming emphasis currently placed upon it. If one is focused on a futuristic battle, you may not be prepared for the near-term skirmish.

The DoD budget for Fiscal Year 2021 stands at $738 billion in total. Of that, $104.3 billion is being spent on Research, Development, Testing, & Evaluation (RDT&E); this is the highest value in our country’s history. This money will be spent on the development of weapons that do not yet exist. Items such as laser rayguns, howitzers with global reach, and deflector shields sound good in theory, but the technology isn’t mature enough to make them a reality.

Each service component has a number of pet-projects that are purely hypothetical at this point: the Air Force’s B-21 stealth bomber concept boasts unmatched abilities, when it hasn’t even flown yet; the Navy’s electromagnetically driven catapults and elevators still haven’t proven their worth; the Army’s search for a robot that can autonomously carry an infantryman’s load hasn’t reached fruition; and all of the services are constructing massive databases to help each keep track of maintenance and availability at extreme cost.

I do not believe these programs should be canceled, but they should not be the national priority. These programs should be relegated to the “back burner” until technology can catch up to the promised capabilities.

The Value of Our Current Force

Right now, the U.S. military is, by far, the strongest force on the planet. Let’s review recent history.

In 1991, the U.S. military dismantled the Iraqi army in 96 hours. Later, in 2003, the US military crushed the Iraqi army in less than weeks, while using only two divisions as the spearhead. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military forced the Taliban government to fall within three months. Since that time, the United States has held control of Afghanistan longer than the Russians or Alexander the Great ever did.

Think about that.

Those are astounding time frames. But like any sports team, all the competitors would like to defeat the champion and claim the title. So, the United States must be vigilant to keep the hyenas at a distance. Because of that, I propose that Washington maintain its current force as its primary effort, while slowly developing its future capability as a secondary effort.

For a moment, let’s set aside the on-going technological revolution. The major weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal are sound, combat-proven, and worthy of keeping. Sure, they will require upgrades to keep pace with technological developments, but they are largely superior to most nations’ weapons. Our weapons systems cannot be allowed to fester or grow obsolete while we chase new futuristic weapons that are years from production. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the army you have, not the one you might want or wish to have at a later time.”

The reality is that new weapons are prohibitively expensive and take too much time to build; because of the costly price tags of the new weapons, the Pentagon invariably ends up buying fewer new weapons and ends up lagging behind our adversaries in terms of the sheer total number of systems; during these extensive construction times, we must maintain our current force structure by funding the “in-place” weapons systems.

Conspiracy Theory

Political doves often create conspiracy-laden theories that accuse the most outlandish plots. One of them touts that the average citizen does not truly comprehend how much the weapons manufacturing industries fuel the U.S. economy overall. True, the military-industrial complex affects many jobs in many states, but the funding of programs just to create “jobs” eventually hurts the military. It is sometimes necessary to cancel a project and shift its money to another more worthwhile project. This may hurt some Congress-members, and it may mean shifting funding to another defense company, but in the end, the United States will benefit from the security gained from a good piece of military hardware.

The Way Forward

To unravel the convoluted budgetary process and streamline defense acquisition, the president should request a special meeting with both Congressional Armed Services Committees to appeal for one-time special monetary powers to shift defense spending toward ‘at risk’ military capabilities. Funds would have to be shifted on an emergency basis, with the aim of purchasing the best items now rather than perfect items far in the future. The president should propose:

1) The RDT&E value should be reduced by 10 percent for one year. Research could still continue with the remaining $93.9 billion, although some delays could be expected. The $10.4 billion could be used elsewhere.

2a) Purchase another eight F-15EX fighters for $1.2 billion, as the Air Force did last year. This would serve to augment the F-15 fleet during the slow expansion of the F-35 acquisition.

2b) Along a similar vein, initiate the purchase of sixteen F-16V Block 72 fighters for $1.3 billion. Just the addition of the AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) will be a great improvement of the Viper’s potential, given that the F-16 will still be flying beyond 2030.

3) Purchase another Virginia-class Block V submarine with the additional Virginia Payload Module for $2.75 billion. This would help in the Navy in two ways: the VPM capability will assist with the aging SSGN line of ships, which will retire soon; it will bring up the submarine production schedule, which had slowed over the last two years. This will alleviate concern of the shrinking attack submarine numbers. Further, insist that all future acquisition of Virginia-class attack submarines be equipped with the VPM missiles to ameliorate the retirement of SSGNs.

4) Disburse $1 billion to change the structure/composition of the Littoral Combat Ship. To date, twenty LCS ships have been laid down. These ships are misfits within the Navy, not truly fulfilling any particular mission. The president should insist that the remaining ships in the class (fifteen hulls) be re-configured as mini-arsenal ships. Using the current hull design, the super-structure would have permanently installed VLS systems to house the Naval Strike Missile, the Harpoon Block 1C anti-ship missile, the Standard Missile 2 missiles or the Standard Missile 6; all of these guided by the SPY-1F Aegis radar; however, this would most likely eliminate the helicopter landing pad in the stern of the ship. In short, the last fifteen LCS ships would be turned into offensive weapons systems and serve as an interim frigate until a new ship design is introduced.

5) Implement a significant change to an Army major acquisition program. Currently, three Services use a variant of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. The Army, however, insists on building its tilt-rotor from scratch. This is costly and time-consuming. The commander-in-chief should bring the Army into the DoD fold by demanding the purchase of the latest CV-22 version to replace the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program. This would save billions in developmental research. As an incentive, the commander-in-chief would offer $1 billion to this effort. The Army would benefit from the improvements made by the other Services, while taking advantage of an active production line.

 

6) Purchase another Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyer, specifically designed to fulfill the air defense role, for $2 billion. The Arleigh Burke is the workhorse for the Navy, and should continue for the foreseeable future. The Flight III design serves as the stopgap until the Navy can fill the role that aging cruisers are struggling with.

7) Lastly, the Army must complete upgrading its ground combat vehicles. Usually, this is a multi-year project. But in the light of increased adversaries, it should be completed sooner. $300 million is needed for sixty upgraded Stryker double V-hull combat vehicles with heavier weapon systems; $500 million would convert 168 Bradley vehicles to the new M-2A4 configuration; $300 million would purchase twenty-nine new M-1A2C Abrams tanks (about a battalion’s worth); all part of on-going programs.

Conclusion

The transfer of developmental funding to active, “ready” programs would require Congressional buy-in. But time can also be an enemy; thus, to keep our strategic advantage, it is worth the venture to shift our defense dollars to more meaningful projects. By shifting $10 billion dollars, the president could ease the burden upon the Navy to restore its ship-building schedule; it would help the Air Force keep its fourth-generation fighters ahead of contemporaries; and bring the Army forward in its long-term upgrading process. This shift may slow the development of futuristic weapons, or it may invigorate the program managers to operate more judiciously.

A shift of $10 billion dollars is a small number to Congress. But it is a valuable number in terms of maintaining our decisive edge over our enemies.

Samuel Arlington Page is a twenty-year veteran who served in Ranger, Cavalry, and Airborne units. He has written a novel about large-scale combat named, Freedom’s Promise: The American Invasion of Mainland China, available on Amazon.com.