Why Was the U.S. So Slow to Recognize China As Dangerous? Its goal is not just to weaken America but supplant it and the liberal international order it created with a Communist ideology-based model of global governance. by Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han

Every state makes its foreign policy based on assumptions about its society and international politics.  These assumptions are usually anchored in the past.  While there is great value in learning from history, it is also true that conditions change, and what was true of the past is no longer. 

During the Cold War, the U.S. foreign policy was largely based on assumptions that the Soviet Union's leaders were determined to spread communism worldwide; they possessed strategic patience and were adaptive in pursuing their goal.  The USSR would never be America’s partner but a long-term rival, and therefore it must be contained.  Moreover, U.S. decision-makers assumed that American society would fully support this approach.  

However, after the end of that confrontation, strategists like former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger falsely assumed that Communist China could be changed into a benign actor, even a “responsible stakeholder,” or strategic partner of the U.S. were the U.S. to engage with China, believing that China’s rise was a positive thing.

We argue that China is not just a rival but a formidable enemy.  Its goal is not just to weaken America but supplant it and the liberal international order it created with a Communist ideology-based model of global governance. The PRC is more dangerous than the Soviet Union because it is unpredictable and more formidable.  It is an amalgamation of a rapidly rising power and an ideological regime with an aggressive leader in Chairman Xi Jinping.  Xi is both extremely ambitious and paranoid about his regime’s security as well as his own.  These factors make this enemy far less certain than the Soviets.

Additionally, China is far more formidable than the Soviet Union because it has learned key lessons from the USSR’s mistakes regarding competition with the United States.  It is an extremely adaptive adversary.  So adaptive that it has been seen as a partner rather than an enemy for a generation.  Moreover, it was so highly valued as a partner that it was brought into the Western economic ecosystem to be allowed and encouraged to prosper.  China’s rapid growth was made possible by the U.S. government, business, financial markets, and universities, as well as its own efforts.  Close ties between the American elite and Chinese business interest remain strong, even in the wake of the coronavirus.

Fundamentally, there remain sectors in U.S. government, business, and intellectual communities who still see China as a partner and want to return the Sino-American relationship to “normalcy.”  Even in the wake of the coronavirus, close ties between the American elite and Chinese business interest remain strong, and there is an assumption that things will return to normal once Trump leaves office. 

This hope is buttressed by China’s massive global propaganda apparatus, other infiltration operations in our society with equal parts ethical relativism, venality, and compliancy, which offers opportunities for China to penetrate our country to undermine it with mechanisms, possibilities, and circumstances the Soviets never possessed. 

Based on the nature of Communist China, the historical pattern of its behaviors, its capabilities, and grand strategic objectives, we must assume that Chinese power cannot be gradually mellowed under the current conditions but can only be altered by cutting off its power sources, particularly its economic power, and to delegitimize and force Xi to step-down before the regime completes its accelerated metamorphosis.

A common misperception is that China is protean.  It has no coherent, universal ideology and thus is not interested in exporting its political beliefs, as some scholars argue. In fact, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is China's basic guiding ideology.  It does indeed export its governing model in international institutions and through its Belt-and-Road program under economic disguise.

The U.S. reacts to peer competitive threats most vigorously during and in the wake of an attack or major crisis that compels accurate threat identification.  Notably, this been absent in the current case.  Historically, it was only after Pearl Harbor and the Czech coup and the first Berlin Crisis that the U.S. threat response was sufficient.  Even with higher levels of threat identification at the outset of the Cold War, the Truman administration's threat response was imperfect and too reactive to Soviet coercive diplomacy.  Yet, appreciably, its "all azimuths" response provided the strategic foundation for the U.S. and its allies to fight and win a long struggle.

The confrontation with China has clear echoes from the past concerning its assumptions and in threat identification, but also far worse than the Cold War in the denial of the threat by so many sectors of U.S. society, economy, and national security community which accounts for the U.S.’s tardy response.  Of course, it is also unique.  U.S. officials and business leaders who minimize the China threat are augmented by active and energetic PRC’s efforts—far exceeding those of Germany, Japan, or the Soviet Union—to minimize its perception as a threat, and thus suppress a focused and necessary response.  These unique aspects pose substantial dangers for the U.S. as they have retarded an effective U.S. response.  Any effective response begins strategic and moral clarity to counter China.

Scotland Launched an Invasion During the Black Death. Does Histroy Tell China to Attack Taiwan? Put simply, coronavirus may put Taiwan in China’s crosshairs as much as the bubonic plague put England in Scotland’s sights. by Arjun Kapur

When the Black Death ravaged Europe in the mid-fourteenth century, the soldiers of Scotland saw opportunity in crisis. First hitting England in 1348, the plague’s deadly spread across the country spurred the Scots to perceive an ideal moment to conquer their neighbors by staging an invasion of northern England in 1349. Might a power in today’s coronavirus-stricken world take advantage of temporary alterations to the global strategic environment for its geopolitical gain? 

Enter China.

It is a cliché in diplomacy to point out that the word in Mandarin for crisis, wēijī, contains two syllables roughly translating to “danger” and “opportunity.” Whether or not that interpretation is wholly accurate, today’s coronavirus crisis surely presents a potential strategic opportunity for Beijing—one that it may already be seizing.

In the last month alone, China has sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel in international waters, sent an aircraft carrier-led flotilla past Taiwan’s coasts, flown aircraft near Taiwanese airspace, and continued its efforts to militarize land features in the South China Sea. As U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus declared on April 6, “We call on the PRC to remain focused on supporting international efforts to combat the global pandemic, and to stop exploiting the distraction or vulnerability of other states to expand its unlawful claims in the South China Sea.”

Chinese militarism this year may be added to the long list of daring coups de main throughout history, as the global disruptions caused by coronavirus might very well feature a repetition of the Scots’ pandemic-inspired aggression nearly seven centuries ago. Trouble could very well lie ahead for Taipei, for there exist at least five rationales for Beijing to antagonize or even invade Taiwan in the coming months.

First, the coronavirus pandemic has at least mildly disrupted global militaries’ normal operations, not least those of the U.S. Navy. An alarming twenty-six U.S. Navy ships have reported coronavirus cases, most prominently the USS Theodore Roosevelt. Second, in January Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen won reelection in a stark rebuke of Beijing, carried by a policy platform of preserving Taiwanese sovereignty. Third, President Tsai’s surprise landslide victory was a result of the Hong Kong protest movement exposing the failure of China’s desired model for Hong Kong—economic integration with the mainland and gradual political tightening. Clearly that model will not work with Taiwan, either.

Domestic politics matter, too. A fourth factor is that it is no stretch of the imagination that Chinese president Xi Jinping did away with presidential term limits in 2018 in order to realize a personal dream of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland during his tenure in office, fully knowing that it would not feasibly be accomplished within his second term. Finally, reunion would be a monumental achievement for Xi if realized in time for the 2021 centennial of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding.

Put simply, coronavirus may put Taiwan in China’s crosshairs as much as the bubonic plague put England in Scotland’s sights. Sure, Scotland acted as the Scottish Wars of Independence had already raged for decades, whereas the cooler contest between Beijing and Taipei has not erupted into violent armed conflict—at least not yet. The plague first afflicted England before Scotland, whereas in 2020 the coronavirus emanated out of China, with Taiwan demonstrating one of the world’s strongest public health responses. And the Scotland-England rivalry was more regional compared to the global strategic showdown Taiwan finds itself entangled in between China and the United States.

Yet the American role only underscores the profound risks of the coronavirus pandemic, as Taiwan’s chief geopolitical champion finds itself worst afflicted by the virus, recently seeing reported cases soar over one million and deaths over 58,000. Astonishingly, more Americans have now passed from coronavirus than the total number of Americans who died in the Vietnam War.

Would Beijing not be wise to capitalize on this favorable strategic situation to achieve what it considers to be perhaps its top geopolitical objective? It would benefit leaders in Zhongnanhai for them to read to the end of the Scottish story, which carries for them an important lesson in humility. Amassing their army in the forest of Selkirk, the Scots’ close quarters proved the ideal incubation ground for the plague, killing 5,000 troops. Rather than pursue their invasion any further, they retreated home, bringing the devastation of the plague home with them. A full third of the Scottish population perished.

As with failed Scottish adventurism then, the strategic costs of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would almost certainly outweigh its benefits, with an international backlash in both hard and soft power terms inevitable, not to mention the ongoing infectiousness of coronavirus posing a threat to the Chinese military and populace. What may seem to be a window of opportunity would become a chance for China’s foreign policy to epically backfire. Beijing today would do well to learn from the Scottish folly of 1349.

The Coronavirus Pandemic is a Many-Headed Hydra—And Immigration is One of Them Now is not the time to exempt certain immigrants who often live in close quarters in employer-supplied housing and commute together in buses—perfect conditions for spreading the virus. by Pedro Gonzalez

Like the Lernaean Hydra of Greek mythology, the coronavirus pandemic is a monster with many heads. From a viral outbreak sprang an economic crisis, which, in turn, has brought forth food shortages. Containment measures in the United States inadvertently resulted in other public health problems, such as delays for breast tumor treatment and a rise in mental health issues. Now the White House might have made a toothy addition to the corpus in the form of a national security concern. 

After President Donald Trump announced he would suspend immigration to the United States to protect the jobs and wages of myriad workers affected by the pandemic, a deluge of business backlash poured on.

When Trump finally signed his proclamation on immigration, it applied primarily to individuals seeking a permanent residency while exempting several categories of foreign workers and employers. In other words, the ban hurts those who are not coming to the United States for solely economic reasons, while benefiting those who are and those who employ them. It also undid the Department of State's pause on all routine immigrant and nonimmigrant visa services, issued on March 20.

In a scathing letter, Dan Stein, President of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, noted that less than 10 percent of immigrants are affected. Stein added that "it completely ignores what is arguably the largest component of foreign-born impact on the welfare of American workers: out of control guest worker programs including H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B."

By exempting seasonal foreign farmworker visas, the president turned a blind eye to one of the largest sources of immigration. Moreover, these workers often live in close quarters in employer-supplied housing and commute together in buses—conditions that seem perfect for spreading a pathogen.

Worst of all, the proclamation also has a special carve-out for the deeply flawed EB-5 visa program.

Created by Congress in 1990, the employment-based fifth preference visa, or EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, allows wealthy foreign investors to purchase a path to citizenship for as little as $900,000. While the program was well-intended, it rapidly degenerated into a cash-for-green cards racket. Money that is supposed to go to businesses and development projects in struggling communities often ends up paying for the scaffolding on luxurious suites accessible only to the jet set.

In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security launched an investigation into the EB-5 program. The DHS determined that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, which oversees the program, "is limited in its ability to prevent fraud or national security threats that could harm the United States; and it cannot demonstrate that the program is improving the U.S. economy and creating jobs for U.S. citizens as intended by Congress." Canada canceled its equivalent of the EB-5 visa in 2014 for basically the same reasons. We kept ours, however, and the problems with it have only grown.

The Government Accountability Office issued a report in 2015, finding the investor program vulnerable to fraud, abundant with counterfeit documentation, and with "no reliable method to verify the source of the funds of petitioners."

A bipartisan, bicameral investigation headed by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley in 2017 found investors swindled out of $50 million that should have gone to development projects. While those projects never materialized, "more than 100 Chinese investors, including several Chinese fugitives, obtained visas."

USCIS identified and confirmed nineteen national security concerns with the EB-5 program in June 2018.

All things considered, why would the administration exempt the EB-5 visa program? It might have something to do with who enjoys a seat with Trump's Great American Economic Revival Industry Groups.

Of the nine real estate groups listed on the White House's website, at least four have a background of funding development projects with EB-5 cash: Vornado Realty Trust, Related Companies, Starwood Capital Group, and Witkoff Group.

Related Companies used EB-5 money to fund a $25 billion ritzy development project on Manhattan's West Side.

EB-5 investors partially bankrolled Starwood's W Hotel in Hollywood and the SLS Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas. Starwood Property Trust is managed by Starwood Capital Group, both of which were created by Barry Sternlicht, who also founded and led Starwood Hotels & Resorts from 1995 until early 2005. Marriott International acquired Starwood Hotels & Resorts in September 2016. Sternlicht still serves as CEO of Property Trust and Capital Group.

Witkoff Group used the EB-5 program to raise money for various projects, including an $80,000,000, 28-story, 255,000 square foot commercial building with a hotel and residential condominium units in Manhattan's Lower East Side.

Vornado was involved in a development project that would have been partially funded by EB-5 cash connected to Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law and a senior advisor. The deal involved Chinese investors and was a point of interest for Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigators. It ultimately fell apart in the face of mounting national security concerns.

But now the Middle Kingdom has had its day in the sun with the president's immigration edict, as more than 80 percent of EB-5 visas go to Chinese investors. Other exemptions, moreover, favor China: the E-2 and L-1 visas.

The E-2 is a nonimmigrant visa that allows foreign nationals of a country with which the U.S. has a treaty of commerce and navigation to be admitted to land of the free by investing a significant amount of capital in a U.S. business. China does not maintain such a treaty with the United States—but there is a backdoor: Grenada. Unlike China, the little Caribbean island is a treaty country, making it a springboard to the United States.

Chinese investors can obtain a second passport from Grenada in exchange for investment there, then use their second citizenship in that treaty country to apply for an E-2 visa. This scheme resulted in a 72 percent increase between 2014 and 2017 for E-2 visas issued in Chinese embassies and consulates, according to Visa Franchise, a leading advisor for identifying and analyzing U.S. businesses. The exemption for the E-2 holds open a backdoor for leapfrogging into the United States.

Grenada has developed a lucrative industry based on the E-2; citizenship is just a $100,000 investment away. It can actually be cheaper to come to the United States with the E-2 rather than with the EB-5 because the total cost of obtaining the E-2 visa along with the Grenadian passport is generally between $300,000 and $500,000.

But if the E-2 is not an option, there is always the L-1.

The L-1 visa "enables a foreign company which does not yet have an affiliated U.S. office to send an executive or manager to the United States with the purpose of establishing one." Chinese investors increasingly use the L-1A nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Forbes deems it is the best option for Chinese investors looking to come to America—even better than the EB-5. In China, however, there is no such thing as a private company or private investor.

China's 2017 National Intelligence Law effectively eliminates the distinction between private and state-owned companies. Article 7 states:

Any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work known to the public. The State protects individuals and organizations that support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence work.

 The country that spawned the coronavirus that triggered a health crisis turned employment crisis, that exacerbated Western panic by suppressing information about the germ, then threatened through state-run media to plunge America into "the mighty sea of coronavirus," appears the biggest winner of the immigration proclamation.

Of all the exemptions President Trump made, few are so venomous as the EB-5 species and its cousins, the L-1 and E-2. If the president intends to make good on his promise to give the American people the help they so desperately need, he must bring his house to order. He must not allow avarice to add a national security threat to the growing litany of challenges we face.

Coronavirus Is Wiping Out Sports in America ($12 Billion in Losses and Counting) Amid this COVID-19 pandemic, the disappearance of sports is expected to wipe out at least $12 billion in revenue and hundreds of thousands of jobs, according to an analysis conducted by ESPN, labor market analytics firm Emsi and Patrick Rishe, director of the sports business program at Washington University in St. Louis. by Ethen Kim Lieser

If it were any other year, we would be currently enjoying the NBA and NHL playoffs and the first handful of games of MLB’s regular season. 

This, however, isn’t any other year.

Amid this COVID-19 pandemic, the disappearance of sports is expected to wipe out at least $12 billion in revenue and hundreds of thousands of jobs, according to an analysis conducted by ESPN, labor market analytics firm Emsi and Patrick Rishe, director of the sports business program at Washington University in St. Louis.

This grim economic forecast will be even worse, perhaps double, if the NFL and college football seasons don’t get off the sidelines this coming fall. The colossal U.S. sports industry as a whole is worth about $100 billion.

“As an economist, you stand back, you look at the carnage that’s taking place—dumbfounded, awestruck, mind-numbing,” Rishe told ESPN. “All of those phrases, they’re all relevant because we just have never seen anything on this scale.”

Before the coronavirus spread across the country, sports were thought by many to be recession-proof. A 2019 report by PwC predicted healthy annual growth through at least the year 2023. “The love affair with sports in the United States is a perpetual and immersive force,” the report said.

Apparently, that force is finite. More troubling is the fact that the $12 billion estimate might be a tad optimistic, because the analysis relies on certain assumptions that appear more unlikely with each passing day, such as MLB salvaging at least half of its season and the NBA and NHL going ahead with the playoffs without fans in attendance.

The mammoth financial fallout from the stoppage in sports can be partly broken down like this: $3.25 billion is what fans would have spent on pro sports; $371 million from the loss in wages (ticket takers, beer vendors and other stadium and arena employees); $2.2 billion for national TV revenues; and $2.4 billion for tourism-related to youth sports.

Further complicating matters is that insurance will unlikely assist in recouping any of those losses. International events like the Olympics do have comprehensive insurance policies, but major sports leagues in the U.S. are not covered for this particular pandemic.

The sports world understands how big the stakes are if nothing changes by this fall. Each NFL regular-season game is worth nearly $24 million in revenue from TV rights alone, according to the analysis. The 65 college football programs in the Power 5 conferences are responsible for about $4 billion in revenue. In many cases, the money makes up nearly half of the budgets for their athletic departments.

Moreover, from umpires and athletic trainers to dancers and groundskeepers, there are about 3 million jobs within 524 occupations that are dependent on sports, according to Emsi. To make matters worse, analysts noted that many of these employees are living paycheck to paycheck.

Why We Need a Push for All Vaccines Now More Than Ever They matter and so does the battle for hearts and minds. by Katherine E. Gallaghe,r Anthony Scott, Ifedayo Adetifa, John Ojal, Shirine Voller and Wangeci Kagucia

World Immunisation Week is celebrated in the last week of April every year. The aim is to recognise efforts to develop new vaccines and increase vaccination coverage worldwide. The World Health Organisation (WHO) also uses the week to galvanise national and international communities to keep pushing for more: greater demand for vaccines, better access, equity and higher coverage. 

Vaccines are some of the most equitable and cost-effective health interventions available. As global attention is captured by the COVID-19 pandemic, the campaign to champion all vaccines matters now more than ever.

Lives saved due to immunisation

The world before vaccination was a very different place. On the African continent, before a yellow fever vaccine was developed and routinely delivered (as recommended by the WHO in 1988), epidemics occurred every three to 10 years. Up to a quarter of those showing symptoms would get severe disease and among those with severe disease, half would die. Outbreaks still occur in at-risk areas where vaccination services have broken down. But if the vaccine is available, 99% of people who get it are protected within 30 days of the injection and will survive.

Similarly with measles, between 2000 and 2018 the vaccination is estimated to have prevented 23 million deaths worldwide. In the 1960s, before widespread vaccination, measles epidemics used to occur every two or three years, not only causing millions of deaths, usually in children, but also long-term disabilities. Measles can attack every organ in the body, and even after recovering from the illness, children can be left blind or deaf, with detrimental effects on their immune systems.

There have been substantial gains in measles prevention. But there were still 140,000 measles deaths worldwide in 2018 due to pockets of unvaccinated children transmitting the disease. In the African region alone, the WHO estimates there were 1.7 million cases of illness and 50,000 deaths in 2018 .

While calling for a COVID-19 vaccine we must remember to ensure that the highly effective vaccines in our existing armoury, like the one for measles, continue to be made available for all who need them. COVID-19 provides a stark reminder of what a world without vaccines would look like.

Limitations

If vaccines are so effective, why don’t we have them for all diseases?

HIV and malaria are “hard hitters” on the African continent and have been for decades, so why are there still no vaccines available?

A large part of the challenge boils down to how rapidly these germs can change their identity. Vaccines aim to simulate a natural infection, so that when a true infection comes along, your body can recognise the germ quickly and launch the correct response to disarm it. They are, in that way, one of the most “natural” medical interventions you could think of. Essentially they just prepare your own immune system to react more effectively than it would if coming into contact with the germ for the very first time.

The route to developing an effective vaccine, therefore, depends on the nature of the germ itself, how your natural immune system responds to it and the safety of different possible types of vaccine material. Unfortunately, both malaria and HIV are highly complex organisms that can rapidly change the way they “look” to your immune system. This makes it hard to make a vaccine, as the organism itself is constantly changing and has inbuilt ways to evade recognition by your immune system.

The safety of potential vaccines is also crucial. Research moves sequentially from “test-tubes” to animals and, if it meets all the criteria indicating that it is safe, then the trials move to include a small number of healthy adults. Gradually, the number and diversity of those included in trials is expanded, until enough safety and efficacy data are accrued to pass it through to the next stage of development.

There is a huge amount of ongoing research to identify possible “candidate” vaccines for both HIV and malaria (and COVID-19). A few malaria vaccine candidates have looked promising and there is a large scale implementation trial of the RTSS malaria vaccine to demonstrate effectiveness; researchers are optimistic. Despite testing a large number of HIV vaccine candidates in the past few decades, they have failed to demonstrate efficacy, and the search continues.

But the frustration from decades of failed attempts should not reduce the rigour of the research needed. The vaccine development process has to be long enough to ensure the end product is safe. Continued focus on developing new vaccines is needed, alongside patience and political will to get them to the populations that need them most when they do become available.

Remaining challenges: access and attitudes

“Getting vaccines to the populations that need them most” encompasses a range of problems. The WHO estimates that in 2018, 20 million children remained unvaccinated or under-vaccinated. That is, they had not completed the full course of recommended vaccinations by the time they reached one year of age. That is one in every seven infants worldwide.

This statistic hides considerable complexity. The number varies by vaccine, across countries and within countries.

Leaving a proportion of the population under-vaccinated doesn’t just affect those individuals, it reduces herd protection. Herd protection is the effect achieved by vaccinating most people in the “herd” and therefore reducing transmission of the infection to such an extent that the remainder don’t come into contact with it. This protects vulnerable people who cannot be vaccinated because they are too young or have certain health conditions.

Pockets of under-vaccinated people put themselves and others at risk as they act as reservoirs for transmission of the infection.

Vaccine hesitancy or “anti-vax” sentiment has become a growing issue, to the extent that the WHO considered it one of the top 10 threats to global health in 2019. It is still relatively rare in Africa, but it has arisen recently in populations more sceptical of health authorities and for whom the memories of uncontrolled infection have disappeared.

It must be guarded against, especially in the uncertain times of COVID-19. A global pandemic like this one threatens to reverse the victories that are won every day over vaccine-preventable diseases in low-income settings, including gains towards polio eradication.

The pandemic reduces the staff and resources available to continue routine immunisation services as resources are redirected to COVID-19 wards. Uncertainty over whether services are continuing as many workplaces are temporarily shut down, together with reduced transport options, makes it harder for parents to access care.

Fear of contracting the virus in transit or while at the health facility may additionally prevent parents from bringing children to the health centre. If the uptake of vaccines does drop, outbreaks of vaccine preventable diseases such as bacterial meningitis and pneumonia, measles, rotavirus diarrhoea and others will cause even higher rates of death when patients present to a health system that is already straining under the weight of COVID.

Now more than ever, routine vaccination must continue. The WHO has released guidelines on maintaining routine immunisation services during the COVID-19 pandemic. While everyone has their eyes on the coronavirus pandemic, it is vitally important that national immunisation programmes, front line health workers and parents find a way to sustain the routine immunisation system and continue to save millions of children’s lives.

Here Are Ten Ways To Beat China Over Coronavirus We need to be smart about how we do this, building up American strength even as we hold China accountable. by Walter Lohman and James Jay Carafano

The growing chorus to “punish” China for how it has handled the COVID-19 crisis is understandable and justifiable. We need to be smart about how we do this, building up American strength even as we hold China accountable. 

If the challenge of our era is a multidecade great-power competition with China, the United States can do a range of things to win.

And although this competition is going to require compromise, none of the following 10 suggestions unnecessarily undermines economic freedom—the true engine of American strength. These are real, “shovel ready” ideas.

1. Get to the bottom of the Chinese Communist Party’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis.

The U.S. should lead an international effort to investigate the origins of the new coronavirus, which causes the disease COVID-19. This is going to require the Chinese government to provide access to facilities, records, and personnel it is unaccustomed to offering.

Every day, we live with the results of the Chinese government’s early cover-up of the coronavirus outbreak. The U.S. and the rest of the world should demand answers so as to avoid its happening again. How Beijing responds will say a lot about the nature of the competitor we face.    

2. Expand the scope of America’s traditional commitment to free trade.

The U.S. needs to conclude new, full-fledged free trade agreements in Asia. It can draw from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as Quad), involving Australia (with which it already has a free trade agreement), India, and Japan.

Expand partner by partner if necessary. Start with Japan and the seedling of a free trade agreement that the Trump administration signed with that nation last year. Resolve trade disputes with India.

This is a long-term endeavor. The U.S. can wait for a full-fledged free trade agreement with India. In the meantime, it should be looking for new partners that can be brought in to the Quad, for their active collaboration and perspectives.  

3. Commit to crafting the military we need in the Indo-Pacific.

Congress should support the key elements of the “Regain the Advantage” plan from Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to increase investment in America’s Indo-Pacific military presence.

In its annual Index of American Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation proposes budgets that can support the U.S. in fighting two major wars at roughly the same time. That requires more ready ships, planes, and troops—a lot more.

This is going to be a difficult conversation to have as the U.S. grapples with the debt it has incurred in dealing with COVID-19. But right-sizing the military to protect American interests is not first and foremost a budget exercise.

Would-be budget cutters are going to have to identify what region of the world and what American interests they are willing to write off. It certainly cannot be the Indo-Pacific if the U.S. is going to compete with China’s rising military might. 

4. Prepare the U.S. economy for a long competition with China.

Instead of dreaming up our own state-led solutions, remove obstacles that stand in the way of America’s fully utilizing its assets, such as regulations that prevent the nation from being a player in tech-enabling rare earth minerals or banking regulations that prevent it from competing with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

And in the rare instance where industry requires a nudge to meet broader strategic objectives, such as with the BUILD Act, make clear that the strategic objective is China. Otherwise, it will just become mere corporate welfare. 

5. Address the 5G challenge head on.

This means standing firm in barring companies such as Chinese government-linked Huawei Technologies Ltd. and ZTE Corp. from supplying the U.S. government and participating in the build-out of our 5G network. It means encouraging our allies to do the same.

With technology generally, “protecting” is not the same as “protectionism.” We need to enhance export controls and investment approval processes to protect against specific threats.

Congress passed landmark legislation to do this two years ago–the Export Control Reform Act and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act. Now, we need to properly execute those laws, especially to address the leakage of emerging and foundational technologies.  

What “protecting” certainly does not mean is imposing tariffs on American consumers of foreign steel, aluminum, or automobiles.

6. Stem Chinese influence in international organizations. 

We need to press for candidates who love the free world to head up groups such as the International Telecommunications Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization, but we need international organizations to hire more Americans, too. 

In recent months, China has demonstrated a detrimental influence over the World Health Organization, an entity of the United Nations, but that did not spring out of nowhere. It has been building for more than a decade. And it’s not just at the leadership level that this detrimental influence is a problem. It’s at the working level.

Chinese in these organizations never adopt the interests of the organizations as their own. They continue to represent Chinese interests. We’re not going to change that disposition, but we can at least dilute it.

7. Work with the Europeans on our common concerns about China.

The U.S. and Europe should coordinate on export controls and investment regimes and on noneconomic issues such as compelling China’s respect for freedom of navigation. This is so much trickier than it seems.

The Europeans have enormous equities in their relationships with China, both inbound and outbound. They are not going to sacrifice that for geopolitical theories. But where there are concrete threats, we will find willing partners. “Willing” but complicated.

They, like us, are real democracies. Their publics and special interests will constrain the choices their governments can make if we try to bully them. So it won’t be easy, but doing the difficult diplomacy necessary to get on the same page with the Europeans will have greater payout than any other diplomatic investment we can make.

8. Use existing laws to counter Chinese economic espionage and theft.

We need to use the laws we have to their fullest extent, as the Justice Department is doing with its “China Initiative” to crack down on the theft of technology from American companies and universities. With regard to this theft, the answer is not preventing Chinese students from enrolling in U.S. universities.

We should want the best and the brightest from around the world attending our universities and contributing to their research. We just need to enforce the law governing their work.

Similarly, The Treasury Department already has the authority to sanction foreign entities that have used cyberattacks to pilfer the technology of U.S. companies. Use it. There is also more we can be doing in the World Trade Organization.

9. Help Taiwan maintain its de facto independence.

Steps to this end include conclusion of a free trade agreement with Taiwan, making available the equipment and expertise that it needs to contribute to its own defense, and vigorously advocating for Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations.

If the debacle over the World Health Organization’s handling of Taiwan’s early COVID-19 warnings are not enough to bring home this need, it’s hard to know what will be.  In truth, Taiwan is on the front line of the U.S.-China great power competition. The U.S. simply cannot afford to let Taiwan be absorbed by China.

10. Stay focused on values.

The U.S. should use sanctions provided in laws such as the Global Magnitsky Act to punish Chinese human rights abusers in Xinjiang and Tibet, and everywhere else fundamental liberties are under assault. We need to stay focused on the struggle in Hong Kong and see that the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act is thoroughly enforced.

But sanctioning your rival is the easier part of global competition. The more difficult part is holding others in the region to universal moral standards. Also important is pressing the human rights case with our allies in places such as Thailand and the Philippines, with partners in places such as Vietnam, and in places that are already tilting toward China, such as Cambodia and Burma (Myanmar).

We need to be smart about it. But if there to be a truly values-based element to our Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. has to stand for something. And in the long run, a freer Indo-Pacific will be a region more friendly to American interests.    

Strategic competition with China cannot be binge-watched. It is going to be a long and complicated fight with no clear historical analogy. The COVID-19 crisis may be the spur Americans need to gird themselves for that fight.

But we cannot overreact in the moment and set precedents that actually will undermine that long-term effort.  We have to bank on the reality that China will remain, and grow, as a global economic and diplomatic presence.

We can do plenty to deal with that.