We need to talk about Japan: Tokyo’s damaging role in Southeast Asia While China is often criticised for the negative influence it wields over Southeast Asian affairs, Japan's role in backing authoritarian regimes and promoting rights abuses in the region remains far less publicised, but arguably no less pernicious. by Alastair McCready

After a three-month Covid-induced break, the United Nations Human Rights Council resumed this month in the unusual setting of the 2,000 capacity Assembly Hall – the largest space in the UN’s Palais des Nations Geneva headquarters, chosen with social distancing in mind. 

On the table at the 43rd regular session were discussions ranging from systemic racism in the US, as well as resolutions on the likes of South Sudan, Libya and North Korea. 

On the agenda, too, on June 22 was resolution L23 on human rights in Myanmar, calling for “full and unhindered access” to large portions of the country in which human rights violations are ongoing. It also called for the lifting of an internet blackout imposed upon townships in Rakhine and Chin states since June 2019.

Of the Council’s 47 members, 37 voted in favour of adopting the resolution, while two voted against (predictably Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines and an embattled Venezuela). Among the eight abstentions included a selection of African states with spotty human rights records of their own, serial-abstainer Nepal, Nerandra Modi’s India, and Indonesia, dutifully abiding by ASEAN’s principle of non-interference among member states. 

But keeping them in good company was a reticent Japan. 

Perhaps surprisingly to the uninitiated, Japan – often regarded as Southeast Asia’s conscientious liberal-democratic counterbalance to unscrupulous and authoritarian China – has a track record of symbolic silence when it comes to human rights abuses in Myanmar. 

Despite its self-proclaimed diplomacy based on “fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law”, Japan remained comfortably perched on the fence at UN votes on human rights in Myanmar in November, September and March 2019. 

Following the September vote, Myanmar expressed their gratitude to Japan for their stance – less commendation and more damning indictment of Tokyo when just four months later Myanmar was ordered to prevent acts of genocide against the Rohingya by the International Court of Justice. 

Min Aung Hlaing, a man who stands accused by the UN of presiding over genocide in Myanmar, was welcomed in Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Ministry of Defence

But it’s not just support of the passive kind offered. 

As the world has cautiously withdrawn funding and support for Myanmar in light of genocide accusations, Japan has continued with a free flow of overseas aid as the largest Asian donor to the country in 2019. 

Ichiro Maruyama, Japan’s ambassador to Myanmar, has also on several occasions openly expressed his support to the Myanmar government, saying in December he was “praying” that the ICJ would rule against a genocide in Myanmar and that his government “firmly believes that no genocide was committed in the country”. While in October last year, Tatmadaw commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, a man who stands accused by the UN of presiding over the aforementioned genocide in the country’s West, was welcomed in Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Ministry of Defence, also meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 

Japan has even aligned on the controversial issue of semantics, refusing to use the term Rohingya at the behest of the Myanmar government, calling them instead ‘Muslims in Rakhine State’.  

Japanese private business, too, continues to engage with elements of Myanmar’s ruling elite, with beverage group Kirin Holdings operating a brewery in partnership with the major military conglomerate Myanma Economic Holdings (MEH). It has made repeated claims in recent years that it is “reviewing strategic options” due to the allegations of genocide against its business partner, with ties remaining unsevered. 

Across Southeast Asia there are similarly sketchy endorsements made by the Japanese government. In 2018 they backed the Cambodian government with material support in the build up to the 2018 elections, widely condemned as a sham by the international community as the Kingdom’s only viable opposition – the Cambodian National Rescue Party – was dissolved shortly before. 

Hun Sen, basking in the glory of the absurdly large margin of victory for his Cambodian People’s Party, received a note from the secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Toshihiro Nikai, following the election “heartily congratulating” him on his victory.

A weak approach to calling out human rights abuses in Vietnam, for which Japan is the country’s largest bilateral donor, and turning a blind eye to Rodrigo Duterte’s deadly “war on drugs” in the Philippines (for which he praised Japan as “a friend unlike any other”), combines to form what Human Rights Watch has labelled the country’s “values-free diplomacy” in Southeast Asia.  

Japan has offered explanations for their complicity by suggesting engagement is preferable to chastisement in encouraging reforms among the leadership of these nations – on one occasion stating that economic sanctions on Myanmar would only “fuel the situation”. 

But in reality, Japan’s brand of ultra-soft diplomacy is more likely motivated by geopolitical and economic considerations, as it attempts to pry the likes of Myanmar and Cambodia away from the clutches of Beijing, who are increasingly reliant on the Asian giant for infrastructure development projects. Indeed, this desire to be the region’s main patron and to compete for influence is evidenced in research published in June last year showing that Japan’s outstanding infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia were valued at $367 billion, with China’s only $255 billion.

So while Japan – riding on its status as among the world’s leading liberal democracies – continues to enjoy less scrutiny than China in its foreign policy dealings in Southeast Asia, its influence upon human rights and democracy in the region remains, in many respects, no less pernicious than Beijing’s. 

As Tokyo vies for economic and political influence in Southeast Asia through its pursuit of “values-free diplomacy”, it squanders its capacity to act as a true counterbalance in the region and a force for positive change.

Chinese Navy Submarines Could Become A Reality In Indian Ocean by H I Sutton

The Chinese Navy is rapidly pursuing global capabilities. A key area of future operations may be the Indian Ocean. Chinese submarines in particular could have a strategic impact if they were roaming those waters. From China’s standpoint this would protect vital sea lanes that will be vulnerable in any war. Naturally many of the world’s navies would be concerned if this were the case. Chief among them is the Indian Navy, which currently has the largest submarine fleet in the South Asia region.

Concern about China’s naval expansion is a hot topic on the world stage. The U.S. Navy is increasingly pivoting towards Asia. Speaking at the Brussels Forum virtual conference on June 25, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referenced the Chinese Communist Party’s “threats to India” and other countries in Asia. “We are going to make sure that we are postured appropriately to counter the PLA.” (People’s Liberation Army, which includes the Chinese Navy.)

But much of the attention is on the South China Sea, where Beijing has made extensive territorial claims. The Indian Ocean theater seems less of a focus, at least in the public’s eye. For India, however, the threat seems very real. Chinese submarines have paid port calls in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in recent years.

During peacetime Chinese submarines would be expected to enter the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. This should be done on the surface, which makes their presence obvious. China might still do it to send a message, but it is of limited utility in an operational setting where submarines want to hide their presence.

In wartime, Chinese submarines might slip through the Sunda Strait or Lombok Strait. These pass between the chain of Indonesian that separate the Pacific and Indian Oceans. One advantage over the Malacca Strait, which runs past Singapore, is that it would deliver the submarines to the deep water of the eastern Indian Ocean. From there they could take less obvious routes to their targets.

The Sunda Strait would be the shortest route, but it is very shallow at its eastern end so the deeper Lombok Strait might be preferred. There a submerged passage is likely considered feasible to the Chinese Navy.

Once through into the Indian Ocean, the submarines could get rearmed or resupplied without having to return to China. The Chinese Navy has already built a base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Even if the submarines themselves did not call in to the port, which would be closely monitored, vessels could operate from there to carry out at-sea replenishment.

And there is another Chinese port under construction at Gwadar in Pakistan. Work on an extension of that port, which may include a Chinese naval base, appears to be imminent. Gwadar has an advantage in that it is connected by land to China so supplies would not have to go by sea.

If China were to create a permanent Indian Ocean squadron, its natural bases would be Gwadar and Djibouti. There is also the small island of Feydhoofinolhu in the Maldives, which China is developing as a resort. Planners will be concerned that it could act as a support base or monitoring station in some scenarios.

For its part, the Indian Navy is also growing its capabilities and modifying its operating patterns to counter the threat. There is evidence that it has been testing its ability to forward deploy submarines to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This could hold the key to monitoring submarine activity in the Strait of Malacca.

At the same time, the Indian Navy’s U.S.-supplied P-8I Neptune aircraft are updating India’s anti-submarine reach in to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Together with the surface navy and the submarine force, this could hope to track Chinese submarine movements.

But in the vastness of the ocean this could be challenging. Even though China’s submarines may not be as quiet as their Western equivalents, they have a natural stealth advantage. Even very old submarines pose a serious threat that cannot be ignored in wartime. So for India it will be critical how quickly it can react to a more pervasive Chinese Navy presence in the Indian Ocean.

India and China deployed in 'large numbers' in border showdown: foreign ministry

An Indian fighter jet flies over Leh, the joint capital of the union territory of Ladakh, on June 25, 2020, part of a show of strength after a border showdown between Delhi and Beijing (AFP Photo/Tauseef MUSTAFA)

New Delhi (AFP) - India acknowledged for the first time Thursday that it has matched China in massing troops at their contested Himalayan border region after a deadly clash this month.

But India's foreign ministry accused China of causing the tensions by starting military deployments, and warned relations between the world's two most populous nations could be undermined if the standoff continues.

The neighbours have blamed each other for a June 15 battle in the Ladakh region in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed while China suffered an unknown number of casualties.

While each has said it wants to de-escalate the territorial showdown, India's foreign ministry spokesman Anurag Srivastava said "both sides remain deployed in large numbers in the region, while military and diplomatic contacts are continuing".

Srivastava said "Chinese actions" on the unofficial border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), led to this month's deadly fight with rocks and batons. No shots were fired.

"At the heart of the matter is that since early May, the Chinese side has been amassing a large contingent of troops and armaments along the LAC," the spokesman charged.

He added that China had obstructed India's patrols in contravention of accords made to avoid skirmishes between their armies, who fought a border war in 1962 and have regularly clashed since.

Srivastava said Chinese forces had built "structures" on the Indian side of their demarcation line in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh where the high-altitude battle was fought.

"While there have been occasional departures in the past, the conduct of Chinese forces this year has been in complete disregard of all mutually agreed norms," the spokesman said.

India had "to undertake counter deployments" because of the Chinese buildup, he said.

Military commanders have held talks and their foreign ministers have also discussed ways to end the showdown.

"Peace and tranquility in the border areas is the basis of our bilateral relationship," said Srivastava, demanding that China follow up on its pledge to cool tensions.

"A continuation of the current situation would only vitiate the atmosphere for the development of the relationship."

China has accused Indian forces of causing the June 15 battle by attacking its troops.

Beijing has also called on India "to immediately stop all infringing and provocative actions."

Zuckerberg Loses $7 Billion as Firms Boycott Facebook Ads By Siraj Datoo

Mark Zuckerberg just became $7.2 billion poorer after a flurry of companies pulled advertising from Facebook Inc.’s network.

Shares of the social media company fell 8.3% on Friday, the most in three months, after Unilever, one of the world’s largest advertisers, joined other brands in boycotting ads on the social network. Unilever said it would stop spending money with Facebook’s properties this year.

The share-price drop eliminated $56 billion from Facebook’s market value and pushed Zuckerberg’s net worth down to $82.3 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. That also moved the Facebook chief executive officer down one notch to fourth place, overtaken by Louis Vuitton boss Bernard Arnault, who was elevated to one of the world’s three richest people along with Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates.

Companies from Verizon Communications Inc. to Hershey Co. have also stopped social media ads after critics said that Facebook has failed to sufficiently police hate speech and disinformation on the platform. Coca-Cola Co. said it would pause all paid advertising on all social media platforms for at least 30 days.

Zuckerberg responded Friday to the growing criticism about misinformation on the site, announcing the company would label all voting-related posts with a link encouraging users to look at its new voter information hub. Facebook also expanded its definition of prohibited hate speech, adding a clause saying no ads will be allowed if they label another demographic as dangerous.

“There are no exceptions for politicians in any of the policies I’m announcing here today,” Zuckerberg said.

Op-Ed: Who China’s Xi Jinping really wants to win the 2020 U.S. election by Frederick Kempe

• China is creating new facts on the ground, expanding its influence across the world – from the Balkans to the South China Sea – as the United States wrestles with the myriad distractions of coronavirus, recession, racial upheavals and presidential elections.
• In the debate over whether Xi wants President Donald Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden to win November’s presidential elections, the reality is that he has already decided who he prefers to be the victor in 2020 – and that would be China.

• China is creating new facts on the ground, expanding its influence across the world – from the Balkans to the South China Sea – as the United States wrestles with the myriad distractions of coronavirus, recession, racial upheavals and presidential elections.

  China also this week created a new fact in the Pacific Ocean. Voters in the Republic of Kiribati, who gained their independence from the United Kingdom in 1979, solidly returned President Taneti Maamau to power. That rewarded his campaign built on embracing Beijing and discarding diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  

  Captain James Cook, who “discovered” Kiribati’s Christmas Island on Christmas Eve of 1777, would be rolling in his watery grave. The atoll he claimed for the British could some day host port facilities for Chinese tourists or, more to the point, warships.

  Seen in isolation, it’s easy to understand why this exotic story got so little attention this week. However, Kiribati has a deeper meaning, and it’s not only for its geographic setting 1,300 miles south of Honolulu, as the only country in the world whose pieces are scattered in all four hemispheres and across 1.3 million square miles.

  The election was one more of many signs (see my column of May 2^nd) that China sees the current global situation, accelerated by COVID-19′s outsized blow to the United States, as a unique moment to gain global influence at Washington’s expense. Kiribati helps that effort in two respects: narrowing the number of countries in the world recognizing Taiwan to just 15 and expanding its presence in waters dominated by U.S. Pacific Command.

  And that brings me to the stale debate in Washington over whether President Xi Jinping, the most dominant Chinese leader since Mao Tse Tung, wants President Donald Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden to win November’s presidential elections. And might tilt everything from trade decisions to intelligence operations to extract his preferred outcome.

  Xi’s power preference 

  The reality is that President Xi has already decided who he prefers to be the victor in our 2020 elections – and that would be China.

  We’re in the systemic struggle of our age, and the U.S. democratic system is facing one of the great stress tests of its history without any certainty about the outcome. The situation is bound to get messier through the elections and, perhaps, far beyond.

  The United States won its global role on the attractiveness of its values and the effectiveness of its institutions, charms that were tarnished even before the country’s worst-in-class performance in the face of coronavirus. Deaths this week in the U.S. hit a world record 124,468, and new covid-19 cases passed the 40,000 mark for the first time, leaving allies around the world bewildered about their favorite superpower. 

  Chinese leaders are telling their global partners this confirms further that the United States is a declining leader with a faltering model. Beijing underscores the value of their brand of leadership, which focuses more on being at the center of global influence that on being atop the heap.

  Over time, the United States may well self-correct, as it has done so often in history. It’s also true that China continues to hurt its global cause through overreach, unfair trade practices and diplomatic bullying.

  This week also produced new signs that Europe has grown warier of the Chinese embrace. “We continue to have an unbalanced trade and investment relationship,” said Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission president, after a summit with Chinese leaders. She pressed Beijing to deliver on last year’s commitments on market access and to close negotiations on an investment agreement.

  At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo surprised on Thursday his European partners by accepting their proposal, which he had seemed cool on earlier, to launch a new U.S.-EU dialogue on China. Josep Borrell, the EU’s de facto foreign minister, raised the idea earlier in the week but soft-pedaled it when it initially seemed the U.S. lacked interest.

  The U.S. also recently stepped up military reassurance efforts on behalf of its Asian allies. This month, three U.S. carriers navigated the Philippine Sea and farther east, bringing with them a flock of fighter jets. Congress is working on a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a special budget that would spend nearly $7 billion over two years aimed, among other outcomes, at bolstering naval forces in the Western Pacific.

  Seizing opportunities

  Even with all that activity, China remains even busier, seizing opportunities wherever it senses a global leadership vacuum worth filling. In the face of COVID-19, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to multi-task. The evidence of that would fill volumes, but here are some fronts worth watching.

  Beijing is accelerating its work toward creating a digital currency, planning for the moment that it may be able to shift its creditors to repayment in yuan. Over time, it would hope to curb the power of the dollar in global transactions and to sanction and print money.

  Kristine Lee in Politico Magazine reports on how, with the Trump administration’s reduced interest in multilateral institutions, “Beijing has systematically positioned Chinese nationals at the head of a wide range of U.N. agencies.” That reflects “Beijing’s savvy diplomatic maneuvering as a rising power, and its position as the world’s second largest-economy,” she writes.

  China also continues to expand its military capabilities in its region, defining 80 new geographic features in the South China Sea as its own, some 55 submerged features, and moving toward the declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone to tighten its air domain.

  Perhaps most crucial to watch is Taiwan. Chinese rhetoric is growing more aggressive, and its military activity in Taiwan’s air defense space is growing more frequent. Beijing has sailed a new aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait, and it launched new destroyers last year.

  Chinese military leaders have said they’d like to make Taiwan their own by the time of the Chinese Communist Party’s 100^th anniversary in July of next year.

  It will take a far more focused and consistent Washington, acting with greater cohesion alongside its global allies, to deter any such birthday aspirations.

Hong Kong’s economic future will be safer under a Joe Biden presidency by Richard Harris

• Calm minds on both sides know China and the US need each other because they are more economically linked than militarily opposed, unlike the Cold War
• Hong Kong’s economic future remains in the hands of the superpowers, with a Biden presidency less likely to cause unwelcome fallout.

• British prime minister Harold Wilson said in 1964 that “a week is a long time in politics”. And in 1886, politician Joseph Chamberlain said: “In politics, there is no use in looking beyond the next fortnight.” In 2020, I shall try to look over the next five months to see how Hong Kong might fare with the next US president. 

  Current US president, Donald Trump, who pre-coronavirus looked unbeatable, seems to be imploding. He is a man who can take pressure, but the burdens of office will wear anyone down – especially a man with the capriciousness to upset the apple cart soon after having gutted the fruit shop. The sight of him looking exhausted after his unsuccessful political 

  rally in Oklahoma

   was telling.

  Two weeks ago, I would have said Trump would easily beat Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, but a fortnight is a long time in politics. Biden is an uninspiring, long-term politico who has shown few leadership skills. This election is Trump’s to lose.

  A scrapping Trump is a great campaigner, a victorious Trump vainglorious, but a losing Trump with his back to the wall is likely to intensify a stream of name-calling, backbiting, spiteful and divisive tweets which could turn voters against him.
  The explosive kiss-and-tell book by John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, went viral over the weekend as soon as a judge granted permission for it to be published, 

  against the wishes

   of the White House.

  It turns out White House meetings debating serious geopolitical issues, such as Iraq or Syria, are often derailed by Trump ranting about unrelated topics.

• 
  
• Bolton reports several impeachable offences, like discussing domestic political and legal interference in US affairs with foreign leaders. He claims 

  Trump buttered up

   President Xi Jinping about detaining Uygurs on terrorist offences because criticism or sanctions could have interfered with trade negotiations.

  Bolton served Ronald Reagan and two Bushes as well as Trump, and he appears genuinely shocked at the lack of administration within the administration.

  He points out the chilling fact that if 

  Trump is re-elected

  , he will not have the constraint of even trying to be popular and would run the country where his maverick, unpredictable and unreliable first thoughts would take him.

• Trump will disobey all the rules of politics in election season in terms of being a friend to everybody – he has offended many and is actively opposed by more. That is not a good place to be when you want to win the middle ground.

  The 

  enthusiasm is fading

   from Trump rallies. He is under attack from new quarters, and his inept handling of the coronavirus has exposed a businessman-politician, not a statesman.

  The US election will be critical to Hong Kong’s economy. Calm minds on both sides know China and the United States need each other because they are more economically linked than militarily opposed – unlike the Cold War.

• Will America choose a man who thrives on conflict and unpredictability, or will the man who has no visible original thoughts lead the country into a difficult decade? I’m guessing the American electorate will say it's time 

  for a change

  .

  Under a Biden presidency, there is likely to be a 

  thawing of relations

   as both sides try to make up and maybe resuscitate the phase one Sino-American trade deal. That is at least nine months away, so investors will have to wait.

  However, Trump’s legacy is that he broke the spell that bound Barack Obama from criticising China on trade matters. He has inspired a wide suspicion of China across the aisle, so trade talks may be more cordial but no easier.

  White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said on Monday that the phase one trade deal with China was “over”. The markets responded badly, with the Hong Kong and S&P 500 indices dipping immediately. Navarro soon retracted or clarified the statement and Trump 

  tweeted to confirm

  , “The China Trade Deal is fully intact”.

• Markets quickly recovered, but the volatility is a clear indicator of how they still fear the narrative on trade. It is still foremost in the minds of investors.

  Bolton’s revelation of the alleged conversation Trump had with Xi underlines how important the trade deal was to Trump. He is not going to prematurely write it off, even if the economic shutdowns have ironically favoured China’s balance of trade. 

  Trade is critical to Hong Kong’s economy, which is why 

  our special status

   with the US is so important. The early furore about the national security law has died down, and the initial limits to its use so far announced might stabilise the flow of negative news and stay the hand of the US in ending Hong Kong’s status.

  Our economic future remains in the hands of the superpowers, with a Biden presidency less likely to cause unwelcome fallout. On our part, Hong Kong needs to stay out of the news. Ill-judged arrests and trials ordered from Government House are an extra economic risk that we don’t need.