India's Worst Fear: Could Pakistan Sink Their Aircraft Carriers? Islamabad has a few options if both countries got into a major war. by Robert Beckhusen

 Both India and Pakistan are rivals and constantly prepare for war. But only India has an aircraft carrier.

A few years back, the Indian Navy put out a proposal for its third aircraft carrier, tentatively titled the Vishal due to enter service in the latter 2020s.

The 65,000-ton Vishal will be significantly larger than India’s sole current carrier, the Vikramaditya known formerly as the ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov.

To see why Vishal is a big deal for the Indian Navy, one needs only to look at her proposed air wing — some 57 fighters, more than Vikramaditya — 24 MiG-29Ks — and Vikrant‘s wing of around 30 MiG-29Ks. While below the 75+ aircraft aboard a U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford-class supercarrier, Vishal will be a proper full-size carrier and India’s first, as the preceding two are really small-deck carriers and limited in several significant ways.

The Indian Navy is also looking at an electromagnetic launch system for its third carrier, similar to the one aboard the Ford class. India’s first two carriers have STOBAR configurations, in which aircraft launch with the assistance of a ski-jump, which limits the maximum weight a plane can lift into the air. Typically this means that fighters must sacrifice weapons, or fuel thus limiting range, or a combination of both.

The Indian Navy is searching for a foreign-sourced twin-engine fighter for the Vishal, with the U.S. F/A-18 and French Rafale in the running, and India has already ordered 36 multi-role Rafales for its air force. This is a blow to advocates of an Indian-made fighter for the carrier such as naval version of the delta-wing HAL Tejas, which is too heavy for carrier work

But regardless of what kind of fighters Vishal uses, the question is whether India really needs a third carrier, which will cost billions of dollars over its lifetime. To be sure, a third and much larger carrier will free up the burden on the Vikramaditya and Vikrant, only one of which is likely to be battle-ready at any given time.

These smaller carriers probably have fewer operational fighters than they do on paper, given that the air wings likely have serviceability rates below 100 percent. Vikramaditya by itself could have significantly less than 24 MiGs capable of flying — and fighting.

Now imagine a scenario in which these carriers go to battle.

Most likely, India would attempt to enforce a blockade of Pakistan and use its carriers to strike land-based targets. But Pakistan has several means to attack Indian carriers — with near-undetectable submarines and anti-ship missiles — which must also operate relatively far from India itself in the western and northern Arabian Sea. China does not have a similar disadvantage, as the PLAN would likely keep its carriers close and within the “first island chain” including Taiwan, closer to shore where supporting aircraft and ground-based missile launchers can help out.

Thus, Indian carriers would be relatively vulnerable and only one of them will have aircraft capable of launching with standard ordnance and fuel. And that is after Vishal sets sail in the next decade.

To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver nearer to shore — and thereby closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them. And even with a third carrier, the threat of land-based Pakistani aircraft will force the Indian Navy to dedicate a large proportion of its own air wings to defense — perhaps half of its available fighters, according to 2017 paper by Ben Wan Beng Ho for the Naval War College Review.

“Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier would pack a significant punch,” Ho writes. “With aircraft available for strike duties barely numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a substantial ‘pulse’ of combat power against its adversary.”

Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three. Under the circumstances, India’s investment in carriers makes more sense symbolically, and primarily as a way of keeping shipyards busy and shipyard workers employed.

However, this is not to entirely rule out a carrier-centric naval strategy. Ho notes that Indian carriers could be useful when operating far out at sea and in the western Arabian Sea, effectively as escort ships for commercial shipping and to harass Pakistani trade. Nevertheless, this strategy comes with a similar set of problems.

“In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a blockade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier,” Ho added. “What is more, Pakistani ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier.”

Another possibility is India massing its carriers in the later stages of a war after the Army and Air Force pummel and degrade the Pakistani military.

But this raises the question as to whether India strictly needs carriers at all if it cannot use them during the decisive periods of a conflict — as opposed to, say, less-expensive warships, and more of them, equipped with long-range missiles.

Britain Wants A Hypersonic Stealth Fighter, But Could A Missile Do The Job? Britain’s new £10 million ($12.2 million) hypersonics program will be used to thrust Britain into the hypersonic race that is currently dominated by the U.S., Russia and China. by Michael Peck

Hypersonic engines won’t turn a Typhoon, F-15 or F-22 into a Mach 5 jet. Instead, hypersonic missiles will do the work. It’s the same approach that allows sixty-year-old B-52s to remain formidable weapons, by arming them with smart bombs. The platform remains the same, but the payload is updated as technology advances.

Can an F-35 be turned into a hypersonic aircraft?

News last month that Britain is boosting its hypersonic weapons program didn’t come as a surprise. Many other nations are doing it.

What caught everyone’s attention was that there are plans to rework the jet engines on the 1990s Eurofighter Typhoon—which propel the aircraft to Mach 2—into hypersonic engines that could achieve Mach 5 or faster.

Which naturally led to a question: can existing fourth- and fifth-generation fighters—which operate at speeds of around Mach 2 or less—become Mach 5 speed demons?

The technology in question is the Sabre engine from British firm Reaction Engines. Sabre aims to combine the advantages of both conventional jet engines with rocket engines. Ground tests have shown that demonstrated that the engine is capable of flying faster than Mach 3, according to Defense News.

“SABRE’s unique feature is a precooler which reduces the temperature of the incoming compressed air,” explains British defense site Forces.com. “This means the engine does not need to cope with extreme temperatures which requires special materials.”

“At high altitudes, it is a rocket, but, at lower altitudes, it works like a jet engine - sucking in and compressing air.”

One option that the RAF is considering for development of hypersonic engines is to add pre-cooler technology to the EJ-200 gas turbine engine that currently powers the Typhoon.

Alas, that isn’t the same as sticking a hypersonic engine on an older fighter.

“You shouldn’t read into that we are somehow going to achieve a hypersonic Typhoon,” said Air Chief Marshal Stephen Hillier.

There is more to developing a hypersonic aircraft than sticking a new engine in an old airframe. To turn a fourth- or fifth-generation aircraft, such as the F-16 or F-35, would invoke a variety of airframe, aerodynamic and avionics issues.

Instead, Britain’s new £10 million ($12.2 million) hypersonics program will be used to thrust Britain into the hypersonic race that is currently dominated by the U.S., Russia and China. For example, hypersonic research is expected to bear fruit in engine development for the Tempest, Britain’s planned sixth-generation fighter.

With 80 percent of Western fighters expected to be fourth-generation for the foreseeable future, hypersonic missiles are a way to keep older jets relevant. “We are working with some other people to see whether we can generate a Mach 5 capability in four years,” said Air Vice Marshal Simon Rochelle, chief of air staff capability. “There will be others pursuing higher and fast speeds … but much beyond that speed you start to change the chemical properties, the physical properties and metallic properties within the actual weapon system.”

“Part of the reason for rapidly developing high-speed weapons was to enable those aircraft to maintain their edge," Rochelle said. “There is a challenge and competition now going on at range, at speed, at pace and we have to mobilize ourselves to be ready to take that on.”

In other words, hypersonic engines won’t turn a Typhoon, F-15 or F-22 into a Mach 5 jet. Instead, hypersonic missiles will do the work. It’s the same approach that allows sixty-year-old B-52s to remain formidable weapons, by arming them with smart bombs. The platform remains the same, but the payload is updated as technology advances.

Why a Flying Aircraft Carrier Would Be So Hard to Build America has tried before and it isn't a good idea. by Peter Suciu

 It is so far impossible to keep such a heavy warship in the sky. It would also be very expensive.

Whether it is because of the Helicarrier from the "Marvel Universe" seen in such films as The Avengers, or the retro art deco-inspired mobile airstrip from Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow, sci-fi fans just can't seem to get enough of such flying aircraft carriers.

In theory, it probably seems like a perfect solution, a carrier that can fly over land and water and become a floating base in the sky. It is unlikely however that such a weapon platform would, or even could be constructed. Forgetting the fact that the scale of such a craft would likely bankrupt a small nation, it would require a construction facility to be purpose-built just to handle the project, and much of technology to keep it afloat remains well beyond reality.

However, the concept of a carrier in the sky has been something military thinkers have considered but in far less high tech ways than movie magic allows.

The U.S. Navy was actually the first to pioneer the concept of a flying carrier, and it began construction of two rigid airships, the USS Macon and the USS Akron, in the late 1920s. Neither of these airships had a runway, but instead, each carried five lightweight Curtiss F9C Sparrowhawk biplane fighters that could be launched and recovered through a hook system that lowered them into the airstream.

The airships had some advantages – these were twice as fast as surface ships of the era, could fly over land and could see much further over the horizon than any surface ship. But each also had some serious disadvantages, the biggest being that bad weather made the airships difficult to control and essentially grounded them. Tragically both airships suffered notable accidents – in April 1933, USS Akron crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New Jersey killing 73 out of 76 personnel on board; while two years later USS Macon suffered a less serious crash, which killed two of its 83 crew and passengers.

The United States Air Force considered a flying carrier concept during the Cold War, but it was far less ambitious and involved a Republic F-84 "parasite" fighter that could be launched from the belly of a B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bomber for reconnaissance operations. This was followed by a slightly more ambitious plan that would transform the interior of a Boeing 747-200 into a hanger in the sky for a dozen or so small jet fighters that could be launched and recovered. This one never went further than the planning stage. While the Flight Dynamics Laboratory claimed it was possible –how possible or practical remains the issue.

All of these concepts were seriously flawed and were really attempts to find a solution for a problem that didn't exist. To put it bluntly, there is no reason to develop a flying aircraft carrier because there simply is no need for a flying aircraft carrier. Long-range bombers can reach any point on the globe already, and a flying aircraft carrier would be a flying target.

Aircraft carriers on the water are protected by destroyers and submarines, and unless similar craft could be built to fly alongside this "mother ship" it couldn't be properly protected. Even with such screening aircraft, it isn't too hard to see how a missile or just a "kamikaze" could all too easily take out such a craft.

This doesn't mean the entire concept is flawed, however.

A more realistic solution might be one conceived by defense contractor Dynetics, with support from DARPA. It involved launching an X-61A Gremlin Air Vehicle – an unmanned drone – from a C-130 that could be used in a variety of missions including reconnaissance but it isn't too hard to see how it could be utilized in a combat role as well.

The ability to launch and recover a drone at least offers the very practical ability to send a drone to regions not otherwise readily accessible. But for now, the flying aircraft carrier is best left in comic books and the movies.

America's Worst Nightmare: Russia and China Are Catching Up Militarily The U.S. Army is less prepared for a great power struggle than you think. by Daniel L. Davis

The U.S. Army's reorientation toward counterinsurgency since 2003 has resulted in a significant deterioration in conventional fighting skills.

On February 7, Vice Chief of Staff for the Army Gen. Daniel Allyn stated that only three of fifty-eight combat brigades in the U.S. Army were sufficiently trained for wartime deployment, blaming the condition on sequestration. It is not the lack of money, however, that is behind the army’s inability to maintain ready forces. Rather, it is the obsolete force structure the army has maintained since World War II. Fortunately, modern thinking and a new organization for the army could reverse this trend—without requiring an increase in the budget.

Just four years earlier, then Army chief of staff Gen. Ray Odierno claimed that the United States only had two trained army brigades, also blaming the lack of readiness on sequestration. The army is by no means under a cash crunch with an annual budget of $148 billion.

It is more, by itself, than the entire defense budgets for Russia, Germany and Japan combined. Sequestration is not what is making the U.S. Army inadequately ready. It is how the money is spent and the way the service is organized that makes the difference. Russia and China have both recognized the changing nature of war and have abandoned the formations born during World War II. Their armies have materially improved as a result.

Beginning in 2010, Russia’s ground forces began eliminating the division structure it had used since the battle of Stalingrad in favor of smaller, more lethal combined arms formations. An analysis of Russia’s reformation in the U.S. Army’s Infantry magazine last year warned that “in Eastern Europe, Russia has been employing an emergent version of hybrid warfare that is highly integrated, synchronized, and devastatingly effective.”

The new Russian battalions “are characterized as highly integrated, extremely powerful, and exceptionally mobile,” the authors explained, noting they were composed of “of a tank company, three mechanized infantry companies, an anti-tank company, two to three batteries of artillery (self-propelled guns and multiple launch rocket), and two air defense batteries.” Chinese ground forces, likewise, have reformed their formations and upgraded their warfighting doctrine.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces began reorganizing their main fighting formations more than a decade ago to take advantage of advances in the technology of war. They moved away from masses of infantry troops to armored, mobile all-arms formations. Like the Russians, they are mostly eliminating the division structure in preference for smaller, more lethal and survivable brigade combat groups. The Department of Defense (DoD) soberly recognizes these trends and their potential implications.

Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. ground forces still retained a robust conventional training focus and had a clear ground advantage over Russia and China. In the years since, however, a reorientation on becoming masters of counterinsurgency tactics has resulted in a significant deterioration in conventional fighting skills. More importantly, the United States lost a decade when it could have modernized, reorganized, and improved the army. The advantage America once had over Russia and China has been eroded. If changes are not made, the U.S. Army could soon fall behind them. Fortunately, there is help on the horizon.

In 2015, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established The National Commission on the Future of the Army and charged them by 2016 to make an assessment of the size and force structure of the future army. One of its key recommendations was that “Congress should require the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to oversee the modeling of alternative Army design and operational concepts—including the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG).” The RSG is an element of a larger army-wide transformation model designed by retired U.S. Army Col. Douglas Macgregor.

The RSG is a six-thousand-person all-arms, all-effects battle group that is “designed to lead change by exploiting new, but proven technologies in a joint, integrated operational context,” according to Macgregor’s online briefing. The Senate Armed Services Committee adopted the recommendation of the Army Commission and the 2017 NDAA ordered the creation of an RSG Office to model and assess the effectiveness of the new construct.

The RSG is organized within a comprehensive operational construct that synthesizes maneuver, strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities. Unlike current army formations, the RSG is a self-contained organization that is an all-arms, mobile armored combat formation commanded by a one-star general that has substantial striking power and greater survivability than current force units.

The Russian and Chinese have already begun moving to this type of reformation. The RSG, manned and led by highly trained American soldiers, has the potential to reestablish the U.S. Army as the world’s unchallenged land power.

It is far from certain that sequestration will be lifted any time soon and in any case, it doesn’t appear that the army will get anywhere near as much of a budget boost as it wants. If the United States wants more than two or three of its fighting brigades combat ready on a consistent basis, it's time to give the RSG and larger army reform serious attention.

Will Russia Weaponize Its Wheat As the World Combats the Coronavirus? The coronavirus has revealed how risky it can be to rely on Russia for grain imports. But even more worrisome than Russia limiting exports in times of crisis is the possibility that Russia could limit exports for political leverage. by Sherri Goodman and Clara Summers

As the world remains in the throes of the pandemic, our next global crisis is looming. Just a few weeks ago, Siberia experienced 100° Fahrenheit weather for the first time in recorded history. The rapid warming caused permafrost to melt, damaging building infrastructure and even contributing to an oil spill. Despite the apocalyptic weather in Siberia, the Russian state largely views climate change as a boon. The government has announced that it plans to use the benefits of climate change, particularly in the agricultural sector. These so-called benefits are one-sided, as they will give Russia another potential weapon in its hybrid warfare arsenal: wheat.

Russia is one of the very few countries that are likely to see an increase in arable land—in previously frozen places like Siberia—under most climate change scenarios. Scientific projections show that warming may expand Russia’s wheat-suitable land by 4.3 million km² in its boreal regions. Though wheat only makes up for 2.3 percent of Russia’s total exports, that constitutes a major proportion of the global wheat export market. Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter and is expected to control 20 percent of grain export markets by 2028. Climate change is likely to make Russia an even greater global grain power.

Russian control of such a large portion of the global grain market is not a recipe for food supply stability. While climate change may expand Russia’s arable land, it is not immune to extreme weather. Melting permafrost has made the country more susceptible to wildfires, and drought will likely become more frequent and severe. Climate change will impact food security domestically, but because of Russia’s increasing role as a global grain power, the international impacts will be more acute. With climate change, other countries may rely more on imports from Russia, which will make them all the more vulnerable when Russia experiences its own climate impacts and restricts exports. Playing Russian Roulette—pun intended—with grain supplies will be increasingly perilous for other countries as the climate warms. 

The coronavirus has revealed how risky it can be to rely on Russia for grain imports. Despite warnings from the WHO and WTO, Russia imposed an export quota on critical grains such as wheat, barley, and maize as the virus swept across the globe. Russia’s move caused other countries to scramble to shore up their grain reserves, adding another burden on governments already stressed by the pandemic. The quota had the greatest impact on Russia’s top importers: Turkey, Egypt, and Bangladesh, all three of which are strategically important and fragile states in their regions. Fortunately, the quota expired this month and has not been renewed.

This is not the first time that Russia has restricted food exports, and the results of these restrictions can be destabilizing. In 2010, Russia restricted its grain exports in the face of drought. This triggered high food prices worldwide, which scholars have linked to the onset of the Arab Spring uprisings. It is understandable and appropriate that domestic food security is the Russian government’s priority. However, even when domestic food security is not threatened, the Kremlin has responded to crises by limiting exports. Russia still had significant grain reserves when it imposed an export quota in 2010, and the same is true today.

Even more worrisome than Russia limiting exports in times of crisis is the possibility that Russia could limit exports for political leverage. Russia could weaponize its wheat exports to coerce other countries whose climate-induced food insecurities leave them few options. Russia has proved itself adept at hybrid warfare and has used its other resources—like fossil fuels—as weapons. Given Russia’s creative use of resource power, its role in global wheat markets is concerning. Whether for domestic food security or international hybrid warfare, Russia’s behavior in 2010 and now during the coronavirus foreshadows new dangers in a warming world.

Aggressively addressing the threat of climate change has become even more paramount as this threat from Russia looms, and policymakers face a crossroads. The first option is a post-coronavirus return to normalcy without reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Still, even that “normal” will be increasingly punctuated by climate impacts, whether they are desertification, hurricanes, extreme drought, or even another pandemic triggered by melting permafrost. All of these disasters would have cascading effects on food security. In an increasingly unstable world, Russia is likely to have more situations in which they feel threatened and curb grain exports.

The second approach to climate change is to focus on the vulnerabilities the pandemic has uncovered. Instead of emerging from the pandemic with a “business as usual” approach, governments can stimulate the economy by speeding the transition to cleaner energy. Policymakers can be proactive about food security. Countries can examine their food imports to consider the climate adaptability and geopolitical aims of the exporting country, modifying their import portfolios accordingly. The pandemic has helped expose the problem of food waste; by innovating new ways to redirect food, countries can reduce their reliance on imports.

Now is the time for governments to increase participation in international institutions. More international coordination will help us address the pandemic, just as it will help us face the climate crisis and resulting in food insecurity. Already, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have coordinated to support supply chains during the coronavirus. This model can be expanded further by tasking an international organization to host backup grain reserves. If an international organization manages a grain stockpile, then it can release supplies to countries in need the next time Russia limits exports—for pandemic, climate, or geopolitical reasons.

In every crisis, there is opportunity. The question now is who will seize that opportunity: Russia or allied nations? The global devastation wrought by the coronavirus is a precursor to the climate crisis. The next ten years are the last chance we have to reach the (modest) Paris Agreement goals. Global leaders should turn this public health and economic crisis into an opportunity to seriously address the climate crisis. Mitigation is required, but so is adaptation and the responsibility to prepare for the warming we are already experiencing. Adaptation and resilience require an innovative and proactive approach to food security. Russia has revealed that it will not be a reliable source of grain the next time it suffers a pandemic or extreme weather. We ignore this lesson at our peril.

America Has Created a “China-Iran Collaboration” Monster Beijing and Tehran could use the prospects of deeper bilateral cooperation to generate leverage with foreign leaders—leaving Washington out in the cold. by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders

News that China and Iran are nearing a twenty-five-year cooperation agreement has sparked concern about a growing alignment between two U.S. rivals. New York Times reporters Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers disclosed details on the purported agreement claimed that it would “extend China’s influence in the Middle East, throwing Iran an economic lifeline and creating new flashpoints with the United States.” Those concerns seem overstated. The leaked text is apparently long on vision statements and short on actual commitments by either side. Both countries remain deeply wary about over-reliance on the other and have incentives to maximize their flexibility. Nevertheless, while the threat of a Sino-Iranian axis remains low, closer cooperation could still result in a stronger Iranian military and greater Chinese military and intelligence presence in the region. Those challenges, which are alluded to but not specified in the reported agreement, constitute the more difficult problems that will need to be addressed in the next few years.     

In January 2016, the two countries agreed to pursue a twenty-five-year “comprehensive cooperation agreement” as part of their new “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The eighteen-page leaked document indicates that the two sides are nearing completion on such an agreement—neither side has disputed its authenticity—although the final version could differ. The agreement anticipates that the two sides will continue or expand cooperation in six major areas, including Chinese investments and purchase of Iranian oil and natural gas, infrastructure (including Chinese assistance developing the Chabahar and Bandar-e-abbas ports), technology (including 5G and artificial intelligence), banking and trade, defense (focusing on counter-terrorism), and coordination in multilateral institutions.  

There are good reasons why China and Iran would want to cooperate in these areas. The two economies are complementary: China is the world’s largest oil importer and Iran is looking for purchasers willing to defy U.S. sanctions; Iran needs modernized infrastructure in areas such as rail and 5G networks, where Chinese firms have strengths. Beijing has also identified Iran as a link along the Belt and Road Initiative, connecting Xinjiang with the Middle East. Strategically, both states are motivated by a common perception of Washington as an adversary and concerns about U.S. military interventionism. Iran seeks Chinese weapons and expertise to expand its military influence in the region, while China is looking to cultivate Iran as a lucrative arms market and a strategic bulwark that ties up U.S. forces outside of Asia.   

Cooperation was previously constrained by China’s opposition to Iran’s illicit uranium enrichment program and desire to avoid dealing directly with a pariah state, but the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which imposed constraints on Iran’s nuclear program reduced both concerns. Only a week after that deal went into effect, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Tehran and signed the “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Since then, the two countries have built relations in multiple areas. This includes Chinese financing for Iranian rail projects, China’s emergence as Iran’s largest oil purchaser, and meetings between high-level officials. Military ties, which flourished in the 1980s when China became Iran’s largest arms supplier, have also started to re-emerge. In December 2019, Chinese, Iranian, and Russian naval ships carried out a drill in the Gulf of Oman, highlighting what some analysts described as a strategic alignment between the three countries.  

The leaked agreement appears to summarize this pre-existing cooperation and offers broad brush strokes for how the partnership could evolve in the future. Nevertheless, the details—or lack thereof—in the agreement suggest the limits of the partnership. Iranian analysts who have scoured the Farsi text report that it contains no precise investment or trade targets. China did not commit to purchase a specific amount of oil, but would “become a regular importer.” There is no mention of previous Iranian claims that China would invest up to $400 billion in return for steep discounts in Iranian oil. Rumors that China would base up to five thousand troops to protect those investments, or that Iran would sell China the strategically located Kish Island, are not supported by the text.  

Both sides have reasons to keep agreements as vague as possible. China has long tried to balance Sino-Iranian relations with its competing interests in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia remains a far more important oil supplier for China ($40 billion in sales versus $7 billion in 2019). While the purported Iran deal has made headlines, Beijing has been working simultaneously to enhance its “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Riyadh and the UAE, in addition to “strategic partnerships” with Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. The Gulf states have also been important diplomatic partners for China, taking common positions on issues ranging from Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing would have little appetite to antagonize those countries by upgrading ties with Iran at their expense.  

The U.S. factor also influences China’s calculations. During the 1990s, U.S. pressure led China to curtail nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation with Iran. U.S. leverage today is weaker but the threat of sanctions still discourages trade and investments by China’s major state-owned and private enterprises. Those constraints increased with the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and heightened U.S. sanctions (although Washington lifted sanctions against one Chinese firm to make progress on a bilateral trade deal). The effects have been significant. Even before the coronavirus weakened demand, Chinese oil purchases in mid-2019 were down 60 percent from the previous year and a Chinese firm pulled out of a $5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field. Beijing wants access to Iranian oil and markets but is not prepared to make commitments that might completely cut off its access to the much larger U.S. economy.  

Iran has its own reasons to hedge. While Iran’s supreme leader has signaled his support for the agreement, virtually guaranteeing its approval in the parliament, many remain skeptical about its potential benefits. One concern relates to the history of failed business deals between the two countries: as one parliamentarian noted on Twitter that, “Somebody should ask the other party to our 25-year pact why doesn't it pay its debts to us?" As in many other countries, some are also wary of falling into a Chinese debt trap. Those fears are exacerbated by rumors, apparently circulated by Iranian opposition figures, which suggest that Iranian territory could be sold to China. Iran’s leadership thus has incentives to keep commitments to China ambiguous. 

None of this, however, implies that Washington should dismiss the twenty-five-year agreement as empty rhetoric. Ambiguity can have benefits: both Beijing and Tehran can leverage the prospects of deeper bilateral cooperation to generate leverage with foreign leaders. With a future U.S. administration more open to negotiations, Iran could signal that it will avoid granting China base access or intelligence cooperation in return for sanctions relief. Just as Beijing curtailed military cooperation with Iran to improve ties with Washington in the 1990s, China could promise to “exercise restraint” in implementing a new accord with Iran if progress can be made in protecting Chinese interests on other issues.  

Regardless of what appears on paper, several aspects of Sino-Iranian cooperation could pose problems for the United States. First, are the continued illicit Chinese oil transfers (some of which reportedly involve ships turning off their transponders to avoid detection), which provide cash for Tehran. Second is Chinese investments in strategic ports. Iran’s welcoming of China to contribute to the development of Chabahar, and recent tensions that call India’s privileged status on that project into question could reduce New Delhi’s ability to serve as a regional counterweight and portend a larger Chinese naval presence in the region. Third, although China is unlikely to condone a full resumption of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it could supply advanced conventional weapons to Iran once United Nations restrictions expire in October, following in Russia’s footsteps.  

The United States will have to employ carrots and sticks to curtail Sino-Iranian cooperation in the areas it cares about most. But an effective U.S. strategy should start with a clear understanding of the inherent limits of the partnership. Mutual wariness and differing interests, as reflected in the lack of firm commitments in the leaked agreement, should reduce U.S. fears of a lasting strategic alignment and help undercut any attempts to use expanded cooperation as leverage.  

Taiwan's Missiles Should Make China Think Twice About Invading Although Taiwan would be unlikely to win a major conflict with China, it plays a defensive game. by Caleb Larson

Taiwan’s objective is not to ensure victory against China, but to ensure that the cost of winning will be so great that a conflict never takes place. Taiwan’s missile collection has, at least thus far, achieved just that.

The key to Taiwan’s deterrent strategy is it’s missile program, as Taiwan lives on China’s doorstep. China is Taiwan’s number one security concern. Taiwan walks a fine line between keeping tensions with China low, while ensuring security via a credible weapons capability.

Historically, this has meant Taiwan’s missiles tend to be more defensive in nature, though more recent missile innovations can strike deeper into mainland China with more precision than their predecessor missiles.

Hsiung Feng III

The Hsiung Feng III is the latest of the Hsiung Feng missile family and was initially developed in 1994 as Taipei’s answer to growing militancy and technological ability from Chinese warships.

Hsiung Feng III is supersonic, and uses solid-fuel propellant as a booster, and liquid fuel to power a ramjet when flying supersonically. As it was originally conceived of as an anti-ship missile, it’s range is rather limited and is estimated to be in the 120 to 150 kilometer range, or about 75 to 90 miles.

Taiwan is not a nuclear power, hence the Hsiung Feng III’s conventional high explosive or armor-piercing warhead.

The Hsiung Feng III’s detonation device is rather unique, and uses a “smart fuse designed to direct most of the explosive energy downward once it has detected that the missile is inside the target ship’s hull, maximizing damage.”

Hsiung Feng IIE

Despite the similarity in name with the Hsiung Feng family, the Hsiung Feng IIE is an entirely different type of missile. According to missile experts, the Hsiung Feng IIE has a range of 600 kilometers, or about 375 miles, and is “the only one of Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng cruise missile variants specifically designed for land-attack missions.”

The Hsiung Feng IIE has a solid-fuel booster, and a liquid-fuel turbojet. It reportedly has an accuracy of 15 meters CEP—that is to say, 50 percent of missiles fired would be 15 meters or closer to the target point (around 50 feet). It carries a semi-armor-piercing high explosive or fragmentation warhead.

Because of the novel land-attack ability, the Hsiung Feng IIE development may have harmed a deal with Washington to buy 66 F-16C/Ds Taiwan had wanted to purchase.

Yun Feng

The Yun Feng missile is currently under development and unlike most of Taiwan's missile assets, it was designed from inception to strike land-based targets well inside mainland China. Unfortunately little is known publicly about the missile.

Like the Hsiung Feng IIE, the Sun Feng is believed to have a semi-armor-piercing high-explosive or fragmentation warhead and will likely have a 1,200 to 2,000 kilometer range (around 745 to 1,200 miles).

Deterring Real Estate

Although Taiwan would be unlikely to win a major conflict with China, it plays a defensive game. Taiwan’s objective is not to ensure victory against China, but to ensure that the cost of winning will be so great that a conflict never takes place. Taiwan’s missile collection has, at least thus far, achieved just that.

Why The Navy Wanted (And Then Gave Up On) Nuclear-Armed Aircraft Carriers A crazy idea. by Sebastien Roblin

Though theoretically capable of contributing to conventional strike and sea control missions, the heavy bomber-equipped CVA-58 was clearly an attempt by the Navy to duplicate the Air Force’s strategic nuclear strike capabilities. This put giant crosshairs on the program during an era of sharp defense cuts.

In the wake of the mushroom clouds that blossomed over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it swiftly dawned on political and military leaders across the globe that warfare between superpowers would never again be the same. But what exactly were the implications of nuclear weapons when it came to planning military force structure?

In the United States, it was assumed that nuclear weapons would be widely employed in future conflicts, rendering conventional land armies and fleets at sea irrelevant. The newly formed Air Force particularly argued that carrier task forces and armored divisions were practically obsolete when (ostensibly) just a few air-dropped nuclear bombs could annihilate them in one fell swoop.

The Air Force touted it soon-to-be operational fleet of ten-thousand-mile-range B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bombers as the only vital war-winning weapon of the nuclear age. This logic resonated conveniently with the postwar political program mandating sharp cuts to U.S. defense spending and force structure—which the Air Force naturally argued should fall upon the Army and Navy.

The Army responded by devising “Pentomic Divisions” organized for nuclear battlefields, with weapons ranging from nuclear-armed howitzers and rocket artillery to bazooka-like Davy Crockett recoilless guns. The Navy, meanwhile, sought to find a way to integrate nuclear bombs into its carrier air wings. However, early nuclear bombs were simply too heavy for World War II-era carrier-based aircraft.

In 1945, the Navy began commissioning three larger forty-five-thousand-ton Midway-class carriers which incorporated armored flight decks for added survivability. The decks were swiftly modified to angular, effectively lengthened configuration for jet operations. Neptune P2V-C3 maritime patrol planes converted into nuclear bombers could take off from Midway-class carriers using rocket-pods but would have no way landing on the carrier deck.

Therefore, the Navy decided it needed huge supercarriers from which it could operate its own fifty-ton strategic bombers. These would displace over 40 percent more than the Midway at sixty-eight thousand tons, and measure 12 percent longer at 330-meters. In July 1948, Defense Secretary James Forrestal approved plans for five such carriers, the first named USS United States with hull number CVA-58.

The naval heavy bombers (which didn’t exist yet) were expected to have such wide wings that naval architects decided that CVA-58 would have a completely flush deck without the standard “island” superstructure carrying a radar and flight control tower. Instead, the carrier would feature side-mounted telescoping smokestacks that could be raised should smoke impeded flight operations, and a similarly retractable wheelhouse that could be extended to observe navigation and flight operations.

The ship’s air wings would include twelve to eighteen heavy bombers that would mostly remain parked on the flight deck, exposed to the elements. Four side-mounted elevators would ferry forty to fifty-four jet fighters between the hangar and flight deck to escort the bombers. Eight nuclear bombs per heavy bomber would also be stowed in the hangar. The combined ship’s company and airwing would total 5,500 personnel.

The carrier’s oddly-shaped deck included four steam catapults—two for use by bombers, and two axial “waist” catapults.

Because the ship would be effectively blind without an elevated radar and control tower, a separate cruiser was intended to serve as the carrier’s “eyes.” Nonetheless, CVA-58 still incorporated eight 5-inch guns for air defense, and dozens of rapid-fire short-range cannons.

The “Revolt of the Admirals”

Though theoretically capable of contributing to conventional strike and sea control missions, the heavy bomber-equipped CVA-58 was clearly an attempt by the Navy to duplicate the Air Force’s strategic nuclear strike capabilities.

This put giant crosshairs on the program during an era of sharp defense cuts. After all, deploying strategic bombers at sea was many times more expensive than basing them on land.

Following his reelection in November 1948, President Harry Truman replaced Forrestal—a naval aviator in World War I, and former secretary of the Navy—with Louis Johnson, who had fewer qualms about enforcing defense spending cuts.

In April 1949, just five days after CVA-58’s fifteen-ton keel was laid down in Newport News, Virginia, Johnson canceled the mega-carrier. He also began advocating dissolution of the Marine Corps, starting by transferring its aviation assets to the Air Force.

This upset the Navy bigwigs so much that Navy Secretary John Sullivan resigned, and numerous admirals began openly opposing the termination of a project they viewed as essential to validating their branch’s existence in the nuclear age.

This “Revolt of the Admirals” developed into a crisis in civil-military relations, as the Navy’s top brass defied the authority of their civilian commander-in-chief and resorted to covert methods in an attempt to influence public opinion. The Op-23 naval intelligence unit formed by Adm. Louis Denfeld secretly circulated a memo called the Worth Paper alleging that Johnson had corrupt motivations due to being a former director of Convair, manufacturer of B-36 bombers, which were also claimed to be deficient.

The bitter inter-service rivalry, and the utility of land-based bombers versus carriers, was publicly litigated in congressional hearings. The Army also piled on against the Navy, and public opinion turned against the sea-warfare branch as Op-23’s activities were revealed.

As Gen. Douglas MacArthur would later discover, Truman had no qualms about squashing military leaders that questioned his authority. His new secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, torpedoed the career of several admirals that spoke against the CVA-58’s termination despite an earlier promise that those testifying before Congress would be spared retaliation.

The irony of this tempest in a teacup, which resulted in the political martyrdom of many senior Navy leaders, was how misguided both sides swiftly proved to be.

In June 1950 the Korean War broke out, and the U.S. found itself desperately short of the necessary conventional land, air and sea forces. U.S. aircraft carriers and their onboard jet fighters soon bore the brunt of the initial fighting, and continued to play a major role until the end of the conflict.

And the Air Force’s vaunted B-36s? They never dropped a single bomb in anger—fortunately, as they were only intended for use in apocalyptic nuclear conflicts.

It turned out that plenty of wars were liable to be fought without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.

However, the Navy also had cause to count itself fortunate that the CVA-58 had been canceled. That’s because in just a few years the size of tactical nuclear weapons rapidly decreased, while high-thrust jet engines enabled hauling of heavier and heavier loads. By 1950, nuclear-capable AJ-1 Savage hybrid jet/turboprop bombers were operational on Midway-class carriers, starting with the USS Franklin Roosevelt.

These were soon followed by nuclear-capable capable A-3 Sky Warrior and A-5 Vigilante bombers, A-6 and A-7 attack planes, and even multirole fighters like the F-4 Phantom II. Carriers with these aircraft were far more flexible than a CVA-58 full of B-36 wannabees ever could have been. Arguably, by the 1960s the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines would amount to scarier strategic nuclear weapons than any aircraft-based delivery system.

The schematics for CVA-58 nonetheless informed the Navy’s first supercarriers, named rather appropriately the Forrestal-class, laid down during the Korean War. But the heavy-bomber carrying United States remains notable as the supercarrier the Navy absolutely thought it needed—but which with literally just a couple years more hindsight it discovered it truly could do without.