The Clock Is Ticking: China's H-20 Stealth Bomber Is Coming If the H-20 does have the range and passable stealth characteristics attributed to it, it could alter the strategic calculus between the United States and China by exposing U.S. bases and fleets across the Pacific to surprise air attacks. by Sebastien Roblin

The crescendo of publicity surrounding the H-20 indicates the PLAAF believes the plane will soon be ready enough to show to the public—and international audiences. Once revealed, analysts will pour over the aircraft’s geometry to estimate just how the stealthy it really is, looking for radar-reflective Achilles’ heels such as exposed engine inlets and indiscrete tail stabilizers.

In October 2018, Chinese media announced that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would publicly unveil its new H-20 stealth bomber during a parade celebrating the air arm’s seventieth anniversary in 2019.

Prior news of the H-20’s development had been teased using techniques pioneered by viral marketing campaigns for Hollywood movies. For example, the Xi’an Aviation Industrial Corporation released a promotional video in May 2018 pointedly imitating Northrop Grumman’s own Superbowl ad for the B-21 stealth bomber, portraying a shrouded flying wing bomber in its final seconds. Later, the silhouette of a possible new bomber appeared at a PLAAF gala. This comes only two years after PLAAF Gen. Ma Xiaotian formally revealed the Hong-20’s existence.

If the H-20 does have the range and passable stealth characteristics attributed to it, it could alter the strategic calculus between the United States and China by exposing U.S. bases and fleets across the Pacific to surprise air attacks.

Only three countries have both the imperative and the resources to develop huge strategic bombers that can strike targets across the globe: the United States, Russia and China. Strategic bombers make sense for China because Beijing perceives dominance of the western half of the Pacific Ocean as essential for its security due to its history of maritime invasion, and the challenge posed by the United States in particular. The two superpowers are separated by five to six thousand miles of ocean—and the United States has spent the last century developing a network of island territories such as Guam, foreign military bases in East Asia and super-carriers with which it can project air and sea power across that span.

Xi’an Aviation, the H-20’s manufacturer, also builds China’s H-6 strategic jet bombers, a knockoff the 1950s-era Soviet Tu-16 Badger which has recently been upgraded with modern avionics, aerial refueling capability and cruise missiles in the later H-6K and H-6J models. Beijing could easily have produced a successor in a similar vein, basically a giant four-engine airliner-sized cargo plane loaded with fuel and long-range missiles that’s never intended to get close enough for adversaries to shoot back.

Alternately, analyst Andreas Rupprecht reported that China considered developing a late-Cold War style supersonic bomber akin to the U.S. B-1 or Russian Tu-160 called the JH-XX. This would have lugged huge bomb loads at high speed and low altitude, while exhibiting partial stealth characteristics for a marginal improvement in survivability. However, such an approach was already considered excessively vulnerable to modern fighters and air defense by the late twentieth century. A Chinese magazine cover sported a concept image of the JH-XX in 2013, but the project appears to have been set aside for now.

Instead, in the PLAAF elected to pursue a more ambitious approach: a slower but far stealthier flying wing like the U.S. B-2 and forthcoming B-21 Raider. A particular advantage of large flying wings is they are less susceptible to detection by low-bandwidth radar, such as those on the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye radar planes, which are effective at detecting the approach of smaller stealth fighters.

While China’s development of stealth aircraft technology in the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighter was an obvious prerequisite for the H-20 project, so apparently was Xi’an’s development of the hulking Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ cargo plane, which established the company’s capability to build large, long-range aircraft using modern computer-aided design and manufacturing techniques—precision technology essential for mass producing the exterior surfaces of stealth aircraft.

According to a study by Rick Joe at The Diplomat, Chinese publications began speculating about the H-20 in the early 2010s. Postulated characteristics include four non-afterburning WS-10A Taihang turbofans sunk into the top of the wing surface with S-shaped saw-toothed inlets for stealth. It’s worth noting that the WS-10 has been plagued by major problems, but that hasn’t stopped China from manufacturing fighters using WS-10s, with predictably troubled results.

The new strategic bomber is expected to have a maximum un-refueled combat radius exceeding 5,000 miles and payload between the H-6’s ten tons and the B-2’s twenty-three tons. This is because the H-20 is reportedly designed to strike targets beyond the “second island ring” (which includes U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Philippines, etc.) from bases on mainland China. The third island chain extends to Hawaii and coastal Australia.

In a U.S.-China conflict, the best method for neutralizing U.S. air power would be to destroy it on the ground (or carrier deck), especially in the opening hours of a war. While ballistic missiles and H-6 bombers can already contribute to this with long-range missiles, these are susceptible to detection and interception given adequate forewarning. A stealth bomber could approach much closer to carrier task forces and air bases before releasing its weapons, giving defenses too little time to react. An initial strike might in fact focus on air defense radars, “opening the breach” for a follow up wave of less stealthy attacks.

The H-20 will also likely be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, finally giving China a full triad of nuclear-capable submarines, ballistic missiles and bombers. Though the H-6 was China’s original nuclear bomber, these are no longer configured for nuclear strike, though that could change if air-launched nuclear-tipped cruise or ballistic missile are devised. Beijing is nervous that the United States’ limited ballistic missile defense capabilities might eventually become adequate for countering China’s small ICBM and SLBM arsenal. The addition of a stealth bomber would contribute to China’s nuclear deterrence by adding a new, difficult-to-stop vector of nuclear attack that the U.S. defenses aren’t designed to protect against.

Some Chinese publications also argue that the H-20 will do double-duty as a networked reconnaissance and command & control platform similar to U.S. F-35 stealth fighters. This would make sense, as China has developed a diverse arsenal of long-range air-, ground- and sea-launched missiles, but doesn’t necessarily have a robust reconnaissance network to form a kill-chain cueing these missiles to distant targets. Theoretically, an H-20 could rove ahead, spying the position of opposing sea-based assets using a low-probability-of-intercept AESA radar, and fuse that information to a firing platform hundreds or even thousands of miles away. The H-20 could also be used for electronic warfare or to deploy specialized directed energy.

The crescendo of publicity surrounding the H-20 indicates the PLAAF believes the plane will soon be ready enough to show to the public—and international audiences. Once revealed, analysts will pour over the aircraft’s geometry to estimate just how the stealthy it really is, looking for radar-reflective Achilles’ heels such as exposed engine inlets and indiscrete tail stabilizers. However, external analysis cannot provide a full assessment, because the quality of the radar-absorbent materials applied to surfaces, and the finesse of the manufacturing (avoiding seams, protruding screws, etc.) has a major impact on radar cross-section.

It is worth bearing in mind, however, that an H-20 seeking to slip through the gauntlet of long-range search radars scattered across the Pacific to launch CJ-10K cruise missiles with a range of over nine hundred miles would not require the same degree of stealth as an F-35 intended to penetrate more densely defended airspace and launch small diameter bombs with a range of 70 miles.

Analysts forecast the H-20’s first flight in the early 2020s, with production possibly beginning around 2025. If the H-20 is judged to be of credible design, the Pentagon in turn will have to factor the strategic implications of China’s stealth capabilities, and will likely seek to field implement counter-stealth technologies which formerly have been mostly vaunted by Russia and China. The publicity which the often-secretive Chinese government is according the H-20 also indicates Beijing’s hope the bomber will serve as a strategic deterrent to foreign adversaries—even before its first flight.

A Technology Trade War With China Could Be a Disaster Technology decoupling will inspire a cold‐​war style competition between the United States and China. by Daniel J. Ikenson and Huan Zhu

In a post last month, we raised concerns about the unforeseen and underappreciated costs of expanding export controls on U.S. technology. Either those concerns fell on deaf ears or the administration did its due diligence and determined that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs because—earlier this week—the Commerce Department published new rules further restricting Huawei’s access to U.S. technology.

U.S. exports to Huawei have been tightly controlled since Huawei and its affiliates were placed on the Entity List in 2019 for national security reasons. However, because of the design of U.S. export regulations and the nature of technology supply chains, Huawei and its affiliates were still able to import semiconductors from foreign producers that use U.S. chipmaking equipment and software. The new rules are intended to close this loophole and completely cut off Huawei from U.S. technology.

Explaining the purpose of those new rules, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross—betraying naïve expectations that Huawei would have just thrown in the towel and shut down its operations after last year’s U.S. sanctions—offered:

Despite the Entity List actions the Department took last year, Huawei and its foreign affiliates have stepped‐​up efforts to undermine these national security‐​based restrictions through an indigenization effort. However, that effort is still dependent on U.S. technologies. This is not how a responsible global corporate citizen behaves. We must amend our rules exploited by Huawei and HiSilicon and prevent U.S. technologies from enabling malign activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

Although we have been skeptical from the start that this is the right way to proceed with China, the die most definitely has been cast and the technology trade war is moving ahead at full speed. Of course, the U.S. government (many in the Trump administration and many in the Congress) has its reasons (some factual; some presumptive; some political) for this course of action. So, instead of rehashing concerns already raised, we offer (in convenient bullet point fashion) the most relevant facts and assumptions culminating in the current policy, as well as the expected benefits and likely costs of that policy. Unfortunately, the list of likely costs is long.

Facts

• The U.S. government sees the Chinese government as a bad actor.
• The U.S. government sees Huawei as an adjunct of the Chinese government.
• The U.S. government sees Huawei as the leader in 5G technology.
• The U.S. government sees Huawei’s leadership in 5G technology as a threat to U.S. national security.
• The U.S. government sees a vulnerability to Huawei’s 5G leadership in Huawei’s dependence on U.S. semiconductors and semiconductor technology.
• The U.S. government seeks to exploit that vulnerability by depriving Huawei of the technology it needs to continue to dominate 5G.

Assumptions

• Targeting Huawei with export controls and entity list restrictions to deprive it of needed inputs will slow or stop Huawei’s progress.
• U.S. sanctions on Huawei from the supply side will compliment U.S. efforts to compel other governments to forego purchasing Huawei gear on the demand side.
• Slowing or stopping Huawei’s progress will enhance U.S. national security.
• U.S. national security will be enhanced because U.S. or U.S.-backed 5G companies will emerge and fill the void as standard‐​setters and dominant suppliers of 5G network gear and consumer products.
• Leadership in 5G begets leadership in the next generation of communications technology and other technologies; followership consigns to more followership.
• The expected benefits of the U.S. government’s approach outweigh its expected costs.

Benefits (if the assumptions are accurate)

• The Chinese government’s ability to control or have disproportionate influence over global information and communications networks (and whatever other currently unforeseen powers that control or influence would bestow upon Beijing) will be reduced.
• Reducing Beijing’s power is—in this context and with certain caveats—akin to enhancing U.S. national security.
• Impeding Huawei’s success (albeit, through compulsion of other governments and laws restricting private companies from engaging in commerce or research and development with Huawei) could buy time for U.S. companies or U.S.-backed companies to emerge and take leadership in 5G and 6G technology space, providing U.S. economic and security benefits that might not otherwise manifest.

Costs

• Cutting off Huawei from U.S. semiconductors, semiconductor equipment, and software will expedite China’s development of indigenous semiconductor production capabilities and, ultimately, put the world’s largest market for semiconductors out of reach of U.S. producers within a few years.
• Cutting off Huawei from semiconductors made with U.S equipment in third countries will compel chipmakers in those third countries to purchase non-U.S. equipment, ultimately drying up current U.S. export markets.
• Cutting off Huawei will inject even more uncertainty into global information and communication technology (ICT) markets, which likelywill slow the process of standards setting, which likely will retard product development schedules, which likely will deter investment in new technologies, and which likely will be resolved only by bifurcation or even greater splintering of global technology standards.
• Bifurcation or splintering of technology standards would significantly limit scope for economies of scale in production, as firms all along the ICT supply chain would be producing for fewer customers or producing in separate production runs for customers that follow different sets of standards.
• U.S. supply chain warfare could prove contagious, encouraging Chinese restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals or other inputs and Chinese retaliation against U.S. technology companies, while opening the door to all countries to treat trade as a strategic weapon rather than as a tool of cooperation and economic betterment.
• Technology decoupling will inspire a cold‐​war style competition between the United States and China to win the hearts and minds of third countries through the offering of carrots and the threats.

Israel Is Making Short Work Of Iran's Republican Guards In Syria Israel isn't afraid. by Sebastien Roblin

 Israeli defense minister Naftali Bennett described Iran as an octopus, threatening that “Wherever you send those octopus arms, we will hack them off.” He also warned they might consider attacking the Octopus' ‘head’—ie, Tehran—if the attacks continue.

On November 19 of last year, four unguided artillery rockets arced out from Syrian territory into Israeli airspace in northern Galilee in the Golan Heights. These were detected and promptly destroyed by Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system.

What prompted this ineffectual attack from Iranian forces?

Like the Ouroboros, the snake that is forever preoccupied devouring its own tail, the side-show war between Israel and Iranian forces in Syria seemingly stretches out into an infinite series of violent affronts repaid in kind.

Since 2013, Iran has built up a military presence in Syria not only to combat rebels opposing the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad, but to build up a military infrastructure that could pressure Israel, including by transferring arms to proxies like Hezbollah. Over that same period of time, Israel has retaliated with hundreds of airstrikes blasting the Iranian bases.

For example, in August, Israel warplanes killed two people in an attack described as pre-empting a scheme to deploy a swarm of drones to attack targets in Israel.

Several commentators have connected the November 19 rocket attack is being a response to Israel’s assassinated Bahaa Abu al-Ata, the commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, with a surprise air strike in Gaza on November 12. The same day, Syria reported a reported missile attack on the home of another PIL leader living in Damascus named Akram al-Ajouri, killing his son and one bystander.

Palestinians then responded by launching hundreds of rockets at Isareli targets, and the IDF retaliated against that with more air strikes in a surge of fighting that lasted for two days.

Thus, Israel’s retaliation for the November 19 rocket attack was inevitable. However, its scale and violence took observers by surprise.

Starting around 1:20 AM local time on February 20, Syrian radars reportedly lit up as Israeli jets approaching from the Golan Heights and through Lebanese airspace released over a dozen precision-guided missiles at targets in Syria. Israel insists it warned Syrian air defenses not to open fire.

As usual, Syria’s air defenses failed to stop the attack. In this remarkable video posted to social media, you can see the bright flashes of Syrian missiles surging into the sky in an effort to repel the Israeli assault. Terrifyingly, early in the video at least two of the missiles appears to plunge back into the city and explode after initial lift-off, perhaps confused by countermeasures or having been launched with too little fore-warning.

Also as usual, the government’s SANA news agency claimed air defense had shot down most (eleven out of eighteen) of the missiles. It described the Israeli attack as being launched a half-dozen jets approaching from Marjyoun, Lebanon, roughly thirty-five miles west of Damascus.

The wave of destruction that struck twenty targets in Mezze, Syria and Damascus International Airport suggests otherwise.

The most prominent target struck was a huge seven-story building dubbed the ‘Glass House’ at Damascus International Airport, used for years as the command-and-control center for Iranian Revoutionary Guard Corps forces in Syria. The large-scale intervention Qud Force and Hezbollah fighters in Syria in 2013 undoubtedly saved Bashar al-Assad’s government well before Russia’s intervention secured its position in 2015.

Post-strike satellite imagery shows the attack caused the top two stories of the building’s northeastern-wing to collapse in upon itself. According to intelligence firm ImageSat, these housed the Quds Force’s intelligence unit. A covered parking lot outside the headquarters was also demolished.

In fact, the Iranian presence at the Glass House had become so well known that it’s believed the IRGC had actually withdrawn much of its staff to a more discreet location earlier this year.

Two buildings part of a second Iranian headquarters at al-Mazzeh airport were almost completely destroyed, with post-strike imagery showing only rubble and rescue vehicles surrounding the site, presumably searching for survivors.

Quds Force arms depots in the suburbs of Ksweh and Qudsaya were also struck according to a report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Israeli jets also targeted Syrian air defenses after they opened fire, destroying a half-dozen Syrian missile batteries—but not, they emphasized, the more advanced S-300 batteries which may have been hosting Russian personnel.

Indeed, it’s quite possible Syria’s two operational S-300 battalions did not engage the Israeli jets at all, despite years of Israeli anxiety surrounding Syria’s potential acquisition of the system. The IDF claims it had reported the strikes in advance with Russia. There are indications Russia may be forestalling the S-300s use against Israel as part of a mutual accommodation between Putin and Nethanyahu. Another issue is that the S-300 is optimized for medium- to long-range and altitude interception, but Israeli use of stealth jets or stand-off range missiles may have reduced detection range of the attack below those thresholds.

Ultimately, the Observatory reported twenty-three were killed in the attack, including five Syrian soldiers and sixteen foreigners (likely Iranians). Reportedly residential suburbs near Damascus suffered collateral damage which killed two civilians and injured two to four more. Several children were reportedly injured by an exploding air defense missile.

“The Rules Have Changed”

Israeli officials subsequently told the Jerusalem Post the strikes were intentionally disproportionate in response.

“We are changing the rules. Even when it comes to almost negligible attacks, whose impact is small, we are changing the equation, and our retaliatory attack will be widespread. When I looked at the south, when a small number of rockets are fired and we respond with a small retaliatory attack, then that sort of situation gets to be acceptable. We have to strike harshly [in response] to all attacks.”

Israeli defense minister Naftali Bennett described Iran as an octopus, threatening that “Wherever you send those octopus arms, we will hack them off.” He also warned they might consider attacking the Octopus' ‘head’—ie, Tehran—if the attacks continue.

Indeed, domestic factors in Iran and Israel may be incentivizing both to escalate conflict with each other.

Iran is currently consumed in riots. Pro-government militias have killed a hundred to two hundred Iranians, and Tehran has instituted a country-wide blackout of the Internet, perhaps sensing a genuine threat to its hold on power.

Meanwhile in Israel, presiding Israeli president Benjamin Nethanyahu has been indicted under serious corruption charges even as he wheels and deals in an effort to form a governing coalition in the wake of an election with inconclusive results.

 In such a context, displays of outward toughness to foreign enemies may become more attractive to divert public attention and generate favorable media coverage.

Given the ouroboros of endless retaliation, nobody expects the latest Irsaeli attack to have put a definite cork in the proxy war between Israel and Iran that has ranged for the last six years.

As conflict intelligence website T-intell.com put it succinctly: “Given the high-number of IRGC casualties and magnitude of the attack, Iran is expected to retaliate militarily against Israel.”

Everything You Wanted to Know About the Largest U.S. Mutiny Trial Here's what went down. by Warfare History Network

After sundown on July 17, something happened at a small port town 40 miles northeast of San Francisco that has never been fully explained…

The 7,500-ton Liberty ship SS E.A. Bryan had been loading there for days; 98 black enlisted men were on board, continuing to stack ammunition into the hold. Also on board were 31 Merchant Marine crewmen and 13 armed guards.

At 10:19 PM, a mighty blast erupted in the port area when one of the ships blew up, followed five seconds later by the other. The night sky was alight in a gigantic fireball as structures close to the blast vanished in a blinding flash. The Bryan was virtually vaporized.

Hundreds of civilians in the area were injured, including six at the Benicia Arsenal, located to the west across Suisun Bay, where $150,000 in damage was done to arsenal buildings. Within the port, buildings were leveled, vehicles and railroad cars were tossed about like toys, and fires were burning everywhere.

As you can read inside this season’s WWII Quarterly magazine, the explosion and its physical, social and legal aftermath clearly illustrated the cost of racial discrimination during this time of war. When President Harry Truman called for the armed forces to be desegregated in 1948, the Navy could honestly say that Port Chicago had been an essential part of the process.

This issue of WWII Quarterly is full of riveting stories and features like this one. Others you’ll find inside include:

“Investigations”

To this day, the cause of the sinking of the HMS Hood during the hunt for the Bismarck is still disputed.

“Cracking the Vierville Draw”

The Stonewallers of the U.S. 29th Infantry Division and the Rangers faced murderous fire on D-Day to capture Omaha Beach’s most vital exit.

“Commandos Crack Hitler’s Atlantic Wall”

No. 48 (Royal Marine) Commando, the last such unit to be formed in World War II, was one of the first to land at Juno Beach on D-Day.

“Blitzkrieg 1940”

After invading Poland, Hitler used his stunning “lighting war” tactics against the West to defeat France, Holland, Belgium, and other countries.

“Game Changer”

The pilots of the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber changed the course of World War II in the Pacific.

“A PT Boat Skipper’s Life”

Lieutenant Hank Blake recalls PT-375’s adventures and the Japanese surrender at Borneo.

As always, please let us know what you think about these and other stories in WWII Quarterly by visiting our website. We’d love to hear what you thought about the Port Chicago story and what topics you’d like to see us cover in subsequent issues.

Europe's Most Active Volcano Is Sliding Into the Sea Here's how we know. by John Murray

The southeast flank of Mount Etna in Sicily is sliding towards the sea at a rate of several centimetres a year. This might not sound like much, but the kind of stress that this movement creates inside volcanoes can cause devastating landslides. If, one day, Etna’s movement significantly increases then it could have serious consequences.

With this in mind, scientists such as myself have been studying Etna to try to better understand what’s going on. Now research published in Science Advances presents strong evidence that Etna’s slide isn’t caused by pressure from magma inside the volcano, as previously thought. Instead, it’s likely caused by gravity pulling on Etna’s lower underwater slopes, far from the summit. The researchers emphasise that this means Etna is more susceptible to catastrophic collapse than had previously been realised, and that the same might be true of other coastal and island volcanoes.

My colleagues and I first calculated the speed of Etna’s movement earlier this year, showing that the entire edifice slid downslope at an average of 14 millimetres a year between 2001 and 2012. But the whole volcano is also expanding outwards from the summit in all directions, meaning its total annual movement towards the sea is several centimetres.

The new research looks for the first time at what is happening at the underwater foot of the volcano, 1,200 metres below sea level and 12 kilometres from the shoreline. Data from five underwater transponders gathered between April 2016 and July 2017, showed the underwater slope remained stable for a year but then slid four centimetres in one eight-day period before finally stabilising again.

The data shows that the amount of movement is smallest at the summit and biggest at the foot of the volcano. But if movement was caused by the magma inside Etna then the biggest movement would occur near the volcanic centre. The researchers also found that the sea floor movement 12 kilometres from the shore is focused along a single geological fault. But near the coast, the strain is divided between two fault systems.

This all suggests that the movement began offshore and spread towards the summit. There were no associated earthquakes during the eight-day episode, indicating that the movement wasn’t caused by seismic activity. Instead, it’s likely to be the effects of gravity pulling on the volcano.

For the past 50 years, the science of volcano movements has been dominated by the idea that most volcanoes have a shallow magma chamber that expands as it fills with magma before an eruption. This causes the walls of the chamber to eventually fracture and allows magma to escape from the side of the volcano. Measuring the volcano’s surface movement would allow you to calculate the depth of the magma chamber. It is this kind of model that is usually used to explain expanding volcanoes.

But many scientists including myself have found that while some well-studied volcanoes in Hawaii, Iceland and elsewhere fit this kind of model, other volcanoes contradict it. This suggests there are other factors that explain volcano movement and can affect eruptions.

In the 1990s, volcanologist Andrea Borgia suggested that the steadily increasing amount of lava and volcanic rock deposited near the top of tall volcanoes caused their summits to subside and their slopes to spread outwards. This idea has gained ground as volcanoes around the world provide us with more and more geological evidence, which the new research paper adds to.

Etna’s uncertain future

So what does this mean for Etna? We can say with certainty that catastrophic collapse, in which an entire sector of a volcano slides off in a gigantic landslide, has occurred on the downslope side of other gravitationally sliding volcanoes. The devastation caused by such events, which occur worldwide about four times a century, means that the possibility has to be taken seriously.

Why China's J-20 Stealth Fighter Can't Compete with the F-35 or F-22 There simply is not enough of them. by Kris Osborn

While debates and uncertainties continue to swirl around how agile, lethal, stealthy and advanced China’s J-20 stealth fighter may be, the country may simply have another challenge crippling its ability to rival the F-22 and F-35: There simply are not enough J-20s.

Several interesting reports cite production problems and delays with J-20 manufacturing, particularly centered around the J-20’s “high-thrust turbofan WS-15 engine.”  A report from the South China Morning Post says J-20 engine work has “fallen behind schedule,” and that China was “thought to have built about 50 J-20s by the end of 2019, but problems with the jets engines delayed production plans.”

If China has in fact produced 50 of its highly touted J-20, that still falls way short of the U.S.’ current fleet of ready and armed 5th Gen fighters. Lockheed statements given to The National Interest report that the firm has built and delivered 195 F-22s, with 186 of them combat ready. Made by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the F-22 uses two Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines with afterburners and two-dimensional thrust vectoring nozzles, an Air Force statement said. It is 16-feet tall, 62-feet long and weighs 43,340 pounds. Its maximum take-off weight is 83,500; there is much interesting discussion comparing F-35 and F-22 engine thrust to China’s J-20 engine. 

As for the F-35, available Lockheed data says it delivered its 134th F-35 last year and, at least prior to COVID-19, planned to deliver as many as 141 F-35s this year. The coronavirus, however, has impacted supply chain and production progress with the F-35, and Lockheed officials recently told Air Force Magazine that they expect to decrease aircraft production by 18-to-24 jets. 

Lockheed’s statement from December of last year says: 

“The 134th aircraft is a Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) model for the United States Marine Corps. In 2019, deliveries included 81 F-35s for the United States, 30 for international partner nations and 23 for Foreign Military Sales customers.”

Of course it is not yet clear just how many J-20s China will build, or how fast they plan to build them. Nonetheless, slower or smaller scale J-20 production by no means erases or largely minimizes the growing threat presented by China’s Air Force. 

Overall, the U.S. Air Force’s technological airpower superiority over China is rapidly diminishing in light of rapid Chinese modernization of fighter jets, missiles, air-to-air weapons, cargo planes and stealth aircraft, according to a Congressional review released several years ago. 

The 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended that Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to assess the U.S.-Chinese military balance and make recommendations regarding U.S. military plans and budgets, among other things. Despite being released in 2014, the findings of the report offer a detailed and insightful window into Chinese Air Force technology, progress and development. 

The Commission compiled its report based upon testimony, various reports and analytical assessments along with available open-source information. An entire chapter is dedicated to Chinese military modernization.

The review states that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had, as of 2014, approximately 2,200 operational aircraft, nearly 600 of which are considered modern.

“In the early 1990s, Beijing began a comprehensive modernization program to upgrade the PLA Air Force from a short-range, defensively oriented force with limited capabilities into a modern, multi-role force capable of projecting precision airpower beyond China’s borders, conducting air and missile defense and providing early warning,” the review writes.

Alongside the J-20, the Congressional report also cites Chinese prototyping of its stealthy J-31 and a host of other fast-modernizing aircraft presenting threats to the U.S. Air Force. 

Alongside their J-10 and J-11 fighters, the Chinese also own Russian-built Su-27s and Su-30s and are on the verge of buying the new Su-35 from Russia at the time of the report, the review states.

“The Su-35 is a versatile, highly capable aircraft that would offer significantly improved range and fuel capacity over China’s current fighters. The aircraft thus would strengthen China’s ability to conduct air superiority missions in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea as well as provide China with the opportunity to reverse engineer the fighter’s component parts, including its advanced radar and engines, for integration into China’s current and future indigenous fighters,” the review writes.

In fact, this ambition did come to fruition, according to a May 1, 2020 report from The National Interest which states China has already bought as many as 24 Su-35s. 

Finally, Chinese threats are by no means limited to the speed, range and maneuverability of the jets themselves, but the increasingly modern weapons they fire. 

“All of China’s fighters in 2000, with the potential exception of a few modified Su-27s, were limited to within-visual-range missiles. China over the last 15 years also has acquired a number of sophisticated short and medium-range air-to-air missiles; precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs; and long-range, advanced air-launched land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles,” the review says.

Has China's Navy Caught Up (and Surpassed) Japan? While the world focuses on the Coronavirus crisis, a new report lays out the rise of Chinese seapower and how it could impact Japan and the entire Indo-Pacific region. by James Holmes

Toshi Yoshihara, a long-time coauthor and friend, has put out the definitive report detailing how strategic thinkers and practitioners in Communist China size up Japanese sea power. The outlook is dour. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has overtaken Japan’s navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), by many measures over the past decade. Tokyo must play catch-up. And Washington must help. 

Yoshihara entitles his report Dragon Against the Sun in apparent homage to Ronald Spector’s Eagle Against the Sun, a standard history of World War II in the Pacific. The simile invites posterity to juxtapose Japan’s plight vis-à-vis an increasingly domineering China today with its plight vis-à-vis the United States eight decades ago. Then, imperial Japan confronted a foe from the far side of the Pacific with a vastly larger economy and a forward outpost in Japan’s extended environs, namely the Philippine Islands. Today, democratic Japan confronts a nearby potential foe with an economy that surpassed its own a decade ago. The two contenders occupy cramped quarters in this incipient age of long-range precision weaponry.

Marine geography drives the contenders into contact at sea at the same time weapons technology makes it easier to strike.

Comparing the PLA Navy to the JMSDF solely on a fleet-to-fleet basis misleads under prevailing circumstances. In 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Kidō Butai, or carrier striking force, had to steam across thousands of miles of storm-beaten ocean to smite Pearl Harbor. Nor could the Kidō Butai—short on fuel and supplies after its epic voyage—sustain its attacks for long. China’s equivalents to “Pearl Harbor”—fleet hubs such as Yokosuka or Sasebo—lie within easy reach in 2020. After all, land-based armaments can reach out hundreds of miles to sea from Fortress China. PLA rocketeers could pummel Japanese bases or fleets with the push of a button, lofting volleys of land-fired ballistic missiles the JMSDF’s way.

It matters little where the firing platform resides so long as firepower arrives on the scene of battle at the time when the battle is fought. Any meaningful tally between Japanese and Chinese sea power must factor shore-based missiles and aircraft into the balance along with the seagoing component. The portents are discouraging taken on those terms.

Yoshihara sketches the portrait of a PLA Navy that has surged to eminence with impressive velocity. Two decades ago Western specialists on Chinese sea power commonly ridiculed the PLA Navy, forecasting that it would take China decade upon decade to construct an oceangoing fleet. Some doubted such a feat was possible at all. Once it became undeniable that China could build a navy—it did, therefore it could—skeptics took to denying that the PLA could build this piece of hardware or that, whether it was anti-ship ballistic missiles, state-of-the-art guided-missile destroyers, or aircraft carriers.

Chinese engineers belied their claims one by one.

Surveying rising maritime challengers of the past reveals that it takes about fifteen years from a cold start to construct a serious regional navy, another fifteen after that to construct an oceangoing navy of consequence. That’s three decades in total. Communist China’s leadership resolved to make the PLA Navy a global force around a quarter-century ago. It is on pace by historical standards if not ahead.

So much for the history lesson. Yoshihara investigates primary-source writings and finds that fatalism about the likelihood of marine conflict now merges with a confidence verging on hubris to impel Beijing’s strategic deliberations. As he puts it: “In Chinese eyes, Sino-Japanese maritime competition and naval confrontation are virtually fated.” At the same time he detects a note of triumphalism among Chinese commentators, who seem to think the PLA would defeat the JMSDF in a walkover. 

What if that mix of fatalism and vainglory reflects thinking among senior Chinese Communist Party magnates as well as analysts who write articles? If it does, then not just an increasingly favorable material balance—the numbers and quality of ships, planes, and armaments that would face off—but the elite and popular mood could predispose Beijing to belligerence. The more promising the PLA’s prospects appear, the more likely Xi Jinping will give the order when a crisis looms or opportunity beckons.

That’s doubly true if another pattern in Chinese writings holds. Namely, strategic thinkers in China exhibit a curious tendency to assume the United States would shirk its treaty commitments to Japan in times of duress. “China’s hypothetical operational successes,” observes the author, “hinge on the absence of U.S. intervention.” In other words, Chinese strategists project that any future sea-fight would pit China against an isolated Japan. A one-on-one confrontation that sidelined the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force would simplify a host of operational and tactical problems for PLA commanders.

That assumption may be false and probably is. But Beijing would hardly be the first strategic actor in history to make a mistake by acting on false assumptions. Garbage in, garbage out.

In short, capability is catching up with aspiration in China. As a result PLA overseers are increasingly bewitched by offensive operations. “Decisive engagements,” writes Yoshihara, “will constitute a core component of China’s war-winning strategy.” The transition from China’s traditional “active defense” strategy at sea to an offensive posture has been a long time coming. Active defense posits that the PLA will be the weaker combatant at the outset of a conflict. That being the case, it must resign itself to the strategic defensive until such time as it can wear down a stronger antagonist, take the strategic offensive, and win belatedly.

Yet framers of Chinese military strategy long ago envisaged dispensing with defensive methods and proceeding directly to the offense. In 2004 Beijing issued a defense white paper, or statement about how it intends to handle martial affairs, that instructed the PLA to construct forces capable of winning “both command of the sea and command of the air.” Command is a Mahanian term. Chinese nautical strategists sound like fanboys when they quote Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s definition of “command of the sea,” as they have for many years. Bidding for maritime supremacy means a force strives to crush enemy forces or drive them off more or less forever. Afterward the victor rules sea and sky and does what it pleases.

Five years ago, in its first-ever formal Military Strategy document, Beijing announced that active defense remains not just relevant but the “essence” of how officialdom views military endeavors. Those are strong words. But they may be an artifact of the decades when the PLA and its forebear, the Red Army that waged civil war and fought Japan, remained a large, backward, and overmatched force. If the PLA can seize the offensive at the onset of fighting while entertaining reasonable chances of victory, then it makes perfect sense to depart from an obsolescent way of war. Mastery can come early rather than late.

What to do about all of this? While the hour is late, Yoshihara insists that all is not lost. First, geography remains Japan’s faithful friend. Japan occupies the northern arc of Asia’s first island chain and regulates access to the Western Pacific. If Tokyo fields the right mix of sea, air, and ground forces, then it could pen up PLA ships and aircraft within the island chain along with merchant traffic that conveys the lifeblood of China’s import- and export-dependent economy. Japan can bring the pain despite being outnumbered at sea. Its capacity to inflict military and economic pain translates into deterrence.

Next, Xi may have erred by vesting China’s national prestige in the PLA Navy. He touts the navy as the champion of “China’s dream,” his program for national rejuvenation. Well and good. But what would happen if the bearer of China’s dream took hard knocks in action? The Imperial Japanese Navy crushed the Qing Dynasty’s Beiyang, or Northern, Fleet during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Painful historical memories would be dredged up if the PLA Navy surface fleet, the Qing fleet’s successor, suffered grave losses in a rematch against the JMSDF, the Meiji fleet’s successor.

Defeat—or even a victory that came with heavy costs—would land a blow against Xi’s prestige vis-à-vis the Chinese people and China’s neighbors. China’s dream would be denied its happy ending. Xi may be less than eager to roll the dice knowing the political stakes for himself as well as the nation. Imaginative Japanese strategy and force design could amplify his misgivings.

With apologies to Hippocrates, Tokyo should make “do harm” its motto when preparing for sea combat. Plot to thrash the PLA Navy—and give the maximal leader’s reputation a beating in the process.

Japanese leaders, furthermore, should work with their counterparts in Washington to make sure both allies remain steadfast when put to the test. Part of the alliance challenge is diplomatic. As statistics guru Nassim Nicholas Taleb might counsel, the allies must show each other—as well as spectators such as the communist leadership in Beijing—that they have “skin in the game” of maritime defense. Statements of common purpose are fine, but the allies must do more. They should do things to convince everyone they will stand together in tough times. For example, forming a truly unified fleet, under a combined command and perhaps featuring mixed ship and aircrews, would guarantee that neither ally could desert the other in a fight—even if it would.

Both capitals would show they had skin in the game if they made national components of the force indivisible. Leave no doubt. 

 

And, of course, part of the alliance challenge is military in nature. As Yoshihara notes, Chinese specialists regard the JMSDF fleet as unbalanced and thus question its efficacy as a standalone force. And they are correct to a point. From its founding the JMSDF has filled niche capabilities where the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet falls short. Undersea warfare—subs, sea mines—is one. The JMSDF fleet, moreover, is organized into escort squadrons designed to ride shotgun for U.S. carrier and amphibious formations as well as execute solo missions. One Chinese commentator crows that Japan “paid a grievous price” by configuring its fleet to plug into U.S. naval operations. Others discern shortfalls in amphibious transport, logistics, weapons range, and aircraft-carrier construction. 

Yoshihara’s remedy: “Japan needs to rebalance its portfolio of capabilities.” Tokyo must put to sea “smaller, cheaper, more numerous, and redundant systems, including heavily armed missile craft,” to serve alongside pricey “exquisite systems” such as Aegis destroyers and light aircraft carriers. A rebalanced and more numerous fleet would be a more resilient fleet should the one-on-one fracas Chinese strategists actually take place. That prospect should give Beijing pause. But again, if political leaders in Tokyo and Washington do their jobs, they will persuade Beijing that the PLA will inevitably face a united U.S.-Japanese opponent should Chinese forces venture into combat.

The allies must leave no political space between them. Let’s put the dragon on notice that it must duel the eagle as well as the sun.

Lastly, haste. Trends have run China’s way for years now. It will take resolve and resources for the allies to flatten the curve—and bend the trendlines in their favor once again. The time for dawdling is over.