Yes, the U.S. Air Force Still Wants 386 Total Squadrons (Thanks to Russia and China) But will Congress pay for them? by Kris Osborn

Elaborate U.S. Air Force wargaming against potential major adversaries has again reinforced the services’ growth assessment request to still increase service size to 386 squadrons, up from 312. 

“We are doing lots of war games against peer competitors and came out to 386. That number is still the goal and then getting the right mix of the right squadrons and making sure they are ready to meet our nation’s demands,” General Stephen Wilson, Air Force Chief of Staff, told The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in a recent interview.

Wilson, and his former fellow Air Force pilot Lieutenant General David Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute, both served during Desert Storm in the early 1990s, when the Air Force went to war with twelve operational squadrons. “Now we have less,” Deptula said in his conversation with Wilson. 

The bottom line, according to senior Air Force leaders and experts observers, is that the U.S. Air Force will fall behind Russia and China by 2025 unless the service quickly embarks upon a sizeable expansion of its fighting technologies, weapons arsenal and major attack platforms. This means new bombers, fighters, drones, rescue helicopters and more. As part of the needed expansion, the Air Force Vice expounded upon a need to emphasize technological research and progress, citing eleven key areas of focus to include “Directed Energy, Hypersonics, AI, Autonomy, cyber, Quantum and Space,” among others. 

Following a detailed analysis several years ago, which likely included close examination of threats, mission requirements and dangerous emerging technologies, the service laid out a request to grow from 312 operational squadrons up to 386. The largest needed increases, according to the Air Force plan, included a request for twenty-two new ISR Command and Control squadrons, seven more fighter squadrons and five more bomber squadrons.

The Air Force assessment, referred to by Wilson, says the analysis supporting the 386 squadrons needed to support the National Defense Strategy is based on estimates of the expected threat by 2025 to 2030. At the end of the Cold War, the Air Force had 401 operational squadrons. By any cursory estimation, it does not take much to notice an uptick in mission demands for the Air Force, coming on the heels of more than fifteen-years of counterinsurgency air support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, confronting the threat of major warfare, the service is facing substantial requests from combatant commanders. 

Other details of the previous Air Force requested expansion plan include:

• Five more bomber squadrons
• Five more combat search and rescue squadrons
• Twenty-two more command and control ISR squadrons
• Fourteen more tanker squadrons
• Seven more fighter squadrons
• Seven more space squadrons

Meanwhile, statements from former senior Air Force leaders, Congressional analysts, observers and critics may go even further when it comes to voicing serious concerns about the service’s ability to meet anticipated threats—calling the current situation “dangerous.” “The USAF is a geriatric force—it has bombers, tankers, and trainer aircraft over 50 years old; helicopters over 40; and fighters over 30—it has a 2000+ pilot shortage,” Deptula told TNI during a previous interview.

Coming Soon: Another Donald Trump - Kim Jong-un Summit This Year? by Daniel R. DePetris

Back on planet earth, the chance of a Kim-Trump summit being scheduled before the U.S. presidential election is about as slim as yours truly landing a columnist position with the Washington Post. For both Trump and Kim, the pros of another “made for TV” blockbuster aren’t worth the list of cons— including criticism from hardliners back home if both come back without any concessions. Trump and Kim, however, have rolled the dice with each other before. We shouldn’t presume they aren't willing to do so again if the environment changes.

t a time when U.S.-North Korea diplomacy and inter-Korean relations are in dire states, it may be absurd to even pontificate about the possibility of another summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Neither Washington nor Pyongyang has demonstrated in public that more summitry is a feasible option over the short term. Even Deputy Secretary of State and North Korea envoy Stephen Biegun threw cold water on the idea, telling the German Marshall Fund this week that "it’s hard to envision circumstances where we could do an in-person international summit.” Add the coronavirus pandemic to the mix and the entire concept looks far-fetched, if not outright farcical.

And yet because Trump is such an unpredictable politician with a flair for the dramatic, nobody can sit in their home-offices and prognosticate about what he may or may not do with a high degree of confidence. The personal relationship between Trump and Kim looked to be on thin-ice after the diplomatic fallout from Hanoi, when both men flew back to their capitals without even a manufactured joint statement in their pockets. But four months later, Trump and Kim met again in a spontaneous, slapdash get-together by the Demilitarized Zone. Who knows what Trump is thinking on a daily basis?

It’s not as if Trump wouldn’t like to continue talking with the North. Over the last 12 months, the administration has expressed its interest in preserving channels of communication with Pyongyang. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said so himself during a June 30 webinar at the Center for the National Interest, where he insisted "the door to dialogue and progress remains open.” This is the kind of remark senior national security officials use as a placeholder when things aren’t going particularly well. But it at least sends a small signal to Pyongyang that the White House remains ready and willing to return to the table if, in fact, Kim wants to get back to business.

The one individual who unquestionably hopes diplomacy thaws out from its deep freeze is South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who has banked his political and personal legacy on reconciliation with the North and has very little to show for his valiant efforts outside of a joint inter-Korean deescalation agreement Pyongyang was threatening to discard up until last week. Moon has always been driven by a sense of urgency on the inter-Korean peace file. He spent part of his July 1 videoconference with European Council President Charles Michel pleading for a return to the exciting summitry of the past. "I believe there’s a need for North Korea and the United States to try dialogue one more time before the U.S. presidential election,” Moon observed. The Blue House reportedly reiterated this messaging to the Trump administration shortly thereafter, an indication Moon’s remarks weren’t for posterity.

Regrettably, for Moon, he is in a weak position to make another Trump-Kim summit happen. As determined as he is to make history on the Korean Peninsula and put an end to the 70-year-old Korean War for good, he is only one man with limited power. Hemmed in by a U.S. and U.N. Security Council sanctions regime that obstructs even the most mundane inter-Korean projects, the Moon government is at best a supporting actor to the main event. If another Trump-Kim summit is even within the realm of possibility, the ultimate decision will be determined by Trump and Kim—not Moon.

Would Kim be open to a 4th meeting with his pen-pal in the White House?

If KCNA commentary and statements from Kim regime underlings are anything to go by, the answer is a “no.” It’s difficult to describe in words how detrimental Hanoi was to the overall tenor of U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy. Biegun’s one-day session with the North Korean delegation in Stockholm ten months ago, which Pyongyang was apparently determined to make a failure before the two teams landed in Sweden, didn’t help matters. A month after that meeting broke down, North Korean negotiator Kim Kye Gwan all but declared direct, top-down diplomacy with Washington under the present circumstances a no-win situation for the North. The only person who gained from such diplomacy, Kim said, was Trump himself. “As we have got nothing in return, we will no longer gift the U.S. president with something he can brag about.” North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon went a step further with those remarks on June 11, when he dragged Trump’s name through the mud (without naming him, of course) and explained that “never again” would the North "provide the US chief executive with another package to be used for achievements without receiving any returns.”

To the Kim regime, the last 2 years have been filled with nothing but empty promises and hot air. What would be the point of another televised sit-down, where Trump could once again use the spectacle to project himself as world-class statesman and dealmaker?

In his heart of hearts, Trump likely wouldn’t have a problem with more flashy summitry. A high-stakes head-to-head matchup would produce at least a week’s worth of media coverage and help distract the country (at least for a short while) from the 87% rise in covid-19 cases, controversy over Trump’s behavior during phone calls with world leaders, #BountyGate and every other scandal burning through the administration. Trump knows how to manipulate the media and create diversions. What better diversion from the bad poll numbers against Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden than a “Nixon to China” moment during an election year? 

Naturally, there are major downsides for Trump as well. If a hypothetical meeting with Kim was the same, old optical illusion that so many have gotten used to, the president could open himself up to a whole new slate of attack ads on his competence and record.

Right now, all of the above is just an entertaining exercise in speculation. Back on planet earth, the chance of a Kim-Trump summit being scheduled before the U.S. presidential election is about as slim as yours truly landing a columnist position with the Washington Post. For both Trump and Kim, the pros of another “made for TV” blockbuster aren’t worth the list of cons— including criticism from hardliners back home if both come back without any concessions.

Trump and Kim, however, have rolled the dice with each other before. We shouldn’t presume they aren't willing to do so again if the environment changes.

America's New B-21 Stealth Bomber Is Just Two-Years Away These are much better than the older B-2s and should be ready in the early 2020s. by Kris Osborn

The much anticipated, high-tech B-21 bomber will “come on in two years,” bringing new dimensions of stealth, software, attack possibilities and nuclear deterrence to the U.S. Air Force. It would even possibly usher in new tactical approaches to how modern operations may move forward in the years ahead. 

In a conversation with The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies regarding the importance of modernizing the nuclear triad, Air Force Chief of Staff General Stephen Wilson confirmed that the stealthy new aircraft will “come on in two years.”

There has been discussion about its first test flight being imminent, and service weapons developers consistently express that the program has been progressing very successfully for several years now. Naturally details regarding its specific developmental nuances are likely not available, as it is a black program. However, prototyping, software development and the overall success of the program has been well-documented. Given all of these factors, it would by no means be surprising if the B-21’s readiness for operations was merely a few years away. Senior weapons developers have long said the aircraft is expected to arrive in the 2020s, so indeed it may very well be on the earlier end of that.

In recent months, Air Force Secretary Barbara Barret, Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Richard Joseph and Air Force Acquisition Executive Dr. William Roper, all visited Palmdale, California for an on-site discussion with B-21 scientists and weapons developers with the aircraft’s maker Northrop Grumman.

During the visit, Roper commented on the extent to which the B-21 will bring new dimensions to stealth attack, saying it will “push the boundaries in hardware technologies, like stealth,” and “blaze new trails in agile software development,” according to an Air Force report on the visit. 

Roper has long-been an advocate for software modernization as a technical foundation for rapid, agile modernization; he recently published some significant comments about the B-21s progress regarding software and key elements of mission command, saying that developers recently completed an essential software-empowered process intended to bring greater levels of information processing, data management and computerized autonomy.

While few details are available regarding the B-21s technical composition for obvious reasons, there are some interesting comments made by Air Force developers as well as observations that can be made by simply looking at available images.

Through virtualization and software-hardware synergy, B-21 sensors, computers and electronics can better scale, deploy and streamline procedural functions such as checking avionics specifics, measuring altitude and speed and integrating otherwise disparate pools sensor information. In effect, it means war-sensitive sensor, targeting and navigational data will be managed and organized through increased computer automation. This will allow pilots to make faster and more informed combat decisions.

In previous statements, Roper has referred to the B-21’s inclusion of “Containerized Software,” something which refers to an ability to program computer operating systems to streamline and compartmentalize different functions simultaneously, yet without launching an entire machine for each app, according to “Kubernetes’” website. Roper cited Kubernetes, which is a computer system for “automating application deployment, scaling and management.” Much of this, as cited by Roper, is made possible through what’s called application containerization; it is defined as an operating system-level “virtualization method used to deploy and run distributed applications,” according to Techtarget.com. Containerization enables multiple “isolated applications or services to run on a single host and access the same operating system.”

By drawing upon software-enabled virtualization, systems can upgrade faster, reduce their hardware footprint and better employ automation, AI and machine-learning applications. In all-out warfare terms, this means B-21 pilots can share information and find and destroy targets such as enemy air defenses much faster than ever before. This is something which can expedite precision weapons attack and identify approaching air and ground threats and, perhaps of greatest importance, keep pilot crews alive.

While many of the details regarding the B-21s stealth technologies remain mysterious, a quick look at its configuration seems to indicate a few interesting new developments. The engine “inlets” are more curved and embedded in the fuselage, compared to its predecessor the B-2. The body surrounding the inlet appears more rounded and slightly less angular as well, suggesting newer methods of implementing “low radar signature” stealth engineering. Naturally, fewer edges, angular shapes or protruding structures are likely to generate much less of a return signal to enemy radar. Also, the back of the aircraft seems to show little or no heat dispensing, as if to suggest that an internally-buried engine is emitting an even smaller heat signature than the current state-of-the-art stealth engines. Or, there simply could be new ways of managing how heat is dissipated or released from the aircraft to lessen or remove any detectable heat signature. In addition, to be less “findable” by enemy sensors, a stealth fuselage is built to effectively mirror the surrounding atmosphere in order to eliminate any detectable temperature difference. Finally, the structural shape of the crew’s command center cockpit on the B-21 seems to have a slightly lower incline than the B-2, making the shape slightly more rounded or “blended” into a seamless, less detectable configuration. 

America’s Military Has a Problem: Russia and China Are Building Hypersonic Weapons Could a new generation of missile defenses help? by James Grant

On June 5, the Space Development Agency (SDA), the Pentagon’s new space technology arm, issued a solicitation for the development of an advanced “space-layer” missile defense tracking system. The technical notice arrived with little fanfare, and passed without much public notice. But for those in the know, it reflects the start of a major strategic initiative—one with the potential to safeguard American military superiority.

The problem is acute. Today, America’s preeminence in missile technology is being challenged for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Alongside the United States, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are currently developing the next generation of kinetic weapons: the hypersonic missile. Hypersonic weapon systems are designed to defeat existing missile defenses through incredible speed—up to twenty-seven times the speed of sound—and high maneuverability (the ability to modify their trajectories in flight).

No effective countermeasures currently exist against these weapons. As our adversaries match—and in some cases exceed—our technological progress in this arena, the Pentagon must prioritize the research and development of a defense against hypersonic weapons.

A Hypersonic Arms Race 

America’s military might is predicated on its long-distance power projection capabilities—the ability to bring overwhelming force in the form of troops, ships, aircraft, and missiles to any corner of the world in a short period of time. While our near-peer competitors, Russia and China, lack this “expeditionary” power projection, hypersonic weapons offer their militaries a powerful anti-access area-denial (A2AD) tool to deter U.S. force deployment and even threaten first strike “decapitation” attacks against the homeland. It is no wonder that Russia and China—and even second-tier competitors like Iran and North Korea—are aggressively pursuing this equalizing technology.

Hypersonic weapons long ago left the drawing board, and are now being deployed by our adversaries. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) revealed its home-grown DF-ZF medium-range hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which sits atop a standard DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, at a 2019 military parade. While the official system is armed with a conventional warhead and intended to destroy static targets, experts believe it could easily be equipped with nuclear warheads. Anti-ship or “carrier killer” variants of the DF-ZF are also reportedly in development. With a range of 2,500km and a top speed of Mach 10—combined with extreme in-flight maneuverability—the DF-ZFs are designed specifically to defeat U.S. missile defenses like the Aegis BMD that protects our ships or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system that defends allied South Korea.

According to experts, the DF-ZF hyperglide vehicle has demonstrated a high degree of accuracy in testing, with warheads landing “within meters” of its intended target. More critically, the DF-ZF prototype is able to take hypersonic evasive action in flight—leaving the adversary with “little time or ability to react.”

Chinese officials have not been shy about its advances in this field, instead lauding their progress on hypersonics as a point of national pride. At a 2017 hypersonic conference in Xiamen, China, Chinese scientists presented more than 250 papers on the topic—about ten times the number presented by U.S. researchers. And in the decade between 2008 and 2018, China is known to have conducted approximately twenty times more hypersonic weapons tests than the United States.

Not to be outdone by its southern neighbor, Russia is also developing its own hypersonic arsenal. On December 27, 2019, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed the deployment of the country’s first hypersonic ICBM, known as the Avangard, calling it a "landmark event.” Russian leaders are placing high hopes on the system, and Russian president Vladimir Putin has boasted that the Avangard has the ability to penetrate both current and future missile defense systems. This optimism is well-placed; in a December 2018 test, the missile successfully “zig-zagged” to its target some 6,000km away, traveling at speeds reaching Mach 27.

The Avangard also appears to be technologically more advanced than its Chinese counterpart. Launched by an RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard detaches high above the atmosphere and then “glides” toward its target. Additionally, Russia is also nearing the official deployment of its Kinzhal (Dagger) air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, which reportedly can reach speeds of up to Mach 10.

The United States, spurred by the progress of competitors, is now restarting its Cold-War-era hypersonic weapons program. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $2.865 billion in funding for hypersonic weapons in 2021—a 13 percent increase from the FY2020 total of $2.508 billion. The request includes funding for research on offensive weapons systems like a truck-mounted hypersonic system, missiles for submarines and surface ships, and air-launched weapons.

The Imperative of Situational Awareness

Yet, for the moment at least, funding for hypersonic defense is far less generous. For instance, the Hypersonic & Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)—which is jointly handled by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and SDA—currently receives just a fraction of those agencies’ budgets that are allocated for “Space Technology Development and Prototyping.”

Yet given the ability of hypersonic systems to find seams in defenses—traveling under radar horizons or out of range of interceptors until there is no time to react—a new method for tracking is needed to even attempt successful intercepts. This can only really be achieved through a constellation of low Earth orbit sensors, as envisioned by the HBTSS program. Such a sensor layer would include some 120 satellites, allowing for persistent and reliable detection of targets regardless of their course or velocity. This sort of system would guarantee constant “custody” of any targets throughout its launch, and provide necessary real-time data to interceptors in an environment where every millisecond counts.

The problem is pressing. America’s conventional defense systems, like the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, Aegis BMD, and THAAD, are at present simply not equipped to protect U.S. assets from the hypersonic threat. Traditional missile defense, which is likened to hitting a bullet with a bullet, is by itself a challenging endeavor that requires target tracking, high-speed data communication and interception. The speed and maneuverability of hypersonics make these tasks much, much more challenging. A space-based layer can help improve situational awareness and thereby give existing systems a fighting chance to address the threat. Moreover, the dividends of a space sensor layer would not be limited to missile defense. All branches of the U.S. military would benefit from the ability to better track assets (from ships to troops to aircraft) in an integrated and shared system.

The power to make such a system possible, however, lies with Congress. With proper funding allocated to research and development, lawmakers can ensure that the United States makes space sensing a reality, and does so before our adversaries speed ahead of us.

BOOM: South Korea's Pricey K2 Black Panther Tank Is Ready For War The K2 has an incredible water-fording capability designed to handle some of the Korean Peninsula’s wet and swampy terrain. by Caleb Larson

 Though expensive, the K2 Black Panther is technologically sophisticated and unique. Its suspension and water crossing ability is optimal for Korea’s hilly and swampy conditions — and combined with top-attack munitions, the K2 would be a hard nut to crack.

According to the Guinness World Records organization, the indigenously-developed K2 Black Panther tank is the most expensive tank in the world at $8.5 million dollars. This is for a good reason though: the K2 has a number of features that make it incredibly capable--and quite deadly on the battlefield. 

On-road/Off-road/Underwater: 

One of the most impressive aspects of the K2 is its suspension system, which can be contorted into a variety of positions. For cross-country performance, the suspension is raised, giving the K2 greater ground clearance. On roads, the suspension is lowered, hugging the ground for better speed.

Additionally, the K2 can lean forward and backward. This gives the tank’s main gun better maneuverability in hull-down positions. When leaning backward, the K2 can raise its main gun to target low-flying aircraft, or to better target more highly elevated targets on Korean Pennisula's hilly terrain. The K2 also has the ability to lean to the left or the right, which improves driving along slopes.

The K2’s engine is a fairly standard 1,500 horsepower diesel. Thanks to the K2’s low curb weight, however, it has a fairly high horsepower to weight ratio. Combined with the adjustable suspension, the K2 is quite nimble.

The K2 has an incredible water-fording capability designed to handle some of the Korean Peninsula’s wet and swampy terrain. By extending an onboard extendable conning tower/snorkel, the K2 can ford water that is 4.1 meters deep, or just over 13 feet.

While crossing a body of water, the turret becomes water-tight, and to ensure the tank maintains contact with the ground, up to 500 gallons of water can be taken on board as ballast to increase the weight of the tank by over two tons.

KSTAM-II: 

Like nearly all tanks, the K2 can shoot standard high-explosive rounds and kinetic penetrators. One of its unique munitions is the KSTAM-II. The KSTAM is an anti-armor, top-attack smart munition that targets the lowest armored parts of tanks, the top.

This munition is fired from the K2’s main gun at a target indirectly, following an artillery-like trajectory at targets up to 8 kilometers away, or nearly 5 miles. When airborne, the KSTAM uses adjustable fins to maneuver towards the target. Once in the vicinity, the KSTAM deploys a parachute, slowing it down and giving it time to find a target and fire an explosively formed penetrator downwards at a tank’s weak top turret armor.

Export

The K2 Black Panther has some notable export successes, finding customers in both Turkey and Poland.

In 2008, the K2 was sold to Turkey, who wanted to incorporate some of the Korean tech into their own domestically produced tank, particularly the K2’s chassis and suspension system.

Poland signed a deal for 800 K2 tanks worth an unspecified amount of money to replace their aging Soviet-issue T-72s, PT-91s, and Leopard 2 tanks.

Dollar Bills

Though expensive, the K2 Black Panther is technologically sophisticated and unique. Its suspension and water crossing ability is optimal for Korea’s hilly and swampy conditions — and combined with top-attack munitions, the K2 would be a hard nut to crack.

Triple Threat: Russia's Tu-160 Is The Fastest, Largest, And Heaviest Bomber Ever Built The Blackjack is here. by Caleb Larson

Why the nickname “White Swan” you ask? Because the entire plane is coated in a brilliantly white reflective coating. It’s protection for the crew. The Tu-160 can carry a nuclear payload, which, obviously, creates a massively bright fireball. The thermal energy of nuclear explosions is enormous, and by reflecting some of that thermal energy (light), the crew is at least in theory somewhat more protected than otherwise.

Fastest bomber ever built. The largest bomber ever built. Heaviest bomber ever built. All of these monikers refer to the Tupelov Tu-160 “White Swan” (NATO reporting name “Blackjack”), a legacy Soviet airframe that has of late gotten a new lease on life.

Swan Diving Towards the Enemy

The Tu-160 is outwardly somewhat similar to the American Rockwell B-1 Lancer which spurred its development. Both have variable-sweep wings, both are supersonic. However, that is where the similarities end.

The B-1 Lancer is somewhat smaller, and is a bomber in the classic sense. The Tu-160, on the other hand, is used more as a stand-off weapons platform, in which missiles are launched from the bomb bay doors while the “White Swan” would speed off at Mach 2+ to safety. It is the only Soviet-designed bomber that does not carry any defensive weapons, although its prodigious 88,000 pounds of payload capacity can carry a dizzying array of conventional and/or nuclear weapons.

Why the nickname “White Swan” you ask? Because the entire plane is coated in a brilliantly white reflective coating. It’s protection for the crew. The Tu-160 can carry a nuclear payload, which, obviously, creates a massively bright fireball. The thermal energy of nuclear explosions is enormous, and by reflecting some of that thermal energy (light), the crew is at least in theory somewhat more protected than otherwise.

Variable sweep wings are no longer in vogue, but offer some advantages. (Check out this F-14 Tomcat for a prime example of variably-swept wings!) During low-speed flight, like landing or takeoff, a straight wing offers more lift. At higher speeds, especially in the supersonic range, a straight wing causes unnecessary drag, and a steeply swept wing would be more efficient. Hence the variable-sweep capability of the Tu-160, with “unfolds” its wings at lower speeds, and “folds” them when flying supersonic.

A New Lease on Life

Although there is no serious design flaw inherent to the Tu-160 design, one of the serious drawbacks is the fact that it is not stealthy.

But stealth is hard. And expensive. Russia’s only stealth aircraft, the Su-57 has had myriad teething problems and is unlikely to enter full serial production any time soon due to many issues — the low cost of oil, upon which the wobbly Russian defense budget depends, and engine issues that may be difficult to rectify any time soon.

What to do when a new design isn’t working out as hope? Fall back on what’s tried and true, with an update. Russia is currently working to modernize its existing fleet of Tu-160s with improved engines and avionics.

The Jamestown Foundation, a research and analysis think tank elaborated on the upgrade: “The production of a modernized Tu-160 strategic bomber will require close cooperation among several different plants and the organization of a whole production chain—something that has been a weak point in Russia.”

It may be some time before we see any new bombers flying around in Russia, stealthy or otherwise.

Intrepid: The Aircraft Carrier the Couldn't Be Defeated by the Japanese Here's the story of this heroic ship. by Peter Suciu

By the end of the war, USS Intrepid suffered a total of four kamikaze attacks as well as a torpedo strike yet she survived.

"Intrepid" means "fearless, undaunted, adventurous," and all those words could certainly describe the World War II aircraft carrier that is now a floating museum on New York City's West Side. Commissioned in August 1943 the USS Intrepid (CV-11) was the fourth ship to bear the name, but perhaps the one to earn it most.

The keel for the Essex-class USS Intrepid was laid down just six days before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and upon completion, she immediately headed to the Pacific where she was greeted by a baptism of fire when she took part in the invasion of the Marshall Islands in January 1944. Heavily damaged during the fighting, the ship returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs and then as quickly headed back into action. In October 1944 "The Fighting I" took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. Planes that sortied from the carrier helped sink the Japanese battleship Musashi.

It was soon after that engagement that USS Intrepid suffered her first kamikaze hit, while in November she would be hit two more times by the suicide pilots. In March 1945 a bomb exploded just off the ship's bow, but despite all this, she remained in action and helped sink the Japanese battleship Yamato just weeks later. By the end of the war, USS Intrepid suffered a total of four kamikaze attacks as well as a torpedo strike yet she survived.

The Intrepid sustained a total of 270 casualties during the Second World War, and November 25, 1944 was the single most deadly day in the ship's history when two kamikaze aircraft struck the ship and killed 69 crew members. As a result of these repeated attempts to sink her, she became known as "The Ghost Ship" by the Japanese, as she continually returned to action. Truly the ship and her crew were "intrepid" in every respect.

After the war USS Intrepid was called back into service and was extensively modernized by the U.S. Navy in 1954. This included the removal of heavy guns, as well as the centerline elevator, while a new heavy-duty starboard side elevator was installed along with a new flight deck to handle modern combat jets. She became the principalship for multiple space mission recoveries including the recovery of the Mercury 7 and the Gemini 3 space capsules.

The USS Intrepid took part in three tours in Vietnam before being finally decommissioned in 1974. She served as an exhibit ship at the U.S Navy and Marine Corp bicentennial celebrations in Philadelphia in 1975-1976, before becoming a floating museum in New York City in 1982. While she hosted many special events and even served as an FBI operations center after the 9/11 attacks, the greatest foe was simply the elements and after years of neglect, she required badly needed repairs.

Fortunately, after a nearly two-year restoration effort from December 2006 to October 2008, which cost nearly $60million, the USS Intrepid was restored, renovated and ready to preserve the history of those who served aboard her.

On Veterans Day, November 11, 2008, she was officially rededicated by President George W. Bush, and today the ship is the centerpiece of the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum. The museum proudly displays more than 30 aircraft and chronicles the story of the ship that just wouldn't be sunk.

The F-106 Delta Dart Was One Mean Looking Fighter Jet (Ready to Dogfight) This jet made history for many reasons. by Peter Suciu

Throughout the Cold War, the United States Air Force continued to develop interceptor aircraft to address the threat from Soviet bombers. This included such aircraft as the Convair F-102 and the North American F-108, and finally, the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, which was designed to be the “Ultimate Interceptor.” But in the end, the F-106 actually proved that the need for such aircraft was simply overstated. 

That is why the Delta Dart was the last dedicated interceptor in the U.S. Air Force to date. 

The all-weather interceptor was developed as a variation on the F-102 Delta Dagger in the early 1950s, and it was originally designated as the F-102B as it retained the delta wing design. Due to extensive structural changes, including changes to the fuselage, and the inclusion of a more power Pratt & Whitney J-75 turbojet engine—which provided a maximum speed of 1,525 miles per hour and a cruising speed of 650 miles per hour—it was re-designated F-106 Delta Dart.  

While it was the last dedicated interceptor, the aircraft was also among the earliest semi-autonomous military weapon platforms. The F-106 was fitted with a sophisticated Hughes MA-1 electronic and fire control system, which worked in conjunction with the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) defense system that took over control of the plane shortly after takeoff and guided it to the proper altitude and attack position. The system would enable the aircraft to lock and fire the weapons at an intruder aircraft and then return the plane to the vicinity of its airbase. The pilot would take over control for landing.  

Armaments that were compatible with the aircraft included the Douglas AIR-2A Genie rocket with nuclear warhead, and the AIM-4 Falcon missiles, of which four could be carried.  

The first F-106A flew in late December 1956, while deliveries to the Air Force began in 1959 but ended just over a year later. In total only 277 F-106As and 63 F-106Bs had been built. While it was considered for use in the Vietnam War, the F-106 Delta Dart remained stateside and was never used in combat.  

One particular F-106 stood out after it earned the colorful nickname “Cornfield Bomber,” when it was involved in an incident during a training mission from Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana in February 1970. The interceptor, which was in service with the 71st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron and piloted by Captain Gary Foust was on a routine flight when it suddenly entered an uncontrollable flat spin. Foust attempted unsuccessfully to regain control, and even deployed the aircraft’s drag chute as a last resort, but finally, Foust was forced to eject. 

In a most unusual situation, the resulting change of balance actually caused by ejection somehow allowed the aircraft to stabilize. Miraculously, the unpiloted F-106 Delta Dart recovered and made a gentle belly landing in a snow-covered field near Big Sandy, Montana. After minor repairs, the aircraft was returned to service and later served with the 49th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. The Cornfield Bomber was retired from service in 1986 and presented to the National Museum of the United States Air Force, where it is currently on display.  

The F-106 Delta Dart proved to be the last dedicated Air Force interceptor, and the aircraft were gradually retired by the early 1980s. Some of those aircraft were converted into target drones and designated QF-106A, while six were retained by NASA for test purposes and used throughout the 1990s. 

China Has Finally Pushed India into America’s Arms It has long been discussed that China may engineer a new, carrier-based variant of its J-31 jet, in what might appear as a transparent attempt to rival America’s F-35 fighter jet. by Shairee Malhotra

A military border stand-off between nuclear-armed neighbors India and China in the Himalayas escalated into deadly clashes on June 15, constituting the worst fighting between the two countries in over five decades and leaving scores of dead and injured soldiers on both sides.

The latest round of blows signifies a major escalation in a border confrontation between the two most populous nations and largest armies, especially since the mutually-respected rules of engagement, having prevented a single casualty for forty-five years, were finally broken. India has now accused China of violating these rules in a “premeditated” attack on its troops in the strategically important Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

Relative Peace and Troubled Waters

Despite ongoing disputes, both sides maintained relative peace and built upon their complex relationship. So much so that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met a whopping eighteen times since Modi’s election in 2014. Unfortunately, these meetings that were meant to build this relationship now serve as mere images, seared into the minds of angry Indians, of the two leaders swinging cozily on the banks of the Sabarmati river in Ahmedabad during Xi’s visit to Modi’s home state of Gujarat. The violent standoff has shocked the country and raised questions on what Modi’s diplomatic efforts and alleged bonhomie with Xi have achieved.

For Indians, history stands as a painful reminder when it comes to China. India’s crushing defeat at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army during the 1962 border conflict with China was a turning point in India’s foreign policy vision—it led to a massive strategic shift from idealism to realpolitik and forced India to prioritize and embrace hard power aspects such as military modernization, in addition to developmental and other national concerns.

This idealism pushed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the time, under his Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai (India and China are brothers) rhetoric, has evoked a bitter sensation of déjà vu for Indians. As the old saying goes, “Once bitten twice shy.” But as China betrayed India in the 1960s, fast forward to 2020, and it seems China has once again stabbed India in the back.

India today stands at a critical juncture as it can no longer avoid making serious choices and difficult diplomatic decisions. Amidst efforts to de-escalate, one thing is certain—the scale of recent killing ensures that business-as-usual is no longer an option.

America in the Wings

Unlike in the 1960s when India did not gravitate towards the United States during the Cold War, India now finds itself in a more favorable position, with Uncle Sam waiting in a long-overdue embrace.

America’s desire for stronger ties with India is no secret. It has long wooed and courted India as a security and economic partner and counterweight to an expansionist and assertive China. But in line with its Cold War hangover of non-alignment, India has demonstrated reluctance to align as explicitly as America wishes for fear of provoking its more powerful neighbor.

Even under Modi’s energetic diplomacy, India continued to tread with balance and caution in its foreign relations. Scholars argue that India’s Cold War-era strategic thinking persists and “non-alignment” has simply become “multi-alignment”—both essentially implying an aversion to alliances.

And yet over the past several years, India has heightened its geniality towards the United States. As part of broader efforts to balance China’s growing power, India joined several security groupings, including QUAD and JAI with like-minded democracies America, Japan, and Australia. Just recently, Australia and India signed a major defense agreement, granting access to each other’s military bases. India’s relationship with Israel—one of America’s staunchest allies—underpinned by its “sky is the limit” rhetoric is already a favorite of the Modi administration. But the road has often been rocky—trade issues and unrealistic expectations dampened outcomes. Even so, India has slowly but steadily moved closer to the American camp.

As nations fumed at China’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and China-U.S. tensions peaked, India too jumped on the bandwagon of global backlash, albeit in a more subtle way. While officials behaved with nuance and steered clear of blame games regarding China’s coronavirus response, Indian media peddled an anti-China narrative, urging the boycott of Chinese products. Political figures critiqued China’s lack of transparency and authoritarianism, going so far as questioning the Chinese model of governance. India, along with Australia and the European Union, imposed certain restrictions on Chinese investments in their countries, further demonstrating this subtle approach.

None of these actions went unnoticed. Wary of closer Indo-American ties, the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Global Times news outlet published editorials cautioning India from involving itself in U.S.-China tensions and serving as an American pawn against China. Picking up on this notion, Brookings scholar Tanvi Madan believes closer India-U.S. ties triggered the border standoff, with Beijing intending to show India its rightful place.

Instead, China’s deadly actions might have achieved exactly the opposite—cementing New Delhi’s strategic tilt towards Washington.

The deadly standoff between the two Asian giants is India’s starkest test yet and will spark a mammoth change in India’s attitude towards China going forward. With India’s 2020 military budget of $74 billion, relatively small compared to China’s $179 billion, the asymmetries of power between the two countries—both economically and militarily—are significant. As Samir Saran, head of India’s Observer Research Foundation opines, a sustained response to Chinese aggression means India will have to utilize its military, economic, and political options.

Likeminded partners are equally important for India in this context, and the standoff could be the catalyst India needs to finally shed non-alignment in its traditional sense and align its interests with those of the United States, with lesser qualms or hesitations.

As former Indian foreign secretary Gokhale recently stated, “In the post-COVID age, enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.” As the tragic events along its border with China have shown, India may have finally learned this lesson the hard way.

Shairee Malhotra is the 2020 South Asia Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, and Associate Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels. A graduate of Queen Mary University of London where she received her MA in International Relations, Shairee has over six years of experience in think tanks in Mumbai and Brussels and has also worked with the European External Action Service (EEAS)