China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive Beijing Is Using New Methods to Spin the Pandemic to Its Advantage. By Laura Rosenberger

A billboard thanking Xi Jinping for China’s coronavirus assistance in Belgrade, Serbia, April 2020

From the first days of COVID-19’s appearance in the city of Wuhan, China’s leaders focused on control—not only of the coronavirus itself but also of information about it. They suppressed initial reporting and research about the outbreak, thereby slowing efforts to understand the virus and its pandemic potential. They called for “increased internet control” when the Politburo Standing Committee met in early February. They even sent “Internet police” to threaten people posting criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its handling of the virus.

Before long, that effort at controlling information went global. As it began to contain the outbreak within its own borders, Beijing launched an assertive external information campaign aimed at sculpting global discussion of its handling of the virus. This campaign has clear goals: to deflect blame from Beijing’s own failings and to highlight other governments’ missteps, portraying China as both the model and the partner of first resort for other countries. Some of this campaign’s elements are familiar, focused on promoting and amplifying positive narratives about the CCP while suppressing information unfavorable to it. But in recent weeks, Beijing has taken a more aggressive approach than usual, even experimenting with tactics drawn from Russia’s more nihilistic information operations playbook. That strategy aims not so much to promote a particular idea as to sow doubt, dissension, and disarray—including among Americans—in order to undermine public confidence in information and prevent any common understanding of facts from taking hold.

“BE TRANSPARENT!”     

When reports of the novel coronavirus surfaced in December, the CCP at first focused on suppressing them—most notoriously by punishing the “whistleblower doctor” Li Wenliang, who later succumbed to the virus about which he had tried to sound the alarm. (Censors were overwhelmed by the eruption of online tributes following his death, some of which invoked the song “Do You Hear the People Sing?” from Les Misérables—a rallying cry for protesters in Hong Kong—or cited the article in the Chinese constitution that provides for freedom of expression.) But as China began to get the virus’s spread under control internally and outbreaks started outside its borders, the focus changed.

Seizing the fortunate timing and vacuum of global leadership, China began sending medical aid to European countries facing outbreaks (some items proved substandard or defective)—along with an aggressive messaging strategy to tout this assistance. Chinese officials and media sought to paper over their own failings and recast China as the leader in a global response to the pandemic. This tactic was particularly prevalent in Italy, the first European country to be hard hit by the virus (and which formally signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative last year). The Chinese embassy there embraced the hashtag #ForzaCinaeItalia (“Let’s Go, China and Italy”), which Italian researchers found was then heavily amplified by a network of bots on Twitter.

Yet these positive narratives about Chinese aid have been accompanied by more negative messages, focused especially on the failings of the United States. Chinese officials and media have criticized Washington’s slow response to the virus. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian tweeted: “Countries like Singapore, ROK took necessary measures & put the epidemics under control because they made full use of this precious time China bought for the world. As for whether US availed itself of this window, I believe the fact is witnessed by US &the world.” The always trolling Hu Xijin, editor in chief of Global Times (an English-language offshoot of the CCP’s People’s Daily), tweeted, “What really messed up the world is failure of the US in containing the pandemic.” A press release issued by the Chinese embassy in Paris hailed the success of China’s “dictatorship” over the United States’ “flagship of democracy,” pushing the message that Beijing’s model is superior and that it, rather than Washington, is the reliable partner to countries in need. In what could be called projection, Chinese officials and CCP media outlets have even criticized the United States for a lack of transparency about the virus’s spread. “Be transparent! Make public your data! US owe us an explanation!” tweeted Zhao Lijian. Notably, state media outlets have paid to promote these stories to U.S. audiences, in undisclosed political ads on Facebook and Instagram—platforms that are blocked in China.

These voices have not stopped at mere criticism. They have actively pushed disinformation about the origin of the coronavirus, including on Twitter (which is also blocked within China). The most prominent conspiracy theory—that the virus actually originated in the United States—first circulated internally in China, with the apparent assent of censors. It broke through to an external audience when Zhao Lijian tweeted an article from a known pro-Kremlin conspiracy website alleging that the virus originated in a U.S. bioweapons lab and was spread by the U.S. Army. More than a dozen Chinese ambassadors and embassies, from South Africa to France, amplified the story on Twitter, and the tweet went viral. Even after Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai disavowed it, other Chinese officials and media outlets have continued to spread it. Global Times piled on with another theory, twisting the words of an Italian scientist to suggest that the virus actually may have started in Italy.

Beyond overt information campaigns, Chinese operatives have also engaged in covert efforts to manipulate information and sow chaos—even amplifying false text messages that went viral in the United States in mid-March warning in panicked tones that Trump was about to order a two-week national quarantine. The messages caused such panic that the National Security Council took the unusual step of tweeting that they were false.

These efforts reflect changes not just in Beijing’s message but also in the mechanisms by which it is transmitted. Over the past year, the number of Chinese diplomats and embassies on Twitter has grown by more than 250 percent. On other Western social media platforms, the government has undertaken aggressive advertising to grow its audience; Chinese state media outlets, such as Global Times, CGTN, and Xinhua, represent several of the fastest-growing media pages on Facebook, according to research from Freedom House. And the Chinese government has invested billions of dollars in its foreign media presence, creating wider channels to distribute Beijing’s messages to external audiences.

INFORMATION IS POWER

Beijing has long understood that harnessing information can be a means of exercising geopolitical power. Particularly under President Xi Jinping, CCP doctrine has emphasized the importance of “discourse power”—“Beijing’s aspirations not only to have the right to speak on the international stage but also to be listened to, to influence others’ perceptions of China, and eventually to shape the discourse and norms that underpin the international order,” as Nadège Rolland of the National Bureau of Asian Research has described it. But China’s external information efforts have typically focused on promoting positive narratives (as with its COVID-19-related assistance) and suppressing criticism. China’s expulsion of reporters from The Wall Street Journal in retaliation for coverage of underreporting data on the virus’s spread and a controversially titled op-ed on its handling of the outbreak is consistent with its long-standing posture toward critical information. But new elements of China’s information strategy represent a departure from past practice—suggesting that Chinese officials see its usual approach as insufficient to the current crisis and are thus resorting to more extreme measures.

For those, Beijing seems to have looked to Moscow, which focuses less on promoting a positive image of Russia and instead aims to sow confusion and deflect blame. Russian officials, diplomats, and state media regularly promote extreme views, conspiracy theories, and doubts about democratic institutions on social media, while networks of covert accounts spread divisive or conspiratorial content without the fingerprints of the state. For example, the coordinated use of diplomatic accounts to spread disinformation—in the form of multiple, conflicting narratives meant to muddy rather than supplant the truth—has been a key part of the Kremlin’s playbook. In 2014, when Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine by Russian-provided missiles, Russian officials pushed outlandish claims about a Ukrainian fighter jet being the real culprit or President Vladimir Putin’s jet the real target. In 2018, after Russian military intelligence’s poisoning of the former KGB agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom, they spread theories pinning the blame on everyone from the Americans to the Georgians. China’s recent promotion of known conspiracy-theory websites is another move taken from the Russian playbook. And all of this comes at a time of broader intersection between the messaging of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian state information actors: Russian and Iranian state media account for two of the top five most retweeted news outlets by Chinese officials and media.

Whether or not this more negative approach marks a permanent break from China’s previous strategy, it is part of a clear trend. During the Hong Kong protests last year, Beijing began experimenting with covert information operations on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, using false personas and pages that aimed to discredit the protesters by portraying them as violent. And Chinese officials and media have promoted conspiracy theories about both the Hong Kong protests (alleging that the United States is behind them) and the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang (sharing stories from a conspiracy site to dismiss research by “U.S.- and NATO-funded” institutions on camps in Xinjiang as “lies”). Like the Hong Kong protests, the COVID-19 information campaign may be another opportunity for Beijing to update its information arsenal.

At least some of these efforts may be intended as an internal bank shot: by sowing doubt externally about the virus’s origins, the CCP can reinforce that view within China without officially promoting it. Indeed, Beijing’s strategy is likely driven both by insecurity at home and by opportunism abroad. Through its combination of positive and negative messaging, the CCP has been able to persuade the Chinese people not only that its model is an example for the world but also that the CCP is pushing back on efforts to blame China—and ethnically Chinese people—for the virus. Racist and xenophobic tropes about the virus and anti-Chinese hate crimes—which state media have aggressively recounted to audiences within China—have only helped the CCP, allowing it to stoke nationalism, dismiss criticism of China’s handling of the virus as racism, and present itself as defending the honor of the Chinese people.

MIXED SIGNALS

This aggressive new information strategy carries risks for Beijing, and in some quarters it seems to be backfiring. Lashing out at the United States, spreading disinformation, and amplifying conspiracy sites risk undermining any positive image China has managed to develop. Simultaneously portraying itself as a responsible global provider of public goods while engaging in irresponsible behavior online sends contradictory signals.

But the strategy may nonetheless succeed if democracies around the world don’t counter it wisely with their own affirmative strategy for the ongoing information contest of which this episode is just the latest chapter. So far, Washington has if anything played into Beijing’s hands. Its bungled initial response to the novel coronavirus and failure to coordinate with allies created openings for China to present itself as a more reliable partner than the United States. The United States’ refusal to sign on to a G-7 statement because other countries would not agree to use the term “Wuhan virus” undermined a multilateral effort and gave the CCP a propaganda win.

Washington should seize the opportunity to coordinate with European allies, who are increasingly concerned about China’s play for influence. European Union High Representative Josep Borrell explicitly called out the way in which the “politics of generosity” is being weaponized for geopolitical purposes in a “struggle for influence.” French President Emmanuel Macron similarly urged Europeans not to be “intoxicated” with the narratives that China and Russia have pushed alongside their aid as a means of dividing Europeans internally. But while others in his administration have called out China’s disinformation efforts, U.S. President Donald Trump has excused them because “every country does it.”

Democracies cannot win the information contest with authoritarian regimes such as China’s by adopting their tactics. Instead, the United States needs to embrace transparency—including acknowledging its own failings and promoting accurate information—and work with its democratic partners and allies on a shared approach. China will succeed in using the pandemic to “emerge from the wreckage as more of a global leader than it began,” as Mira Rapp-Hooper has written, only if the United States lets it.

China Is the Ultimate Geopolitical Paper Tiger And America Must Challenge It The United States is challenging China for the first time since Richard Nixon opened the door to Chinese economic expansion in the seventies. This challenge has shown us that China is a paper tiger and it will never have a greater effect on the world than it does now if we stay the course. by Arthur Machado

The Western World’s attempt to bring China into the world of Democratic nations using economic incentives has failed. The laissez-faire approach favored by the West has revealed China and its leadership do not intend to allow their country to enter the modern era of personal freedom. Although China has embraced modern economics and the advance of technology this has not led to the adoption of a modern political and human-rights ideology. If anything China’s rejection of individual human rights has grown even more abusive as it suppressed information about the coronavirus, places over one million Muslim, Uighurs, in thinly disguised concentration camps, and adopts a computer-driven social rating and internal spy system that persecutes its own citizens restricting everything from the individual right of travel to job prospects and what consumer products the unworthy can buy. As China oppresses its own people, it has attacked Taiwan’s free and open elections and exerted unprecedented control over international and multinational entities bringing organizations ranging from the NBA, Uber, and even a worldwide technological behemoth like Google, to heel. 

If the United States stays the course, and, what used to be known as the free world, can put aside its petty political machinations, then the Chinese goal of world economic, military and political dominance can be stopped. The United States is challenging China for the first time since Richard Nixon opened the door to Chinese economic expansion in the seventies. This challenge has shown us that China is a paper tiger and it will never have a greater effect on the world than it does now if we stay the course. Had the political opposition been less vicious and unrelenting and if U.S. leaders can unify on foreign policy and trade, as it has in the past, then the West would be in an even better position to control Xi Jinping’s attempt to assert Chinese hegemony then it is now.

China’s largest natural resource is its labor force. However, the growing wage demands of Chinese labor have made it uncompetitive with other low-cost manufacturing nations. In an attempt to alleviate this burden, some Chinese companies have even resorted to conscripting foreign, slave labor. Economically, absent its huge low-cost labor force, it has insufficient resources or intellectual capital to keep its industry afloat. Most notably, its petrochemical reserves provide less than 40 percent of its total oil and gas needs, and without its ability to plunder the intellectual property of businesses and countries who use its factories it would be technologically moribund. Allegations that the Chinese government modified computer motherboards to include spying hardware is also driving large industry and governments away from using products with hardware origins in China, which hurts the high-end technical aspect of China’s industry. United States’ tariffs and now the coronavirus is also beginning to reduce interest in investment in China. Investors and manufacturers are moving their production to avoid future trade wars and resultant supply chain issues.

China’s military strength is also overblown. Overly regimented and isolated, it has substandard land and air forces and little strategic naval power or a naval tradition on which to build one. Certainly not a nation any country would want to invade, the narrow trade routes leading to Chinese ports mean U.S. naval forces could blockade and stop Chinese aggression by sea and it is unlikely, even with its obsolete and underfunded forces, Russia would be unable to stop Chinese aggression to the west. Oil, the lifeblood of its economy, could be stopped far from the Chinese coast and naval exit pathways out of China must pass by major United States’ military installations throughout the Pacific. Absent an unexpected surprise, or a nuclear attack, in the event of war it is unlikely any Chinese shipping would get into or out of the East and South China Seas. Leaving its only supply routes overland through Russia, India or Central Asia which would require years of infrastructure build-up in the west and other than Russia, which might see an opportunity to hurt the United States none of these countries have any great interest in helping China.

In the end, we can continue to politically oppose U.S. policies aimed at reining in Chinese economic and humanitarian abuses or we can set aside our political differences and support a unified foreign policy.

The future of the free world awaits our decision.

Pompeo Hints At U.S. Alternative To World Health Organization After Coronavirus The Trump administration has taken aim at the group for alleged Chinese influence. by Matthew Petti

US. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hinted that the United States could create its own alternative to the World Health Organization in a Thursday interview with Laura Ingraham of FOX News. 

The Trump administration has cut all U.S. funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) amid accusations that the international medical body helped cover for China’s mishandling of the novel coronavirus. Pompeo suggested that the United States would demand drastic changes before restoring its relationship with the organization—if at all.

“I think we’ve got to take a real hard look at the WHO and what we do coming out of this,” he said. “We need a fix. We need a structural fix for the WHO.”

Ingraham asked Pompeo whether it was possible that the United States could call for WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus’s resignation.

“No, I think that’s right, Laura,” he responded. “Even more than that, it may be the case that the United States can never return to underwriting—having U.S. taxpayer dollars go to the WHO. We may need to have even bolder change than that.”

“Yeah, make our own organization,” Ingraham responded, before changing the topic to the controversy around the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

U.S. officials have anonymously alleged that the novel coronavirus, which first emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan, first infected members of the public in a laboratory accident at the virology center.

Pompeo did not endorse the theory, but said that China has not been transparent enough about the origins of the virus.

“We still don’t have the transparency and openness we need in China, and it is the World Health Organization’s responsibility to achieve that transparency,” he told Ingraham. “You recounted what happened in January and the delayed announcement about the pandemic, and the fact that China had asked them not to announce, and the World Health Organization didn’t do that.”

The Trump administration and its supporters are not alone in expressing concern about Chinese influence at the World Health Organization.

Bernie Sanders campaign co-chair Rep. Ro Khanna (D–Calif.) has called for using U.S. funding for the WHO as leverage to demand transparency and counter Chinese influence.

China’s rivals in its near abroad have also clashed with the WHO over allegations of Chinese influence.

Japanese deputy prime minister Taro Aso has referred to the body as the “Chinese Health Organization.” Taiwan, an autonomous island that China considers a renegade Chinese province, claims that the WHO ignored its early warnings because the public health body refuses to recognize the Taiwanese government.

Even the Iranian government, a close ally of Beijing, has expressed serious doubts about the officially-reported coronavirus statistics in China.

“What’s been great is to see other countries around the world to begin to recognize the WHO’s failures as well,” Pompeo told Ingraham.

Are America and China Headed Towards a South China Sea Showdown? Is Beijing trying to push forward on its maritime claims while the world is battling Coronavirus? by Peter Suciu

This week American warships, which were joined by an Australian Navy vessel, took part in a drill in the South China Sea as tensions rise again between China, Malaysia, and Vietnam over the disputed waters. The USS America (LHA-6), an amphibious assault ship, which operates with at least five Marine F-35B Lightning II fighters as well as MV-22Bs tiltrotors and CH-53 helicopters as part of a typical Maine air combat element, remains the most significant operational naval asset in the region as the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) remains in Guam while its crew recovers from the coronavirus. 

The New York Times reported that USS America, joined by the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) and Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52), entered the contested waters off Malaysia, as Chinese government survey ship Haiyang Dishi 8 has been "tailing" a Malaysian state oil company ship that is carrying out exploratory drilling. Despite working to control the spread of the coronavirus, which originated in China last year, Beijing has not reduced its activities in the strategic waterway throughout which one-third of global shipping flows.

Military analysts have said Chinese assertiveness has only intensified.

"It's a quite deliberate Chinese strategy to try to maximize what they perceive as being a moment of distraction and the reduced capability of the United States to pressure neighbors," Peter Jennings, a former Australian defense official and current executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told The New York Times on Monday.

The three American warships were joined this week by the Australian frigate HMS Parramatta to counter-movements by the Haiyang Dizhi 8, which was accompanied by a Chinese coastguard vessel.

"During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and US navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills," the Australian defence department said in a statement to Reuters.

The U.S. Navy is also operating two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), USS Montgomery (LCS-8) and USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS-10) in the South China Sea, where such standoffs have almost become routine.

Earlier this month, the Vietnamese accused a Chinese patrol ship of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat, and last month China opened two new research stations on artificial reefs it had build on waters claimed by the Philippines and other nations in the region. Those reefs are equipped with defense silos and military-grade runways. However, the actual ability to use those artificial reefs as viable military bases is questionable due to the reported shoddy construction and climate change that is allowing the ocean to slowly sink the unstable islands.

The United States has also accused Beijing of increasing its presence in the South China Sea as other nations in the region are dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak. At the same time, China has also been donating medical aid to South-east Asian countries to help battle the coronavirus. A team of Chinese medical experts even arrived in Malaysia this week to help address the more than 5,400 cases of the infection.

In addition, despite this rattling of sabers, Malaysia and China retain strong economic relations, and Malaysia has even ordered four 68-meter Keris-class Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) from China. The first of its class was delivered in January and the second vessel has been delayed due to coronavirus, while the remaining two – to be built in Wuhan – could be delayed beyond next year's scheduled delivery date.

Here's What Would Happen If Kim Jong-Un Suddenly Died Who would lead and what might China do? by Nam Seung Hyun

The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will act as an Achilles’ heel of international politics in Northeast Asia, where the balance of power is maintained, as well as on the Korean Peninsula. The impact of his sudden death will be analyzed on a dual-level, both domestically and abroad. Domestically, his death will undermine the durability of the Kim family’s dictatorship. In particular, various changes in Pyongyang’s inner power system will occur, such as whether the Kim’s three generations of hereditary regime will continue or not.  

His younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, who has played the number two role since the end of last year, will temporarily be at the forefront of power. However, in the absence of absolute power, her temporary power will not last long in North Korea’s patriarchal society. After a year or so of transition, a collective leadership system will emerge, as was the case after the deaths of the Soviet Union’s Stalin and China’s Mao Zedong in the past. China will also focus on stabilizing Pyongyang by constructing a pro-Chinese shadow cabinet.

Next, various changes will occur in the balance of power by maintaining the status quo of the international situation in Northeast Asia. China expects at least 3 million North Koreans to move from North Korea to the Chinese border to survive. China will provide emergency supplies to stabilize the situation in the North Korean region on the Korean Peninsula and will do its best to prevent the collapse of security. In particular, Beijing’s military will prepare to mobilize forces in case of various scenarios, such as if the ROK-U.S. alliance sends its forces northward from the Imjin River near the Demilitarized Zone to the Pyongyang Daedong River-Wonsan Line. The Chinese leadership will focus on preventing the collapse of the buffer zone between the maritime and continental forces. 

Eventually, a full-scale dialogue between U.S. and Chinese leaders will be needed. Russia and Japan, which are considered to be traditional stakeholder interests, will also mobilize to minimize the negative impact of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Inevitably, military tensions on the Korean Peninsula will increase.

Why America's Accusations That China Is Testing Nuclear Weapons Harms Arms Control The success of the CTB Treaty requires good-faith arguments. by Sahil Shah

In a new compliance report released last week, the United States once again accused Russia, and now China, of violating the “zero-yield” standard or threshold envisioned under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). While “zero,” “yield,” and “threshold” do not appear in the text of the CTBT, the United States, Russia, China, and other negotiating parties have always held the interpretation that the Treaty bans nuclear test explosions with any yield, anywhere.  

The current U.S. administration’s vague and ungrounded claims pointing to possible Russian and Chinese “low-yield” nuclear testing are vexingly unsubstantiated and ultimately harm progress on arms control, strategic stability, and confidence-building. These thinly-supported claims are also counterproductive to American national security goals, especially as President Trump’s team continues to propose a “new generation” of trilateral arms control agreements that would include both Russia and China. Washington cannot achieve this important goal without producing pragmatic proposals to back its vision. Instead of using the common lack of CTBT ratification between America and China as an opportunity to take what would be a tremendously positive joint step, the U.S. administration is using it to spark increased animosity.

Many worry that the U.S. accusations have been made in less than good faith. Given the general lack of enthusiasm for the CTBT in the administration, it is difficult to conclude otherwise. For example, as one of the lead negotiating countries of the CTBT and the only signatory that pays a significant single share of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)’s operational budget, the U.S. government has done a disservice to its own diplomatic record and financial investment by leaving out any mention of the Treaty in the report. Failure to even mention the CTBT, which is a cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, sends a poor message to the international community about this administration’s sentiments towards the Treaty’s relevance and value. 

With current tensions with China heightened over the COVID-19 pandemic, the information environment is ripe for some American lawmakers to mobilize the claim that China is engaging in “low-yield” nuclear testing as a tool to withdraw Washington from the CTBT altogether. However, the concerns are seemingly based on higher activity levels at the Chinese Lop Nur test site. If the same metrics were used, the same accusations could also be leveled against American activities at the U.S. Nevada test site. Senior Chinese officials have made it clear that alleged talk in the United States about “unsigning” the CTBT and American preparations to resume nuclear testing at a shorter notice have made consensus difficult amongst the Chinese National People’s Congress on the CTBT. While China says it is committed to ratification, these actions have made it far easier for China to put the onus back on America to break open the “log-jam” that is stagnating progress on the Treaty’s entry-into-force.  

In contrast to the unclear claims against China, the new report explicitly asserts that Russia has conducted experiments that produced nuclear yield as the result of supercritical chain reactions. However, the United States “does not know how many, if any, supercritical or self-sustaining nuclear experiments Russia conducted in 2019.” Moreover, the Trump administration offers no numbers of violations, or evidence, for the other years since the CTBT was finalized in 1996. Russia, which ratified the CTBT a number of years ago, has wholly dismissed U.S. allegations with a similar tone to China’s reaction. 

It has become clear that part of the issue is the semiotic slippage of what constitutes a “nuclear test.” U.S. accusations over “low yield” testing concern so-called tiny “hydro-nuclear” tests that involve explosively compressing plutonium or uranium to produce a supercritical chain reaction and a nuclear yield equivalent to only grams of TNT. Scientists have long described these tests as “tickling the dragon’s tail.” Unfortunately, hydro-nuclear tests with a nuclear yield below that of the high explosive used to detonate the physics package are possibly undetectable or at least indistinguishable from the subcritical–or “zero-yield”–tests technically allowed under the CTBT. 

Thus, issues over “low-yield” nuclear testing are impossibly difficult to verify unless physical, on-site transparency inspections occur. In any case, hydro-nuclear tests of little to no nuclear yield are not going to provide Russia or China any militarily-significant advantages over America, and the utility of these tests varies based on previous test and design experience. In view of this, it is important to note that the United States, which has conducted more nuclear tests than any country, has no technical need for resuming any level of nuclear testing either.

One should not forget that the CTBT’s billion-dollar-plus, intricate array of sensors has exceeded expectations over the past two decades in its ability to detect nuclear tests anywhere and at any time. This was made clear when the International Monitoring System (IMS) detected a North Korean nuclear test with a yield of less than one kiloton in 2006. Twenty years prior to this, when technical experts were finalizing the parameters for the CTBT verification regime, they aimed at a global detection capability threshold of one kiloton. Since that 2006 test, the CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS)’s capacity has risen from less than 60 percent to 90 percent completion, continually improving its accuracy and agility along the way. 

While hundreds of IMS sensors listen to rhythms emanating from all corners of the planet, any anomalies that may be a nuclear test are assessed in real-time by an international group of technologists and scientists. Cross-correlation methods can be used to pinpoint even low-yield tests, as seen in the aforementioned North Korea case, but the system is not completely infallible. Anxieties over “low-yield” nuclear tests are one of the many reasons why consultation and clarification, confidence building measures, and on-site inspections are key parts of the CTBT.  

If these new accusations against China and Russia are meant to pave a path for a U.S. exit from the treaty, it is crucial that lawmakers and their national security advisors do not take Administration accusations at face value, but actually aim to understand the CTBT and its technical merits. Moreover, it is the job of the U.S. intelligence community to analyze activities that have implications for a country’s international obligations. If the intelligence community has information regarding Chinese or Russian activities that indicate behavior inconsistent with the CTBT, it should make it explicitly known. As has been done in the past, the Director of National Intelligence could appoint a panel of scientific experts from outside the intelligence community to review and report on whatever information, if any at all, underpins these claims.

All CTBT signatories, including all five major nuclear powers, share a responsibility to herald the treaty into force—a task which requires America and China to ratify. Without entry-into-force, the CTBTO’s international team of trained scientists cannot conduct intrusive, short-notice, and physical on-site inspections. Until then, it would be logical for the United States, China, and Russia to solve any concerns through the other options afforded to them under the CTBT. Russia has proposed transparency exchanges to the United States in the past, and America should respond positively and seek to include China in the development of a trilateral—or better yet, P-5 wide—protocol.

As previously suggested, increased trust could help lead to P-5 agreement on the provisional application of the CTBT and accompanying on-site-inspections in the event that the United States and China finally ratify the treaty. This is especially important if the treaty’s entry-into-force remains delayed by others. Such steps would offer the first tangible proposal for the “next generation” of arms that President Trump so desperately wants.

Thinly-supported accusations of Russian, and now Chinese, treaty-cheating based on “low yield testing” are perennial bad faith and counterproductive tactics that damage arms control and strategic stability. The United States must showcase commitment to finishing what it started by engaging in dialogue and ratifying the CTBT immediately alongside China. Only this will truly help unlock the Treaty’s full potential.

Forget the F-22 or F-35: Here Are 3 Exotic Stealth Fighters You've Never Heard Of The next generation? by Caleb Larson

The F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lighting II have stolen the spotlight in the world of aviation. So here are three stealth fighters under development that you may have never heard of.  

Generic Future Fighter

Engineers at Saab are already beginning work on Sweden’s newest fighter, which will be designed from the get-go as a stealth fighter. 

Working with Linköping University in Sweden, Saab created a sub-scale model of what they envision as their Generic Future Fighter. Though the demonstrator airframe was only a 13 percent scale model, it reportedly is able to fly and gave researchers some insights into stealth fighter development. 

In keeping with Saab’s delta wing heritage, the Generic Future Fighter model has a modified delta wing and smaller canards just below and rear of the cockpit. It has an F-22 style bubble canopy with a chine running the length of the nose. Also, like the F-22 Raptor, the Generic Future Fighter uses a canted tail design. 

The small size of the demonstrator served to quickly and cheaply gather real-world flight data. The demonstrator reportedly performed as expected. 

KAI KF-X

The KAI KF-X is a joint South Korean-Indonesian stealth fighter project. The project was conceptualized as far back as 2001, but was initially dismissed as too technologically challenging for South Korea’s domestic aircraft manufacturing sector, and too expensive. 

The project was reassessed in 2010 and a joint partnership was Indonesia was created to help offset some of the research and development costs. Indonesia holds a 20 percent stake in the project and has committed to buying approximately 50 of the airframes once they enter production. 

The KAI KF-X superficially appears similar to the F-35 stealth fighter, though its capabilities are likely much less stealthy. It too has a canted tail and a nose chine, although the overall airframe appears to be more compact than the F-35. It is intended to be stealthier than the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, and have more capabilities than the F-16 with greater range and service life. 

Project AZM

In tandem with China, Pakistan is reportedly developing a 5th generation stealth fighter. Like Pakistan’s previous venture with China, the JF-17, the AZM will likely be largely dependent on Chinese technology and assistance, though the final airframes may be assembled in Pakistan. 

China’s FC-31 stealth fighter may be a starting place for the Project AZM idea. It is lightweight, compact, and presumably on the cheaper (and less capable) side when compared to China’s Chengdu J-20. 

A home-grown stealth fighter would be a prestige win for Pakistan, though the likely focus on cost-reduction raises questions about the airframe’s final capabilities. Still, developing a stealth fighter would be an impressive feat for a country with a defense budget under $8 billion. 

Proliferating Capabilities

The proliferation of stealth technologies is the next frontier of weapon control regimes and may well rule the twenty-first-century.

Russian Army's New Enemy: Coronavirus Infections The Russian Defence Ministry has ordered some 15,000 soldiers back to base, where they will be put under a two-week quarantine in an effort to stop the spread of the new coronavirus. Even as recently as last week the Russian Army was still rehearsing for the Victory Day parade to be held on May 9 in Red Square to mark the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe – known in Russia as "The Great Patriotic War." by Peter Suciu

The Russian Defence Ministry has ordered some 15,000 soldiers back to base, where they will be put under a two-week quarantine in an effort to stop the spread of the new coronavirus. Even as recently as last week the Russian Army was still rehearsing for the Victory Day parade to be held on May 9 in Red Square to mark the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe – known in Russia as "The Great Patriotic War." 

Only late last week did Vladimir Putin finally announce the decision to postpone the celebrations, which were to include parades in approximately 450 cities all over Russia and also to include the participation of 116,000 military personnel, or about 10% of the Russian Armed Forces' peacetime strength. The holiday has remained significant in Russia as it honors the victims and veterans who took part in the conflict.

The "risks associated with the epidemic, whose peak has not passed yet, are extremely high," said Putin as reported by The Moscow Times. "This does not give me the right to begin preparations for the parade and other mass events now."

The Kremlin had been hesitant to postpone this year's event, as it was meant to strengthen ties with foreign leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, who was expected to attend. President Donald Trump had also been invited but declined due to concerns from his top advisors. However, National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien had planned to lead the American delegation at this year's parade.

The concern now is whether the preparations could have resulted in unnecessary exposure to COVID-19. A leaked video appeared online this month that showed thousands of troops lined up in tight formation at a parade ground outside of Moscow. The Russian Defence Ministry has confirmed that it held a parade rehearsal on April 1 with as many as 15,000 soldiers in attendance. 

Russia had been criticized for allowing the rehearsals for the parade to continue during the COVID-19 outbreak as soldiers were unable to practice social distancing despite Moscow and the surrounding region instituting strict physical distancing guidelines. It isn't clear if any of the soldiers who took part in the Victory Day preparations had been infected, but cases of coronavirus have been discovered in several Russian military units and academies. Earlier this month the defense ministry also confirmed that dozens of cadets and instructors from the Nakhimov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, which sent a delegation to march in the parade rehearsals, had been infected with the coronavirus.

With the postponement of the celebrations, the additional full dress rehearsals for the parade that had been scheduled for April 29 and May 4 have been canceled.

The Russian Army had also been in the spotlight for its efforts to help fight the spread of coronavirus across Europe. Last month Russian military transport planes brought medical specialists to an airbase outside of Rome to help Italy's efforts and this followed by missions in early April to Serbia. It is unclear if any of the personnel who took part in those missions may have been exposed to COVID-19.

The WHO's Relationship with China Has Become the Ultimate Left vs. Right Media War Despite the attempts by establishment media outlets to finesse the problem of the WHO’s relationship with China, that task is likely to get more difficult, not less, going forward. by Ted Galen Carpenter

A vigorous media war is taking place over whether to blame both China and the World Health Organization (WHO) for the spread of the coronavirus and the global tragedy it has spawned. Conservative outlets direct their fire at both targets and specifically defend President Trump’s decision to cut-off new funding for the WHO. Centrist and liberal journalists attempt to rebut criticisms of the WHO, and they argue that the need for continued funding and the international cooperation the WHO embodies is more urgent than ever before, given the severity of the current global pandemic. It is an increasingly awkward position, though, because the WHO’s advocates face the task of defending the organization without appearing to defend its cozy connections to China’s communist regime. 

That balancing act is especially difficult in the United States, given the surge of public opinion blaming Beijing for the spread of the virus.  A new Harris poll finds that 77 percent of Americans hold the Chinese government responsible. Moreover, there is widespread bipartisan agreement on that issue. The increasingly prominent narrative is that not only did the pandemic originate in China, but that Chinese officials withheld key information for weeks that could have enabled other countries to adopt measures impeding the spread of the deadly virus.  In late March, more than a month after the crisis erupted, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo charged that China’s government was still withholding important information.

Conservative outlets are especially determined to promote allegations about Beijing’s lack of transparency, with Fox News commentators leading the charge. But even some centrist and liberal publications have begun to feature articles accusing China’s government of “deceptive practices” and placing primary blame for the pandemic on Xi Jinping’s regime. 

A growing number of critics also blast the WHO for being utterly subservient to Beijing.  The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board stated bluntly that the WHO’s “bows to Beijing” had severely damaged the international response to the virus.  Other conservative publications echoed those accusations. Essentially, they accuse the WHO of being Communist China’s willing accomplice, or at least its enabler.

Two allegations are especially prominent. The first is that WHO officials reflexively repeated Beijing’s misleading positions about the nature and spread of the virus, and WHO statements were so positive about China’s performance in containing the spread that those statements amounted to fawning.  The other complaint is that the WHO had obediently done Beijing’s bidding and excluded Taiwan from participating in collective efforts to stem the spread of the virus, even though Taipei had been remarkably successful in its own containment efforts.  As with other coronavirus issues, some of those criticisms are spreading beyond the usual conservative publications into moderate and even left-of-center ones.

Nevertheless, most media reactions to President Trump’s April 14 decision to cut-off new funding to the WHO tended to follow ideological lines, as did the reaction in Congress. Conservative, anti-China publications generally praised the president’s action.  Most liberals predictably criticized the move as excessive and counterproductive. It was notable, though, that few in the latter faction defended the WHO’s relationship with China as part of rationale for opposing Trump’s edict. One attempt to fully exonerate the WHO and at least partially exonerate China, was a New York Times article by Richard Perez-Pena and Donald G. McNeil Jr.

Most WHO defenders, though, diligently have sought to separate the two issues. Writing in The Hill, international consultant K. Riva Levinson, made the distinction emphatically, saying “the WHO made mistakes, but it’s China that must be held accountable.” A few have gone even further, raising doubts about the wisdom of Trump’s funding cutoff, but still acknowledging that the WHO, as well as China, had not handled information about the coronavirus outbreak well at all.

In contrast to the defensive posture of most WHO supporters, proponents of the funding cut-off usually stress the China angle in their attacks on the WHO. Gordon G. Chang, a long-time basher of the communist regime, asserted that Trump was right to end funding because of the organization’s collaboration in Beijing’s disinformation program and its exclusion of Taiwan. Libertarians have joined with conservatives in attacking the WHO for its China connection. An article by one critic in the flagship libertarian publication Reason magazine contended that the WHO “helped spread Chinese lies about COVID-19.”

Despite the attempts by establishment media outlets to finesse the problem of the WHO’s relationship with China, that task is likely to get more difficult, not less, going forward. The extent of public hostility in the U.S. toward the Chinese government generally, and its role regarding the coronavirus pandemic in particular, will make expressing that position increasingly hazardous for journalistic reputations. Anti-China and anti-WHO forces smell blood, and they’re not about to cease their attacks on either target.