The U.S. Navy's Stealth USS Zumwalt Destroyer Finally Fires Its Guns The $4 billion ship was commissioned in 2016, but broke down while passing through the Panama Canal just a month later. It has faced other delays and cost overruns, but the Navy has called the delivery of the warship a "major milestone," as it had originally planned to buy more than two dozen of the stealth destroyers, which has been reduced to just three. by Peter Suciu

It isn't actually uncommon for some military warships to never fire their guns in anger—notably the HMS Dreadnought never participated in any First World War naval battles despite being designed to engage enemy battleships. When it comes to modern warships we must hope that the need to use them in combat can be avoided, but actually testing the weapons is necessary to maintain that peace.

This is why it was a big deal that the U.S. Navy's USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), which departed on its first operation in April, has now finally actually concluded a structural test fire of its Mark 46 MOD 2 Gun Weapons System (GWS).

Sailors aboard the stealthy destroyer, working with engineers and technicians from the Navy Surface Warfare Centers, successfully executed the test, which was conducted at the Naval Air Weapons Center Weapons Division Sea Test Range, Point Mugu last week.

The Mark 46 GWS is a remotely operated naval gun system that uses a 30mm high velocity cannon along with a forward looking infrared sensor, low light television camera and a laser rangefinder for shipboard self-defense against small, high-speed surface targets. The GWS is already a program of record that has been successfully installed and operated on LPD-17 and LCS class ships.

The test firing on board USS Zumwalt was the first large caliber weapons firing event for the new class of destroyers. It occurred just three weeks after the Navy officially accepted delivery of the combat system.

"The privilege of being a ‘first-in-class’ ship includes having the opportunity to systematically conduct testing across the breadth of systems installed onboard the ship," said Capt. Andrew Carlson, Zumwalt's commanding officer, in a statement. "The real plus is conducting those tests, such as today's live fire with the Mark 46 GWS, which provide tangible evidence of combat capability maturation."

The structural test fires were to assess the structural and electrical components of the ship against shock and vibration of the weapon firing, as well as to measure any potential hazards to personnel or degradations to adjacent equipment as a result of the firing live ordnance.

The $4 billion ship was commissioned in 2016, but broke down while passing through the Panama Canal just a month later. It has faced other delays and cost overruns, but the Navy has called the delivery of the warship a "major milestone," as it had originally planned to buy more than two dozen of the stealth destroyers, which has been reduced to just three.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) had called out the Navy for ongoing problems with the ship's originally planned 155mm deck guns. It was found that each round for the guns cost around $800,000. Since last year the Navy has explored other options for the Advanced Gun Systems. As a result the role of the destroyers has changed from land attack to offensive surface strike—and modifications to make that switch cost around $1billion the GAO noted as reported by Business Insider.

Despite the issues, the second of the Zumwalt-class, the USS Michael Monsoor, is undergoing combat system activation at her homeport of San Diego, while the third and final ship, the USS Lyndon B. Johnson, is currently under construction in Maine.

Autonomous Navy Ships Could Revolutionize Amphibious Assault The notion of a disaggregated, yet interwoven attack force, less vulnerable to enemy fire, will be launched to hit “multiple landing points” to exploit enemy defenses. by Kris Osborn

While this emerging Navy strategy is, of course, intended to implement a far more effective attack strategy, it is also, by design, intended to save more lives when launching dangerous assaults into heavily-defended enemy areas.

The future of amphibious attack may consist of thousands of disaggregated manned and unmanned surveillance boats, armor-carrying connectors, minesweepers and small attack vessels operating in tandem as the Navy and Marine Corps refine a new strategic approach and continue their pivot toward a new, great-power threat environment.

The concept is to configure a dispersed, yet “networked” fleet of next-generation connectors and other smaller boats launched from big-deck amphib “mother ships.” The larger host ships are intended to operate in a command and control capacity while bringing sensors, long-range fires and 5th-generation air support to the fight.

“We envision fleets of smaller, multi-mission vessels, operating with surface warfare leadership. People talk about a 355-ship Navy, how about a 35,000-ship Navy?,” Maj. Gen. David Coffman, Director of Naval Expeditionary Warfare, told an audience at the Surface Naval Association Symposium.

Coffman explained it as a “family of combatant craft, manned and unmanned, integrated in a distributed maritime operation.”

Since potential adversaries now have longer-range weapons, better sensors, targeting technologies and computers with faster processing speeds, amphibious forces approaching the shore may need to disperse in order to make it harder for enemy forces to target them. Therefore, the notion of a disaggregated, yet interwoven attack force, less vulnerable to enemy fire, will be launched to hit “multiple landing points” to exploit enemy defenses.

“This does not mean we give up the bigs, it means we use them more effectively. They are a big part of our ability to project combat power,” Coffman explained.

New ships, such as future Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCAC), Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV), Amphibious Combat Vehicles, ship-launched undersea drones and even newly up-gunned PC boats, are expected to empower the emerging strategy to introduce a new, more effective and lethal “over-the-horizon ship-to-shore” attack ability.

Future LCAC replacements, such as the now-under-construction Textron-built Ship-to-Shore Connectors, are expected to figure prominently in these anticipated missions. They introduce an unprecedented ability to transport 70-ton Abrams tanks to war and bring an integrated suite of new technologies to amphibious attack missions.

Execution of this new strategy is, depending upon the threat, also reliant upon 5th-generation aircraft, Coffman said; the Corp F-35B, now operational as part of Marine Corps Air Ground Task Forces aboard the USS Wasp and USS Essex, is intended to provide close-air support to advancing attacks, use its sensors to perform forward reconnaissance and launch strikes itself. The success of an amphibious attack needs, or even requires, air supremacy. Extending this logic, an F-35 would be positioned to address enemy air-to-air and airborne air-to-surface threats such as drones, fighter jets or even incoming anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles. The idea would be to use the F-35 in tandem with surveillance drones and other nodes to find and destroy land-based enemy defenses, clearing the way for a land assault.

The entire strategic and conceptual shift is also informed by an increased “sea-basing” focus. Smaller multi-mission vessels, according to this emerging strategy, will be fortified by larger amphibs operating as sovereign entities at safer distances. Coffman said these ships would operate as “seaports, hospitals, logistics warehouses and sea-bases for maneuver forces.”

A 2014 paper from the Marine Corps Association, the professional journal of the US Marine Corps, points to sea-basing as a foundation upon which the Navy will shift away from traditional amphibious warfare.

“Seabased operations enable Marines to conduct highly mobile, specialized, small unit, amphibious landings by stealth from over the horizon at multiple undefended locations of our own choosing,” the paper writes.

In effect, future “ship-to-shore” amphibious attacks will look nothing like the more linear, aggregated Iwo Jima assault. A Naval War College essay on this topic both predicts and reinforces Coffman’s thinking.

“The basic requirements of amphibious assault, long held to be vital to success, may no longer be attainable. Unlike the Pacific landings of World War II amphibious objective areas could prove impossible to isolate,” the paper, called “Blitzkrieg From the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and Amphibious Operations,” states. (Richard Moore, 1983)

The essay, written in the 80s during the height of the Cold War, seems to anticipate future threats from major-power adversaries. Interestingly, drawing from some elements of a Cold War mentality, the essay foreshadows current “great-power” competition strategy for the Navy as it transitions from more than a decade of counterinsurgency to a new threat environment. In fact, when discussing its now-underway “distributed lethality” strategy, Navy leaders often refer to this need to return its focus upon heavily fortified littoral defenses and open, blue-water warfare against a near-peer adversary - as having some roots in the Cold War era.

The Naval War College essay also seems to anticipate modern thinking in that it cites LCACs as fundamental to amphibious warfare, writing that LCACs can “land at several points along an enemy coastline, seeking out enemy weaknesses and shifting forces.”

LCACs can access over 70-percent of the shoreline across the world, something the new SSCs will be able to do as well. Designed with over-the-horizon high-speed and maneuverability, LCACs are able to travel long distances and land on rocky terrain and drive up onto the shore. Referring to a more dispersed or disaggregated amphibious attack emphasis, the Naval War College essay describes modern attack through the lens of finding “surface gaps” to exploit as a way to bypass or avoid “centers of resistance.”

Dispersed approaches, using air-ground coordination and forward positioned surveillance nodes, can increasingly use synchronized assault tactics, pinpointing advantageous areas of attack. Not only can this, as the essay indicates, exploit enemy weakness, but it also brings the advantage of avoiding more condensed or closely-configured approaches far more vulnerable to long-range enemy sensors and weapons. Having an SSC, which can bring a heavier load of land-attack firepower, weapons and Marines, helps enable this identified need to bring assault forces across a wide-range of attack locations. None of this, while intended to destroy technologically sophisticated enemies, removes major risks; Russian and Chinese weapons, including emerging 5th-generation fighters, DF-26 anti-ship missiles claimed to reach 900-miles and rapidly-emerging weapons such as drones, lasers and railguns are a variety of systems of concern.

New Amphibious Attack Platforms

The effort to integrate large numbers of multi-mission smaller craft, naturally hinges upon the continued development of vessels enabled by newer advanced technologies. Textron's upgraded Ship-to-Shore Craft includes lighter-weight composite materials, increased payload capacity, modernized engines and computer-automated controls. Also, SSC’s new Rolls Royce engines have more horsepower and specialized aluminum to help prevent corrosion. Textron engineers also say the SSC is built with digital flight controls and computer automation to replace the traditional yoke and pedals used by current connectors. As a result, on-board computers will quickly calculate relevant details such as wind speed and navigational information, according to Textron information.

The Navy’s 72 existing LCACs, in service since the 80s, can only transport up to 60-tons, reach speeds of 36-knots and travel ranges up to 200 nautical miles from amphibious vehicles. The first several SSCs, which have been built and launched on the water, bring a new level of computer networking, combat-power transport technology and emerging elements of advanced maritime propulsion systems. The new SSC's have also moved to a lower frequency for ship electronics, moving from 400 Hertz down to 60 Hertz in order to better synchronize ship systems with Navy common standards. Along with these properties, the new craft uses hardware footprint reducing advances to lower the number of gear boxes from eight to two.

As part of this overall attack apparatus, the Corps is preparing to deploy new BAE-built Amphibious Combat Vehicles by 2021. By integrating a new, more powerful engine, large weapons and digitized C4ISR systems, the ACV is expected to bring new mechanized firepower to amphibious assaults - when compared to the existing AAV - Amphibious Assault Vehicle. BAE is now beginning Low-Rate Initial Production as part of a Marine Corps plan to build hundreds of the new vehicles. Unlike existing tracked AAVs, ACVs are eight-wheeled vehicles engineered for greater speed, maneuverability and survivability. By removing the need for torsion bars, a wheeled-vehicle such as the ACV can build a v-shaped hull for additional protection, BAE Systems developers say. "The Marine Corps went from tracked to wheeled because of advances in automotive technology," said John Swift, Director of Amphibious Warfare.

These vehicles, if upgraded with advanced AI-enabled networking and computer technologies, could help identify threats, protect SSCs and of course bring needed firepower to amphibious landings. BAE and the Corps are now preparing to fire weapons at the new vehicle until the live-fire attacks achieve "total destruction," as a way to prepare the vehicle for combat, Swift said.

Mine Threat:

Coffman also explained that he envisions unmanned, yet networked LCACs as something which, among other things, can limit risk to Marines from a range of enemy attacks such as deep-water mines.

“We have significant gaps in our capability to defeat 100,000 Russian and Chinese mines which will not be laid in shallow water,” Coffman said. When accompanied by a fleet of small attack and reconnaissance vessels, SSCs will operate with more protection from mines and other enemy threats.

 

While this emerging Navy strategy is, of course, intended to implement a far more effective attack strategy, it is also, by design, intended to save more lives when launching dangerous assaults into heavily-defended enemy areas.

“Amphibious landings are marked by extremely high costs and heavy casualties, and are considered among the riskiest and least desirable operations to conduct,” the Marine Corps Association essay maintains.

Building the Post-Pandemic World The “West”— the idea, not the place—remains the most visionary, powerful, resourceful, inspiring, and sustainable hope for humanity. Our leaders must marshal these strengths now to build a post-pandemic world that will benefit future generations. by James Jay Carafano and Kurt Volker

The coronavirus pandemic has set the stage for the greatest upheaval in the global order since World War Two. China, Russia, Iran and other adversaries of America are positioning themselves to take advantage of the post-pandemic environment and may have significant advantages in doing so.

The United States cannot afford to ignore this reality and concentrate solely on spurring a domestic recovery. Washington must lead an international effort of like-minded democracies—including Allies and friends in Europe, Asia, South Asia and the Middle East—to shape the world emerging from coronavirus in a way that favors freedom, prosperity, and global security.

The “West”— the idea, not the place—remains the most visionary, powerful, resourceful, inspiring, and sustainable hope for humanity. Our leaders must marshal these strengths now to build a post-pandemic world that will benefit future generations.

Much of the world remains focused on repairing the local damage done by the coronavirus and taking international steps to improve preparedness for future pandemics. These are important and necessary efforts. But it is not too soon to begin thinking through the geopolitical impact of the virus and designing strategies for advancing western values and interests.

This is not the first time the West has faced a brave new world and needed to put together a vision and strategy for the future. 

Such was the case in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Gazing at the ashes of World War II, Western leaders concluded that the future of the victorious democratic community depended on the growth of democracy, independence, prosperity and security in the world as a whole. They established institutions and doctrines to help achieve those goals: the United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Bretton Woods institutions, the European Coal and Steel Community (which later became the EU), the International Court of Justice, NATO and more. It wasn’t perfect, but it reflected a clear vision and strategy for the long-term, and it brought tremendous results. 

We are at another such juncture in human history. Some of those institutions shaped seventy years ago still work. Others do not. Regardless, we need a clear vision and bold strategies to shape the post-pandemic world. Here are seven specific recommendations. 

1. Create a Series of Summits Among Like-Minded Democracies 

In the years preceding the coronavirus outbreak, expediency in making deals with adversaries—whether it was guzzling Russian gas, buying cheap Chinese manufactured goods, or cutting Iran some slack on nuclear development—took priority over insisting on values and principles. Multilateral organizations like the OECD, WTO, Council of Europe, UN Human Rights Council and others failed to enforce their own standards. Democracies were divided, complacent, and compromised.

The period of re-emergence from coronavirus represents an opportunity to rally like-minded democracies around common values and goals. This could be based on a series of agenda-setting summit meetings designed to advance a coherent, pro-freedom agenda, in organizations such as NATO, the G-7 (or “D-10” adding, Japan, Korea and Australia), U.S.-European Union, the Community of Democracies, USMCA, and more.

2. Create a Transatlantic Investment, Growth, and Resilience Pact (TIGRE) 

Together, North America and Europe represent the most prosperous, most secure, most law-abiding, and most freedom-respecting segment of the world. They have the political, economic and security heft to set the global agenda in ways that can protect freedom, market economic principles, rule of law, human rights, democratic systems, and global peace and security. The heart of this should be unleashing the power of investment and free and fair exchange of goods and services in a single, massive economic zone—one that links the USMCA, EU, and EFTA. Allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia could also adhere to such a zone.

A key part of such a pact is the identification of strategic infrastructure and industries that must be sourced within this democratic, free-market zone. This would effectively negate China’s efforts to make inroads in Europe through its Belt-and-Road initiative, or dominate 5G networks. States emerging from coronavirus will be tempted to build national barriers—but we would be far better served by lowering barriers among like-minded allies, and raising even higher barriers against authoritarian adversaries that do not share our values and interests. 

Past efforts to create a transatlantic trade and investment pact were hobbled by specialized interests in many countries, and ultimately too timid in seeking to tear down barriers and build a genuine, robust transatlantic economy. In the wake of the coronavirus, it may be possible to launch a revolutionary new Transatlantic Investment, Growth, and Resilience Pact.

3. Re-Prioritize NATO as an Integrated Security Provider to Contain Authoritarianism                                                                                         French president Emmanuel Macron told a painful truth when he described NATO as braindead. NATO remains the single most important guarantor of security for the transatlantic area, as well as the organization most capable of projecting security into crisis areas. But NATO needs a fresh infusion of political capital from its nation-states. As a consensus-based organization, the alliance is only as strong as the political commitment of its member states. This means every ally must recommit to NATO as the coordinator for dealing with all types of security threats. The United States needs to lead this effort.

   One reality the coronavirus crisis exposed is that security is not limited to the military domain. Cyber, information, energy, critical infrastructure and supply chains, and health systems all represent domains where the security of our societies is under constant threat. NATO has adapted to a changing threat environment several times in the past. It must adapt again, by expanding its understanding of the threat environment and by investing in the tools necessary to coordinate the policies and actions of its members in providing security in the twenty-first century. The reflection process initiated by NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg must be bold in recommending far-reaching changes to the operation of the alliance.             

4. Expand the Zone of Freedom, Open Economies, and Security

Over one hundred million people in Central and Eastern Europe now live in democracy, growing prosperity, and security thanks to post–Cold War NATO and EU enlargement. NATO and the EU are both stronger, and Europe is safer and more prosperous, as a result. Several nations in Europe’s neighborhood, however, remain outside this zone of freedom.                                       

The recent addition of North Macedonia as the alliance’s thirtieth member strengthens NATO, bolsters regional stability in the western Balkans, and sends a strong message to pernicious actors—such as Russia—that they do not have a veto right over the decisions of the sovereign member states of NATO. A transatlantic agenda should ensure that the door to NATO membership remains open for all qualified nations, especially for official candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, as well as for countries like Kosovo and Ukraine which hope to one day join the alliance.

It is clear that Ukraine has a long way to go before NATO membership becomes a serious possibility, and NATO should continue to foster closer relations. Ukraine continues to demonstrate that it sees its future allied with the West, not living under the yoke of Russian domination. Likewise for Georgia, which was first promised eventual membership at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.

In the wake of the coronavirus crisis—and recognizing the risk of authoritarian states seeking to capitalize in the post-pandemic world—NATO and the EU need to recommit to a process of enlargement to include all European democracies who meet the requirements of membership. Those standards incentivized important reforms in Central Europe in the past, and can still provide an incentive for reform in Europe’s neighborhood if the prospect of membership is real. For NATO, it will be essential to make clear that Russia’s occupation of the territory of some aspirant countries will not be an obstacle to membership. NATO and the aspirant country could agree on a no-first-use-of-force pledge in seeking the restoration of territorial integrity, and commit only to peaceful reintegration. 

5. Rebuild a Strategic Alliance with Germany 

In all of the above initiatives—from growth and investment to strengthening NATO and expanding the zone of freedom—the most important partner for the United States is Germany. The period leading up to the outbreak of the coronavirus represented the sharpest downturn in U.S.-German relations in generations. Coming out of the pandemic, the United States and Germany need to put aside the frictions of the past few years and work together on this new strategic agenda. This can begin with President Donald Trump and Chancellor Angela Merkel holding a special bilateral summit meeting, and be re-invigorated again both after the U.S. presidential election and after Germany’s Bundestag election. The relationship with France is also critical, especially given France’s role in key international organizations.  Rebuilding a Trump-Macron relationship will also be important, alongside this effort to strengthen a U.S.-German strategic alliance.

6. Strengthen the U.S.-UK Special Relationship 

With the UK on its way out of the European Union, it is essential that the United States ensure that the United Kingdom remains fully a part of the wider democratic, market-driven security community. The partnership with the United Kingdom should grow even stronger in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. The world’s largest and fifth-largest economies have an important role to play in helping to kickstart the global economy and can do so by implementing a free trade agreement that is already being negotiated between London and Washington. In concert with the TIGRE Pact referenced above, the U.S.-UK relationship can contribute to a greater whole, bringing all of the transatlantic community—and potentially other allies—together.    

7. Coordinate Western Policies to Reform Failing Global Institutions  

While the coronavirus crisis has shown that institutions linking free nations need to be reinforced, it has also highlighted that many global institutions are ineffective or failing, often due to the influence of authoritarian states. The world’s free nations need to coordinate policies to drive reform of these institutions and insist that they live up to their responsibilities. Having Russia on the UN Human Rights Council, or China taking advantage of rules under the World Trade Organization, or the World Health Organization giving political and bureaucratic cover to China’s lack of cooperation in investigating, reporting and combating the coronavirus—all need to be reviewed and addressed.

There is no magic formula for building the post-coronavirus world. Many initiatives will run aground. But now is the time for free nations to think boldly and seek to overcome past barriers. If we do not, then others who do not share our values and interests surely will.

How Washington Is Using the Coronavirus to Fight a Tech War Against China Overdue or a bad idea? by Stratfor Worldview

The United States and China have been locked in a technology cold war for several years. The COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan, is now pressuring Washington to make even stronger moves against Beijing by fueling anti-China sentiment among U.S. voters and legislators alike. But the White House’s latest attempt to increase export controls on China and limit Beijing's overall access to U.S. technology will come at the cost of further fragmenting the global tech sector’s highly integrated supply chain network. 

Expanded Export Controls

On April 28, the U.S. Commerce Department issued new rules that broaden the scope and dual-use goods subject to U.S. export controls, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment:

• The first rule change expands the Commerce Department’s definition of military end-use to include items that also support or contribute to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development or production of military items.
• Under the second rule change, previously exempt exports of national security-controlled items for civilian end-use and civilian end-users in China (and several other countries) will now be subject to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reviews. 
• The Commerce Department has also proposed a third rule change that would require a license for the re-export of national security-controlled items to countries of national security concern. 

The COVID-19 Catalyst

The expanded export controls constitute U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration’s latest attempt to limit Beijing’s access to advanced technologies. As part of this strategy, the Commerce Department placed the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei on its "entity list" in May 2019, which has since forced the company to stockpile certain manufacturing components by subjecting it to extreme export controls. Increased visa requirements and the threat of more visa restrictions have also recently led to a reduction in the growth rate of Chinese students studying at U.S. universities. Universities have reduced ties to Chinese companies and Chinese-funded programs in technology-related fields, such as physics and engineering, as well. 

Amid growing anti-China sentiment due to the COVID-19 outbreak, Washington’s push to limit Chinese involvement in U.S. defense supply chains is unlikely to shift, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. Recent polls conducted by the Pew Research Center showed that 66 percent of Americans now have a negative opinion of China — a 20 percentage-point jump from when Trump took office in 2016, and the highest rate since Pew began polling the question. Although there is significant disagreement in Congress on Trump’s aggressive trade policy against China, countering Beijing’s tech aspirations and rise has largely become a bipartisan issue. Joe Biden, the former vice president and current Democratic presidential candidate, has heavily criticized Trump’s alleged weak management of Chinese threats, emphasizing he’d take a stronger approach against Beijing should he win the November vote. 

Risks to U.S. Tech Companies 

The new rule changes could equate to a de-facto export ban on transactions involving strategic technologies with China. The new rules come with presumptive of denial, which means that most export licenses will not be granted without a significant amount of due diligence. The rules are vague enough to allow for denials, even if the end-user only works with the Chinese military in areas unrelated to technology. But the significant overlap between China’s private and non-military sectors — as well as the military and intelligence apparatus in China — will make it difficult to ensure the transaction is, in fact, for civilian end-use (as opposed to military end-use). 

Several U.S. tech industries have already voiced concerns about how the expanded export controls could affect their operations and bottom lines. Representatives of the semiconductor industry have said that the rule changes could potentially damage their revenue and exports. Even prior to the new rules, the U.S. Pentagon had expressed reservations about similar rule changes affecting U.S. chipmakers, arguing that they undermine innovation for the U.S. defense sector in the long-term. Many small- and medium-sized U.S. businesses will likely forgo trying to transact with Chinese companies altogether, given the potential risks and the exorbitant costs of due diligence. U.S. tech giants such as Apple, Applied Materials, Google, Microsoft and Qualcomm can afford the compliance costs for most transactions, but the expansive scope of the new end-use definitions could hit potential sales of crucial technologies, such as advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to Chinese customers. 

Additional Actions Against China 

Despite these risks, the United States will eventually move forward with proposed changes, which will significantly affect overseas companies transacting with Chinese companies. Washington will continue to expand the Commerce Department’s entity list, making sales to more Chinese companies subject to more stringent export controls. The United States will also likely modify its Commerce Department’s so-called “direct product rule,” which sets the level of U.S.-made technology and content in goods produced overseas before becoming subject to U.S. export controls. The minimum level is currently 25 percent, which puts most foreign-produced goods involving U.S. content outside export controls. The Trump administration, however, has discussed reducing the threshold to as low as 10 percent. The United States will continue to expand diplomatic pressure on foreign countries to deny export licenses for strategic transactions to Chinese companies as well. In one major success earlier this year, Washington diplomatically pressured the Netherlands to pull an export license for the sale of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines produced by the Dutch semiconductor firm ASML’s to China’s largest chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC).

U.S. pressure will also focus heavily on influencing Taiwan — which is home to the world’s largest independent semiconductor foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) — to reduce TSMC’s business with Chinese companies. TSMC produces Huawei’s most advanced chips using ASML’s EUV machines. According to internal Taiwanese reports, TSMC has also found that the level of U.S. content is 9-10 percent, putting it near the White House’s proposed new threshold. If the Commerce Department determines that TSMC’s most advanced chips are not subject to U.S. export controls, Washington will attempt to diplomatically block the sales or expand the scope of export controls further, as TSMC’s older generation of chips use higher levels of U.S. equipment.

Global Implications

Many global tech firms, including TSMC, will adopt strategies that compartmentalize their U.S. and Chinese-centric businesses, or take steps to reduce reliance on the United States due to their high dependence on Chinese consumption. China’s growing middle class, economic expansion and increased demand for electronics has made it the fastest-growing destination for tech products and services. Increasing sales in China has become a critical growth vertical for most tech companies, particularly those in Asia. TSMC is highly dependent on both sales to China and the United States. Sales to Apple alone accounted for roughly 23 percent of the firm’s revenue in 2019. But TSMC’s sales to Huawei — which accounted for 14 percent of its revenue last year — are also growing fast. 

China’s dominance in the manufacturing, testing and prototyping of electronics will make completely separating China from U.S. supply chains difficult – or at the very least, more expensive. This could ultimately raise the costs and reduce the number of choices for U.S. consumers, as U.S.-destined goods are built using less efficient supply chains. 

China’s Response

Beijing will expand financial and government support for the tech sectors, and will continue to make technology the focal point of its industrial strategies such as Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035. To boost indigenous capabilities, Chinese firms will have little choice but to continue aggressively attempting to access U.S. and Western-made strategic technology by conducting industrial espionage, as well as overseas mergers and acquisitions. China’s aggressive techno-nationalist response will only embolden U.S. attempts to reduce its access to foreign technology by reinforcing Washington’s opposition to Beijing’s state-led industrial policy. 

China’s indigenization strategy for semiconductor development, however, has so far proven exceedingly slow and is likely to remain far behind international peers. Most Chinese companies are currently five-to-ten years (or several generations) behind leading technologies in areas such as semiconductor manufacturing. This leaves Huawei and others with little choice but to continue importing high-end products from companies such as TSMC and Samsung in the short-to-medium term. Even if China successfully reduces its reliance on TSMC and foreign chip makers by building up its semiconductor manufacturing industry, it will take even longer to develop sufficient alternatives to foreign-made semiconductor manufacturing equipment, such as that produced by ASML. Until then, Beijing’s tech sector will thus largely remain at the mercy of U.S. policy shifts.

How Mexico City's 2017 "Bending" Earthquake Could Happen Again This is what the science says. by Diego Melgar and Xyoli Pérez-Campos

One year has passed since a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Mexico City, toppling 40 buildings and killing over 300, but the memory remains fresh. Condemned structures dot many neighborhoods, their facades crumbling. And after an earthquake 225 miles away in Oaxaca state shook the capital city again on Feb. 16, 2018, the city mayor said hospitals treated dozens of people for panic attacks. 

Seismologists, too, are still studying the Sept. 19 earthquake, trying to better understand what’s happening underneath Mexico City. Our recent paper, published in Geophysical Research Letters in March, brings critical findings to light.

After the damaging quake, we analyzed data from the national network of seismological sensors, as well as high-quality GPS stations around the country. Together, these instruments measure shaking across Mexico. We wanted to know what caused this magnitude 7.1 earthquake and whether a future shock could strike even closer to this city of 20 million.

Here’s what our research revealed.

The Earth’s trembling surface

People in central Mexico are accustomed to the ground shaking. Since 1980, 40 perceptible earthquakes have hit this region. The Sept. 19 quake actually occurred on the 32nd anniversary of the magnitude 8.1 earthquake that killed at least 10,000 people in and around Mexico City in 1985.

That catastrophe marked an entire generation of Mexicans, including ourselves, back when we were just kids.

Now, as working seismologists, we have discovered that the 2017 earthquake, called Puebla-Morelos, was fundamentally unlike its 1985 predecessor. In fact, it was different than most big Mexican earthquakes, which typically happen along the country’s Pacific coast, where two tectonic plates collide.

The Puebla-Morelos quake occurred well inland – just 70 miles south of Mexico City, in Puebla state. Since the 1920s, only five other large earthquakes have originated in central Mexico.

The zone of potential ‘bending’ earthquakes, where the subducted tectonic plate that runs beneath Mexico juts downward at a sharp angle, is a band spanning the country from center to south. Only five earthquakes have struck this region in the past century, including the deadly Sept. 18, 2017 quake that killed 300 in Mexico City. Major earthquakes typically occur along the Pacific coast. D. Melgar, CC BY-SA

  How earthquakes happen

Most major earthquakes worldwide happen along the unstable intersections in the Earth’s crust, where two tectonic plates – that is, the underground slabs that make up the planet’s rocky shell – collide, one plate sliding beneath the other.

These are called subduction zones, and continued plate movements in those areas are responsible for the world’s largest earthquakes – the kinds that occasionally rattle Alaska, Japan, Chile and Indonesia.

At most subduction zones, after one tectonic plate slides beneath a neighboring plate, it continues on a diagonal downward dive and sinks deep into the Earth’s mantle.

Not in Mexico. There, the initial contact between the two tectonic plates – which collide off the country’s southern Pacific coast – starts off normally enough, with the subducted plate sinking diagonally downwards.

But then, just as it begins to jut underneath the Mexican mainland, the plate – which is made of dense, heavy rocks – reverses course. It bends upward, sliding itself horizontally beneath the plate Mexico sits on top of. This setup continues for about 125 miles or so.

Then, underneath Puebla state – just south of Mexico City – at a depth of about 30 miles below ground, the subducted plate abruptly changes direction once more. It dives almost vertically downward, plunging itself deep into the Earth’s mantle.

What is a ‘bending’ quake?

When the plate bends downward, some of the rocks in the plate break. Think of a sturdy piece of wood. Flexed lightly, it bends. But when the flexing becomes too strong, it will splinter violently.

This is what causes “bending” earthquakes like Mexico City’s. After the bent tectonic plate snaps, seismic waves emanate outwards from the breaking point, causing the Earth to tremble. The closer you are to the epicenter, the stronger the shaking.

This kind of rare Mexican quake typically has a relatively lower magnitude than the more common Pacific coast variety. But that doesn’t mean the shaking above ground feels weak. Because “bending” quakes strike in Mexico’s densely populated central region, beneath the feet of many millions, the shaking can be very strong indeed.

And when they hit near Mexico City, as September 2017 demonstrated, the consequences can be devastating.

Defining the hazard zones

This same unstable subducted plate runs underneath all central Mexico. And, thanks to previous studies, we know that it is bent across a large, continuous swath of central and southern Mexico.

It is here – from Michoacán state, part way up the Pacific coast, all the way down to southernmost Oaxaca – that bending earthquakes could occur.

But the tectonic plate’s bend, we learned, is only half of the story behind central Mexico’s shaking. The plate’s texture matters, too.

High-resolution images of the ocean bottom off Mexico’s Pacific shore reveal that the seafloor terrain is rugged in a very organized fashion. There, beneath thousands of feet of water, we see high, narrow ridges and deep valleys that run lengthwise in a northwest-to-southeast direction.

This “fabric” was created about 8 million years ago, when the rocks first formed – way before tectonic plates collided to give Mexico its subduction zone. Even so, the plate’s texture – marked by this linear fabric of underground mountains and canyons – turns out to be relevant in determining where these rare, bending earthquakes might occur.

 

High-resolution images of the Pacific Ocean seafloor off Mexico’s coast reveals that the subducted plate there has a linear texture comprised of ridges, valleys and bumps. This ‘fabric’ continues when the plate slides beneath the Mexican mainland and then angles downward, plunging itself into deep into the Earth’s mantle. ‘Bending’ earthquakes are most likely to occur where the plate bends in the same northwest-to-southeast direction as its ridges and valleys run. Global Multi-Resolution Topography Data Synthesis, CC BY-NC-SA

 Our research found that because its ridges and valleys are oriented uniformly – think of the grain on a sturdy piece of wood – a tectonic plate is far less likely to snap if the force that bends it is at an angle perpendicular to the direction the fabric runs. Like a sheet of plywood, a tectonic plate is more resistant to pressure when bent against the grain.

In other words, large, damaging “bending” earthquakes are most likely to occur where the subducted plate’s own texture aligns with the direction of its downward bend.

This is good news for cities like Morelia, in Michoacán, where we believe the plate’s fabric runs almost perpendicular to the direction of the plate’s break – the wrong setup for a strong earthquake.

But it is bad news for neighboring Puebla and Oaxaca. There, plate texture and plate bend are almost perfectly aligned – off by less than 10 degrees. Under such circumstances, the bent plate can more easily snap and break from continued tectonic movement.

What’s in store for Mexico City?

The part of the plate bend near Mexico City, where the Sept. 19 quake occurred, falls somewhere in between. The alignment between texture and plate is not perfect – but they’re off angle by just 20 to 30 degrees.

That means the capital could see another large quake. And, based on our analysis, the epicenter could actually be closer to the city: This volatile tectonic band extends as far north as the city of Cuernavaca, 30 miles from Mexico City’s southern edge.

These findings are a step forward in understanding Mexico’s complex geology. But we still don’t know how often “bending” earthquakes might happen – whether once a century or every decade. Seismologists worldwide are still far from being able to predict where, when and how the next big one will strike.

What our new study can do, we hope, is help Mexicans nationwide understand what’s happening beneath their feet.

History Shows Why Naval Mines Are No Joke They are a real threat to even the most advanced navies. by Kris Osborn

As the Navy accelerates its development of offensive and defensive mine-warfare technology, service weapons developers often look to history for key lessons regarding the tactical and military implications they present. Although technology has long since progressed since even the days of the Gulf War in the early 90s, both shallow and deep water mines continue to present a serious problem for U.S. Navy ships on patrol—just as they have done throughout the years. Large numbers of blue or deep water mines are an increasing threat, according to Navy weapons developers who are refining new mine-warfare strategies.  

The significance of the mine threat is well articulated in a 2011 Naval War College Review article called “Taking Mines Seriously—Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas.” Author Scott Truver says “mines are ‘weapons that wait.’ They are the quintessential naval asymmetric threat. Since the end of WWII, mines have seriously damaged or sunk almost four times more Navy ships than all other means of attack combined.”

Industry and Navy countermine technology developers are all too aware of the toll mine warfare has taken on U.S. forces throughout history. For instance, an interesting 2015 essay from Naval History and Heritage Command, called “Mine Warfare,” recalls a catastrophic mine attack on U.S. forces during the Korean War in the 1950s. The essay specifies an instance in 1950 during the well-known Battle of Inchon amphibious assault:

“…On September 26, off North Korea, U.S. destroyer Brush struck an enemy mine that killed 13 sailors, wounded 34 more, and put the ship out of action. Two days later YMS 509 of the ROKN sustained damage from a “floater” on the south coast. The next day Mansfield, spared at Inchon, hit a mine in North Korean waters that sent her to a shipyard in Japan. Then, in one day, October 1, Communist mines destroyed the wooden-hulled U.S. minesweeper Magpie, killing or injuring her entire crew of 33 men, and badly damaged ROKN YMS 504…..(“Mine Warfare,” Naval History and Heritage Command, Edward J. Marolda, 2015).

Decades beyond WWII, mines have claimed U.S. lives and introduced significant levels of combat danger and peril. The Navy’s Frigate, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, was devastated by Iranian-laid mines in 1988 in the Arabian Gulf. An essay on the incident written by Navy History and Heritage Command, explains how USS Samuel B. Roberts crew members battled dangerous, raging fires while the ship was “slowly but inexorably sinking.”

Several years later during the Gulf War, the Navy’s helicopter carrying USS Tripoli was disabled by a mine attack, which exploded at 25-foot hole in the forward starboard section of the ship, according to a 1991 UPI news report. On the same day, a guided missile cruiser, the USS Princeton, was also hit by a mine; the ship’s midsection was cracked and the ship had to cut power by 50-percent due to damage to a propeller.

“Mines are weapons that can wait.”