Coronavirus: Why It’s Dangerous to Blindly ‘Follow the Science’ Because the virus is novel, epidemiologists must make assumptions based on incomplete data. by Neil Levy, Eric Schliesser and Eric Winsberg

The Lancet and the New England Journal of Medicine are among the most influential scientific journals in the world. Both have recently had to retract studies on the effectiveness of COVID-19 treatments after doubts were raised about the underlying data. The scandal reveals the dangers of “fast science”.

In the face of the virus emergency, research standards have been relaxed to encourage faster publication and mistakes become inevitable. This is risky. Ultimately, if expert advice on the pandemic turns out to be wrong, it will have dire consequences for how reliable scientific evidence is treated in other policy areas, such as climate change.

The pandemic has become politicised, pitting smug liberals versus reckless conservatives. There’s also a move towards thinking about options in terms of science versus common sense. If we accept this framing, we risk causing people to believe that experts are no better than the rest of us at making predictions and providing explanations that can guide policy.

For example, some “lockdown sceptics” have responded to falling death rates by arguing that the lockdown wasn’t necessary in the first place. Setting aside arguments over to what extent lockdowns saved lives, it is right to worry about the way this has cast aspersion on expertise more generally.

But we shouldn’t see the epidemiologists advising governments as having the same standing – in regard to the pandemic – as other experts have with regard to other hot-button issues that engage scientific consensus. It is misguided to think that, because epidemiology is a well-established science, the guidance it provides us with right now is necessarily perfectly reliable.

There is no reliable science – yet – of the novel coronavirus. Because it is novel, the models that the epidemiologists use must make assumptions based on incomplete data.

We have seen dramatic revisions in these models as some of the assumptions came to be seen to be completely off-base. Even now, there is good reason to worry that some of the models governments rely on may exaggerate the infection fatality rate. Testing has concentrated on the most sick — but if others infected with mild or no symptoms were factored into the calculations, the fatality rate would be smaller, by a currently unknown amount.

Part of the underlying problem is built into the way epidemiology is organised to deal with new, unfolding disease in a fast-moving environment. Leading epidemiologists see themselves as synthesisers of “many branches of science using many methods, approaches, and forms of evidence”. But it takes time to collect and combine such evidence.

Lives versus the economy

Epidemiology is not the only discipline relevant to the response to the pandemic. Lockdowns themselves have costs, of an unknown magnitude. Too often, these costs are presented as economic costs, as if we faced a choice between a healthy economy and healthy people. But people die from recessions.

We should frame the issue as one pitting lives against lives, not lives against the economy. Estimating the effects of lockdowns on future deaths and illness, physical and mental, is not a matter for epidemiologists alone but for a variety of disciplines – psychiatrists, sociologists, economists, educators, public health experts and many others.

Coming to a reliable consensus takes time and the input of many disciplines, especially because the consequences of any policy affect so many areas of life. There simply has not yet been enough time for such a consensus to emerge.

Implications for climate science

Climate science looms over the pandemic debates and offers an example of the value of tested science in public policy debates. From the beginning of the crisis, many have worried that conceding anything to those with reservations about following the authority of science will play into the hands of climate sceptics.

There is every reason to believe that the strong consensus that exists with regard to climate science is fully justified. A central part of the reason that the consensus is trustworthy is that it has been stress-tested so many times from so many angles.

Scientific claims like “carbon emissions cause global heating” are not the province of any one discipline. Rather, the expertise of many disciplines is needed: physicists, paleoclimatologists, mathematicians, astronomers and many more have contributed to making climate science robust. All these experts are required to identify mechanisms, rule out alternative explanations and make predictions.

Like epidemiology, climate science provides a reliable guide to policy. But it is reliable mainly because its predictions and assumptions are further tested and assessed by many disciplines beyond climate science proper.

We strongly advocate giving scientific input into policy significant weight. Though in this case that advice can reflect only some of the science and offers a partial picture. Taking that advice is taking a bet, and we should not be very surprised if we lose that bet in ways we only dimly understand in advance. The stakes of this bet are especially high when taking the advice requires suspending some civil rights.

If we do lose the bet, having framed the debate as one of experts versus sceptics will lead to a victory for that latter. That would set back our response to issues that rely on scientific certainty, especially climate change, by decades.

Science is our best guide to the world. But reliable science takes time and contributions by many different kinds of people, including the values of the public. We should celebrate the achievements of science, but recognise that not all science is equally warranted.

Three Reasons Why COVID Has Forever Changed the Way We Shop It’s wrong to expect a “snap-back” at shopping centres, food courts, cinemas and other places where people used to gather to spend money. by John Daley

It’s wrong to expect a “snap-back” at shopping centres, food courts, cinemas and other places where people used to gather to spend money.

We’ve identified three reasons why spending in physical stores on goods like clothes is likely to remain much lower than it was for a long time.

1. Fear, much of it age-based

First, even when governments relax restrictions, lots of people will still be worried and will go out less. Unless there are zero cases for several weeks in a state or city, many people will remain reluctant to go out.

This is why we have previously argued that there is a big dividend in eliminating COVID-19 in the style of New Zealand, the Northern Territory, and South Australia, rather than bumping along with “suppression” – and several new locally-acquired cases a day – as Victoria is still doing.

This reluctance to go out and spend, irrespective of government restrictions, could be seen in Australia before government restrictions were imposed, as shown on the “Consumers and mobility” tab of the Grattan Econ Tracker.

The effects of fear shouldn’t be underestimated.

Spending in Sweden has fallen almost as much as in Denmark, even when Denmark was in lockdown and Sweden had minimal restrictions. Swedes are afraid to go out, particularly if they are old.

Spending by people aged 70+ has fallen further in Sweden than in Denmark, and 60-69 year-olds have cut their spending by about the same amount in both countries.

This isn’t surprising. COVID-19 is much more deadly for older people.

Age-based fear is a challenge for retailers because older households now spend significantly more than younger households. 25 years ago it was the other way around.

2. Time to form new habits

Second, we are likely to keep spending on different things, and using different channels, even after restrictions are lifted.

Habits tend to form when behaviour changes consistently. They strengthen over time, and are particularly sticky once behaviour has been consistent for a period of months – and we’ve been living with lockdown for that long in Australia.

Once formed, the new habits can persist unless there is another shock.

 

Australians have become used to doing more of their purchasing online. They have become used to spending more on living comfortably at home, and less on clothes for the office and to go out.

After the shutdown, people are likely to continue to work from home more often.

The habits of shopping remotely, and spending more on home furnishings and less on clothes, are likely to continue, and they would be likely to continue even if COVID-19 vanished tomorrow.

3. Global recession

Third, irrespective of COVID-19 regulations and behaviours, we are heading into an “old-fashioned”, globally synchronised, deep recession.

For the moment, JobKeeper, the temporarily-boosted JobSeeker payment, and a recent bounceback, have resulted in spending on credit and debit cards a bit more than this time last year.

But unemployment jumped to 7.1% on Thursday. That official rate understates how bad things are.

In May an extra 227,700 Australians lost their jobs (on top of 607,400 in April).

But only 85,000 of them were counted as unemployed. When and if the bulk of those people look for work, the unemployment rate will climb further.

 

After JobKeeper ends in September (or is phased out as a result of the government’s review) many of the three million people on it will also become counted as unemployed.

Australians who have lost their jobs are likely to spend less than they did before.

After each of the previous two recessions it took years for employment to recover.

Spending need not recover after COVID

These three factors – fear, new habits, and recession – are present in countries and regions that seem to be well clear of coronavirus.

Much of China has been free of most government restrictions for months. Manufacturing and infrastructure spending has largely returned to pre-COVID levels.

But consumer activity is still below pre-COVID levels, and it is inching up only slowly.

Australia might well see an “opening party” on the day each particular COVID-19 restriction is lifted.

But after that, the best guess is that consumer spending will remain very subdued and refocused for a long time.

For those in the hardest-hit sectors and regions – particularly arts and recreation, hospitality, and clothing – the pain will continue long after the restrictions are lifted.

China's Population Growing Pains Are Its Biggest Challenge Government researchers have predicted that the world’s largest population will peak at 1.4 billion people in 2029. by Anthony Fensom

 China’s demographic contraction will reduce its GDP growth rate as well as its ability to fund its foreign ambitions such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The party’s social compact will also come under increasing pressure as economic growth eases and inequality rises.

China’s seemingly inexorable rise has hit a roadblock: demographics. And despite desperate efforts to reverse the effects of the Communist Party’s one-child policy, experts warn it may be too late to prevent lasting damage.

Government researchers have predicted that the world’s largest population will peak at 1.4 billion people in 2029. However, it will then experience an “unstoppable” decline that could see it drop to 1.36 billion by 2050, reducing the workforce by as much as 200 million.

Should fertility rates remain unchanged, then China could even shrink to 1.17 billion people by 2065, according to the China Academy of Social Sciences.

“From a theoretical point of view, the long-term population decline, especially when it is accompanied by a continuously aging population, is bound to cause very unfavorable social and economic consequences,” the report said.

Introduced to slow population growth, China’s one-child policy that included heavy fines, forced abortions and sterilizations proved far too successful, cutting the birth rate per family from 2.9 children in 1979 to 1.6 in 1995.

In 2016, the limit was raised to two children, but births declined again after a brief uptick. Last year, the number of births dropped to 15.2 million, with some cities and provinces reporting decreases as large as 35 percent.

China’s fertility rate has now officially dropped to 1.6 children per woman, which is below the considered “replacement rate” of 2.1 children, although analysts have questioned whether the real rate could be as low as 1.18. Even a rate of 1.3 would see China’s population more than halve in just under eighty years.

Another legacy of the one-child policy has been a lack of women. Thanks to a preference for male heirs and selective abortions, China now has thirty-four million more men than women and by 2020 could have twenty-four million single men of marrying age unable to find wives.

This situation could get even worse, with women between the ages of twenty-two and thirty-one expected to decline by 40 percent between 2015 and 2025.

Recently, more developed areas such as Beijing and Shanghai have seen fewer births than western regions such as Qinghai province, a factor linked to migration. Other areas such as the “rust belt” northeastern region, known as Dongbei, have seen a decline for economic factors, however.

Yet others blame faltering “traditional concepts of marriage and parenthood.” Marriage registrations have dropped each year since 2013. Meanwhile, divorces are also increasing.

“Young people’s ideas of family and giving birth are changing, and traditional values such as sustaining family lineages through giving birth have been weakening,” Nankai University’s Yuan Xin told China Daily.

Other factors include rising costs of raising children, including higher housing prices and competition for quality education, together with a lack of daycare facilities.

Turning Point

Yi Fuxian, an economist at Peking University, has suggested that the population has already started shrinking, declining in 2018 for the first time since the 1960s famines caused by the “Great Leap Forward.”

“It can be seen that 2018 is a historic turning point in China’s population,” he told the New York Times.

“China’s population has begun to decline and is rapidly aging. Its economic vitality will keep waning.”

A shrinking workforce is one of the first such negative outcomes for the world’s second-largest economy.

The working-age population, which consists of those between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four, shrank for four straight years after peaking in 2013.

As a result, China’s dependency rate—the portion of nonworking people, including children and the elderly—rose for the first time in more than thirty years in 2011 and is expected to continue rising.

The nation’s elderly population could reach 400 million by the end of 2035, up from 240 million last year, according to government forecasts.

This is already hitting government budgets. Pension payouts reached 640 billion yuan ($90 billion) in 2016, up 140 percent from five years earlier. Analysts suggest this figure could rise substantially, to as high as 60 trillion yuan annually by 2050, accounting for more than 20 percent of total government spending.

This is despite China’s social security, pension and healthcare system being relatively limited, with an estimated 900 million Chinese living with little social safety net.

These projections have added further fuel to claims that Asia’s biggest economy is “already getting old” before it gets rich.

“In advanced countries, the cohort of those aged over sixty roughly doubled to about 24 percent of the population between 1950 and 2015. At that point, per capital income was about $41,000,” notes Bloomberg Opinion columnist Shuli Ren.

“In China, this process is going to take just another 12 years, to 2030. But its income per head in 2025 would still be only a third of the level in advanced economies in 2015.”

Restrictions Eased

Aware of the looming crisis, Chinese policymakers have moved to further loosen restrictions on family planning. Penalties are being removed at the local level for having “over-quota” children, with suggestions that birth restrictions will be abolished completely.

China’s National Health Commission is now working with other departments to “research and improve policies involving taxation, employment, social security and housing to support the implementation of the universal second-child policy,” China Daily noted.

One such measure is a proposal to increase the retirement age from fifty-five to sixty for women and from sixty to sixty-five for men, bringing China more in line with international norms.

Local governments have also responded with subsidies, the extension of maternity leave and other initiatives including campaigns such as the “1,001 reasons to have a baby.”

Yet as seen in the developed world, reversing a declining birth rate is extremely challenging, even with ultra family-friendly policies.

A study by economist Lyman Stone found that even Nordic-style policies offering extensive family support have had little impact on long-term fertility, amid a declining fertility rate across advanced nations “nearly unmatched in its global breadth and its severity.”

An economic slowdown has seen the nation slip from double-digit growth in gross domestic product (GDP) to single digits, while debt has climbed to reach some 254 percent of GDP as at the end of 2018.

Welcoming more foreign workers, as Japan has done, or enhancing labor productivity are seen as two ways of compensating for a shrinking workforce. Yet Harvard Business Review contributors J. Stewart Black and Allen J. Morrison see plenty of headwinds, including declining productivity growth and a lack of openness to foreigners, including in major Chinese corporations.

“If the current leadership composition continues, we predict that like Japanese firms before them, Chinese companies will begin to slide off the Global 500,” Black and Morrison predict.

From having a demographic dividend from a rising working-age population, an economic model “grounded in the exploitation of inexhaustibly cheap labor” is fast running out of steam.

Analysts at JPMorgan see China’s growth potential slowing to 5.5 percent from the current rate of 6.5 percent between 2021 and 2025, falling further to 4.5 percent by 2030, making it difficult for China to overtake the United States as the world’s biggest economy.

“This means that China will remain the second-largest economy much longer than expected,” the analysts said.

China’s demographic contraction will reduce its GDP growth rate as well as its ability to fund its foreign ambitions such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The party’s social compact will also come under increasing pressure as economic growth eases and inequality rises.

Meanwhile, the combined workforces of India, Indonesia and the United States are expected to keep expanding through at least 2060. A high birth rate and strong immigration levels should see the U.S. population increase from 324 million in 2017 to 390 million in 2050, while India’s population is seen overtaking China’s by 2027.

If demographics are destiny, then China is facing its biggest challenge in decades with no easy long-term solution in sight.

Yes, Russia's Old Strategic Bombers Are All Over the Place Lately Another day, another deterrence patrol. by Peter Suciu

Russia’s aging Tu-95MS strategic bombers have been racking up the miles in recent weeks. Four of the Cold War-era warbirds of the Russian Aerospace Force (Air Force), which are a key element of the air component of Russia’s nuclear triad, performed a planned flight over neutral waters of the Chukchi, Bering and Okhotsk Seas and the northern part of the Pacific Ocean.

The venerable Tu-95MS strategic bombers, seen as the face of the Aerospace Force, have been upgraded to carry the latest X-101 cruise missiles. Those missiles can be retargeted once the bombers are already airborne.

The Tu-95 is a four-engine propeller plane that was developed 60 years ago. As The National Interest has reported, “Soviet planners requested in 1950 a four-engine bomber that could fly five thousand miles to hit targets across the United States while hauling over twelve tons of bombs. The jet engines of the time, however, burned through fuel too quickly. Thus, the design bureau of Andrei Tupolev conceived of an aircraft using four powerful NK-12 turboprop engines with contrarotating propellers.”

Despite the age, the aircraft can still fly great distances and have been making practically regularly flights near American waters.

“Four Tu-95MS strategic missile-carrying bombers of the Russian Aerospace Force’s long-range aviation performed a planned flight in the airspace over the neutral waters of the Chukchi, Bering and Okhotsk Seas, and also the northern part of the Pacific Ocean,” the Russian Defense Ministry told state media on Wednesday.

“The aircraft took off from the airfields in the Chukotka Autonomous Area and the Amur Region,” the ministry added. “The aircraft of Russia’s Aerospace Force perform all flights in strict compliance with the international rules of using the airspace.”

The bombers’ scheduled flight lasted about 11 hours.

The Russian Defense Ministry also reported that at sections of the route the Russian aircraft were escorted by U.S. Air Force F-22 fifth generation fighters.

This was the eighth such incident of Russian bomber formations flying off Alaska’s coast this year, according to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the second this month.

“For the eighth time this year, Russian military aircraft have penetrated our Canadian or Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zones, and each and every time NORAD forces were ready to meet this challenge,” Air Force Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, who commands NORAD and U.S. Northern Command said in a statement issued Wednesday. “Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, NORAD constantly monitors the northern approaches to our nations and our operations make it clear that we will conduct homeland defense efforts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.”

It was just last week that four Tu-95Ms strategic bombers—possibly the same aircraft—conducted a patrol flight near Alaska. As with this week’s incidence, the Russian bombers were intercepted and escorted by U.S. F-22 fighter jets.

The U.S. and its NATO allies have paid similar visits to Russian waters. Last week the movements of the French guided-missile frigate Aquitaine in the Barents Sea were closely tracked by the Russian Northern Fleet, while last month four U.S. Navy warships from the U.S. 6th Fleet (C6F), along with one Royal Navy vessel, entered the Barents Sea to conduct maritime security operations, assert freedom of navigation and to demonstrate seamless integration among allies. It was the first time U.S. and British warships had operated in the Barents Sea since the Cold War.

China Says It Can Reveal Stealth Jets, But What's The Truth? Chinese scientists say they have solved a fundamental dilemma inherent to radar. by Michael Peck

Here's What You Need To Remember: Wu also said that this development puts China ahead of other nations in developing anti-stealth radar. “As for now, I do not see a meter wave air defense radar from abroad that can match the criteria of the advanced meter wave radar.”

In addition, it also functions as a fire control radar that can guide missiles toward stealthy jets like the F-35.

“Meter wave radar can be deployed on vehicles, on land and warships, creating a dense web that gives hostile stealth aircraft nowhere to hide,” said China’s Global Times.

Chinese scientists say they have solved a fundamental dilemma inherent to radar. High-frequency radars, such as microwave radars, emit a lot of short pulses that are good for guiding weapons to a target. Low-frequency radars, that emit waves that are meters long, are better for searching an area but aren’t precise enough for fire control (here’s a quick primer). That means high- and low-frequency radars tend to be paired for search and fire control.

Stealth aircraft are shaped to avoid detection by high-frequency beams. “Meter wave radars can detect stealth aircraft because modern stealth aircraft are mainly designed to avoid detection by microwave radar, and are less stealthy to meter wave radar,” said Global Times. “However, analysts previously said that because of their low resolution and accuracy, meter wave radars can only send warnings about incoming threats. And even if microwave radars compensate for the shortcomings of the meter wave radars, they are unable to entirely overcome these shortcomings.”

Wu Jianqi, a senior scientist at the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, told Chinese media that his team has solved this dilemma. “Wu solved the issue by designing the world's first practical meter wave sparse array synthetic impulse and aperture radar,” according to Global Times. “Wu said that his radar has multiple transmitting and receiving antennas tens of meters high, scattered in a range of tens to hundreds of meters. They can continuously cover the sky as the radar receives echoes from all directions.”

Wei Dongxu, a Chinese military analyst, told Global Times that “this significantly enhances the radar's ability to track an aerial target, pinpointing the stealth aircraft's exact coordinates by synthesizing parameters and data gathered by the radar under the support of advanced algorithms. Since the radar can now see stealth aircraft clearly and track them continuously and accurately, it could become capable of guiding long-range anti-aircraft missiles and landing precision strikes on them."

Wu also said that this development puts China ahead of other nations in developing anti-stealth radar. “As for now, I do not see a meter wave air defense radar from abroad that can match the criteria of the advanced meter wave radar.”

But is this true?

The vulnerability of stealth aircraft to low-frequency beams has not escaped the notice of military researchers around the world.  Russia has also claimed – more than once – to have developed stealth-detecting radar. Naturally, the U.S. is also working on advanced sensors that will do the same.

While the physics of the Chinese claims seem plausible, it is important to remember that the effectiveness of a military sensor depends on a variety of factors. How easily can the Chinese meter-wave radar be spoofed or jammed? How vulnerable are these radar complexes – comprising multiple antennae – to being destroyed by missiles?

In the end, the problem with evaluating anti-stealth is the same as evaluating stealth: we really won’t know how well any of this work until it is used in combat. The F-35 has been used in minor conflicts like Syria, operating against second-string or non-existent air defenses. But stealth – or anti-stealth – will only be proven in a conflict between powers that possess advanced aircraft, radars and anti-aircraft missiles. That means America, Russia and China.

Why John Bolton Is Seeking Regime Change Against Donald Trump In unleashing the Justice Department on Bolton, Donald Trump has done him a huge favor. Bolton’s book is now a best seller. by Curt Mills

WASHINGTON—National security adviser was the position President Donald Trump could never quite fill correctly. Conventional wisdom prior to this week held that his most calamitous selection was Michael Flynn—the former general who served in his post less than a month and later suffered federal prosecution. If not him, it was H.R. McMaster, whom Trump soured on almost immediately and who nearly careened America into war with North Korea. 

But it appears the third time was the unlucky charm. Recent revelations from John R. Bolton—after an apparently still-delayed book launch—could be the torpedo that helps to sink the flailing Trump presidency. Trump’s third national security advisor was apparently told by the president’s second chief of staff, the ex-Marine general John F. Kelly: “You can’t imagine how desperate I am to get out of here. ... This is a bad place to work, as you will find out.” 

Bolton says he found out.

And so—after either resigning, or, in Trump’s telling, being unceremoniously sacked last fall—Bolton is living out his best ninth life. A legal logjam, a global pandemic and rolling national crises delayed the release of Bolton’s book at least a season but now even the Justice Department can’t forestall the inevitable: advance copies are making their way to newsrooms across the USA. Indeed, Trump’s desire to punish Bolton by unleashing the Justice Department has inadvertently aided him. Bolton’s profile has never been higher—and his book is at the top of the Amazon bestseller list. Bolton should be thanking Trump for all the free publicity.

Democrats are fuming that Bolton should have appeared before Congress to testify during the impeachment hearings. House Intelligence Committee head Adam Schiff thus complained, “Bolton may be an author, but he’s no patriot.” But Bolton’s book may actually pack more of a punch now that Trump has already been so badly weakened. The cold, hard truth is that for the White House, the results are dismaying. As Rudolph Giuliani (the president’s personal attorney) once remarked, if he is a “hand grenade” on the administration’s future—as Bolton once famously said of the New York mayor and his dealings in Ukraine—then Bolton himself is an “atomic bomb.”

 

The problems he presents for Trump are numerous. For one thing, Bolton cannot be presented plausibly as a member of the deep state. He is a hardcore conservative who has been battling in the trenches for the GOP for decades. In 2000 he played a key role in ensuring that Florida ended up in George W. Bush’s column during the disputes over election ballots.

Another problem is the specificity of Bolton’s main charges. According to Bolton, President Trump is “stunningly uninformed,” all but directly sought the help of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in his re-election (before Wednesday, Trump’s China hawkishness was perhaps the most salient rationale for his re-election), did not know the United Kingdom was a nuclear power and was once confused over whether Finland was part of Russia.

Of course, Bolton butters his own bread. He’s trying to take advantage of a national depression for his own (emphatically fringe) foreign policy prerogatives. On Afghanistan, Trump supposedly said: “This was done by a stupid named George W. Bush.” And on America’s protracted deployments, in general, in the Middle East, Africa and Europe, the president is recorded as saying: “I want to get out of everything.” These are surely sentiments closer to the hearts of the voters who elected Trump than the unmitigated hawkishness of Bolton. Anyway, why should Trump have followed Bolton’s nutty advice to go to war with Iran? Whatever his deficiencies, Trump made the right call.

On Venezuela, Bolton was horrified that Trump quickly lost patience with the true faith in Washington: regime change. After recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaido as the country’s president, Bolton says Trump privately complained that the mid-thirties pol was just a “kid” while his opponent—strongman Nicolas Maduro—looked “tough.” Here too Trump’s intuitions are closer to common sense than those of polished Beltway mandarins. Maduro’s now survived six years of oil crashes, hyperinflation and intermittent American efforts to help oust him. Add in the pandemic, and Maduro has proven himself nothing if not pretty “tough” politically. Once again, Trump appears to have had it right. 

Still, the wind may be in Bolton’s sails. The Lincoln Project, a congerie of NeverTrump Republicans, aired a hard-hitting ad on Thursday that alleged Trump “choked like a dog,” in dealing with Xi Jinping. At the same time, Joe Biden—the presumptive Democratic nominee for president—launched a fresh ad blitz in battlegrounds Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and others. In his message, Biden said: “I’ll promise you this: I won’t traffic in fear and division. I won’t fan the flames of hate. … I will do my job and I will take responsibility.”

And Trump? He tweeted that Bolton is “a dope” and “a sick puppy.”