South Korea's Army Is Superior to the North's (But It Might Not Matter) Pyongyang's nuclear weapons are still a powerful balance. by Kyle Mizokami

The Republic of Korea Army has deterred war for the last seventy years, a benchmark of success for any peacetime army.

In the last seventy years, the Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) has evolved from a constabulary force into one of the largest, most powerful, technologically advanced armies in the world. This remarkable evolution is entirely due to the original 1950–53 invasion and war by neighboring North Korea. This existential threat has never truly gone away, with North Korea consistently threatening—and preparing for—a second, successful invasion.

The Republic of Korea Army was established in 1945 by U.S. forces occupying the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. By 1946 the ROK Army had nine “national security regiments,” lightly armed infantry regiments with a total manpower of 25,000 troops. As U.S./Soviet relations worsened, this was increased to 50,000 troops.

The invasion of North Korea in June 1950 caught the fledgling ROK Army ill-prepared for a conventional invasion. In particular, the army lacked the anti-tank firepower necessary to deal with the Korean People’s Army’s 105th Armored Brigade, which fielded approximately 120 Soviet-made T-34/85 tanks and SU-76 self-propelled guns. Although a small armored force by World War II standards, the ROK had virtually nothing to counter it with and was rapidly pushed south towards the port town of Busan.

he next three years saw intensive efforts by the United States to train and expand the ROK Army to modern standards, not the least of which so that the army could assume the bulk of the responsibility for the country’s defense. These efforts were successful, and within a few years of the Korean War’s end the U.S. Army on the peninsula had been scaled down to two, and later just one division.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the ROK Army remained on high alert, guarding against a second North Korean invasion, several armed provocations on the border, and even contributing a substantial ground force to America’s war in Vietnam. Up to 50,000 ROK soldiers served at a time in Vietnam, where they earned a reputation for being tough guerrilla fighters. Ultimately, 312,853 South Korean soldiers served in Vietnam, with at least 4,687 killed in action and 5,000 wounded.

South Korea has traditionally maintained a large army, in part because a large army is necessary to properly guard the 160 mile-long demilitarized zone, and in part because the Korean People’s Army is also manpower-intensive. This has led to the unusual situation in which the 560,000-strong ROK Army, which is only responsible for the defense of South Korea, is larger than the 475,000-strong U.S. Army, which has a global presence. This has prompted at least one U.S. general, who would assume control of the combined U.S-ROK armies in wartime, to quip “My army is bigger than my army.”

Today’s ROK Army consists of forty-one divisions and fifteen separate brigades organized into eleven corps. The army has 2,360 tanks, 2,400 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and 5,180 pieces of field artillery. Overall, the army is organized roughly along American lines, with three divisions and separate artillery, engineer, and signal brigades assigned to each of the eleven army corps. The corps are in turn organized into three army-level formations, plus the ROK Capital Defense Command, designed to turn the city of Seoul into a fortress.

The ROK Army has long since achieved technological superiority over North Korea, fielding world-class equipment particularly armored vehicles. The K-2 Black Panther tank, K-21 infantry fighting vehicle, and the K-9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer form the core equipment set for an increasingly mechanized army. Despite this, the army is organized largely to conduct defensive operations—it has no standing armored divisions and just four armored brigades parceled out to corps for local counterattacks. The main formation of the ROK Army is the infantry division, and the army has six mechanized infantry and sixteen regular infantry divisions. Another two mechanized brigades round out the maneuver force with one, 16th Mechanized Brigade, forming part of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division.

Like the U.S. Army, the ROK Army places an emphasis on special operations forces. The 707th “White Tiger” Special Mission Battalion allegedly has a mission somewhat similar to the U.S. Delta Force. There are four special forces brigades and six special assault regiments assigned to provide support to larger units such as army corps. Another three special forces brigades specialize in unconventional warfare, including land, sea, and air infiltration techniques. Lastly are two special anti-infiltration brigades designed to hunt down North Korean infiltrators.

As a country that has faced for decades the prospect of invasion, the army maintains large numbers of second line reservists. Seven reserve infantry divisions augment active army units, while twelve “local” defense/homeland defense divisions scattered across the country protect rear-area security against North Korean special forces, agents and infiltrators.

The Republic of Korea Army is a large, powerful land force capable defending the border from North Korean invasion. It’s no accident that the North Korean military has evolved asymmetric means such as long range border artillery, light infantry, infiltration forces, and chemical and radiological units to counter the South’s increasing technological superiority. The ROK Army has deterred war for the last seventy years, a benchmark of success for any peacetime army.

Is Iran's Massive Army a Paper Tiger or a True Force to Be Reckoned With? The country has an enthusiastic, if not quite cutting-edge military. by Kyle Mizokami

Iran’s sheer size, both in geography and population, are a deterrent to invasion.

One of the most powerful and influential countries in the Middle East is undoubtedly Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran sits astride several key strategic—and often volatile—regions, including the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Caucasus. Iran is primarily a land power, and has invaded and suffered invasion from other peoples and countries over the past several thousand years. As a result, Iran retains large ground forces, both in the Iranian Army itself and the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The commander in chief of the Iranian Armed Forces is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Like many states, there are two armies: the Iranian Army, loyal to the country itself, and the IRGC and its Basij militia, which is loyal to the regime and the spirit of the revolution. Unlike most states with two armies, the Iranian Army and the IRGC suffer from less role and capability duplication, in large extent due to the Iranian Revolution.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 deposed the monarchy under the shah and imposed a theocratic revolutionary state. The new rulers of Iran, skeptical of long-standing institutions historically loyal to the shah, allowed the Army to survive as an organization but developed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a counterweight. While the Army would guard the country’s borders and defend against external threats, the IRGC would guard the regime itself. As a result, the Army was arrayed generally towards Iran’s primary enemies at the time—Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia—and placed mostly near the Iranian border. The IRGC, on the other hand, maintains significant garrisons in Iran’s major cities and towns.

In 2013, the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed the Islamic Iranian Ground Forces as consisting of 350,000 active duty troops, including 130,000 professionals and 220,000 draftees. These troops are organized into four armored divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions, four light infantry divisions, six artillery groups, two special forces/commando divisions, an airborne brigade, three to four commando brigades, an unknown number of aviation units, and other separate armored and infantry brigades.

The ground forces have a number of armored vehicles at their disposal, including 1,663 main battle tanks, 725 reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles, 640 armored personnel carriers, 2,322 towed and self-propelled howitzers, and 1,476 multiple rocket launchers. While the sheer amount of equipment sounds impressive, and many pieces, such as the UK’s Chieftain tank, American Sea Cobra attack helicopter and M113 armored personnel carrier, were first-rate weapons for their time, much of it is very dated by 2017 standards. This equipment has been supplemented by Russian equipment purchased during the 1990s to rearm the battle-worn Ground Forces. In general, however, the Ground Forces remain chronically underequipped, crippled by sanctions and a lack of domestic military technology.

Western sanctions and arms embargoes directed against Iran created a vacuum that the country’s nascent arms industry struggled to fill. Today Iran has an enthusiastic, if not quite cutting-edge military-industrial complex. It manufactures a slew of small arms and support weapons for the infantry and offers domestic copies of vehicles such as the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle and T-72 main battle tank. Not all of its stated achievements pan out, however; Iran claims to have designed and built the Karrar (“Striker”) main battle tank in just one year, which it says is in some ways superior to the Russian T-90MS it had been attempting to purchase. This is almost certainly untrue.

The IRGC, an equal service alongside the Ground Forces, maintains land forces of its own. The hundred-thousand-strong Ground Forces of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution protects the theocratic regime, and as such is more lightly armed than the regular Iranian Army. The Basij paramilitary militia is a lightly armed force also meant to protect the revolution and regime. The Basij infamously acted as poorly trained cannon fodder in the Iran-Iraq War, sending young boys and old men against prepared Iraqi defenses. Today, it is described as a “combination of political party and military organisation” of four to five million that keeps tabs on dissenters and guards the regime.

The most important part of the IRGC, and possibly all of the Iranian Armed Forces, is the Quds Force. Consisting of fifteen to thirty thousand of the best IRGC troops, the Quds Force provides Tehran’s regime with an unconventional warfare capability, broadly similar to the CIA and U.S. Special Forces circa 1967. The Quds Force typically operates alongside nonstate actors such as Hezbollah, providing training, weapons and support. Analysts believe that the Quds Force armed elements of the Iraqi insurgency with IEDs built around explosively forged penetrators, allowing them to penetrate armored vehicles. According to retired U.S. Army general Stanley McChrystal, “We knew where all the factories were in Iran. The E.F.P.s killed hundreds of Americans.”

Much like China’s army in the 1980s, the Iranian Army and other ground forces are large but poorly armed. Iran’s sheer size, both in geography and population, are a deterrent to invasion. With Iraq struggling for its own survival, Tehran’s ground forces generally exist to secure the borders and keep the existing system of government in place. That being said, like the People’s Liberation Army, an injection of funding—and purpose—could turn Iran into the dominant land power in the Middle East.

Watch Out: Israel's New Air-Launched "Rampage" Ballistic Missile Is Fierce The Israeli air force operates a wide range of conventional guided air-to-surface munitions. But none can match Rampage’s range. by Kyle Mizokami

 It seems "Rampage" works as advertised.

Israel reportedly used in combat for the first time a new kind of fast, long-range missile.

According to aviation journalist Babak Taghvaee, on April 13, 2019 Israeli air force warplanes fired, for the first time, at least one Rampage air-launched ballistic missile at a missile factory and weapons warehouses in Masyaf, Syria.

The Israelis chose to deploy Rampage “due to the danger of Syria Air Defense Force's S-300PM-2s,” Taghvaee tweeted. The S-300 surface-to-air missile, in theory, can intercept aircraft flying as far as 120 miles away.

The Israeli air raid succeeded in striking the target facilities and “destroying multiple artillery rockets and ballistic missile launchers,” according to Taghvaee. He tweeted commercial satellite imagery that appears to confirm damage to the site in Masyaf.

Rampage first broke cover in the summer of 2018. Israel Aerospace Industries and Israel Military Industry Systems announced they had tested, from an F-16, the 15-feet-long, 1,200-pound, GPS-guided Rampage — and had already inked a sale contract with one customer, presumably the Israeli air force.

With Rampage, the Israeli air force joined a slowly growing number of air arms developing ALBMs for non-nuclear attacks. Russia has introduced its own, much larger ALBM. China reportedly is working on one, too.

Among leading powers, only the United States apparently doesn’t see the value in an air-launched ballistic missile. America’s existing cruise missiles — which already are available to U.S. forces in very large numbers — are capable of striking, in large salvos, a wide range of distant targets.

IAI said speed, range and cost are the ALBM’s main advantages. Eli Reiter, manager of IMI’s firepower division, praised Rampage’s “extraordinary cost-effectiveness ratio” but did not disclose the missile’s cost.

“It can be detected, but it is very hard to intercept,” Amit Haimovich, director of marketing for IAI’s Malam engineering unit, told The Jerusalem Post.

The Israeli air force operates a wide range of conventional guided air-to-surface munitions. But none are supersonic. And it’s likely none can match Rampage’s range. “The whole point of this missile is that it can hit targets within standoff ranges,” Haimovich said.

While IAI didn’t specify the new weapon’s reach, a similar but larger Russian weapon reportedly can strike targets as far as 1,200 miles away. It’s reasonable to assume Rampage can travel hundreds of miles.

By the same token, it’s also reasonable to assume Rampage comes with a relatively small warhead. Israel’s Popeye cruise missile, which is roughly the same length as Rampage is, weighs 3,000 pounds — twice as much as Rampage does — and boasts a 750-pound warhead and a 50-mile range.

At half the weight of Popeye and likely devoting a greater proportion of its internal capacity to fuel, Rampage probably boasts a much smaller warhead than Popeye does. To be fair, Rampage’s high speed could lend it kinetic energy that partially compensates for the comparatively small warhead size.

But Rampage’s size means that an F-15 or F-16 probably wouldn’t carry more than two at a time. That limits the size of the missile salvos the Israeli air force could launch at some distant hard target — say, an airfield or chemical-weapons site.

This is a familiar problem for the first operator of ALBMs. In March 2018, Russian president Vladimir Putin introduced Kinzhal, an apparent air-launched version of the Iskander surface-launched rocket. China began testing its own ALBM in December 2016, according to press reports.

The Russian air force has modified six MiG-31 long-range fighters to carry the 25-feet-long Kinzhal, according to Taghvaee. The Kremlin will modify, before the end of 2018, as many as six more MiG-31s to carry the ALBM, Taghvaee claimed.

The squadron-size force of ALBM-armed MiGs gives Russia the ability to strike heavily-defended targets at long range. But not very many targets. “We’re talking about isolated launches — two or three or six missiles at a time,” said Pavel Podvig, an expert on the Russian military. The same limitations could apply to Israeli warplanes lobbing Rampages.

When it comes to long-range strikes, it clearly isn’t worth it to the U.S. military to trade warhead- and salvo-size for the protective benefit of speed, when it can simply launch lots of relatively slow weapons to compensate for their comparative vulnerability.

But for a country such as Israel with fewer launching platforms, a very fast and hard-to-intercept ballistic weapon — however modest its explosive power — might be just what it needs to hold at risk certain kinds of distant targets.

If Taghvaee’s reporting is accurate, it seems Rampage works as advertised.

Japan's Diesel AIP Stealth Submarines Are Deadlier Than You Think China, beware? by Kyle Mizokami

The combination of long-endurance stealth, sensors, and modern torpedoes and missiles makes the Soryu class an effective hunter-killer.

The Second World War taught Japan valuable lessons. The first—don’t start wars—is an obvious conclusion that has been taken to heart. Other lessons were the result of the wartime Allied air and naval blockade of the country, which brought it to the brink of starvation. For Japan, poor in resources and arable land, to survive the next war, the air and sea lanes must stay open, and for that to happen, Japan must have top-flight air and naval forces.

Japan’s postwar submarine fleet is one of the best in the world. With an authorized total of twenty-two submarines, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s submarine fleet is also one of the largest. Japan builds its own submarines, with the work split between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both based in the port city of Kobe.

Japan takes an iterative approach to submarine construction, with a new submarine class introduced roughly every twenty years that builds upon previous ones. The current class, Soryu, builds upon the older Oyashio class, and the two classes form the entirety of the fleet. Each Soryu features a high degree of automation, reducing crew size to nine officers and fifty-six enlisted men—down ten personnel from the Harushio-class of the mid-1990s.

At 4,200 tons submerged, the nine Soryu-class submarines are the largest submarines built by postwar Japan. Each is 275 feet long and nearly twenty-eight feet wide. They have a range of 6,100 nautical miles and can reportedly dive to a depth of 2,132 feet, or two-fifths of a mile. The Soryu class features an X-shaped tail, reportedly for increased maneuverability in approaching the seabed. This maximizes the sub’s maneuvering room in shallow and littoral waters, particularly the straits in and around Japan that mark key invasion routes.

Each submarine has an optronic mast and ZPS-6F surface/low-level air search radar for detection of enemy ASW and maritime patrol craft. As submarines, however, the main sensor is sonar, represented by the Hughes/Oki ZQQ-7 sonar suite incorporating one bow-mounted sonar array and four flank sonar arrays. The subs also have a towed sonar array for rear acoustic detection.

The Soryu class has six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes mounted in the bow. Armament consists of Type 89 heavyweight homing torpedoes with a range of twenty-seven nautical miles and a maximum operating depth of 2,952 feet. The standard diameter torpedo tubes, along with strong American ties, mean the Soryu is also armed with UGM-84 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles. According to Combat Ships of the World, there are unconfirmed reports that the submarines carry a warshot of thirty weapons instead of the twenty of previous classes. They can also lay mines.

The Soryus have extensive active defense systems, in the form of the ZLR-3-6 electronic countermeasures suite and two three-inch underwater countermeasures launchers for launching acoustic devices. On the passive side, the entire submarine is covered in acoustic tiling to reduce both the signature of enemy active sonar signals and sounds from the inside the ship.

Propulsion is what the class is most famous for. Each can make thirteen knots surfaced and twenty knots submerged, powered by twelve Kawasaki 12V 25S diesel engines and one tandem Toshiba electric motor. For silent running, each submarine is equipped with four Stirling V4-275R Mk air independent propulsion systems licensed from Sweden that can power the submarine underwater for up to two weeks. There are also rumors that the last ships built will trade their AIP units for lithium-ion batteries.

The Soryu class isn’t perfect, though: one major criticism of the boats during the Australian submarine competition was their relatively short operating range. At 6,100 nautical miles, the Soryu’s range wasn’t an issue for their original mission: protecting the home waters of Japan.

Australian Soryus, however, would have had to travel 3,788 miles from their base at HMAS Stirling just to reach the vicinity of Taiwan, a voyage that would necessitate at least one refueling stop, and probably two. For the Australian bid, the Soryus were to be lengthened six to eight meters for improved crew habitability and increased range, but the need to modify the submarine for Australian requirements likely worked against Japan.

The combination of long-endurance stealth, sensors, and modern torpedoes and missiles makes the Soryu class an effective hunter-killer. It is, however, a specialized killer, as Australia came to realize, and would have been a fish out of water in Australian service.

As potent as the class is, expect a replacement class that builds upon this hunter-killer within the next decade. Japan is exploring unmanned underwater vehicles, and toward that end, underwater communications and underwater wireless power-transmission methods. What will Son of Soryu look like? Stay tuned.

China vs. Japan: Who's Navy is Stronger? Has China built a destroyer with to match Japan’s top of the line destroyers, or will it have to wait until the next generation? by Kyle Mizokami

 It would undoubtedly be better to see these two fine ships working together than trying to tear each other apart.

The People’s Republic of China Army Navy (PLAN) is experiencing an unprecedented rise in ships and capabilities. China is building virtually every class of warship, from aircraft carriers to corvettes simultaneously, and in some cases, by the dozen.

Of particular note is the Luyang III or Type 052D–class destroyer. Designed to provide anti-air area defense to a carrier battle group or amphibious ready group, the 052D is the defensive linchpin of any Chinese task force, particularly one operating beyond the range of land-based assets. Two destroyers have been commissioned into the PLAN, with another seven under construction and one more planned.

At the same time, Japan is looking to modestly expand its surface warfare capabilities. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has approved plans to build two new Aegis air warfare destroyers, bringing the pacifist country’s overall number of Aegis ships to eight. Based largely on American equipment, the new destroyers will be Japan’s answer to 052D. (For the purpose of this article we’ll imagine the new Japanese destroyers as Atago-class destroyers with upgrades—or Atago Plus for short.)

Or will it? Has China built a destroyer with to match Japan’s top of the line destroyers, or will it have to wait until the next generation? Are the upgrades Japan has planned for the two new ships too little, too late, or do they provide a decisive edge over the 052D?

The centerpiece of the 052D is the combination of Type 346 Dragon Eye active electronically scanned array radar system and Type 518 L-band radars. A Russian expert claimed the Dragon Eye is capable of detecting the F-35, but there’s no firm evidence of that at this point. It is also not known if Dragon Eye is capable of shooting down ballistic missiles.

Atago Plus, on the other hand, is powered by the AN/SPY-1D(V) passive electronically scanned array radar. The Atago Plus–class was not originally purchased with software to engage ballistic missiles, but this is being remedied with an update. In terms of radar, the Atago Plus–class is the clear winner.

The 052D and Atago Plus both have a single main gun in the 127-millimeter to 130-millimeter class. For self-defense against missiles, small boats and fast attack craft the Chinese destroyer has two 30-millimeter guns and a H/PJ-12 anti-missile close-in weapon system (CIWS), the latter a seven-barrel 30-millimeter gatling gun. The Atago Plus–class has two Phalanx CIWS Block 1B, an upgraded version of the long-serving radar controlled gatling gun capable of engaging missiles and small boats.

In terms of gun armament, the two ships are a virtual tie. The Chinese ship has more guns, but we don’t know how effective they are. The Japanese ship has fewer guns but the systems are proven.

Both destroyers primarily rely on missile armament, with dozens of vertical launch silos providing flexible payload options. The 052D destroyer has 64 individual vertical launch silos. Japan’s Atago Plus–class destroyers have 96 individual silos—64 in the bow and 32 in the stern.

The silos on the 052D destroyer can be loaded with HQ-9B SAMs, CY-5 rocket-delivered anti-submarine torpedoes, and YJ-18 anti-ship missiles, China’s version of the Russian Klub. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates they will also at some point be equipped with a land attack cruise missile, possibly a naval version of the DF-10.

The 052D has more defensive systems—in addition to the silo-based surface-to-air missiles, it also reportedly has a quad pack of DK-10A medium range surface-to-air missiles, two 30-millimeter guns, and one H/PJ-12 and FL-3000N point defense anti-missile systems. It even has a 24 shot anti-submarine decoy system. Does this help the 052D’s defensive rating? A little, but not where it really counts: The Atago Plus’ defenses can cover a broader spectrum of threats to the task force, not just the ship itself.

The silos on the Atago Plus–class can carry SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptors, SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles, the newer SM-6 surface-to air-missiles, and ASROC, a system similar to the CY-5. Due to political reasons, Japan does not have land-attack cruise missiles.

The Atago Plus–class wins on defensive capability. The Atago-class is equally capable of intercepting sea-skimmers and ballistic missiles at the edge of space. It can carry fifty percent more missiles in its silos—all of which are defensive. On top of all that, it has multiple layers of anti-submarine warfare capability.

In the area of offensive missile armament, the 052D has a decisive advantage, being capable of loading all 64 vertical launch cells with anti-ship missiles. Of course no navy in its right mind would do that, but it does illustrate the flexibility of the Chinese system. The Atago Plus–class is limited to eight SSM-1B anti-ship missiles that, like the American Harpoon, are too large to fit in silos and must be stored on the deck or superstructure.

The 052D–class wins on offensive capability. It can pack a potent ship-killing punch — if it is willing to trade away defensive missiles. The fact that China has cruise missiles and no political qualms about deploying them gives the 052D a latent land attack capability.

Digital networking and information sharing capability is another area of increasing importance. China has the new Joint Service Integrated Data Link System (JSIDS) system, similar to Link 16. Japan on the other hand utilizes Link 16 itself. Not knowing much about JSIDS, we’ll call this one a draw.

So far, with the exception of offensive armament, the 052D-class has tied or come in a respectable second to the Atago Plus. But we haven’t even mentioned the specific upgrades the Atago Plus will have—upgrades that allow the ship to pull far ahead of its Chinese competitor.

The Atago Plus–class will utilize the U.S. military’s Cooperative Engagement Capability. CEC on the new destroyers—and Japan’s E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft—will allow the ships to share sensor data and provide targeting data for missiles.

An Advanced Hawkeye will, for example, be able to provide targeting data for SM-6 missiles fired from an Atago Plus—at targets out of range of the ship’s own radars. CEC will permit the Japanese ships to cooperate in a similar fashion with U.S. air and naval ships. Overall, CEC will allow the destroyers to leverage the power of similarly equipped ships in the area, increasing their useful range.

The Atago Plus–class is also being built with future weapon upgrades in mind. The ships are being built to accommodate electromagnetic railguns and lasers under development with the Ministry of Defense’s Technical Research Development Institute. Although neither weapon has achieved operational status, Japanese designers appear confident they are just over the horizon.

Overall, the Japanese destroyer is the better ship. The Atago Plus–class will do a better job of not only defending itself, but whatever other vessels it is designed to protect. Using CEC, the destroyers can utilize sensors on other ships and planes to extend its capabilities. It is definitely weighed toward a defensive mission and is weak in offensive capability, but the installation of a railgun may go a long way towards improving its ability to attack ships and land targets at a distance.

The 052D-class is a credible ship but there’s a lot unknown about it, particularly with regards to the effectiveness of the radar and the accuracy of its missiles. Having 50 percent fewer missile silos than its Japanese competitor hurts the 052D. The lack of an upgrade path seems a bit problematic in the long term, but it should be kept in mind that a successor, the 055-class, already appears on the verge of production.

So, if the two ships met on the high seas, who would win? It seems unlikely that either one could hurt the other with anti-ship missiles—both carry too much defensive armament for that. Adding another ship or two to escort—the entire point of both destroyers—would stretch the 052D’s capabilities. The Japanese ship could probably defend two other ships with ease—and then engage the Chinese ship with its railgun.

Both ships have good designs, but China’s is a little more of an achievement because the country’s shipyards are relatively new to building large modern combat ships. Noting that, the Japanese ship is the clear winner in our duel. It would undoubtedly be better to see these two fine ships working together than trying to tear each other apart.

A U.S. B-2 Bomber Attacked a Chinese Embassy in 1999 (This Was What Was Left) Overall, twenty-eight thousand bombs and other munitions were exploded over Yugoslavia, a country the size of Ohio. by Kyle Mizokami

There was no logical reason to intentionally bomb the embassy and provoke China, nor was there a great swelling of anti-Chinese feeling in America that would have provoked such an act.

During NATO’s 1999 air war over Yugoslavia, the Atlantic alliance struck hundreds of targets over Serbia and Kosovo. Most were uncontroversial: air-defense sites, army headquarters and other military targets. The destruction of one target in particular, however, set off a wave of anti-Western—and anti-American in particular—protests half a world away. That target was the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

NATO’s bombing campaign began on March 24, 1999, after peace talks meant to stop the persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo collapsed. Targets in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo were struck—first the Serb air defense network that opposed NATO planes, then a broader target array including Yugoslav army forces said to be directly involved in the persecution of Kosovars. The target list also included political-military targets inside the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade itself.

Overall, twenty-eight thousand bombs and other munitions were exploded over Yugoslavia, a country the size of Ohio. William Cohen, then secretary of defense, characterized Allied Force as “the most precise application of airpower in history.” Some five hundred civilians died in the bombing, a remarkably low number for such a high number of munitions expended. In its own account of the campaign, NATO stresses that targets were “carefully selected” and that “massive effort was made to minimise the impact of the air campaign on the Serb civilian population.”

Despite the seemingly extensive target vetting, on May 7 the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was struck by five Joint Directed Attack Munition satellite-guided bombs, delivered by U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers. Three Chinese journalists—Shao Yunhuan of Xinhua, and Xu Xinghu and his wife Zhu Ying of the Guangming Daily—were killed in the attack. Twenty other Chinese nationals were injured, five seriously.

In response, President Bill Clinton made a rare public apology to China. Clinton gave his “profound condolences” to the Chinese, saying the attack was a mistake. NATO claimed it was acting on information that the embassy was actually the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP).

In his detailed explanation to Chinese officials of the target selection process, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stated that the United States believed it was striking a state-sponsored proliferator of missile parts to Libya and Iraq and a Yugoslav military logistics facility. Pickering blamed “multiple factors and errors” that stretched back to 1997, and cited three main failures: the flawed technique used to identify the FDSP building, the U.S. military and intelligence community’s complete lack of understanding of where the Chinese embassy was actually located, and the lack of vetting the FDSP’s location with anyone who actually knew better. As Pickering pointed out, although many U.S. and NATO diplomats must have actually visited the Chinese embassy in the four years since it moved, its new location had not been updated in “no-target” databases.

Despite assurances that the attack was a mistake, a wave of anti-American protests spread across China, targeting the U.S. embassy in Beijing and consular facilities in other major cities. Tens of thousands of Chinese demonstrated in Beijing, and U.S. diplomatic buildings suffered damage from vandalism. Chinese authorities cordoned off the buildings from protesters, but otherwise allowed them to continue.

Across China, the general consensus was that the destruction of the embassy in Belgrade was intentional. Even the Chinese government did not believe that the embassy was bombed because of an out-of-date map. The attack, intentional or not, tapped into a deep vein of anti-foreigner sentiment in China dating back hundreds of years. Chinese people, having lived their entire lives with the knowledge of unequal treaties, demands, and other aspects of colonialism forced upon a weak China, viewed the attack as yet another humiliation imposed by foreign powers. Much of the anti-Western sentiment was heartfelt.

At the same time however, there was evidence that the Chinese Communist Party encouraged the anti-Western protests. Chinese authorities allegedly organized the protests through Communist Party cadres assigned to universities. Bottles, stones, bricks, paint and even Molotov cocktails were thrown at the U.S. embassy in Beijing. In Chengdu, the consul’s residence was set on fire. Given the tight control the Chinese Communist Party exerts over the country, it is difficult to imagine that the more violent protests were at least tacitly allowed to occur. Then again, it’s difficult to imagine that the vast U.S. military and intelligence apparatus could mistake an embassy with a traditional Chinese green tiled roof for a military logistical hub.

The rush to conspiracy on the part of China is in some ways understandable. There is no obvious reason why the Chinese embassy in Belgrade should be bombed, especially by an all-seeing and all-powerful American military. Simple stupidity simply can’t be the cause; terrible acts such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy must have equally terrible causes, such as a mysterious, racist, imperialist urge to once again humiliate the great Chinese people.

Yet to what end? There was no logical reason to intentionally bomb the embassy and provoke China, nor was there a great swelling of anti-Chinese feeling in America that would have provoked such an act. Ultimately, the conspiracy explanation lacks motive. Hanlon’s razor says it best: never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.

Why Israel's F-15 Fighter Jet Is One of the Most Feared Planes in the Sky An Israeli Strike Eagle would go a long way toward fixing the Israeli Air Force’s shortcomings. by Kyle Mizokami

The aircraft served continuously over the past twenty years, not only in training exercises but anti-terrorism operations.

One of the fighter jets most associated with Israel is the F-15 Eagle. The first F-15 touched down in Israel in 1976 and the jet has served continuously—and without defeat—since. In 1998, the Israeli Air Force introduced a new version of the jet, one designed for air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. The Ra’am (Thunder) serves as the long-range striking arm of the Israeli Air Force, complementing the new F-35I Adir fighter to ensure Israeli air superiority now and into the foreseeable future.

The earliest versions of the McDonnell Douglas (today Boeing) F-15 Eagle were pure air-to-air fighters. Large twin-engine, single-seat fighters, they featured a bubble canopy for excellent visibility, a powerful APG-63 radar, a combat load of four AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missiles and four AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, and an M61 Gatling gun. The two Pratt & Whitney F100 engines gave the F-15 such an impressive power-to-weight ratio that the new jet could easily accelerate straight up.

The F-15 was large and versatile enough that engineers considered a multirole version, one that took advantage of the F-15’s power, range, and size to carry air-to-ground weapons. This led to the development of the F-15E Strike Eagle, which entered service with the U.S. Air Force in 1989 and promptly saw service in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 

The Strike Eagle’s performance in the Gulf War stirred Israeli interest. The Gulf War had not exactly gone as planned for Tel Aviv, which had been bombarded by Scud missiles launched by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Israel acquiesced to U.S. pressure not to retaliate, but even if it had decided to do so it lacked the long-range aircraft and reconnaissance assets necessary to hunt Scud launchers in Western Iraq. Saddam Hussein remained in power after the war to eject his army from Kuwait, ensuring that Iraq would remain a threat to Israel. Meanwhile, Iran was in the early stages of its nuclear weapons program. A long-range fighter would be a necessary weapon for deterring, or failing that destroying, threats from the east. 

An Israeli Strike Eagle would go a long way toward fixing the Israeli Air Force’s shortcomings. The F-15E’s conformal fuel tanks would add range the range necessary to attack long-range targets. The dual air-to-air/air-to-ground capability meant an F-15E could self-escort if necessary. (In 1981, Israeli F-15s escorted F-16s tasked to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, enlarging the air group and the need for aerial refueling and other support.) A single plane that could do it all, that the Israel Air Force already knew very well, was an intriguing option. 

Israel selected the F-15I, or Ra’am, in May 1994 with an initial agreement to buy twenty-one aircraft (known as Peace Fox V) with a further option for four more (Peace Fox VI.) The order was increased to twenty-five aircraft in 1995. The F-15 had already served in the Israeli Air Force for fifteen years, and Israeli engineers had plenty of ideas on how to improve on the platform. Israeli Aerospace Industries worked with manufacturer Boeing (which had since purchased McDonnell Douglas) to contribute many of the aircraft’s avionics. 

The F-15I hosted a number of indigenous features. The aircraft had an Israeli-made central computer, GPS/inertial guidance system, and an Elbit display and sight helmet (DASH). The airplanes were delivered with electronic warfare systems built into the F-15E, instead of using the Israeli Elisra SPS-2110 Integrated Electronic Warfare System. 

The F-15I could carry all the weapons Israeli F-15As carried and then some. The Ra’am initially carried AIM-9L Sidewinder and Python infrared-guided short-range missiles, but time has narrowed that down to the Python. The fighter also carried both the older AIM-7 Sparrow and newer AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided medium-range missile. 

The F-15I’s twin engines and large airframe mean can carry up to 18,000 pounds of fuel and munitions. The Israeli Air Force originally described the jet’s ordnance load as thirty-six Rockeye cluster bombs or six Maverick air-to-ground missiles. Today, the F-15I’s air-to-ground munitions set has expanded to include Paveway laser-guided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) satellite-guided bombs, BLU-109 “bunker-buster” bombs, the SPICE precision-guided bomb, and AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles. 

The first F-15I arrived in Israel in 1997, with new aircraft arriving at about once a month until the order was fulfilled in 1999. The aircraft served continuously over the past twenty years, not only in training exercises but anti-terrorism operations, the 2006 Lebanon War, the Gaza War, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Cast Lead. The F-15Is were also heavily involved in Israeli planning to strike Iranian nuclear facilities had Iran, a strike headed off by the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the West.

The IAF’s adoption of the F-35I “Adir” fighter did not dampen the country’s enthusiasm for the F-15. The IAF still calls the aircraft its “strategic aircraft,” with the head of the Air Force stating, “At the end of the day, when we want to reach far distances with few aircraft many arms - the F-15I wins.” 

In 2016, Israel announced the start of an upgrade program meant to keep the F-15I relevant, including a new active, electronically-scanned array radar and updated avionics. In 2018, the IAF was reportedly torn between purchasing F-15I and F-35 fighters, leaning towards the former over the latter. If Israel purchases more F-15s, it will almost certainly end up flying the platform for the better part of a century. That’s a ringing endorsement for a warplane first flown in the early 1970s.