How North Korea's Propaganda Prevents Inter-Korean Peace Can the North Korean people be helped to see the truth? by Jihyun Park

As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

In 2017, two hours after its sixth nuclear test, the North Korean regime released a song entitled “There Is Peace in Our Weapons.” Here are some of that song’s lyrics:

“No matter how precious peace is
I will never beg
To our total weapons To our total weapons
Peace is peace"

Emotional brainwashing is the most important aim of North Korean propaganda. Just as the tale of Kim Il-sung liberating Joseon from Japan and winning the Korean War continues to be told in the North, so too do tales aimed at engendering hostility and hatred toward the United States and South Korea.

The history of the Korean War as taught by the regime is reflected by the Sinchon Museum of American War Atrocities, a museum that evokes hatred in hearts across the country. The regime claims that the U.S. military committed a massacre of civilians in the North Korean town of Sinchon during the war, and so there you will find the “400 Mothers’ Tomb” and “102 Children’s Tomb”: memorials to the women and children butchered in the alleged atrocity. This alleged war crime known as the Sinchon Massacre is a piece of anti-American propaganda which shouts to the ranks of their armed forces. Anti-American and anti-South Korean indoctrination continues to this day and serves as the primary source of division on the Korean Peninsula.

It is said that North Korea is perpetually on a war footing and that all of its people are part of its armed forces. North Korean children must join the Young Red Guard and practice shooting firearms with live ammunition by the time they are 15 years old. University students in their third year must do 6 months of military service, and, in the event of war, these reservists would don their military uniforms and be ordered to the front lines. The general population drills several times a month. The North Korean regime insists that the military and military matters be prioritized before all things, and this military-first concept entails isolation from international norms. They say that if there is no strong military, Korea will be swallowed up by external forces.

In order to really understand North Korea, it is imperative that its 75-year political history be understood. Kim Il-sung governed the country with a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Juche Idea, and Kim Jong-il carried out a “military first” policy. Kim Jong-un, succeeding in the line of dictators, insists on nuclear power and commits ruthless atrocities. If the regime desired unification of the Korean Peninsula, it would not have developed nuclear weapons and new missiles to deliver them. At the same time, if war were to break out, the regime would no longer be able to control the country and its nuclear arsenal would become useless. Neither does China, for that matter, wish to call for reunification or see war on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, what the North Korean regime desires is the withdrawal of American armed forces from South Korea.

For the war to come to an end, it is of the utmost importance that the North Korean people be accurately informed of their history. To this day, North Koreans remember the Korean War as being between Koreans, including the people of South Korea, and the United States. For the seeds of change to be sown, the North Korean people must comprehend the reality of the atrocious situation they face. How could this be achieved? Uncensored access to social network services (SNS), the internet, newspapers, and TV stations are all great candidates. The free world has a responsibility to help the North Korean people escape the brutality of the dictatorship under which they live, and an answer to ending this treachery may be found in the power the media brings to bear when it concerts its efforts.

Why China Is Still Needed to Any Peace Treaty With North Korea Pyongyang will continue to manuever between Beijing, Washington, and Seoul. by Miyeon Oh

As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

One of the key takeaways from what has happened on the Korean Peninsula lately—rumors surrounding Kim Jong-un’s health in April and then Pyongyang’s hostile actions, including its destruction of the Joint Liaison Office—is that it would not be possible to tackle North Korean problems without China. If a crisis or major change happens in North Korea, it is inevitable that the United States will need China’s help to stabilize the Korean Peninsula and avoid or mitigate any serious disruptions. And given that any major crisis or proliferation on the peninsula would be a direct threat to China’s stability and security environment, China will likely do whatever it takes to keep the status quo and stabilize the Korean Peninsula on its own terms.

Pyongyang is likely to have more room to maneuver between the two countries when their relationships are at odds, so it is driving a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea by using provocations in order to create friction within Seoul to blame Washington, since America had demanded of Seoul that inter-Korean reconciliation not outpace denuclearization efforts. At the same time, given its stalled negotiations with the Unites States, North Korea is likely strengthening its ties with China in the midst of intensifying U.S.-China tensions in order to increase its gains and leverage. While there was a hope for the possibility of U.S.-China cooperation on North Korean issues in light of Stephen Biegun and Mike Pompeo’s meeting with a Chinese delegation in Hawaii led by Yang Jiechi, the U.S. and China likely remained divided on the appropriate reaction to North Korea’s increasingly hostile actions and rhetoric. Given that the meeting failed to produce any tangible results on an array of issues including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Himalayas, it doesn’t seem likely that the United States and China will act together to make visible progress on denuclearization or support additional sanctions anytime soon.

Given the current geopolitical landscape around the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific, it is hard to imagine that the Korean War will come to an end in five years. An end-of-war declaration would have to be agreed to and signed by the United States, South Korea, and North Korea as a first step to reaching a formal peace treaty. Such a declaration should not only end hostilities, replacing the 1953 Armistice, but also: (1) declare the Korean Peninsula a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (NWFZ); (2) incorporate formal reciprocal arms control measures that lead to disengagement and de-escalation of the military confrontation on the peninsula; (3) commit parties to conventional arms reductions and confidence-building measures; and (4) include universal principles of human rights, respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, and the resolving of disputes through exclusively peaceful means. In addition to these provisions, an important pre-condition, which seems almost unrealistic for the current geopolitical environment, should be that the United States, China, and the two Koreas all be committed to initiating a dialogue and negotiations on a peace treaty consistent with parallel progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. More importantly, it would be impossible to achieve denuclearization if the Kim family is not convinced that their regime can receive security guarantees for giving up nuclear weapons and can survive after a peace treaty. Only when the Kim family realizes that their nuclear program is detrimental to the future of the regime and that North Korea’s economy will be better off without it will Pyongyang be interested in pursuing an end-of-war declaration and peace treaty.

Would an Official End to the Korean War Really Change Anything? History and each country's internal dynamics suggest we should be skeptical. by Mitchell Lerner

As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

As a historian, I typically write about the past. Today though, as I sit to write about the future, one wonderfully liberating thought flashes through my mind: since I am writing about events that have not yet occurred, no one can say I am wrong! Five years from now, I suppose, someone choosing to re-read these entries might find my predictions to have missed the mark, but by then we might also have a world largely bereft of human life due to some combination of coronavirus, global warming, and a lack of college football, so my short piece about a potential end to the Korean War seems unlikely to garner much attention.

This is, I admit, an exciting lack of accountability, one that encourages me to change the parameters of the question slightly. A formal end to the Korean War would certainly be nice, and it might even be possible. The more important question, though, is whether or not such an agreement would have any practical effect. Signatures on a piece of paper followed by a dramatic press conference would be welcome. But, would they actually have any impact? Here, I admit to being quite skeptical. Many factors lay at the heart of my pessimism, but three are most prominent, all of which stem from the specific political needs and internal dynamics of the major players.

First, the Trump administration has embraced a more personal style of diplomacy that has, in the case of North Korea, neglected to develop the institutional framework critical to making significant policy changes. Not only has such an approach been largely unfruitful, it has actually weakened the American position. Should Trump be voted out of office in November, his replacement will essentially have to start from scratch in developing DPRK ties, an effort that will be particularly complicated since we can expect candidate Biden to offer harsh condemnation of Trump’s connection to a dictator. Trump has also already used some of the diplomatic weapons in his arsenal, meeting with Kim for summits and photo ops, for example, and even walking into North Korea. These are carrots usually reserved for the end of a diplomatic process, as part of a negotiated package that includes mutual concessions. Instead, Trump gave Kim the favorable media coverage he sought and got nothing in return. Offers of economic inducements will also be less enticing than Trump seems to think, since the emergence of a market-based middle class is likely to be seen in Pyongyang as a double-edged sword at best. And with the recent decline in U.S. prestige and influence across the world, Trump (or his replacement) will also have less to offer by normalizing relations than in the past.

At the same time, forces in South Korea are also likely to temper enthusiasm for change. Studies have shown that the ROK’s younger generation is less likely than its elders to see the North as part of a united nation, and are more likely to hold hostile views towards the DPRK. Every year that passes sees this generation wielding more political power, making it even more unlikely that future ROK governments will continue President Moon’s outreach effort with the same commitment. Recent DPRK bellicosity seems likely to further exacerbate those trends for the near future, as does the fact that Moon, despite his desire to maintain talks, is unlikely to break with the wishes of his American ally, particularly considering the economic problems expected from the coronavirus crisis.

The biggest obstacle to a true reconciliation, however, emerges from Pyongyang. Historically, the Kim family has relied on the presence of an external threat to justify their domestic shortcomings and rally the people behind them. DPRK leaders thus need an enemy to rationalize their despotic behavior and perpetuate their regime. George Kennan once famously wrote of the Soviet Union that its leaders were driven to put forward a vision of the outside world as “evil, hostile and menacing” because that fear “provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers.” The Soviet Union is long gone, but a similar world view exists in Pyongyang where for decades a family of ruthless tyrants has generated repeated external crises in order to perpetuate their control. Evidence even suggests that the Kims are at their most provocative in international relations when things are domestically unstable, as seems likely in the current environment of the coronavirus and economic sanctions. North Korea is thus more likely to spend the next few years reverting to its traditional saber-rattling than it is to extending an olive branch, and with presidential elections in both the United States and South Korea in the next few years, such behavior will likely quash even the most basic steps towards normalization.

Hopefully, anyone looking back at this piece in five years will find me to have been brutally wrong. I am certainly hoping for genuine peace and even friendship, so I will happily split a bottle of soju with the first person to contact me in five years to mock this prediction. Still, the lessons of the past and the conditions of the present leave me skeptical about those chances.

Why the American-South Korean Alliance Cannot Be a Simple Bargaining Chip With North Korea Any successful denuclearization effort may require a change to the alliance, but that change must be thought through in Washington and Seoul before talking to Pyeongyang. by Michael O'Hanlon

 As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

I do not believe that there will be a general peace treaty involving the United States and the Koreas by 2025. A Biden administration would probably be traditionalist and cautious on the matter, meaning that it would not agree to such a formal peace until nuclear matters are successfully addressed, and that seems a long shot by 2025. Even an interim deal that relaxed some sanctions in exchange for verifiably dismantling North Korea’s nuclear production infrastructure, while letting Pyongyang keep its existing arsenal for the time being, would be tough to achieve, though it would be a good idea. President Trump is harder to predict, but my former support for his nontraditional diplomacy with Kim Jong-un has evaporated given his inability to stay focused on the issue or develop a realistic negotiating strategy.

However, posing the question of peace raises the follow-on question. If and when we could get such a treaty, along with some semblance of a nuclear accord and perhaps even some de-escalation of the conventional military standoff, should the United States and South Korea keep their alliance? Moreover, should they keep the presence of American military forces on the Korean Peninsula? President Trump has seemed willing to end the alliance at times. If we could get the aforementioned deal, would that outcome make sense?

As much as Dean Acheson’s 1950 comments about Korea not being important to America came back to haunt the United States, it is still a fair question in the abstract as to whether a distant superpower should want to ally formally with a small and exposed peninsula attached to the giant Eurasian land mass—attached via China and Russia, no less. Is it worth it? Is it prudent? On balance, I think the case is strong for keeping the alliance, from an American perspective, provided that South Koreans agree. That said, if South Koreans (or all Koreans, in the case of a reunified country) do not agree, then the United States can accept that outcome too given that, geographically speaking, Korea is a small, faraway, and difficult to defend place.

With the planet’s eleventh largest economy, though, South Korea is quite important in today’s world. Alliances with such important powers are generally worth preserving for the simple reason that the United States should not want to go back to the kind of anarchy that prevailed in Europe, as well as East Asia, a century ago, when major powers often had weak and shifting relationships with each other but no real enduring bonds. The result of that, of course, was two world wars as well as conflict in Korea. South Korea is not just a large economy either, but it moreover punches far above its weight in a number of critical industries: it is among the world’s top three producers of ships, of semiconductors, and of numerous types of advanced electronics. It is also the second most powerful country in the Indo-Pacific region after Japan, with which the United States also has a security alliance. The American and Korean publics seem to understand and agree with these observations as well. Both peoples see the other in a favorable light and support the alliance.

Given the dynamism in the Asia-Pacific region which gave rise to President Obama’s rebalance or pivot, which has been maintained in a number of ways by the Trump administration, Korea’s role in America’s global system of alliances takes on an even more important light. In concrete regional terms, the U.S.-ROK alliance is crucial to American posture in the broader Indo-Pacific. While American allies are plentiful around the world, they are most numerous in Europe and, in different ways, both Latin America and the Middle East. However, they are far more scarce in Asia. In specific military terms, the U.S.-ROK alliance has proven its mettle not only on the Korean Peninsula but from Vietnam to the Middle East and beyond. The United States has some 60 allies and security partners, but, of those, arguably only Great Britain, Australia, and perhaps Canada and France have shown the same commitment to collaborative global military operations with the United States, combined with the same mass and fighting capability, as South Korea has demonstrated.

Indeed, although it is streamlining the size of its armed forces at present, South Korea today has the largest military of any American ally. It probably has one of the three or four toughest and most combat-ready armed forces in the world. It ranks fifth in military spending among formal U.S. allies (sixth if one counts Saudi Arabia), and leaving aside U.S. security partners in the broader Middle East, none of which are formal allies, South Korea is also at the top of the list for burden-sharing among American allies. It devotes some 2.5% of GDP to its military—the most of any U.S. ally in East Asia, Europe, or the Americas with the exception of Colombia (and Trinidad and Tobago)—well in excess of NATO’s 2% goal or actual average of 1.5%. For future security missions ranging from counterterrorism to protection of sea lanes to cyber defense, the alliance offers great benefits for the United States.

Regardless of one’s views on whether a long-term U.S.-ROK alliance makes sense, however, it is important to think through the issue before that alliance becomes a chip in a negotiating process with Pyongyang. The alliance is far too central to U.S. security to be handled in such a way.

Yes, Peace, Denuclearization, and Korean Unification Are Still Possible The problem is a lack of trust and a lack of action-for-action. by Joseph R. DeTrani

As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

A peace treaty ending the Korean War is achievable by 2025, the 75^th anniversary of the Korean War. However, North Korea’s decision to demolish the Joint Liaison Office on June 16, 2020, coupled with the vitriol from sister of Chairman Kim Jong-un and heir apparent Kim Yo-jong, will once again slow the process of reconciliation and embolden the critics of negotiations.

I nonetheless remain confident that eventual reconciliation with North Korea is possible and that substantive intra-Korean talks can lead to unification. Moreover, the denuclearization of North Korea is possible and a peace treaty ending the Korean War is necessary if we expect meaningful progress toward these goals.

North Korea wants nuclear weapons as a deterrent to any aggressor seeking regime change. Our job has been to convince North Korea that regime change is not our objective. In addition, we must show Pyongyang that, with denuclearization, a normal relationship with the United States is possible, which would entail the removal of sanctions and access to international financial institutions and foreign direct investments. To date, despite the assurances provided to North Korea with the Agreed Framework in 1994, the Six Party Talks Joint Statement in September 2005, and the Singapore Summit Statement in June 2018, North Korea has walked away from these agreements and built more nuclear weapons.

What has been missing during all these years of negotiations and resultant agreements is “trust.” Their negotiators cite Libya as an example. Our job has been to convince North Korea that they are not Libya, that they will receive the security assurances they want, and that normalization of relations with the United States is their best security assurance. Furthermore, Pyongyang must realize that economic development assistance will benefit its people and enhance the leadership’s stature, and that progress with intra-Korean negotiations will lead to peace, prosperity, and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula as well as its eventual unification.

To achieve these objectives, a new strategy that focuses on “actions-for-actions,” where benefits accrue to North Korea as they move forward with complete and verifiable denuclearization, is necessary. This process will take time, but as long as there is progress toward denuclearization, with commensurate deliverables to North Korea, the ultimate objectives are achievable.

To regain momentum in stalled talks with North Korea, informing them that the United States is prepared to discuss a declaration to end the Korean War with a peace treaty would be a timely confidence building initiative for 2020, the 70^th anniversary of the Korean War. Assuming an agreement for complete denuclearization, with timelines, is secured, a peace treaty before the 75^th anniversary of the Korean War is achievable and even necessary.

Why the Korean War Is Unlikely to End for Good Anytime Soon Despite how important it is, Pyongyang doesn't want to give up its nukes and U.S.-China rivarly only make things worse. by Sang Hyun Lee

As the world commemorates the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: Do you believe that the Korean War will finally come to an end before its next major anniversary in 2025? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic. 

Nearly 70 years have passed since the Korean War stopped, but the two Koreas are still divided and inter-Korean relations remain, legally, at a state of war. While the cease-fire continues, the Korean Peninsula has been experiencing unstable peace, with large and small armed clashes occurring within the framework of the armistice system. The relative peace experienced on the Korean Peninsula has been the result of an unstable balance of military power and an armistice agreement which was intended to be temporary. Thus, for lasting peace to come upon the Korean Peninsula, the Korean War must be ended officially and a permanent peace regime established.

Why is it important to finally end the Korean War? Because ending the Korean War is a starting point for building a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Consider Article 3 of the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula signed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un on April 27, 2018. That article states that the two sides will actively cooperate to build a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. It also argues that bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a firm peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is a historic mission that must not be delayed any further. Particularly, Phrase 3 of Article 3 states that “the two sides agreed to declare the end of war this year [2018] that marks the 65^th anniversary of the Armistice Treaty and actively promote the holding of trilateral meetings involving the two sides and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two sides, the United states and China with a view to replacing the Armistice Treaty with a peace agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.” The pledge, of course, has not been realized.

The establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is an item of high importance in the Moon administration’s North Korea agenda. Roughly speaking, a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula would seek to establish a framework for the coexistence of the two Koreas by ending the unstable armistice on the peninsula and eliminating the possibility of a war. With the rise of North Korea’s nuclear threats, the peace regime debate has been inextricably intertwined with the denuclearization of North Korea. Indeed, the core of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula would be the denuclearization of North Korea, and peace without denuclearization would be nothing but a castle on the sand. The very first step toward a successful denuclearization negotiation would be the declaration of an end to the Korean War. However, officially ending the Korean War is unlikely to be achieved by 2025 for two reasons.

First, there is little chance that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons program on its own or that denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea will produce any meaningful results soon. In April 2012, North Korea revised the preamble of its constitution to clearly recognized itself as a nuclear power. Then in March 2013, a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee was held to confirm the “byeongjin policy,” which pursues economic development and nuclear power simultaneously. North Korea’s policy of pushing for both nuclear weapons and economic development is fundamentally opposed to the position of South Korea and the United States that a peace regime presupposes the North’s denuclearization, signaling that Pyongyang has no intention to give up its valuable strategic arsenal.

Second, worsening U.S.-China strategic competition in the post-coronavirus era will make negotiations on North Korea’s denuclearization more difficult. This will, in turn, also make it difficult to realize a declaration to end the Korean War. A declaration is just a declaration, not a treaty or statute that is legally binding. Nonetheless, if a declaration of the end of the war is to lead to a meaningful peace regime, it should be approved by neighboring countries such as China, Japan, and Russia, as likewise for a declaration between the U.S. and North Korea. However, strategic competition between the United States. and China after COVID-19 is expected to worsen, which would give them little incentive to cooperate on this issue.

Recently, North Korea blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, marking a sharp turn toward heightened hostilities between Seoul and Pyongyang. Pyongyang subsequently rejected a South Korean offer to send a special envoy for urgent talks and instead announced plans to remilitarize the DMZ, which had been disarmed following the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement. As a result, inter-Korean relations have regressed to the states things were before the June 15 Joint Declaration, which called for the two Koreas to work together to resolve the issue of national reunification. Given this, it seems quite difficult to expect a declaration of the end of the Korean War by 2025.

The Trump Administration Has a China Containment Plan The new strategy for Beijing is profoundly different from the political containment and détente strategies that the United States followed during the real Cold War. by Ramon Marks

The Trump administration has announced a new strategic approach to China. The move has been interpreted as an escalation into a new “Cold War,” reminiscent of the old competition between the West and the Soviet Union.

But the new strategy for China is profoundly different from the political containment and détente strategies that the United States followed during the real Cold War. The competition with the Soviet Union and its allies was fundamentally political and military. A spiraling nuclear arms race converged in central Europe where two opposing military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were poised for war. Moscow aggressively promoted the spread of communism, opportunistically fomenting and supporting revolution and guerilla wars around the world.

The Soviet Bloc, however, could never successfully compete with Western democracies in the marketplace. The rigid, centrally planned approach to economics pursued by Soviet-style communism did not hold a candle to the dynamic free-market economies of the West. The Soviet Bloc operated within its own closed economic world, generating far less prosperity than market-based economies. Ultimately, the Soviet system collapsed of its own weight, strangled both by its centrally planned dirigisme, and Western alliance trade controls that denied the Communist Bloc access to advanced technology and products. Anyone from the United States who traveled to Russia after the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s thought that they had walked into a time warp, a country stuck in the 1950s. In the end, the Soviets did not have the economic ability to keep up the military competition with the United States and its allies. The arms race bankrupted the Soviet Union and its centrally planned communist, economic system.

The current situation with China bears no resemblance to any of this. China is the world’s largest, market-based economy in purchasing power parity terms. The Chinese challenge is overwhelmingly a question of market governance. Unlike the former Soviet Union, China does not seek to impose or spread its style of communist rule on other countries (other than Taiwan), either by military means or political persuasion. China’s nuclear arms inventory is a fraction of that of the United States or Russia, adequate only to survive a first nuclear strike and retaliate. China’s economy is not centrally planned under Soviet-style communist principles. China’s economy has leaped to the top by exploiting and manipulating what the administration describes as the global economy’s “free and open rules-based order.” China is now the leading exporting country in the world and the second-largest importer after the United States. It has cynically manipulated free market rules to achieve its long-range goal of global economic dominance under an authoritarian communist party model more reminiscent of German-style fascism than Marxist socialist doctrine, or Soviet-style central economic planning and control. Like Nazi Germany, China espouses a form of (Han centered) ultra-nationalism, marked by dictatorial powers, suppression of dissent, and overwhelming regimentation of society and the market economy to serve the ends of one-party rule under a benighted leader.

But, unlike the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, China’s military objectives have so far proven to be far more limited than its economic ambitions. China’s priority military focus is confined to the zealous defense of its territorial borders, including dominance over its littoral waters, the Yellow, East and South China Seas. While China’s navy today is the world’s largest, having built four warships for every one built by the United States over the last ten years, those ships are concentrated in waters near its coast, not patrolling throughout the world like those of the U.S. Navy. 

In the mid-1990s, China fired missiles into waters close to Taiwan, trying to intimidate that country’s first democratic, presidential election. In response, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) sent two carrier battle groups into the Strait of Taiwan. Confronted with that U.S. naval might in those days, China had no choice but to back down. Chinese missiles stopped falling and Taiwan held its election. The balance of naval power in the region since then has dramatically shifted to China’s favor. PACOM would not sail modern carrier strike groups today into the Taiwan Strait to deter China. But while China’s navy, backed by thousands of missiles ashore, has grown far more powerful, its aims so far remain defensive to protect the homeland and adjacent waters, leveraging advantage from its interior lines of defense.

The Trump administration’s new policy approach to China marks a subtle recognition of these objective realities. The administration is marshaling a foreign policy strategy that is centered more on economic than military imperatives. 

The number one national security challenge posed by China according to the new policy is not existential or military but rather “state-driven protectionist policies and practices [that] harm United States companies and workers, distort global markets, violate international norms and pollute the environment.” Mercantilism, intellectual property theft, cyber hacking, discriminatory trade practices, business corruption, financially destabilizing, opaque loans to foreign governments, are listed as actions that compel a systemic policy response by the United States. While the strategy notes Chinese challenges to American values and military security as other concerns, it is clear that the major focus of the new national security policy is on economic governance challenges. The strategy also strikes a stark realist perspective by underscoring that it is not aimed at overthrowing or changing China’s communist regime, leaving that question of internal governance to “the Chinese people themselves.” This approach contrasts with old Soviet Cold War policy, (at least before the advent of Nixon/Kissinger détente) when effecting regime change in at least some communist countries was considered a possible goal. 

To implement its new policy, the Trump administration is pursuing a number of different avenues. The military aspects of the initiative will be relatively limited, calling mainly for increased military cooperation with allies, continued freedom of navigation cruises in the South China Sea (something that can be handled by one or two smaller warships such as frigates or destroyers), and continued development of precision strike missiles, drones, cyber and space capabilities. The financial investment necessary to support this kind of military commitment should be considerably less than what was spent during the Cold War and after on nuclear weapons, carrier battle groups, advanced stealth bombers and fighters, and weapons and equipment for mass infantry combat. The strategic competition with China is envisioned to be fundamentally peaceful, focused in the realm of economic and global governance.

The steps in the process of implementation by the Trump administration to address China’s unfair economic governance practices are manifold. They range from curtailing China’s access, under its “Military-Civil Fusion” strategy, to advanced U.S. technologies including telecommunications; to aggressive prosecution for trade secret theft; to restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment in sensitive U.S. infrastructure and supply chains; to more aggressive enforcement of foreign agent registration laws on Chinese government agents in the United States; to combatting the U.S. sale of Chinese counterfeit products and fentanyl; to restricting access of students with connections to China’s military to sensitive academic fields; to imposing tariffs to protect strategically important U.S. industries such as steel and aluminum; to more crackdowns on illegal Chinese dumping and subsidies for products sold to the U.S. market.

While these measures are comprehensive, none involve a U.S. Cold War-style military buildup to confront China aggressively immediately off its coastline. The Trump administration’s new policy initiative makes it clear that the United States is not trying to impose regime change on China, however much the United States abhors its authoritarian practices. While the United States will continue to stand up diplomatically for human rights and respect for the autonomy of Taiwan and Hong Kong, the fact is that short of nuclear war, there are limits to what the United States (and its allies) can impose by military will on China. In the years ahead, the key to global stability will be the pursuit of effective economic diplomacy and trade policy, persuading China to practice fair and honest governance in the global marketplace consistent with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, bilateral obligations and international norms. The national security structure of the United States will need to adjust overall. The role of the military in the conduct of foreign affairs, including powerful regional combatant commands, will likely be less compared to the Cold War and the post—9/11 eras. Future National Security Advisors at the White House may also be less likely to be generals, and more likely to be economists and international trade experts. While keeping its guard up, America will become less Sparta and more Athens. A new Cold War is not beginning.

Want to Win the Next War Against Russia, China or North Korea. Let AI Run the Show. What if artillery rounds, mini-drone swarms of explosives, rockets and even air-fired missiles are all approaching forward-positioned Army troops at the same time? Imagine that these incoming weapons are dispersed, varied and fast approaching. How do ground commanders avoid being overwhelmed and destroyed? Could AI help solve this lethal predicament? by Kris Osborn

What if artillery rounds, mini-drone swarms of explosives, rockets and even air-fired missiles are all approaching forward-positioned Army troops at the same time? Imagine that these incoming weapons are dispersed, varied and fast approaching. How do ground commanders avoid being overwhelmed and destroyed? Could AI help solve this lethal predicament? 

The incoming attacks are fast, multi-faceted and extremely lethal. Ground commanders and armed infantry simply do not have time to respond to all targets simultaneously to discern which ones to intercept. Not only that, but commanders may simply have too many targets to optimize which kind of layered defense might be best suited to counter different approaching weapons. Think about the scenarios going through a commander’s head. Which countermeasure is best? A kinetic interceptor? Electronic warfare? Lasers? These questions would likely need to be addressed, analyzed and answered in real-time, possibly even a matter of seconds, to save lives. 

“We are trying to merge operationally relevant data at the tactical level by connecting sensor to shooter. What if the shooter is a robot? Do I have to confirm each target?” Dr. Bruce Jette, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, told TNI in an interview. 

AI systems can now instantly organize incoming sensor data, perform near-real time analytics and make determinations regarding the scope of the attack, its range, speed, configuration and approaching trajectory. Perhaps of greatest significance, it could possibly determine which method of defense might be needed. All of these variables are likely to converge so fast that a human commander simply could not respond, placing the Army force, installation or Forward Operating Base at great risk of destruction. 

Advanced algorithms, however, can synthesize and analyze radar returns, infrared sensor data, navigational details and countermeasures, bounce all of that information off an existing and seemingly limitless database, and present options to human decisions makers immediately. Perhaps larger incoming weapons will need to be destroyed with a kinetic, explosive interceptor such as a Coyote drone? Perhaps a small group of electronically-powered mini-drones might be best countered by an EW weapon able to jam the target and throw it off course? Or further, perhaps the combat is in an urban area where explosive fragments might injure civilians, a circumstance which may call for a laser? However, weather obscurants or certain terrain features might preclude the ability for a laser to incinerate approaching targets, requiring a different defensive solution. AI programs can now determine which methods have been effective in the past in varying, yet specific scenarios and present commanders with a series of options. This kind of application, which is now being rapidly advanced by Army scientists, researchers and weapons developers, could bring new dimensions to warfare. It is exactly what Jette envisions. 

Jette paralleled this process to an interesting and significant multi-service term called “weapons hold, weapons tight, weapons free.” Weapons Hold, according to a 2002 multi-service “Brevity Code” manual, means only fire in self-defense or in response to an order: Weapons Tight means fire at targets positively identified as hostile; Weapons Free means only fire at targets not identified as friendly. AI, Jette explained, can massively expedite this process. Perhaps some elements of this could be performed autonomously? 

In these cases involving the use of force for defensive purposes, if applied in a non-lethal way, might be best executed by robots themselves, Jette explained. Of course, the priority is to ensure humans are in the loop regarding decisions about lethal force, yet perhaps this kind of defensive application might save lives in a matter of seconds. The concept, as Jette seemed to explain, was to synergize and optimize the idea blend between the procedural and analytical functions best performed by AI, while preserving and calling upon the attributes and faculties unique to human cognition. 

“How far can we push computational capabilities to do that in real time, or near real-time functionality for a weapons system? We are looking at target identification and firing solution development,” Jette said. 

Ultimately, Jette explained the fundamental concept with all of this is command and control, essentially advancing the need to analyze the precise extent to which new technology changes and informs tactical warfare.

“I think this takes a thought process that is different from what we have explored so far, because we have been so focused on the technology. We have medium and small robotic systems and we have numerous AI efforts going on. The real difference will be thinking through that second and third layer, looking at how we change the way we think about command and control, and take advantage of the capabilities that are inherent in the system.” Jette said.