How Is Canada's Labor Market Impacted by Coronavirus? Not only have people lost jobs, they have also stopped looking for work. by Louis-Philippe Beland, Abel Brodeur, Derek Mikola and Taylor Wright

The shutdown of non-essential services to control the spread of COVID-19 has had severe economic consequences in Canada, including the loss of nearly two million jobs in April. 

As economists, we are analyzing the effects of COVID-19 on Canadian labour markets in an ongoing research paper by asking the following questions:

• What are the short-term impacts of COVID-19 on unemployment, hours and wages?

• Do the economic consequences vary across demographic groups, union status and immigration status?

• Are there larger effects for occupations that are more at risk of contracting the virus?

• Are there smaller effects for individuals who can easily work from home? What is the impact on the labour market for essential workers?

• • Which occupations and industry are seeing the biggest changes in economic outcomes?

  • Understanding which workers are most affected by the coronavirus economic shutdown will help guide policy and Canada’s economic recovery.

    The hardest hit

  • COVID-19 has had a severe impact on Canadians in terms of unemployment rates, hours worked and labour force participation — the proportion of the adult population currently employed or seeking employment.

    Job losses have been staggering. The unemployment rate more than doubled to nearly 14 per cent between February and April.

    

    The unemployment rate in Canada between January 2016 to April 2020. The x-axis represents time in months, with m1 representing January. (Data from Statistics Canada. Calculation by authors)

    But this measure is an understatement of how dire the situation is — labour force participation fell by five percentage points to 59.8 per cent over the same period. These individuals aren’t included in unemployment calculations, which only capture people who are looking for work. This means that a fall in labour force participation translates to people not searching for work. Not only have people lost jobs (increased unemployment), they have also stopped looking for work (decreased labour for participation).

    One concern is that COVID-19 might increase existing inequalities in the Canadian labour market. For example, if minimum wage earners lost their jobs, it could affect their ability to pay for rent or other essentials. Knowing which workers are more affected will help guide effective policy recommendations.

  • Our results suggest that the negative impacts of COVID-19 are more pronounced for workers who are younger, unmarried or less educated. We also find evidence that workers in unions are less likely to be negatively affected. In sum, our results suggest that COVID-19 may be deepening already existing inequalities.

    COVID-19 has negative labour market outcomes for both men and women, with no discernible differences between the two, suggesting that the shutdown has not increased gender inequalities. Our results also indicate that women without children have experienced slightly larger job losses, reductions in hours, wages and labour force participation than mothers.

  • We find that immigrants and non-immigrants similarly experienced a near doubling of the unemployment rate to just below 13 per cent, and a six percentage point decline in labour force participation to just below 58 per cent.

    Essential and remote workers are less affected

  • To gain further insight into why some workers have been affected by the economic impacts of COVID-19 more than others, we also looked at the characteristics of different jobs.

    We built four indices that capture whether workers in a given occupation are regularly exposed to infectious diseases, work in proximity to others, are considered essential workers or are more likely to work remotely. We constructed the indices from various sources, including O-NET OnLine, which gathers information on occupational tasks and adapted them to the Canadian Labour Force Survey.

  • Our estimates suggest that the labour market impact of the pandemic was significantly more severe for workers more exposed to disease and people that work alongside others, such as nurses and front-line workers. These workers were more likely to have COVID-19 related work absences, work fewer hours or leave the labour force. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we also found the effects are significantly less severe for essential workers and people who can work remotely.

    Additionally, we find that these occupational differences interact with the inequalities noted above. For example, less educated workers are less likely to work from home and more likely to be essential workers. Women without kids are less likely to work from home, perhaps explaining why they were relatively harder hit by the economic shutdown.

  • Looking ahead

    These results are important given the trade-off elected officials face when making decisions about reopening sections of the economy and preventing disease.

    As policy-makers look to help displaced and affected workers, these findings highlight some of those most in need of assistance: the young, the unmarried and those with less education. Our results also suggest that governments should consider promoting policies that encourage businesses to let their employees work from home.

    The federal and provincial governments have provided a variety of aid packages to individuals and organizations that should help alleviate financial burdens. A key concern going forward is that this aid could create a disincentive to work, especially among low-income earners. This could have the unintended consequences, increasing long-term income and wealth inequalities. All levels of governments should monitor this closely.

Why A Naval War Against Iran Would Be Brief (But Bloody) Iran has no hope of beating the USN. by David Axe

At least 56 Iranians died in the fighting. Two U.S. Marines perished when their helicopter crashed. Battered, the Iranian fleet pulled back, and since then has been hesitant to make good on its periodic threats against Iran’s neighbors and the United States.

Tensions have escalated in the Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of U.S. president Donald Trump’s decision unilaterally to withdraw the United States from the agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S. military has implicated Iranian agents in several summer 2019 attacks on civilian ships sailing near Iran. The U.S. Navy sent the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and her strike group to the region. The U.S. Air Force deployed B-52 bombers and F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

If war breaks out, American forces could target Iran’s small navy as well as the vessels belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps militia.

The battle could be brief. Iran’s fleet has a long history of waging losing fights with the United States and other Western powers.

During World War II, the Allied powers worried that Iran, while technically neutral, might sympathize with and aid the Nazis, potentially depriving the Allies of the country’s oil. On Aug. 25, 1941, Commonwealth and Soviet forces invaded.

British and Australian warships steamed into Abadan Harbor as part of a surprise attack. HMS Shoreham opened fire first, striking the Iranian warship Palang. Soon virtually the entire Iranian fleet was in ruins and commander-in-chief Adm. Gholamali Bayandor lay dead.

The British and Soviets divided up Iran and deposed its shah. In the two decades following the war, the new regime rebuilt the navy with mostly British-made ships, some of which remain in service today.

The new Iranian navy fought hard during the bloody Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. Iran’s attacks on tanker ships—some strictly neutral, others admittedly supplying Iraq—incited international rage.

In 1987, Washington approved Kuwait’s request to “reflag” its tankers as American vessels, in order to allow the U.S. Navy to escort the ships through the Persian Gulf. The Americans’ Operation Earnest Will, lasting from July 1987 to September 1988, included several smaller efforts that resulted in the destruction of Iranian forces.

The Navy converted two oil-service barges into “sea bases” for Special Operations Forces and armed helicopters, and the U.S. Army placed attack copters aboard Navy ships. On Sept. 21, 1987 Little Bird helicopters from the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment attacked the Iranian vessel Ajr as she laid mines, forcing the crew to abandon ship.

A few days later, Little Birds sank three Iranian patrol boats.

On Oct. 16, 1987, an Iranian missile struck a Kuwaiti tanker, injuring 19 people. In response, a U.S. task force targeted two inoperable oil platforms that IRGC forces were using as bases for armed speedboats.

American warships surrounded the platforms, compelling the Iranian crews to evacuate. U.S. commandos climbed aboard one platform to gather up any documents the Iranians had left behind. Four U.S. destroyers opened fire, setting the platforms ablaze.

On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine while escorting tanker ships through the Persian Gulf. The carrier USS Enterprise led a retaliatory raid.

Two U.S. destroyers and an amphibious assault ship carrying a battalion of U.S. Marines assaulted an oil platform the Iranians were using as a staging base. The Iranians fired back, drawing heavy return fire from the destroyers and Marine Cobra helicopters. Marines stormed the platform, capturing one surviving Iranian gunner.

Iranian speedboats raided three civilian cargo ships. As the Iranians withdrew, Enterprise’s A-6 bombers zeroed in, sinking one speedboat with cluster bombs.

The Iranian missile boat Joshan fired a Harpoon anti-ship missile at a group of American warships—and missed. The Americans fired back with Harpoon and Standard missiles then sank the damaged Joshan with their guns.

While the U.S. ships fought off Iranian air attacks, Tehran’s 1960s-vintage destroyers joined the battle. Sahand and Sabalan both fired without effect at A-6s overhead. The A-6s shot back with Harpoons and laser-guided bombs, sinking Sahand and badly damaging Sabalan.

At least 56 Iranians died in the fighting. Two U.S. Marines perished when their helicopter crashed. Battered, the Iranian fleet pulled back, and since then has been hesitant to make good on its periodic threats against Iran’s neighbors and the United States.

China's Military Buildup Has Russia Worried “In the long run, we watch China’s success and do not rule out any possible scenario because we remember how Beijing’s foreign policy changed from the 1950’s to the reform period under Deng Xiaoping.” by Dimitri Alexander Simes

China’s northern neighbor is trying to make the best out of Beijing’s rise. While Russia has its reservations about the implications of China’s new military strength and its track-record of reverse engineering foreign technologies, its interest in forming a united front with Beijing to counterbalance the West is even greater. Only one question remains: will it be this way for long. 

Even with its economy starting to slow down, China’s military is still on the rise. Years of higher military spending fueled by high economic growth are starting to manifest themselves in new technologies and newfound assertiveness. Beijing has made visible strides in its aviation, naval, and missile defense capabilities. Whether it be making territorial claims in the South China Sea or opening up its first overseas military base in Djibouti, China is starting to exert military influence in its near abroad and beyond.

How does Russia view this development? Even as Moscow and Beijing strengthen their cooperation across all areas, many Western experts warn that China’s growing military might will increasingly become a source of tension between the two countries.

The National Interest spoke with several Russian defense analysts and Sinologists to better understand the Russian perspective on China’s military rise.

“At the present moment, our national interests coincide with China’s national interests so the development of China’s armed forces and military technology does not alarm Russia’s military command and political leadership,” said Yuri Tavrovsky, a professor at the Russian People's Friendship University.  

Nevertheless, Tavrovsky admitted that there was some level of apprehension in Moscow about China’s military build-up. “In the long run, we watch China’s success and do not rule out any possible scenario because we remember how Beijing’s foreign policy changed from the 1950’s to the reform period under Deng Xiaoping,” he said.

Alexander Lukin, a China scholar at the Higher School of Economics, expressed a similar sentiment. “My sense is that there is understanding [in the Kremlin] that someday China could pose a problem, but right now these concerns are far less than the concerns regarding the West,” he told me.

“Hypothetically speaking, if relations with the West were better, then the approach to China would probably be different,” Lukin said. “But since relations are not getting better and are unlikely to get better, the tendency towards closer cooperation with China will continue.”

Overall, the Russian analysts The National Interest spoke to did not regard China’s military buildup as a direct threat. Viktor Murakhovksy, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, told me that Beijing’s efforts were clearly aimed at Washington, not Moscow.

“If you look at the situation geo-strategically, China does not have an interest in expanding in Russia’s direction and has a very clear observable interest in securing its security in the South China Sea and further out in the Pacific Ocean region,” he said.

Russia’s and China’s shared desire to balance the United States greatly shaped how the experts that The National Interest spoke to viewed China’s newfound military might. Some even saw it as a potential blessing for Moscow. Tavrovsky argued that Russia benefits from a stronger China which can more effectively challenge the United States.

“It was one thing when Russia was the only strategic adversary of the West,” he said. “Now that the National Defense Strategy [of the United States] lists two adversaries, all of America’s and the West’s resources are divided between our two countries.”

Tavrovsky noted that the United States’ growing emphasis on containing China “to a certain degree lessens the pressure on Russia.”

In Washington, a growing number of policymakers and analysts are concerned about Beijing’s global military ambitions. By contrast, in Moscow, China is praised as a conservative and responsible military power.

“China so far is behaving in a very restrained manner,” Lukin told me. He argued that with its current financial resources, Beijing could have had numerous overseas bases by now if it wanted to. That China’s global military footprint remains small is evidence for Lukin that the Chinese “are more interested in resolving economic problems” than in expanding their military influence abroad.

Lukin concedes that with its mounting global economic interests, China is likely to increasingly rely on military force to safeguard those interests. But he asserted that “even if China will increase its military activities, it will take a hundred years before it can compare to that of the United States.”

Furthermore, he stressed that even a more militarily active China is less threatening to Russia than the West because Beijing’s foreign policy is less ideological than Washington’s.

“We know that the United States bombs other countries because it does not like them, that the United States wants to install democracy all around the world,” Lukin said. “China does not want to install Confucianism or Communism in Russia.”

Russia played an instrumental role in helping to equip the new Chinese armed forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China was Russia’s largest weapons purchaser from 1999 to 2006, with China accounting for as much as 60 percent of Russian arms exports in 2005. However, over the subsequent years, China’s share of Russian arms sales fell dramatically. By 2012, it was a mere 8.7 percent.

The primary cause for this rapid decline was growing Russian anxiety over Chinese reverse engineering. For example, during the 1990s Moscow sold Beijing a number of its elite Su-27 fighters and later even granted China a license to assemble them domestically. China later canceled the contract and used the technical knowledge it gained from building Su-27 to debut its J-11 fighter, an almost exact copy of the Russian plane.

Arms trade between Russia and China has rebounded somewhat in recent years. Moscow secured a deal in 2015 to supply Beijing with the S-400 anti-aircraft system and Su-35 fighter jets, some of Russia’s most advanced weaponry. Russia is also reportedly interested in selling China the Su-57, its new fifth-generation fighter.

Moscow has no illusions about China reverse-engineering Russian arms in the future. Vadim Kozyulin, director of the Asian Security Project at the Moscow-based PIR Center,

confessed to me, “When we make deals with China, we always keep in mind that China wants to first of all copy our weapons.”

He added, “Russians understand this threat, but the instruments for pushing back against this are not that many.”

What then explains Moscow’s sudden reversal on arms trade? According to Lukin, the political fallout with the West over Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 made the Kremlin more willing to accept some of the costs of tighter cooperation with China.

“Based on the Russian government’s actions, it clearly made the decision that we do not have any other choice other than to move closer to China,” Lukin said.

At the same time, Russian analysts are increasingly confident about their country’s ability to maintain its innovative edge in military technology. Tavrovsky told me that Chinese reverse engineering is less of a concern now than it was in the 1990s because unlike then, “the Russian defense industry and military research today receive sufficient funding from the government.”

He explained that the Russian military-industrial complex now “feels itself quite confident” and “sells advanced weapons and military technologies to China under the assumption that our configurations are more advanced than the ones we sell to China and other countries.”

Murakhovsky similarly expects the Russian defense industry to remain very much competitive against China’s.

“When they say [about China], here is a giant country, with an enormous population, a mighty economy, with an increasingly powerful military—that’s all correct,” he said. “But to feel that we are so small and miserable standing next to it, begging them to sell us some military technology—it is not like that.”

Murakhovsky added: “China will not surpass Russia in the development of key military systems. We have a formidable military-technical capability, it is continually updated and we look to the future with confidence.”

At the same time, all the Russian experts interviewed also acknowledged that Beijing has already outpaced Moscow in certain areas. Some of the examples they cited included developing a military application for artificial intelligence, shipbuilding, drone-making, and introducing anti-carrier ballistic missiles.

In the not so distant future, China could be the one selling arms to Russia. Murakhovsky told me that he thinks “purchasing certain types of weaponry from China, would be very beneficial for both countries.” In particular, he welcomes the prospect of Russia buying Chinese drones or ships.  

“China has a potent shipbuilding industry. They make their frigates and destroyers like hot buns on a stove—produce several things a year and put them out to sea,” Murakhovsky said. “It is totally possible to order hulls for our prospective ships from China because the experience of our shipbuilding shows that we build very slowly.”

Thus, China’s northern neighbor is trying to make the best out of Beijing’s rise. While Russia has its reservations about the implications of China’s new military strength and its track-record of reverse engineering foreign technologies, its interest in forming a united front with Beijing to counterbalance the West is even greater. Only one question remains: will it be this way for long?

Asia’s Cyberwar Goes Viral China’s apparent attempt to pull off a cyber heist of critical medical and laboratory data occurs against the backdrop of dueling narratives about the origins and handling of COVID-19. These two issues highlight Asia’s new era of cyber and information warfare. by Patrick M. Cronin

China’s alleged attempt to purloin or disrupt a vaccine in the middle of a life-or-death struggle with a pandemic is a sad commentary on the state of major power relations.  But not to be lost among the headlines about the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security warning that China and others may be tampering with the US public health system is that Asia is increasingly at the center of cyber and information warfare.

China’s apparent attempt to pull off a cyber heist of critical medical and laboratory data occurs against the backdrop of dueling narratives about the origins and handling of COVID-19. These two issues highlight Asia’s new era of cyber and information warfare.

The Asia-Pacific region is now the primary theater for a cyber competition that is flaring up in public because of the coronavirus.  Before the pandemic, regional powers were already furtively caught up in a maturing cyber arms race that appeared muted because of the opaque nature of the domain.  However, faced with a genuine national security health emergency, leaders are demonstrating some of their hidden digital assets and operations as they fight to shape the narrative and be first to conquer the coronavirus.

Influence operations and cyber data theft and manipulation are the two key facets of Asia’s heightened contest in the global infosphere.  China and the United States are principal but by no means exclusive protagonists in this match.  North Korea, Russia, and Iran are predictably active in cyber operations.  But South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Australia are also on the cyber front lines, as well as, more surprisingly, Vietnam. 

In recent weeks, the escalation of the war of words and electrons between China and the world has been unmistakable.  Through information warfare and carefully constructed narratives, China, the United States, and other Asian-Pacific state actors are attempting to portray themselves as technically competent, transparent, and forward-looking leaders.  They are also practicing damage control by touting bold decisions and humanitarian gestures.

But states in Asia and elsewhere are also focused on the theft of online intellectual property, including propriety data related to the search for life-saving medicines and an effective vaccine.  

For China and the United States, the geopolitical dimension of the competition to be first with a vaccine is something in between an Olympic and a Cold War competition.  Leaders in Beijing feel China would lose face if the People’s Liberation Army virologists were not the first to develop a vaccine.  Meanwhile, US leaders face similar pressure, as shown by a recent headline in the Wall Street Journal that read: “America Needs to Win the Coronavirus Vaccine Race.” No wonder some say the race for a coronavirus vaccine is akin to “this century’s space race.”

While in theory, major-power cooperation might produce a draw, if not a win-win scenario, that could be homespun and embellished for domestic and foreign audiences.  The resurgence of great-power competition and nationalism have cultivated a zero-sum mentality that influences decisions even on global public health issues.  That zero-sum mentality explains China’s attempts to suppress derogatory information, influence the World Health Organization, delay the release of genome information that could help other states develop COVID-19 treatments and vaccines, and wage offensive propaganda and “mask diplomacy” campaigns.  

Consider China berating New Zealand for supporting Taiwan’s bid to observe the World Health Assembly, despite the obvious global public good of having Taiwan participate.  Think about China’s 10-day push to test all 11 million people in Wuhan.  These incidents appear to be more about winning the battle for domestic and foreign hearts and minds, than about prudent public health policies and crisis management.  With life and death hanging in the balance, this is more than mere public relations in the digital age.  

In some cases, Beijing is not only promoting its own image, but actively sabotaging others. For example, some hacking aims to disrupt and reinforce doubt about an actor’s ability to function effectively to counter the virus.  China’s diplomats have promoted conspiracy theories that the US military sent the virus to China. A China-linked bot network targeting Serbian social media spread false claims that the European Union was neglecting Serbia and not providing significant aid. A new RAND study refers to this category of mischief in the infosphere as “virtual societal warfare.”

The deadly pandemic seems to be pulling together the threads of information and cyber operations. 

The Trump administration’s warning suggests that Chinese and Iranian hackers targeted US medical research entities in a manner that could both lead to data theft or perhaps even worse, data destruction.  That is, if Beijing prizes being the first country to declare a successful vaccine, thereby boosting its reputation while undermining America’s.  While representing a significant escalation of its cyber capabilities, Beijing operatives would have shown how to tether information and cyber operations for national security gains.  

But China appears to be both a hacker and a hackee.  At least, reports out of Australia and Vietnam suggest China has been the victim of medical hacking, presumably from actors trying to determine the origins and true impact of the virus on Wuhan, the original epicenter of COVID-19.  China’s coronavirus data are also leaking, perhaps from sources within China.

Meanwhile, North Korea, which has increasingly turned to cybercrime as a means of keeping its sanctioned economy afloat, may be stepping up its efforts to steal cryptocurrency amid the pandemic.  Indeed, the contest is not limited to Asia.  After all, similar reports about hacking in Europe and intrusions by Iran and potentially Russia point to a worldwide phenomenon of rising cyberattacks as a result of the pandemic.  Yet China and other regional countries appear now to be the main drivers in information and cyber operations.

While Asian nations have been ramping up cyber defense and offense capabilities over the past decade or more, the pandemic inflamed them like an autoimmune disorder under stress.  The China-US competition over narratives and data is likely to exacerbate entrenched regional disputes over territory, as well as US-China tensions over high technology and trade.  

Short of shots being fired, the growing cyber competition centered on Asia is a rare window into how future conflicts could begin and unfold.  How these and other conflicts end, however, remains an even murkier business. 

Cold War II? U.S.-China War of Words Over Coronavirus Heats Up China threatened to sanction U.S. lawmakers the same day U.S. officials accused Beijing of industrial espionage. by Matthew Petti

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo slammed China for its “counterproductive actions” on coronavirus on Thursday, a day after Chinese state-run media threatened U.S. lawmakers and U.S. law enforcement accused China of coronavirus-related cyberattacks.

The United States and China have portrayed each other as malign actors as both superpowers struggle to take charge of the global coronavirus response. But the events of Wednesday and Thursday could mark a shift from rhetoric to concrete action.

Rep. Ro Khanna (D–Calif.) told the National Interest that the United States should have a “proportionate response” if China targets U.S. lawmakers, but that “there’s a lot we can do to ratchet down the tensions before then.”

“While the United States and our allies and partners are coordinating a collective, transparent response to save lives, the [People’s Republic of China] continues to silence scientists, journalists, and citizens, and to spread disinformation, which has exacerbated the dangers of this health crisis,” Pompeo said in his Thursday statement.

He referred to a statement released by the FBI and U.S. Department of Homeland Security on Wednesday warning “organizations researching COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] of likely targeting and network compromise by the People's Republic of China.”

China unleashed its own accusations of malign behavior on Wednesday.

“China is extremely dissatisfied with the abuse of litigation by the US against China over the COVID-19 epidemic and mulling punitive countermeasures against US individuals, entities and state officials,” warned the Global Times, the English-language edition of the state-run People’s Daily.

The Global Times claimed that China will add at least four lawmakers and two U.S. “entities” to its sanctions list and “impose countermeasures that will make them feel painful,” citing “analysts” and “sources close to the matter.”

The article pointed out several U.S. policymakers, but singled out Missouri’s elected officials for special criticism.

“China could impose the countermeasures on the relevant states represented by those anti-China lawmakers, including measures targeting trade and exchanges,” the Global Times wrote. “Some Missouri companies, for example, have long-term investments in China and are likely to feel severe consequences if China strikes back with punitive measures in response to the coronavirus lawsuit.”

Missouri attorney-general Eric Schmitt filed a lawsuit in April claiming that the Chinese government had “lied to the world about the danger and contagious nature of COVID-19,” while Sen. Josh Hawley (R–Mo.) is proposing a bill to allow lawsuits against the Chinese Communist Party “for reckless actions like silencing whistleblowers and withholding critical information.”

Republican lawmakers and U.S. officials have implied that the coronavirus was the result of a lab accident covered by the Chinese government.

Democrats have likewise called for investigations. They also voted unanimously in the Senate to push for Taiwan—a self-governing island that China considers its own territory—to have a separate seat at the World Health Organization.

“We need to get public opinion on our side, including public opinion within China,” Khanna said, calling for an independent investigation that would not be perceived as political. “There are a lot of people within China who think the Chinese Communist Party mismanaged the response.”

But the Democratic camp is also skeptical about the lab accident theory, and warns rushing into a cold war with China is a dangerous distraction while the United States faces a serious domestic crisis.

“My point is that, while China bears much responsibility for this crisis, it was not inevitable that a hundred, two hundred thousand Americans had to die,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D–Conn.) said in a recent interview with the National Interest. “The president has run an abysmal response to the virus, which has resulted in it being much worse in the United States than it had to be.”

Is U.S. Senate Coronavirus Stock Trading Scandal Brewing? With the revelation that the Justice Department is closely probing his stock trades in February, North Carolina Sen. Richard Burr has temporarily resigned his position as chairman of the Senate intelligence committee. by Jacob Heilbrunn

With the revelation that the Justice Department is closely probing his stock trades in February, North Carolina Sen. Richard Burr has temporarily resigned his position as chairman of the Senate intelligence committee. Other senators have come under scrutiny for potential insider trading, including Kelly Loeffler, James Inhofe, and Dianne Feinstein, but have all stated that their actions were above board. Loeffler sold up to $3.1 million in stocks in late February and early March and her husband is the head of the New York Stock Exchange. Feinstein has turned over documents to the Justice Department about stock trades executed by her husband.

After refusing to comment earlier this morning, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell issued a statement that explained that Burr had contacted him “this morning to inform me of this decision to step aside as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee during the pendency of the investigation.” This development came after it was reported that the FBI had seized Burr’s cell phone on Wednesday as part of an investigation into stock dealings in February. Burr sold up to $1.7 million in stocks a week before the market began to plummet as a result of the widespread fear of the impact of the coronavirus on the American and world economy.

In his capacity as chairman of the committee, Burr obtained classified intelligence that explicitly warned about the perils represented by the coronavirus. At the time, President Trump was suggesting that the coronavirus did not in fact pose a significant threat to the American economy. Burr himself co-wrote an op-ed saying that America could easily handle the coronavirus, stating that it was “better prepared than ever before to face emerging public health threats.”

Democrats are seizing upon Burr’s action to demand that he resign from the Senate entirely. North Carolina has a Democratic governor who would appoint a replacement for Burr. If Burr were to resign, it would likely create two competitive races in North Carolina in 2020 as Thom Tillis is up for reelection, thereby increasing the chances of a Democratic takeover of the Senate. Burr himself has indicated that he does not intend to run for re-election in 2022. He stated Thursday that he believed the issue of his stock sales was a mere sideshow: “This is a distraction to the hard work of the committee, and the members, and think that the security of the country is too important to have a distraction.”

His resignation comes at a moment when the committee was preparing to finish its protracted investigation of Russian interference into the 2016 election campaign. Who will replace Burr as head of the committee is unknown, though leading candidates based on seniority include senators Jim Risch, Susan Collins and Marco Rubio. Each could leave their own stamp on the final committee document. The resignation of Burr is certain to raise the stakes surrounding it.

At the same time, his resignation will heighten the public controversy over his and other senators’ financial actions during the early months of the coronavirus pandemic. The political fallout from the virus may only have begun.

Baseball Players With Health Issues Wary of MLB’s Plan to Return Despite Coronavirus Play ball or don't play ball? by Ethen Kim Lieser

As Major League Baseball’s owners approved a proposal to start the 2020 season, players with underlying health conditions are keeping a close eye on the league’s health policies, which have yet to take shape.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, older adults and people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions or immunodeficiencies might be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.

One of the players who could be at higher risk is Colorado Rockies outfielder David Dahl, who in 2015 had his spleen removed following an outfield collision in the minor leagues. Without this important organ, Dahl could be more susceptible to contracting the coronavirus.

“It’s definitely scary ... my immune system is pretty bad,” Dahl told The Athletic. “But I trust the medical experts, the guys with the Rockies, everyone who will be involved that if we do come back and play, we’ll be safe and taking the right precautions to make sure we aren’t at a greater risk.”

Oakland A’s relief pitcher Jake Diekman battles an autoimmune condition called ulcerative colitis. But his concern is largely with professional baseball players getting preferential treatment for coronavirus testing over the nation’s health-care workers and ordinary citizens.

“I want to play just the same as anyone, otherwise I wouldn’t be throwing and working out,” Diekman told the San Francisco Chronicle. “But if they’re going to test us all the time, are we taking tests from people who really need it? I don’t want us to get tested every other day and basically snake all these tests because they want to put on MLB, and yet let’s say the hospitals in Oakland, we’re borrowing theirs, if 50 people a day can get tested but it would be 100 if we weren’t taking them.”

NBA players have also received much criticism for their relatively easy access to coronavirus tests, while the general public struggles with widespread testing shortages.

The owners’ proposal, which includes an 82-game regular season that starts in early July, has been sent to the Major League Baseball Players Association for approval, and it is believed that health and safety concerns will be widely addressed in the document. Negotiations between the sides, however, could take up to two weeks, as they work through all the layers in order for baseball to start its season.

In a tweet, Washington Nationals relief pitcher Sean Doolittle voiced his desire for the league to fully commit to protecting the health of all of its players: “There are a number of players & staff who have pre-existing conditions that they are aware of (and likely more who aren’t yet). We need a plan that seriously considers the increased health concerns of any players, staff or workers who are at higher risk.”

The San Francisco Chronicle published a list of other MLB players with known health conditions: Type-1 diabetes (Kohl Stewart, Orioles; Jordan Hicks, Cardinals; Brett Martin, Rangers; Adam Duvall, Braves; Scott Alexander, Dodgers), past treatment for cancer (Jon Lester and Anthony Rizzo, Cubs; Tim Hill, Royals; Daniel Norris, Tigers), colitis (Kyle Gibson, Rangers), and heart conditions (Kenley Jansen, Dodgers; Carlos Carrasco, Indians).

South Korea’s Coronavirus Opening Did Not Go As Planned. What Can America Learn? South Korea is a canary in the coal mine for coronavirus-stricken democracies. The virus struck earlier here than in Western democracies, and the suppression has been superb. So South Korea is much further along than the West. What it does now can be a learning moment for other societies considering reopening, and the bitter lesson from this past weekend is that the coronavirus will snap back, even here. by Robert E. Kelly

For months, the story of South Korea’s fight against the coronavirus has broadly been one of success. But a wave of infections in the country this past weekend has tarnished that narrative. After pushing the number of new daily coronavirus cases down into the single digits, the South Korean government experimented with loosening social-distancing. Unfortunately, one person in the clutch of nightclubs unwittingly acted as a super-spreader over the weekend. A re-clampdown has begun.

Initially, the government underplayed the pandemic, as did most governments globally. After all, South Korean president Moon Jae-in needs Chinese assistance—or at least, a lack of active resistance—in his efforts to bring North Korea in from the cold. Before coronavirus completely took over the global agenda, détente with the North was the core policy project of his presidency. That deep desire for rapprochement likely blunted Moon’s willingness to be more direct in responding to coronavirus in February. Even after President Donald Trump blocked travel from China, Moon did not. The conservative press here hit him hard over this. 

But that aside, the Korean government fairly quickly swung into action once it became obvious just how dangerous the coronavirus was. After initial dithering, Moon went full bore into the problem. The Korean government’s health bureaucracy has previous experience fighting SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). The lessons learned from those smaller, earlier epidemics were quickly rolled out. 

Quite suddenly by the end of February, the lockdown began. The speed was amazing. Quickly, shops, schools, churches, restaurants, museums, and so on were shut down. Temperature checks popped everywhere. Hand sanitizer became ubiquitous. Pharmacies rationed out masks for free. I recall being genuinely impressed at the scale of the countermeasures—and unnerved at the seriousness of the virus—when even our apartment complex installed hand sanitizer dispensers in our building elevators. It is very clear that the government had large stockpiles of PPE (personal protection equipment) ready to go. It all appeared lightning fast.

The government’s response to those infected was similarly very robust. The now accepted trio of mitigation steps—testing, tracing, and isolating—was set up very rapidly. If a person needed a test because they had symptoms, then a test was not hard to find; that person could even drive through a testing station. Infected persons were placed in quarantine; even those with mild symptoms were not sent home as in the United States. Contact tracing was a huge effort, with thousands of staff around the country tracking down possibly infected people. All of this was made substantially bureaucratically easier, in contradistinction to the United States, by an already-in-place national health care system and national identity number. 

This worked so well that by early May, South Korea’s new daily case discovery had been pushed down to below ten. It seemed like the coronavirus had broadly been beaten. Talk began of reopening schools. Face masks became a little less common. Restaurants began to fill up again. We could all go outside a lot more. 

The government, therefore, experimented with loosening social-distancing restrictions. In retrospect, this was a bad call, most obviously for very crowded nightclubs. But at the time, it seemed like a reasonable decision. Social-distancing and the lockdown are just as miserable and disruptive here as everywhere else and have been in place longer than in the West. 

Disappointingly, the coronavirus snapped back sharply. Everyone was quite surprised. There was an expectation of some new cases, but few people thought there would be so many and so fast. Even the Korean Centers for Disease Control seemed surprised. The current tally is now 119 new infections and 22,000 contacts traced. All this came from one person who visited a few nightclubs in Seoul.

Unsurprisingly, a re-clampdown has begun. School reopenings have been pushed back. Bars and clubs are closed again. If there is a silver lining, it is that these infections started in an unusually dense venue—a nightclub. Most social spaces are obviously not so tightly packed, so restaurants and stores, for example, are still open.  

There is an important lesson here for the United States, which seems hellbent on re-opening this month: that is almost certainly premature. If South Korea, despite all its world-class suppression and mitigation measures, could nonetheless experience such a sharp coronavirus snapback after a cautious reopening, then the impact of America’s reopening will be far greater. 

In the United States, countermeasures have been far less thorough. Compliance with social-distancing has been mixed at best. Testing is far too thin on the ground. There is little quarantining or contact tracing. Personal protection equipment has been in short supply. Coronavirus numbers—both new cases and deaths—have plateaued but not declined. The United States has had eighteen times more fatalities per capita than South Korea from the coronavirus. And there has been heavy pressure from the American political Right to reopen the country and simply carry the humanitarian costs as a necessary trade-off to restart the country. 

Inevitably, any reopening will have such trade-offs. South Korea is a canary in the coal mine for coronavirus-stricken democracies. The virus struck earlier here than in Western democracies, and the suppression has been superb. So South Korea is much further along than the West. What it does now can be a learning moment for other societies considering reopening, and the bitter lesson from this past weekend is that the coronavirus will snap back, even here. 

The South Korean government reasonably experimented but got burned. In the United States, where suppression far lags South Korea and the coronavirus is not contained, I fear a reopening will lead to a catastrophic spike in cases and deaths this summer.