How China Plans to Win a War Against the Navy: Sink Its Aircraft Carriers History tells us so. by Kyle Mizokami

After the missile tests, the carrier USS Nimitz left the Persian Gulf region and raced back to the western Pacific. This was an even more powerful carrier battle group, consisting of the Aegis cruiser Port Royal, guided missile destroyers Oldendorf and Callaghan (which would later be transferred to the Taiwanese Navy), guided missile frigate USS Ford, and nuclear attack submarine USS Portsmouth. Nimitz and its escorts took up station in the Philippine Sea, ready to assist Independence. Contrary to popular belief, neither carrier actually entered the Taiwan Strait.

More than twenty years ago, a military confrontation in East Asia pushed the United States and China uncomfortably close to conflict. Largely unknown in America, the event made a lasting impression on China, especially Chinese military planners. The Third Taiwan Crisis, as historians call it, was China’s introduction to the power and flexibility of the aircraft carrier, something it obsesses about to this day.

The crisis began in 1995. Taiwan’s first-ever democratic elections for president were set for 1996, a major event that Beijing naturally opposed. The sitting president, Lee Teng-hui of the Kuomintang party, was invited to the United States to speak at his alma mater, Cornell University. Lee was already disliked by Beijing for his emphasis on “Taiwanization,” which favored home rule and established a separate Taiwanese identity away from mainland China. Now he was being asked to speak at Cornell on Taiwan’s democratization, and Beijing was furious.

The Clinton administration was reluctant to grant Lee a visa—he had been denied one for a similar talk at Cornell the year before—but near-unanimous support from Congress forced the White House’s hand. Lee was granted a visa and visited Cornell in June. The Xinhua state news agency warned, “The issue of Taiwan is as explosive as a barrel of gunpowder. It is extremely dangerous to warm it up, no matter whether the warming is done by the United States or by Lee Teng-hui. This wanton wound inflicted upon China will help the Chinese people more clearly realize what kind of a country the United States is.”

In August 1995, China announced a series of missiles exercises in the East China Sea. Although the exercises weren’t unusual, their announcement was, and there was speculation that this was the beginning of an intimidation campaign by China, both as retaliation against the Cornell visit and intimidation of Taiwan’s electorate ahead of the next year’s elections. The exercises involved the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Corps (now the PLA Rocket Forces) and the redeployment of Chinese F-7 fighters (China’s version of the MiG-21 Fishbed fighter) 250 miles from Taiwan. Also, in a move that would sound very familiar in 2017, up to one hundred Chinese civilian fishing boats entered territorial waters around the Taiwanese island of Matsu, just off the coast of the mainland.

According to Globalsecurity.org, redeployments of Chinese long-range missile forces continued into 1996, and the Chinese military actually prepared for military action. China drew up contingency plans for thirty days of missile strikes against Taiwan, one strike a day, shortly after the March 1996 presidential elections. These strikes were not carried out, but preparations were likely detected by U.S. intelligence.

In March 1996, China announced its fourth major military exercises since the Cornell visit. The country’s military announced a series of missile test zones off the Chinese coastline, which also put the missiles in the approximate direction of Taiwan. In reality, China fired three missiles, two of which splashed down just thirty miles from the Taiwanese capital of Taipei and one of which splashed down thirty-five miles from Kaohsiung. Together, the two cities handled most of the country’s commercial shipping traffic. For an export-driven country like Taiwan, the missile launches seemed like an ominous shot across the country’s economic bow.

American forces were already operating in the area. The USS Bunker Hill, a Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser, was stationed off southern Taiwan to monitor Chinese missile tests with its SPY-1 radar system. The Japan-based USS Independence, along with the destroyers Hewitt and O’Brien and frigate McClusky, took up position on the eastern side of the island.

After the missile tests, the carrier USS Nimitz left the Persian Gulf region and raced back to the western Pacific. This was an even more powerful carrier battle group, consisting of the Aegis cruiser Port Royal, guided missile destroyers Oldendorf and Callaghan (which would later be transferred to the Taiwanese Navy), guided missile frigate USS Ford, and nuclear attack submarine USS Portsmouth. Nimitz and its escorts took up station in the Philippine Sea, ready to assist Independence. Contrary to popular belief, neither carrier actually entered the Taiwan Strait.

The People’s Liberation Army, unable to do anything about the American aircraft carriers, was utterly humiliated. China, which was just beginning to show the consequences of rapid economic expansion, still did not have a military capable of posing a credible threat to American ships just a short distance from of its coastline.

While we might never know the discussions that later took place, we know what has happened since. Just two years later a Chinese businessman purchased the hulk of the unfinished Russian aircraft carrier Riga, with the stated intention of turning it into a resort and casino. We know this ship today as China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, after it was transferred to the PLA Navy and underwent a fifteen-year refurbishment. At least one other carrier is under construction, and the ultimate goal may be as many as five Chinese carriers.

At the same time, the Second Artillery Corps leveraged its expertise in long-range rockets to create the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile. The DF-21 has obvious applications against large capital ships, such as aircraft carriers, and in a future crisis could force the U.S. Navy to operate eight to nine hundred miles off Taiwan and the rest of the so-called “First Island Chain.”

The Third Taiwan Crisis was a brutal lesson for a China that had long prepared to fight wars inside of its own borders. Still, the PLA Navy deserves credit for learning from the incident and now, twenty-two years later, it is quite possible that China could seriously damage or even sink an American carrier. Also unlike the United States, China is in the unique position of both seeing the value of carriers and building its own fleet while at the same time devoting a lot of time and resources to the subject of sinking them. The United States may soon find itself in the same position.

In Syria's Congested Air Space, America's F-22 Led The Fight Against The Islamic State The coalition’s war planners also used the F-22s to leverage their low-observable profiles — and far-reaching sensors — while escorting non-stealthy fighters in case Syrian fighters or air-defense systems engaged. by Robert Beckhusen

Think of the F-22 like a sniper — it can use force if needed, but its primary job in the Middle East is to provide overwatch. Case in point, in August 2016, F-22s chased after Syrian Su-24 attack jets when they approached where American commandos were operating in northeastern Syria. The F-22’s stealthiness also allows the twin-engine jet to get closer to potentially hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile sites with less likelihood of being spotted.

Years ago, four F-22 Raptors taking part in the second-wave of the U.S.-led coalition’s opening airstrikes on Islamic State in Syria dropped their bombs. It was the first time the stealthy fifth-generation fighters had ever engaged in combat. The coalition’s war planners also used the F-22s to leverage their low-observable profiles — and far-reaching sensors — while escorting non-stealthy fighters in case Syrian fighters or air-defense systems engaged.

Fortunately, the Syrian military held its fire.

Fast forward to today, and F-22 Raptors are still flying over Iraq and Syria and have shifted almost fully into that latter role, according to Air Force Magazine. “When we first got here, we were 95 percent precision strike. And now we’re probably 95 percent air superiority,” Lt. Col. “Shell” — a callsign — of the 27th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron told the magazine.

Air superiority is what Lockheed Martin and the Air Force designed the F-22 to do. But in practice over the Middle East, this mission normally means acting as a scout. Lt. Col. “Shell” elaborated to the magazine that the Raptors are in the air helping “deconflict” the airspace, and helping keep Russian and Syrian planes away from U.S. troops and the Syrian Democratic Forces, an alliance of militias spearheaded by the majority-Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

The F-22 can do it because of its complex suite of active and passive sensors, which combined with instruments, allow the aircraft to “fuse” data together and present it to the pilot on a display screen. As well, this allows the Raptor to stand in for command-and-control aircraft such as the E-3 AWACS, with pilots scanning the area and feeding information to other friendly aircraft whenever anything pertinent pops up — while also warning Russian aircraft to keep away over radio if they come too close.

When coalition attack aircraft approach their targets, the Raptors help guide them in.

Think of the F-22 like a sniper — it can use force if needed, but its primary job in the Middle East is to provide overwatch. Case in point, in August 2016, F-22s chased after Syrian Su-24 attack jets when they approached where American commandos were operating in northeastern Syria. The F-22’s stealthiness also allows the twin-engine jet to get closer to potentially hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile sites with less likelihood of being spotted.

The F-22 is already a mature aircraft — which makes its presence in the war an interesting moment. Having first flown in 1997, the Air Force plans to keep the clipped delta-wing fighters in service for at least 43 more years since the airframes are tough and haven’t been used heavily.

“We came to find out we have not been flying the Raptor nearly as hard as those design missions [in the 1980s-1990s] nor as what we found out during the structural testing, so actually the airframe itself — without any service life extension program — is good out to approximately 2060,” Tom McIntyre, an Air Combat Command program analyst, told the House Armed Services Committee in June 2017.

Regardless, there are no more Raptors coming, as building more would likely be prohibitively expensive since the production lines have closed down. The plane’s computer hardware is from the early 1990s and many of the components are longer made. The Air Force position is that it doesn’t make sense to restart F-22 production when it’s buying more than 1,700 stealthy F-35A Joint Strike Fighters which possess a whole new array of technologies.

The flying branch only bought 187 operational Raptors — out of an original goal of 381.

The F-22 also won’t fly into the 2060s without upgrades. In the government’s 2018 fiscal year budget, the stealth plane will get $1 billion for this purpose, which could possibly include new radars, antennas and avionics to include displays, datalinks and cryptographic software.

The Air Force could take stealth features from the F-35 and apply them to the F-22.

Pilots could get helmet-mounted cueing systems, which allows the pilot to target weapons where she or he is looking — the Air Force announced Raptor pilots would receive a high-tech helmet called Scorpion, but never fielded it. It’s not entirely clear whether F-22 pilots would want one, as these helmets — such as on the F-35 — are heavy and potentially dangerous in the event of an ejection.

But the pilots love their Raptors, and if their watchful presence over Iraq and Syria is any indication, so does the Air Force.

The Trillion Dollar Battle Over North Korea's Rare Earth Elements Is Just Beginning Trillions of dollars in untapped resources. by Patricia Schouker

It is no exaggeration to consider that the “Art of Negotiation” also applies to rare earth elements. If Washington isn’t serious about the rare earth resources of North Korea, then the winner, once again, could be Beijing. Moscow, too, could benefit from Washington’s loss given that China needs continued access to energy resources in Russia and Central Asia, as well as to Russia's advanced military technologies.

When looking at contemporary geopolitics, often energy and related resource questions are  key in the struggle for influence amongst world powers, as energy can drive or amplify underlying tensions. Today, the attractiveness of traditional oil exploration loses ground with the emergence of new energies and technologies, often produced by “Rare Earths” and the elements they contain.

The DPRK could have a high concentration of rare earth elements, but given that it is a reclusive country, it has not yet exploited these resources, which could upset the current global order. Just as the Cold War split the world along ideological lines, this new struggle for resources will create fissures between those who have access to rare metal resources and those who do not. Because entire industries are built on a few rare metals, disruptions to their supply can have profound global implications while providing some countries with tremendous leverage.

Erbium, Thulium, Cerium, Samarium, Lithium . . . these are some of the elements that under the “rare earth” label. Many of the technological advances that have been realized over the past several decades have elements derived from the seventeen elements of the periodic table.

Not insignificantly, rare earth elements are also an essential component for the arms industry. “Neodymium” is used to produce bombs, lasers, radars and sonars, “Dysprosium” for missile guidance and video systems, and “Terbium” is used for electric motorization. The United States owns the third largest reserve in the world, with the Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California. That mine was the world’s leading producer until the 1980s, which is when China entered the element market and created a near global monopoly. The main factors in this market takeover were the availability of cheap labor and a lack of concern over environmental and work conditions. Currently, it is estimated that China controls more than 95 percent of the world’s production of rare earth minerals, with about fifty-five million tons of deposits.

Recent studies suggest that North Korea could have the world’s largest rare earth reserves. These deposits cannot at present be exploited due to a lack of significant demand and crippling sanctions—the country being cut off from external markets and having not yet developed a society based on mass consumption. Today’s new projects need more experienced infrastructures, which increases the costs of starting projects, creates higher operating costs, and leads to the production of more expensive metals—an investment North Korea cannot afford.

The Jongju site, in North Korea, is home to nearly 216.2 million tons of rare earth oxides, double the known world reserves. In terms of monetary value, if these figures are accurate, South Korea estimates the value of the mineral resources of its North Korean neighbor at $2,800 billion. In comparison, the GDP of South Korea was about 1,530,75 trillion in 2017. According to the Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) report, North Korea could hold vast amounts of magnesite (six billion tons), graphite (two billion tons), iron ore (five billion tons) and tungsten (250,000 tons). The country could become a key player in the rare earth industry, as demand peaks for smartphones, semiconductors and related products. Pyongyang said it could exploit up to twenty million tons of these seventeen elements, with China as its potential buyer. Rare earth metallurgy is also essential for United States, Russian and Chinese weapons systems. The U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system requires rare earth elements, as do Russia’s S-400 and S-500 missile defense systems.

Nothing seems to be able to unblock the exploitation of North Korea’s subsoil minerals for external purposes, except through possible international agreements, the lifting of sanctions, or, in an extreme case, military intervention. These elements offer new insights on the geopolitical situation that surrounds North Korea.

While China is gaining distance from its former ally, drastically reducing its import of coal from North Korea on the grounds of “non-compatibility with their new anti-pollution standards,” Russia, on the other hand, is increasingly eyeing the rare earth resources of the country. South Korean companies could also consider new economic agreements to exploit these resources.

During the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea’s immense energy potential has pushed several South Korean conglomerates, including KORES, to invest in mining projects in the North and to  consider the development of infrastructures to facilitate rare earth exploitation. The Kim regime has neither the financial means nor the technological expertise necessary to exploit these mines on their own. KORES has analyzed that Pyongyang has already signed a total of forty investment agreements with foreign entities—90 percent with China, despite ongoing sanctions.

Several South Korean officials have been alarmed by Beijing’s interest. According to South Korean parliamentarian Park Young-sun, “The Government must act quickly because China has already secured many mineral resources in North Korea. If South Korea can import mineral resources from North Korea, it could use it stably for several decades.” Since South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have resumed talks, South Korean authorities are openly talking about a further extension of the North-South railway infrastructure project. The DPRK could be on the verge of being integrated into a vast supply chain infrastructure via a Metal Silk Road-a strategic partnership between Russia and China investing simultaneously in railways, pipelines and ports parallel to a Chinese like North-South Korea Special Economic Zones (SEZ) which is a geographically delineated area subject to unique regulations and administration from the host country in which it resides, in order to attract foreign direct economic investment  that could not otherwise be achieved.  Four specific regions in North Korea could be considered national priorities—Rason, Unjong, Wonsan and Sinuiju. These zones, with a variety of intended functions and ostensibly foreign-friendly regulations, signal a willingness of the Kim regime to explore economic policy options. Although the Kim regime may be promoting special economic zones as a key piece of its economic development strategy, there is still a long way to go to ultimately make these zones successful.

The first UN Sanctions against North Korea date back to 1993 and they have been counterproductive, as they pressured Pyongyang further in attempting to blackmail the world with its nuclear weapons and missile tests. North Korea has opted today for a predictable deterrence strategy, namely, to increase their missile tests to demonstrate its determination, but also its defense capabilities in an international environment which they deem hostile.

One way out of this crisis could be a potential de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear power status, similar to India, Pakistan or Israel, that obtained nuclear weapons sans international approvals. This option would be an admission of failure of nonproliferation policies but could break the stalemate that pushes Pyongyang to move further in its nuclear program and missile threats. An agreement in 1994 had already raised many expectations and hopes for a way out of the crisis: North Korea was required to give up its nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance from South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States who had committed to building two light water nuclear power plants in North Korea. This agreement failed in the absence of commitments from the different stakeholders.

It is no exaggeration to consider that the “Art of Negotiation” also applies to rare earth elements. If Washington isn’t serious about the rare earth resources of North Korea, then the winner, once again, could be Beijing. Moscow, too, could benefit from Washington’s loss given that China needs continued access to energy resources in Russia and Central Asia, as well as to Russia's advanced military technologies. China’s attempts at energy acquisition constitute a significant challenge to American policy. The puzzle can therefore revolve around who offers the best return on investment, only not on real estate, but rather on rare metals, with Kim Jong-un able to potentially collect a huge fortune. Is China able to match a possible U.S. agreement? Would another summit provide an opening for a second chance?

Frigates Will Dominate In The Navy's New War Strategy The Navy soon could select a shipyard to build the new class of frigate starting in 2020. by David Axe

Reducing the number of large warships and adding frigates could help to reduce the cost of a larger fleet. A 9,000-ton-displacement Arleigh Burke-class destroyer costs more than $2 billion. A frigate, displacing just 5,000 tons, should cost around $1 billion, according to the Navy.

The U.S. Navy might tweak its force-structure goals in order to boost the number of frigates.

That's what Vice Adm. Bill Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations, told a House of Representatives subcommittee on March 27, 2019. "We’re expecting a pretty hard look at the mix of ships this year," Merz said, according to USNI News.

In rewriting the force-structure plan to include more small surface combatants, the Navy could signal its intention to acquire larger numbers of smaller ships at the expense of bigger ships.

The idea would be to distribute U.S. naval power across a greater number of less-expensive vessels, reversing a decades-long trend toward larger, and fewer U.S. warships.

"We know we are heavy on large surface combatants, and we’d like to adjust that to a more appropriate mix, especially with the lethality we’re seeing coming along with the frigate," Merz said.

The Navy's released its last force-structure plan in late 2016. That plan, which called for a fleet of 355 major warships, up from the 289 ships the Navy possessed in early 2019. The new, bigger fleet would include 104 large surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers and 52 small surface combatants including Littoral Combat Ships and frigates.

But the Navy is struggling to afford the 355-ship fleet. The 2020 edition of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan projects the fleet could grow to 355 ships by 2034. But the Congressional Budget Office estimated that just buying all the new vessels would cost $27 billion per year, roughly double what the Navy historically has spent.

Reducing the number of large warships and adding frigates could help to reduce the cost of a larger fleet. A 9,000-ton-displacement Arleigh Burke-class destroyer costs more than $2 billion. A frigate, displacing just 5,000 tons, should cost around $1 billion, according to the Navy.

But the frigate still could carry many of the same weapons and sensors that a destroyer does, although somewhat fewer of them.

According to a Navy document that the Congressional Research Service obtained, the frigate will come armed with a 57-millimeter gun, a 32-cell vertical missile-launcher for SM-2 Block IIIC and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, a 21-round point-defense Rolling Airframe Missile launcher and eight launchers for over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles.

Its radar and combat system will be a smaller version of the Aegis system that equips the Navy's destroyers and cruisers. The frigate will embark an MH-60R helicopter and an MQ-8C drone. That weapons and sensor suite should give the frigate the ability to engage enemy aircraft, ships and submarines at a distance of 100 miles or more.

Over time, the ship could gain additional weaponry. The Navy document refers to potential upgrades for the frigate including a 150-kilowatt laser and an anti-submarine missile, which could be a rocket-boosted torpedo similar in concept to the defunct ASROC missile.

But the SM-2 Block IIIC, of which the frigate could carry 32, could be the new ship's most potent weapon. The Block IIIC replaces the semi-active radar-homing seeker on older SM-2s with the active radar-homing seeker of the SM-6 missile. The SM-6's seeker itself is a derivative of the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile.

With a semi-active missile, the launching ship must use its own radar to guide the missile through most of its flight. An active missile has its own, tiny radar, allowing the ship to launch and leave, thus protecting it from retaliatory strikes.

The SM-2 Block IIIC can do much more than just shoot down aircraft. With small tweaks to the seeker, the Navy already has given the SM-6 and SM-2 Block IIIC missiles anti-ship capability. Additional tweaks could allow the SM-6 -- and by extension the SM-2 Block IIIC -- to hit targets on land.

The new frigate also could function as a command vessel for robotic vessels, using Link 11 and Link 16 data links, satellite communications and Network Tactical Common Data Link to help the unmanned vessels to navigate and also to authorize them to fire weapons.

The Navy soon could select a shipyard to build the new class of frigate starting in 2020. "All shipyards have agreed that they can give us the lethality we need," Merz said.

The old fleet plan called for 20 of the vessels. A new plan could boost that number.

Invincible Or Outdated? Could The B-52 Bomber Have Finally Met Its Match? The Air Force has not yet found all the money for the B-52 upgrade program. by David Axe

More efficient engines could save $10 billion in fuel and maintenance costs through the 2040s, Tirpak reported, citing Air Force documents. The service wants 608 engines -- eight for each B-52.

Sixty-seven years after the U.S. Air Force received its last B-52 from Boeing, the flying branch finally has firmed up plans to fit the heavy bomber with new engines.

Air Force magazine in its January 2019 issue took a deep dive into the re-engining effort.

"If Air Force plans hold up, the B-52 will be approaching nearly a century of service by 2050," reporter John Tirpak wrote. "To keep the airplane flying, the service plans to equip each B-52 with new engines, which are expected to be so much more maintainer-friendly and efficient that they’ll pay for themselves in just 10 years."

In addition to new motors, the 76 B-52s in Air Force service also could get upgraded avionics, defensive gear, sensors and ejection seats, War Zone reporter Joe Trevithick revealed. The re-engined, enhanced bombers could receive the new designation B-52J.

In 2018, the Air Force announced it would retire its 62 1980s-vintage B-1Bs bombers and 20 newer B-2 stealth bombers no later than the 2040s, while the updated B-52s would continue to operate alongside at least 100 new B-21 stealth bombers.

“Despite their age, the B-52s have high mission-capable rates, can carry a huge diversity of weapons, and can perform effectively—as long as the enemy lacks elaborate air defenses,” Tirpak wrote. “Even in a higher-end fight, the B-52 can still launch missiles from well outside enemy air defenses. It is the only U.S. bomber that can launch nuclear cruise missiles, and it will be the initial platform for the new Long-Range Stand-Off missile.”

It took two decades of debate for the B-52 upgrade plan to reach this point. Since 1996 the Air Force has conducted no fewer than 13 studies examining options for new motors for the 240-ton bomber. As of early 2019 the B-52H still flies with the same Pratt & Whitney-made TF-33 engines that have powered the type since 1962.

A 2018 Air Force briefing cited the TF-33's "inefficient and limited capability relative to modern commercially-available engines." The Pratt & Whitney motors are "costly and manpower-intensive to maintain [while] facing obsolescence of parts."

"Modern engines are so much more reliable than the TF-33s that were once installed, the new engines will probably never have to be removed," Tirpak wrote. "The meantime between overhauls for that class of engines is typically around 30,000 hours—greater than the number of hours the service plans to fly the bombers for the rest of their service lives."

The goal in replacing the engines is to improve the B-52's fuel-efficiency by at least 20 percent while maintaining its ceiling and take-off performance. A B-52H with TF-33 engines can carry 35 tons of bombs and missiles as far as 4,500 miles without aerial refueling at a top speed of 650 miles per hour.

"Despite rumors to the contrary, Isabelle said the Air Force is not looking for substantially better physical performance from the new engines—for example, in time-to-climb or top speed—although that may turn out to be a welcome by-product," Tirpak explained.

The Air Force in 2018 estimated the cost of B-52 service-life extension—including the re-engining other capability improvements—at around $32 billion, according to Tirpak.

Between 2011 and 2016 it cost the Air Force around $1.2 billion annually to operate 76 B-52s, the Government Accountability Office reported in 2018.

More efficient engines could save $10 billion in fuel and maintenance costs through the 2040s, Tirpak reported, citing Air Force documents. The service wants 608 engines -- eight for each B-52.

The Air Force has not yet found all the money for the B-52 upgrade program. “We are working through our leadership to develop a strategy on how to approach the acquisition,” James Hunsicker, the service’s deputy chief of bomber requirements, told Tirpak.

The Air Force tapped Boeing to integrate the new motors. Pratt & Whitney, General Electric and Rolls-Royce all have proposed engine types for the B-52 effort. The Air Force in 2017 stated it would test new engines on two B-52s as early as 2022, select a contractor before 2026 and complete the re-engining project before 2034.

Why China's First Ballistic Missile Submarine Only Set Sail Once The single Xia-class submarine was not a military success. by Kyle Mizokami

While China’s first ballistic-missile submarine was meant to be a real, operational submarine and part of China’s nuclear deterrent, the obstacles encountered during construction forced lower expectations. The boat was more of a test bed, allowing China to test new underwater.

During the early 1980s, the People’s Republic of China attempted to modernize its nuclear deterrent force. One concrete results of the effort was the construction of a single nuclear ballistic missile submarine, a “boomer” in arms-control parlance. Constructed at enormous cost, the Xia class of submarines was such a disappointment that a follow-on class was not fielded for twenty years.

For a country with a population of more than a billion, the People’s Republic of China has a remarkably small nuclear force—and a restrained nuclear policy. The country detonated its first nuclear device in 1957, and its first thermonuclear device in 1964. The country’s nuclear weapons, under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, are estimated to total approximately 260 weapons, equipping both land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

China’s nuclear policy is a pragmatic one, largely anchored in the country’s former poverty. Rather than pursue a first-strike capability and thousands of nuclear weapons, something it could not afford during the Cold War, the country largely pursues a countervalue strategy that places an emphasis upon survivable weapons that can stage devastating revenge attacks against enemy cities. As a result, land-based missiles dominated the PLA during the early years.

Upon coming to power in 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping cut military research and development spending, concentrating what was left on the “Three Grasps”—the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile, a submarine-launched ballistic missile and a communications satellite. Sea-based nukes, which are much more difficult to locate and destroy than other basing strategies, were more in line with China’s countervalue strategy. This made a ballistic-missile submarine a national priority, and construction began that same year.

The Type 092 was designed by the Nuclear Powered Submarine Overall Design Section of the Seventh Academy, with Chief Designer Huang Xuhua overseeing the project. Despite most of China’s submarines using a traditional World War II–derived submarine hull, Huang pressed for a teardrop hull, the kind pioneered by the U.S. Navy with great success in the experimental sub USS Albacore. The first draft of the submarine plans was finished in October 1967. China’s nuclear-submarine development effort, code-named Type 09, would produce two ships: the Type 091 attack submarine and Type 092.

The priority given to the Three Grasps accelerated the Type 092’s developmental pace, which had been stalled by political maneuvering and even the carnage of the Cultural Revolution. The first submarine of the so-called Xia class was launched in 1981, and went to sea for the first time in 1983.

The Xia class was designed to carry twelve Julang (“Great Wave”) JL-1 ballistic missiles. The JL-1 was a solid fueled design with a range of just 1,770 kilometers and a 250-kiloton warhead. The JL-1 was first test-fired from a modified Golf-class submarine in September 1982. The missile’s range was disappointing: fired from the Yellow Sea, it could barely hit the northern half of Japan, and while it could hit the Soviet city of Vladivostok, it could not range as far as the important military hub of Khabarovsk. Indeed, a PLA boomer would have to be parked in the Baltic Sea to place Moscow at risk.

The single Xia-class submarine was not a military success. Ship construction was notoriously difficult and likely strained the limits of China’s submarine building abilities. The ship became operational in 1983, but faced enduring problems with reliability and radiation leakage from its onboard reactor. The ship is also allegedly the noisiest of all U.S., Russian and Chinese ballistic missile submarines underwater, making it easy to detect and track.

The sub undertook a single patrol and then never sailed again, staying pierside for so long there were rumors it had caught fire and sank in 1985. It has allegedly never sailed beyond Chinese waters. The Xia-class boat was thought to have gone into refit in 1995, and was not seen for years. It surfaced briefly in 2000 at a military exercise, but then resumed its fairly indolent career. It went back to drydock at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base between 2005 and 2007.

While China’s first ballistic-missile submarine was meant to be a real, operational submarine and part of China’s nuclear deterrent, the obstacles encountered during construction forced lower expectations. The boat was more of a test bed, allowing China to test new underwater technologies as it gradually placed more emphasis on naval forces in general. Today the ship has been replaced by the Type 094 Jin-class submarines. Although by no means perfect (the subs have their own noise issues) the four Jin submarines are closer to China’s original vision of a sea-based nuclear deterrent capability, and they almost certainly owe their existence to the groundbreaking Type 092.

A Crisis Is Brewing Between India and China. But This Time There Is a Big Difference. America has inserted itself deeper into the China-India-Pakistan triangle, altering the shape of the regional order, pushing it toward a bipolar one with Beijing and Islamabad on one side and New Delhi and, to some extent, itself on the other. by Arif Rafiq

lt isn’t entirely clear what is taking place along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates Chinese and Indian-controlled territory along the Himalayas. However, the more credible voices in the Indian commentariat contend that in May, China made a series of ingresses along the undemarcated, disputed “line” and have assumed control of roughly 60-square kilometers in the Ladakh region claimed by New Delhi, including a strategically-important region near a nearly-completed highway that serves as a vital line of communication to its frontiers with China and Pakistan. And there are unconfirmed reports this morning of renewed clashes near the LAC that have left three Indian soldiers dead and maybe even dozens captured. 

Assuming that these contentions are true and that this is no spontaneous border standoff between China and India, one must ask what Beijing’s motivations are. The initial reaction, particularly from China-watchers in the United States, has been to tie Beijing’s moves along the LAC to a broader set of assertive measures, including recent measures to further erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. Beijing, they argue, is exploiting a leadership vacuum in Asia as the United States reels from the coronavirus pandemic, signaling to its neighbors that it is emerging as the region’s dominant power.

But it may be a mistake to reflexively link Beijing’s moves along the LAC to a broader policy of Chinese aggression. In fact, there are indications that China is responding in part to U.S.-backed Indian unilateral measures made last year.

Last August, the Indian government revoked the nominal autonomy of the broader Jammu and Kashmir region, annexing the disputed region which had the status of a state according to the Indian constitution. New Delhi then divided the former “state” into two separate territories: “Jammu and Kashmir” and “Ladakh,” the latter being both the location of recent Chinese ingresses and home to territory claimed by Beijing. Earlier this month, Chinese scholar Wang Shida, writing on the state-run China Economic Net website, seemed to tie India’s annexation of Kashmir to the recent LAC activity, arguing that New Delhi “forced China into the Kashmir dispute” and “dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India.” As Wang notes, Beijing’s official response to New Delhi’s Kashmir moves was indeed quite strong—though many observers seemed to interpret them as merely symbolic measures to placate ally Islamabad. 

Indeed, it appears that both New Delhi and Washington have severely miscalculated how Beijing would respond to the annexation of Kashmir last year. While many U.S. analysts viewed New Delhi’s moves as an attempt to formalize the status quo, they ignored statements by Indian officials, including Interior Minister Amit Shah, suggesting that India would extend its writ to portions of Kashmir under the control of China and Pakistan. Additionally, the United States, and the State Department, in particular, offered its tacit endorsement of India’s annexation of Kashmir, suggesting that the move could promote economic prosperity in the area and deflecting congressional scrutiny over the draconian lockdown imposed by India over the region. And while President Donald Trump offered on several occasions to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, the bureaucracy, including the then-top U.S. diplomat for South Asia, Alice Wells, consistently sought to water down that offer.  

The United States has provided cover for India as it has sought to create facts on the ground in Kashmir. And so it is unsurprising that China is now trying to create its own facts on the ground. Indeed, by endorsing New Delhi’s unilateralism and attempting to prop it up as a regional hegemon, Washington may be inadvertently facilitating Beijing’s rise as a power in South Asia. 

Pakistan is not the sole regional state that fears Indian aggression. In 2015, India imposed a blockade on Nepal, just months after the country was hit by a devastating earthquake. Since then, Nepal, long dominated by India, has been veering into China’s orbit.  

In 2017, Nepal joined the Belt and Road Initiative and is reducing its economic dependence on India. A growing partnership with China has given Nepal greater resolve in standing up to India. This month, the lower house of Nepal’s parliament approved a new official map that includes areas claimed by India, after New Delhi inaugurated a road that passes through territory claimed by Kathmandu.  

Washington, however, continues to amplify New Delhi’s influence in the region, despite the obvious anxiety it causes for smaller states in the region. It sees India as the locus of regional economic integration. A U.S. grant-funded electric power line project in Nepal became controversial because political forces there perceive to be tied to an American strategy to prop up India and contain China.  

Similarly, Sri Lanka has a complicated history with India. While Chinese lending has triggered accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy,” political factions in Sri Lanka still court Beijing as an alternative to New Delhi, which has interfered in Sri Lankan politics. India, for example, trained and armed the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers terrorist group. 

South Asian states, including Pakistan, may come to regret their economic embrace of China as their trade deficits and loan balances grow. But the United States is also making a strategic error by enabling India’s worst instincts. U.S. policymakers see India as a benign power in South Asia and view its extraterritorial actions and unilateralism in recent decades as exceptions to a policy of restraint. But that view is not shared by many of India’s neighbors who have a historical memory of Indian aggression. As a result, they are turning to China to balance India. 

With decent relations with both India and Pakistan, the United States is positioned to offer meaningful assistance to both countries toward a negotiated settlement to the Kashmir dispute. But not only did the unelected bureaucracy work to obstruct Trump’s mediation offer, but it also pushed U.S. policy into a new direction by effectively endorsing Indian revisionism. As a result, America not only lost a potentially historic opportunity to bring peace to the region and grow its soft power, but it also inserted itself deeper into the China-India-Pakistan triangle, altering the shape of the regional order, pushing it toward a bipolar one with Beijing and Islamabad on one side and New Delhi and, to some extent, itself on the other. 

Indian officials often speak of a two-front war with China and Pakistan. And though such a scenario is presently unlikely, India’s Hindu nationalist government, emboldened by the United States, risks veering into one in the years ahead should it fail to revisit its current regional policy. New Delhi would not be able to walk the walk, given the conventional power disparity between it and Beijing and the growing synergies between China and Pakistan. India and the United States do not view one another as allies. And so it would be a mistake for New Delhi to count on Washington’s support. China’s ingresses along the LAC provide an opportunity for both India and the United States to assess the second-order effects of their policies in South Asia. That reassessment must begin with Kashmir.