America's Coronavirus Data Debacle Before anyone declares that it is possible to predict that a country can safely open its economy by a given date because of what the models show—they better know how the models were built and be familiar with their driving assumptions. by Amitai Etzioni and Ruth Etzioni

Is it plat already?” millions of Americans learned to ask, as we live and die by statistical models. We are not exaggerating when we say “live and die,” because if the models on which the White House and governors rely on are faulty, if they predict a recovery before there is one, restrictions will be prematurely lifted, and many deaths that could have been averted, will take place.   

The leading scientist on the pandemic, Dr. Anthony Fauci put it succinctly, “models are only as good as the assumptions you put into them.” One tends to zoom over this short line but it speaks legions. It suggests that the outcomes of the vital statistical models vary a great deal not only on the basis of the evidence that one puts into them, the way one puts meat into a grinder, but also depending on the kind of grinder one chooses. Before anyone declares that it is possible to predict that a country can safely open its economy by a given date because of what the models show—they better know how the models were built and be familiar with their driving assumptions. The reason the White House model is unduly optimistic is because it assumed that the data China provided was reliable. Even later, as data from other nations were added, the model continued to greatly underestimate the numbers of those who will be infected and of those who perished. (On April 17, the Chinese upped their official tally of the deaths in Wuhan by a staggering 50 percent.) 

As a tool for policy guidance, the model the White House mainly relies on is held, to put it very gently, not in high regard among statisticians with experience modeling other epidemics like AIDS and Ebola. It was fashioned by the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). This model was one reason Trump has maintained that the governors were asking for many more ventilators, protective gear, and medications than they would need.  

As the Washington Post reported “Leaders in one state said Trump administration officials have used IHME’s numbers to push back and in some cases deny their requests for equipment and help. Officials in that state cited emails and documents in which federal officials highlight IHME projections as evidence the state needs thousands fewer ventilators and beds than the state’s models project.” Dylan George, who helped the Obama White House develop models to guide its Ebola response in 2014 added, that “As a result, you have every state trying to create their own models to anticipate their needs.”  

To gain a sense of the issues at hand, we must go into the statistical weeds. On April 2, IHME predicted that cumulative coronavirus deaths could reach as high as approximately 178,000. This prediction was reduced on April 5 to about 136,000. On April 8, this figure was scaled down to 60,145 (with the upper range cut, to about 126,000). Thus, in a few days, “the model changed its predictions by more than 33 percent.” Even the notorious weather forecasts are more reliable. 

Aside from being a poor predictor, a strong case can be made that the kind of model IHME provides and that the White House draws on, is the wrong kind of model to begin with. The IHME model takes the pattern of data of what happened in some countries, tweaks it to match the accumulating U.S. data, and uses it to project what will happen in the future. It does not examine what will be the outcome if various specific conditions would vary. For instance, if there would be more or less social distancing, then various levels of testing and of contract tracing. We need such a polity exploring model rather than a mere one that seeks to predict the future on the bases of past occurrences. The British Empirical College is an example of such a polity model; there are many others.  

Meanwhile, those of us who skipped the course on statistics in college, or did not have a chance to look up our notes recently, sadly better take all predictions about the course of the pandemic, especially those coming from the White House, with the biggest grain of salt we can find. And, to the extent that we have leeway, maintain virus safeguards longer than the headlines of the next days will suggest. 

Amitai Etzioni is a university professor and professor of international affairs at The George Washington University. His latest book, Reclaiming Patriotism, was published by the University of Virginia Press in 2019 and is available for download without charge. 

China’s Coronavirus Play in the Americas The coronavirus crisis has exposed a U.S. overreliance on supply chains emanating from China, and it has also exposed a regional overreliance on China as an export market. Supply chains will have to shift, and Latin American and Caribbean nations are well-positioned to benefit. by Eric Farnsworth

As coronavirus overtakes the Americas, evidence is accumulating that China is taking advantage of increasingly desperate circumstances to enhance its regional position in support of broader global ambitions. It may seem the height of opportunism or even cynicism but China’s actions in the midst of the current crisis build on years of patient investment across a full spectrum of activities. From capital expenditures to media and messaging to technological capabilities to people-to-people exchanges, China is leveraging new facts on the ground that will bear directly on the conduct of regional affairs long after the pandemic subsides.  

Despite the wishes of some observers, anticipation that China might seek to “rescue” Latin America and the Caribbean from the worst impacts of the virus through trade, aid, or investment, which fundamentally misses the point. China’s own growth is now negative for the first time in almost thirty years, impacting its appetite for foreign trade and investment. Nonetheless, to the extent China can contribute to hemispheric resiliency in the face of the crisis, while reaping the reward of enhanced product sales and gaining the goodwill that comes with public acknowledgement of assistance, Beijing is all too happy to oblige. Indeed, donations of protective gear and equipment have already occurred with fanfare, and additional donations will surely arrive. There may also be splashy announcements of financial assistance and debt forbearance. 

But all of this is “small ball.” China is playing a longer and much larger game, working diligently to change the narrative regarding its interests, intentions, and methods. It seeks to establish a benign equivalency between the Chinese communist system and liberal democratic governance worldwide by creating confusion and doubt about democratic practices. The implications of such an outcome are significant: if successful, the Chinese Communist Party will have won a strategic victory over the West without firing a shot. Coronavirus provides an opportunity to accelerate the timeline. 

Emerging markets are a key to Beijing’s success. Even as Washington seeks to build support for the idea of the United States as the “preferred” partner for emerging markets, thus establishing a firewall to the expansion of Chinese influence, China now seeks to use the coronavirus crisis to blunt and undercut such claims. It is obfuscating its own role in enabling the gathering crisis at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020, while shifting blame and focusing significant resources highlighting the difficulties of the G7 nations to control the virus and amplifying the message globally. Beijing has undoubtedly been helped by others’ missteps, particularly the United States, which have enhanced the effectiveness of the pre-existing strategy.

With the West reeling, Beijing is promoting the idea that China has conquered the virus and now, ironically, it is time to save the world. It is doing so utilizing the platforms, partnerships, and procedures it has spent the last two decades developing. Of course, it is impossible to know whether China really has conquered the virus, given a lack of transparency and independent verification of Chinese claims. But if pragmatic results can be delivered by media blackouts, scientific censorship, mass deployment of highly intrusive surveillance technologies, and dominance by the party leadership of all aspects of citizens’ lives, among other things, and democratic governance cannot guarantee similar results, then the people of Latin America and the Caribbean should at least be open to the idea that working with China and importing some of its methods is a sensible alternative to chaos. Or at least that is the argument. And once its system is broadly accepted on equal terms across the Americas, China’s strategic global standing will be dramatically enhanced.

There is a regional silver lining: the crisis has exposed a U.S. overreliance on supply chains emanating from China, and it has also exposed a regional overreliance on China as an export market. Supply chains will have to shift, and Latin American and Caribbean nations are well-positioned to benefit. In these circumstances, mutual interest would appear to dictate reconsideration of a robust economic integration agenda among willing partners in the Americas. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was one such attempt; the Free Trade Area of the Americas was another. Both have been cast aside by history. But that’s no reason not to consider new economic approaches for different times. Other steps must be considered as well, including a general posture toward the region defined more by the active pursuit of mutual opportunity than by perceptions of threat, or indifference.

The United States may generally be the preferred partner, but as the coronavirus takes a greater toll across the Americas, and the region looks for help from wherever it might be found, Washington must contend for influence in ways it has not previously had to do. The coronavirus is giving Latin America and the Caribbean a reason to reconsider the relative value proposition of its partners, building on the foundation that China has been working diligently and patiently for years to lay. In time, the current crisis will pass. The competition for hemispheric influence will remain.

Chaos: Why Japan's Coronavirus Response Could End up Hurting Its International Reputation The Japanese government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic has been reactive, chaotic and lacking in clear leadership. by Ra Mason

The Japanese government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic has been reactive, chaotic and lacking in clear leadership. Japan has effectively lost control of its attempts to isolate all suspected cases.

A full nationwide state of emergency was only declared on April 16, after cases rapidly expanded outside central metropolitan areas. The national emergency gave prefectures the powers to impose their own lockdown measures, but these are partial and not enforceable by law.

This followed ambiguous recommendations by the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for people across the country to practice the “three Cs”: avoiding closed spaces, concentrated gatherings and close contact.

But the government’s coronavirus strategy might be more fittingly categorised by “three As”: arrogance, anxiety and atypical. This includes over-confidence in party protocol, anxiety over making sudden societal changes and indifference towards conventional advice from foreign peers.

In some ways, this mirrors a wider pattern of the Abe administration implementing policies at home that are out-of-sync with the image Japan has of itself as a leader on the world stage. These contradictions between foreign and domestic policy have led Japan capriciously to the brink of a coronavirus disaster.

Since Abe’s return to power in 2012, Japan has set a foreign policy course aimed at regaining international prestige. This came partly as a response to domestic perceptions that Japan had damaged its reputation over the course of more than two decades of stagnation. Abe’s new agenda has been characterised by concepts of proactivity, promotion of an international rules-based system and regional leadership.

Why then, with so much at stake, has the response of his ruling Liberal Democratic Party to the coronavirus pandemic been so erratic?

Arrogance

This begins with Abe, who has strengthened his grip on power under the pretexts of strong leadership and national interest. Though often framed in patriotic rhetoric, measures introduced by the prime minister on information sharing, military expansion and media control have largely amounted to a reduction in civil liberties and the empowerment of Abe and his inner circle. This concentration of power promotes a discourse of Japanese exceptionalism focused on national pride at home and international prestige abroad.

But there is an arrogance here based on the fact that Abe’s cabinet doesn’t actually have popular approval among the Japanese public for its handling of the coronavirus response. The LDP only commands an overwhelming electoral advantage because of the broken and dysfunctional opposition, with no other party gaining far above 5% of the vote.

This has created a kind of hubris, where the ruling party acts unilaterally as if given a mandate by a huge majority of the people, due not least to the LDP’s almost unbroken grip on power since 1955. In recent years government policies have only been subjected to limited domestic media scrutiny.

Anxiety

Japan has long been considered a socially conservative country. Generally speaking, this includes a high level of social awareness and anxiety about social perceptions. This acts as a disincentive for politicians to make sudden or sweeping changes for fear of upsetting the apple cart.

Most Japanese prioritise stability and safety, which is largely reflected in the generally cautious actions of their political leaders. Securing such stability and safety is not, conversely, assumed to require dramatic measures that drastically change daily life. There is evidence, for example, of citizens ignoring or only partially adhering to the comparatively sudden social distancing measures the government requested.

At the same time, Japan has a problem of indifference. Criminal incidents, such as violence or anti-social behaviour, can often go unreported. Instead, there is an expectation for people to practice social awareness and consideration for others through their own, socially conditioned, behaviour. This makes it hard for the government to demand further additional adherence to draconian measures because while some people are anxious about how they are socially perceived, they expect to take personal responsibility for their own actions.

There is also a degree of trepidation in Japanese society that guards against military-style emergency measures that are associated with Japan’s wartime era.

In any case, there is already a degree of deliberate distancing from strangers, and the wearing of face masks has long been commonplace. This could partly explain the initially slow spread of the virus. On the flip side, however, this could have led to a false sense of reassurance.

Atypical

Japan has tended to adapt rather than adhere to international orthodoxies. This goes for politics, economics and society, and has proven effective in sustaining the country’s economic strength and soft power esteem. However, it has also led politicians in Tokyo to believe that not following the advice, policies or behaviour of other leading powers may be warranted. Japan does things differently, they claim, for good reasons.

In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, this is starting to look like a grave mistake. Japan is out of kilter with many of the countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and EU states, that it might most need to cooperate with, both to stop the spread of the virus and address its economic impact.

The health concerns from such an atypical approach are obvious. But economically, too, everything from air travel to the Olympics and tourism have been negatively affected. Even compared to other battered global economies and healthcare systems, the prognosis for Japan is grim.

Ironically, then, the combination of disjointed domestic policies could also result in Japan taking an extra hit to the one thing its leader was doubtless hoping to preserve – its international reputation.

Coronavirus Isn't Our Only Security Threat And it hasn't made the rise of China unstoppable, either. by Victor Davis Hanson

The world was a dangerous place before—and will be after—the coronavirus pandemic. 

While Americans debate the proper ongoing response to the virus and argue over the infection’s origins, nature, and trajectory, they may have tuned out other, often just as scary, news.

Many Americans are irate at China for its dishonest and lethal suppression of knowledge about the viral outbreak. But they may forget that China has other huge problems, too.
Its overseas brand is tarnished. Importers can never again be sure of the safety or reliability of Chinese exports. They will know only that their producer is a serial falsifier that is capable of anything to ensure power and profits.

Even China’s vaunted propaganda machine that slanders its critics as racists and xenophobes no longer works. The sheer number of countries that have suffered huge human and financial losses from Chinese lying won’t believe another word from Beijing.

How will China collect its Silk Road debts from now-bankrupt Asian and African countries? Most of them are accusing China of being racist and responsible for the global epidemic that wrecked the very economies from which China planned to harvest profits.

China was beginning to lose the trade war with the U.S. even before the virus struck. Americans think that China is huge, powerful, and rich. In truth, Chinese per capita income is about a sixth of America’s.

China produces only about two-thirds the nominal gross domestic product of the United States despite having over four times as many people. Hundreds of millions of rural Chinese remain trapped in poverty.

Beijing should expect that lots of industries will return to the U.S. Thousands of Chinese students and researchers will likely go home, too. Their absorption of American science and technology was critical to Chinese industry.

China, however, will not meekly accept its new reduced post-viral status. Instead, it will act even more provocatively and desperately than ever.

Rumors have spread that China may be conducting nuclear tests in violation of zero-yield global agreements. If true, it reminds us that our adversaries are most dangerous when cornered and wounded.

Iran, battered by U.S.-led sanctions, domestic unrest, serial government lying, and an inept response to the epidemic, has now sent naval vessels into the Persian Gulf to harass U.S. warships.

The Iranians concede that they could easily be blown out of the water by the U.S. Navy. But their larger intention is to goad America into getting bogged down in a Middle East standoff during the coronavirus panic—and right before the November election.

Baiting America may be a dangerous strategy for Iran, but it is running out of choices as crashing oil prices, trade sanctions, and the costs of dealing with the virus have all bankrupted the country.

Iran can hardly expect help from its usual patrons—China, Russia, and North Korea. China is now an international outlaw facing a severe recession. Russia is reeling from crashing oil prices. And North Korea is embargoed and broke.

How all three autocracies dealt with the coronavirus is censored. But they likely face greater internal unrest and more poverty. Expect all of them to become more provocative as the U.S. election approaches. They hope Donald Trump will be gone in 2021, replaced by a more malleable president who can be bullied.

The United Nations has been mostly absent during the global pandemic. The two democracies that the U.N. treats the worst, Israel and Taiwan, have done superbly during the crisis—in exactly the opposite fashion as U.N. pet China.

It would have been better for all had the U.N.’s duplicitous appendage, the World Health Organization, been silent as well.

WHO parroted Chinese propaganda and did its own part to delay the world’s response to the virus, costing thousands of lives and destroying trillions of dollars of economic output.

The virus won’t likely be defeated by international health organizations or U.N.-supported transnational committees. Instead, bilateral scientific cooperation between Western countries will find vaccines and antidotes, not unaccountable and subsidized international associations.

When the viral crisis began, the U.S. was facing a possible $1 trillion annual deficit, as Trump followed the George W. Bush and Barack Obama red-ink legacy. The need to restore instant liquidity to the devastated U.S. economy may cause the budget deficit to hit a historic $3 trillion or more this year.

Such a staggering sum is bearable only because of near-zero interest rates and a global recession that has strangled consumer spending.

But soon the U.S. will have a rendezvous with a tough payback unless it accepts that thrifty Americans will never again receive real interest on their savings accounts and that inflation is extinct forever—both dubious propositions.

The virus may burn out, but an even scarier world continues.

The Complex Politics of Oil and the Environment Is Playing out in Nigeria Here are the details. by Abosede Omowumi Babatunde

In the Niger Delta’s coastal communities, oil pollution of the marine environment has depleted the fishing and water resources that people have traditionally depended on for their livelihoods. This has led to a complex pattern of conflicts in the region since the late 1990s. 

Oil spills, gas flaring, and other activities of oil companies have led to massive degradation of land and marine resources. Environmentalists and scientists have provided varying estimates of the magnitude and frequency of oil spills in the region.

Local people blame the oil multinationals and the Nigerian government for the environmental degradation, and feel they have not been properly compensated for its impact. Communities have also developed conflicts within and between themselves over these issues.

The Nigerian government has failed to compel oil multinationals to adhere to local environmental protection regulations. This is not surprising since the government benefits from oil revenue, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. But the damage to the natural environment has exposed the region’s people to poverty. The high rate of poverty in the Niger Delta in contrast to the enormous oil wealth has been clearly depicted in the 2015 United Nations’ Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index. Oil-related activities have also damaged sources of clean water. This has fuelled conflict over the limited available resources.

The actions of aggrieved locals – including attacks on oil facilities and pipeline vandalism – have made the situation even worse.

And there’s another dimension: the complicity of local elites and elders. Their quest for monetary gain through oil benefits, including contracts to clean up oil spills and monitor pipelines, has complicated the environmental problems.

The roles of diverse local actors in this environmental and conflict landscape have been downplayed by analysts. But it is important to grasp how all the players – locals, oil companies and government – have contributed to the protracted insecurity.

I studied oil communities in Ondo, Delta and Rivers states between 2010 and 2016, focusing on how the interactions among these players aggravate environmental pollution and conflicts in local communities. A nuanced analysis like this is necessary, in my view, if solutions are to be found.

Complex connections

My fieldwork took place in states that have experienced oil-induced environmental problems and destructive conflicts.

I selected the following coastal communities: Awoye and Ayetoro in Ondo state, Owodokpokpo-Igbide and Isoko South LGA in Delta state, and Goi in Rivers state. I conducted in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with a diverse group. They included traditional and community leaders, farmers, fishers, and representatives of women and youth associations. I also interviewed officials from government, oil companies and the Niger Delta Development Commission (whose mission is to advance economic, social and ecological goals).

The respondents provided deeper insights into the connections between global, national and local actors. They showed how the actions of these players have fuelled a cycle of environmental degradation, conflict and insecurity in the oil communities.

Oil spills, gas flaring and other activities of oil companies have had a huge environmental impact on fishing and subsistence farming. Rivers are polluted and fishing nets and boats are damaged by oil. The pressure on land has increased, leading to deforestation and exploitation of marginal land. People have lost sources of income and have few alternatives.

This has led to multifaceted conflicts. The initial conflict between oil communities, oil companies and the Nigerian government has escalated to conflict within and among oil communities. People are pitted against one another in the quest for oil-related benefits or means of livelihood.

Oil benefits can take the form of contracts for oil spill clean-ups, pipeline surveillance and development projects. A few local actors control what little benefit trickles to communities from the oil companies and government. But the majority are sidelined and looking for ways to challenge their exclusion or to survive.

The coping strategies of the alienated local actors tend to wreak further havoc on the fragile environment and marine resources. They include criminal activities like pipeline vandalism, in retaliation against being excluded from oil benefits. This also creates the need for cleanup contracts. Some locals also siphon oil and refine it artisanally to sell on the black market. These activities result in a vicious cycle of environmental degradation, poverty and conflict.

Solving the problem

A nuanced analysis of this network of global, national and local interactions and their consequences is critical when looking for ways to tackle the conflict in the Niger Delta region.

The problem calls for a joint approach to a solution: broad consultation, collaboration and effective dialogue. The stakeholders are not just the oil companies, Nigerian government and local elites, but also the local fishers, farmers, traders, youth and women.

How Menopause Is an Opportunity to Reset Your Habits (And Prevent Weight Gain) Even though weight gain is common, you can beat it by using menopause as an opportunity to reset your eating and exercise habits. by Clare Collins, Jenna Hollis and Lauren Williams

For many women, the journey through menopause is a roller coaster of symptoms including hot flushes, night sweats, sleep disturbance, dry and itchy skin, mood changes, anxiety, depression and weight gain. For some, it can be relatively uneventful. 

Menopause is medically defined as not having any menstrual bleeding for 12 months. Most women reach this milestone between the ages of 45 to 55.

Even though weight gain is common, you can beat it by using menopause as an opportunity to reset your eating and exercise habits.

Do women gain weight at menopause?

Australian women tend to gain weight as they age.

During menopause, women also experience a shift in how fat stores are distributed around the body. Fat tends to move from the thigh region up to the waist and abdomen.

A review of studies that quantified changes in body fat stores before and after menopause found total body fat mass also increased significantly.

While the average weight increase was only about one kilogram, the increase in percentage total body fat was almost 3%, with fat on the trunk increasing by 5.5% and total leg fat decreasing around 3%.

Average waist circumference increased by about 4.6 centimetres and hips by 2.0 centimetres.

Other bad news is that once postmenopausal, women have lower total daily energy needs. This is partly because body fat requires less energy to maintain it compared to muscle. So even if your weight doesn’t change, the increase in body fat means your body needs fewer kilojoules each day.

In addition to this, the menstrual cycle had a small energy cost to maintain ovarian function. This amounted to about 200 kilojoules a day, which is now “saved”.

The bottom line is that unless your transition to menopause is accompanied by a reduction in your total energy intake or an increase in your physical activity, you’re at high risk of weight gain.

But there is some good news

Around 60% of women manage to avoid weight gain at menopause.

They manage this by either decreasing the total amount of food they eat, cutting down on fat and sugar, using commercial weight loss programs, doing more exercise, or a combination of all these.

They key thing is that they change some aspects of their lifestyle.

So what works best?

Until recently, only three major studies had tested interventions.

The Women’s Healthy Lifestyle Project compared the impact of receiving support to improve diet and exercise habits over four years covering menopause, to making no changes at all.

Women who changed their lifestyle had lower body weights, less abdominal fat and better blood sugar levels compared to those in the control group.

The second study, of 168 women, enrolled them into a 90 minute Nordic walking program, three times a week.

This was associated with a reduction in weight, body fat and waist circumference, as well as blood levels of bad cholesterol and fats, highlighting the benefits of endurance walking.

The third study divided 175 Nigerian women into two groups: one group undertook a 12-week circuit training exercise program, the other was a control group.

Women in the exercise group reduced their waist circumference relative to their hips, indicating a reduction in abdominal fat, even though their total body weight did not change.

The 40-something trial

More recently, we studied 54 women aged 45-50 years in the “40-Something” trial.

We randomly assigned half the participants to receive healthy eating and physical activity support from health professionals, using motivational interviewing to encourage behaviour change. The other half received information only and were asked to self-direct their lifestyle changes.

Our aim was to prevent weight gain in women who were in either the overweight or healthy weight range as they entered early menopause.

We encouraged women who were overweight to reduce their body weight to achieve a body mass index (BMI) in the healthy weight range (BMI 18 to 25). We encouraged women already in the healthy weight range to maintain their weight within one kilogram.

We gave all women the same healthy lifestyle advice, including to eat:

• 2 serves of fruit and at least 5 serves of vegetables every day
• 1-1.5 serves of meat or meat alternatives
• 2-3 serves of dairy
• wholegrain breads and cereals.

And to:

• limit foods high in fat and sugar
• cut down on meals eaten outside the home
• engage in moderate to vigorous physical activity for 150-250 minutes per week
• sit for less than three hours per day
• take at least 10,000 steps per day.

 

Women in the intervention group had five consultations with a dietitian and exercise physiologist over one year to provide support and motivation to change their eating habits and physical activity.

After two years, women in the intervention group had lower body weights, less body fat and smaller waist circumferences compared to the control group who received information pamphlets only.

When we evaluated changes based on their starting BMI, the intervention was more effective for preventing weight gain in women initially of a healthy weight.

Of all the health advice, eating five serves of vegetables and taking 10,000 steps per day were the most effective strategies for long-term weight control during menopause.

Although weight gain, and especially body fat gain, is usual during the menopausal transition, you can beat it.

Rather than menopause being a time to put your feet up, it’s a time to step up your physical activity and boost your efforts to eat a healthy, balanced diet, especially when it comes to the frequency and variety of vegetables you eat.

Clare Collins, Professor in Nutrition and Dietetics, University of Newcastle; Jenna Hollis, Conjoint Lecturer, University of Newcastle, and Lauren Williams, Professor of Nutrition and Dietetics, Griffith University

Nuclear Modernization Is Essential Business. Don’t Let Coronavirus Shut It Down. You can't put a price in deterrence. by Patty-Jane Geller

Since the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Pentagon has had to realign priorities to adjust to a slow-down in defense spending. That challenge may be exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Some predict the pandemic-induced economic downturn and huge stimulus package will necessitate cuts to the defense budget. Yet Beijing’s fatal decision to withhold data about the virus, its malicious misinformation campaign about the virus’s origins, and its pernicious influence on the World Health Organization have served to heighten awareness of the dangers posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

As the Pentagon continues to adjust for great power competition with China, its realigned priorities must include bolstering missile defense in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing long-range precision fire capability, and defending critical assets in space. But the bedrock of U.S. national security must remain nuclear deterrence.

It’s possible to mistake nuclear deterrence for an outdated capability. Nuclear weapons have been around for over seven decades and have not been employed since World War II. It’s fashionable to advocate for hip, new technologies like artificial intelligence, directed-energy railguns and cyber hackers to compete with China. But in a great power competition, nuclear deterrence is an absolute essential. 

The National Defense Strategy’s top priority—to defend the homeland—rests on strong nuclear deterrence. Adversaries must know that a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland will be met with responsive intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), survivable nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or flexible bombers.

The U.S. ICBM force in particular is key. With 400 Minuteman III missiles spread across the middle of the United States, adversaries know it’s impossible to take out all of our ICBMs before we can launch a retaliatory strike. This promise of retaliation is precisely why our adversaries have calculated time after time against using nuclear weapons—it’s not because they feel it would be immoral. 

But here’s the problem: Our nuclear deterrence is deteriorating from old age, even as Russia and China modernize and expand their nuclear forces. Every single element of the U.S. nuclear deterrent has passed its projected life span. As just one example, the air-launched cruise missile carried by the B-52 bomber is now more than twenty-five years past its design life. Meanwhile, both China and Russia have nearly completed updating their nuclear arsenals. China is expected to double its nuclear stockpile in the next decade. And both Beijing and Moscow continue to develop advanced capabilities—such as hypersonic missiles with intercontinental-range and ICBMs tipped with multiple warheads—that threaten the United States.

Opponents of U.S. nuclear modernization have incorrectly cited China’s No First Use policy as evidence that Beijing does not have hostile nuclear intentions. But trusting China to adhere to this “good faith” policy ignores its long history of saying one thing but doing another. For instance, Chinese state media has emphasized China’s “model” response to dealing with the COVID outbreak, even as the regime ruthlessly silenced whistleblowers who dared to expose the virus.

There’s no reason to believe that China would take a different approach to nuclear weapons. In fact, leaders have stated their intention to use nuclear weapons first if the United States intervenes in a conflict with Taiwan. Admiral Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, put it best when he said: “I think I could drive a truck through that No First Use policy.”

As China’s lack of desire to rise peacefully becomes more apparent, so does the importance of U.S. nuclear modernization programs remaining on schedule. If attempts to delay modernization succeed, the security consequences could be grave. For example, there is “no margin” for another life extension for our aging Minuteman III missiles. Either the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent goes forward, producing replacements, or our nuclear deterrent is dangerously diminished. 

Deterrence depends on our adversaries perceiving that our nuclear warheads and delivery platforms will work as intended. If the United States fails to replace aging warheads or timed-out missiles, adversaries might doubt they would actually produce an unacceptable amount of damage. 

Further, the perception of weakness may embolden our adversaries. China might view the time as right to invade Taiwan, or Russia might invade a Baltic state. These calculations—which are not at all implausible—could drag the United States into a nuclear conflict. 

Critics of nuclear deterrence argue that the United States should prioritize arms control over modernization. But if our deterrent strength ebbs, leading adversaries to believe they own the advantage, what incentive would they have to negotiate? States enter arms control agreements when it is in their interest to reduce or constrain weapons. But if the United States is forced to retire its nuclear forces unilaterally as a result of obsolescence, Russia and China would not reduce their own forces in exchange, just to be nice. Instead, they would gladly accept this most imprudent gift. 

The Defense Department may need to make changes to its budget due to the pandemic. And, of course, finding ways to reduce the costs of nuclear modernization would be a welcome development. But we must not allow opponents of nuclear deterrence to use the pandemic as an excuse to advance their categorical anti-nuclear agenda. Rather, in a time of global uncertainty, there is no more important national security priority than ensuring a strong nuclear deterrent.