The F-106 Delta Dart Was One Mean Looking Fighter Jet (Ready to Dogfight) This jet made history for many reasons. by Peter Suciu

Throughout the Cold War, the United States Air Force continued to develop interceptor aircraft to address the threat from Soviet bombers. This included such aircraft as the Convair F-102 and the North American F-108, and finally, the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, which was designed to be the “Ultimate Interceptor.” But in the end, the F-106 actually proved that the need for such aircraft was simply overstated. 

That is why the Delta Dart was the last dedicated interceptor in the U.S. Air Force to date. 

The all-weather interceptor was developed as a variation on the F-102 Delta Dagger in the early 1950s, and it was originally designated as the F-102B as it retained the delta wing design. Due to extensive structural changes, including changes to the fuselage, and the inclusion of a more power Pratt & Whitney J-75 turbojet engine—which provided a maximum speed of 1,525 miles per hour and a cruising speed of 650 miles per hour—it was re-designated F-106 Delta Dart.  

While it was the last dedicated interceptor, the aircraft was also among the earliest semi-autonomous military weapon platforms. The F-106 was fitted with a sophisticated Hughes MA-1 electronic and fire control system, which worked in conjunction with the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) defense system that took over control of the plane shortly after takeoff and guided it to the proper altitude and attack position. The system would enable the aircraft to lock and fire the weapons at an intruder aircraft and then return the plane to the vicinity of its airbase. The pilot would take over control for landing.  

Armaments that were compatible with the aircraft included the Douglas AIR-2A Genie rocket with nuclear warhead, and the AIM-4 Falcon missiles, of which four could be carried.  

The first F-106A flew in late December 1956, while deliveries to the Air Force began in 1959 but ended just over a year later. In total only 277 F-106As and 63 F-106Bs had been built. While it was considered for use in the Vietnam War, the F-106 Delta Dart remained stateside and was never used in combat.  

One particular F-106 stood out after it earned the colorful nickname “Cornfield Bomber,” when it was involved in an incident during a training mission from Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana in February 1970. The interceptor, which was in service with the 71st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron and piloted by Captain Gary Foust was on a routine flight when it suddenly entered an uncontrollable flat spin. Foust attempted unsuccessfully to regain control, and even deployed the aircraft’s drag chute as a last resort, but finally, Foust was forced to eject. 

In a most unusual situation, the resulting change of balance actually caused by ejection somehow allowed the aircraft to stabilize. Miraculously, the unpiloted F-106 Delta Dart recovered and made a gentle belly landing in a snow-covered field near Big Sandy, Montana. After minor repairs, the aircraft was returned to service and later served with the 49th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. The Cornfield Bomber was retired from service in 1986 and presented to the National Museum of the United States Air Force, where it is currently on display.  

The F-106 Delta Dart proved to be the last dedicated Air Force interceptor, and the aircraft were gradually retired by the early 1980s. Some of those aircraft were converted into target drones and designated QF-106A, while six were retained by NASA for test purposes and used throughout the 1990s. 

China Has Finally Pushed India into America’s Arms It has long been discussed that China may engineer a new, carrier-based variant of its J-31 jet, in what might appear as a transparent attempt to rival America’s F-35 fighter jet. by Shairee Malhotra

A military border stand-off between nuclear-armed neighbors India and China in the Himalayas escalated into deadly clashes on June 15, constituting the worst fighting between the two countries in over five decades and leaving scores of dead and injured soldiers on both sides.

The latest round of blows signifies a major escalation in a border confrontation between the two most populous nations and largest armies, especially since the mutually-respected rules of engagement, having prevented a single casualty for forty-five years, were finally broken. India has now accused China of violating these rules in a “premeditated” attack on its troops in the strategically important Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

Relative Peace and Troubled Waters

Despite ongoing disputes, both sides maintained relative peace and built upon their complex relationship. So much so that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met a whopping eighteen times since Modi’s election in 2014. Unfortunately, these meetings that were meant to build this relationship now serve as mere images, seared into the minds of angry Indians, of the two leaders swinging cozily on the banks of the Sabarmati river in Ahmedabad during Xi’s visit to Modi’s home state of Gujarat. The violent standoff has shocked the country and raised questions on what Modi’s diplomatic efforts and alleged bonhomie with Xi have achieved.

For Indians, history stands as a painful reminder when it comes to China. India’s crushing defeat at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army during the 1962 border conflict with China was a turning point in India’s foreign policy vision—it led to a massive strategic shift from idealism to realpolitik and forced India to prioritize and embrace hard power aspects such as military modernization, in addition to developmental and other national concerns.

This idealism pushed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the time, under his Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai (India and China are brothers) rhetoric, has evoked a bitter sensation of déjà vu for Indians. As the old saying goes, “Once bitten twice shy.” But as China betrayed India in the 1960s, fast forward to 2020, and it seems China has once again stabbed India in the back.

India today stands at a critical juncture as it can no longer avoid making serious choices and difficult diplomatic decisions. Amidst efforts to de-escalate, one thing is certain—the scale of recent killing ensures that business-as-usual is no longer an option.

America in the Wings

Unlike in the 1960s when India did not gravitate towards the United States during the Cold War, India now finds itself in a more favorable position, with Uncle Sam waiting in a long-overdue embrace.

America’s desire for stronger ties with India is no secret. It has long wooed and courted India as a security and economic partner and counterweight to an expansionist and assertive China. But in line with its Cold War hangover of non-alignment, India has demonstrated reluctance to align as explicitly as America wishes for fear of provoking its more powerful neighbor.

Even under Modi’s energetic diplomacy, India continued to tread with balance and caution in its foreign relations. Scholars argue that India’s Cold War-era strategic thinking persists and “non-alignment” has simply become “multi-alignment”—both essentially implying an aversion to alliances.

And yet over the past several years, India has heightened its geniality towards the United States. As part of broader efforts to balance China’s growing power, India joined several security groupings, including QUAD and JAI with like-minded democracies America, Japan, and Australia. Just recently, Australia and India signed a major defense agreement, granting access to each other’s military bases. India’s relationship with Israel—one of America’s staunchest allies—underpinned by its “sky is the limit” rhetoric is already a favorite of the Modi administration. But the road has often been rocky—trade issues and unrealistic expectations dampened outcomes. Even so, India has slowly but steadily moved closer to the American camp.

As nations fumed at China’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and China-U.S. tensions peaked, India too jumped on the bandwagon of global backlash, albeit in a more subtle way. While officials behaved with nuance and steered clear of blame games regarding China’s coronavirus response, Indian media peddled an anti-China narrative, urging the boycott of Chinese products. Political figures critiqued China’s lack of transparency and authoritarianism, going so far as questioning the Chinese model of governance. India, along with Australia and the European Union, imposed certain restrictions on Chinese investments in their countries, further demonstrating this subtle approach.

None of these actions went unnoticed. Wary of closer Indo-American ties, the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Global Times news outlet published editorials cautioning India from involving itself in U.S.-China tensions and serving as an American pawn against China. Picking up on this notion, Brookings scholar Tanvi Madan believes closer India-U.S. ties triggered the border standoff, with Beijing intending to show India its rightful place.

Instead, China’s deadly actions might have achieved exactly the opposite—cementing New Delhi’s strategic tilt towards Washington.

The deadly standoff between the two Asian giants is India’s starkest test yet and will spark a mammoth change in India’s attitude towards China going forward. With India’s 2020 military budget of $74 billion, relatively small compared to China’s $179 billion, the asymmetries of power between the two countries—both economically and militarily—are significant. As Samir Saran, head of India’s Observer Research Foundation opines, a sustained response to Chinese aggression means India will have to utilize its military, economic, and political options.

Likeminded partners are equally important for India in this context, and the standoff could be the catalyst India needs to finally shed non-alignment in its traditional sense and align its interests with those of the United States, with lesser qualms or hesitations.

As former Indian foreign secretary Gokhale recently stated, “In the post-COVID age, enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.” As the tragic events along its border with China have shown, India may have finally learned this lesson the hard way.

Shairee Malhotra is the 2020 South Asia Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, and Associate Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels. A graduate of Queen Mary University of London where she received her MA in International Relations, Shairee has over six years of experience in think tanks in Mumbai and Brussels and has also worked with the European External Action Service (EEAS) 

Nukes and Killing Carriers: The Scoop On China's Latest Ballistic Missiles China’s missile program is very secretive. by Caleb Larson

 Although China’s intercontinental strike ability is somewhat limited when compared to heavyweights like the United States or Russia, Beijing’s capabilities are growing. What China lacks in international reach is made up for big time in regional capabilities.

China’s missile arsenal can threaten regional adversaries like Taiwan and Japan, or global competitors like the United States—on their own territory. 

Marching Forward

China’s missile program is very secretive. This is partly because China has not entered arms control agreements as willingly as America and Russia, but also since Beijing only reveals intentionally misleading or opaque information. 

Beijing’s missiles serve multiple purposes. The first use, especially for their shorter-range missiles, is part of an anti-access/area denial strategy in which China and the South China Sea are an impregnable fortress, able to resist attacks from land, air, and sea. 

The other purpose is to threaten the United States in Asia, and American allies in the region like Japan and South Korea. 

Lastly, China has an increasingly sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal that can threaten the United States directly. These ICMBs are nuclear. 

According to CSIS, China has “the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world, upgrading its missile forces in number, type, and capability.” 

Here are some of the notable arrows in China’s quiver. 

DF-5 Family

China’s longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile is the Dong Feng-5 family of missiles. The progenitor of the DF family entered service in 1981. As with the entire DF family, the original DF was silo-based and liquid-propelled, apparently based in central China. 

It had a range of 12,000 kilometers, or about 7,500 miles. The initial variant had a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 800 meters, meaning that each missile had a 50% chance of falling within 800 meters of a specific target point. Not terribly accurate—but the United States is well within range. 

In 2015, the newer DF-5B was deployed. These missiles carry more warheads and have increased accuracy, up to 300 meters, or about a thousand feet. Rather than a single warhead, the DF-5B has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).

 The DF-5C was reported to exist only recently, in 2017. It’s MIRV capability was increased to ten. 

DF-15

The DF-15 family are road-mobile missiles that use a transporter for launch. They have a range of anywhere from 600-900 kilometers, or about 370 to 560 miles, depending on the variant. 

The DF-15 enjoys more of a tactical rather than strategic position within the Chinese military due to its more limited range and modest payload. Despite these limitations, the DF-15 can be equipped with a nuclear warhead, high explosive, or air-fuel burst mixture, or chemical weapons. 

Because of their shorter range, possible targets are highly dependent on launch location. Given a close enough launch location, South Korea, some parts of north and east India, and Taiwan could be hit. Accuracy and range have both steadily improved with later variants. 

DF-21

The DF-21 family is also road-mobile, and was the first highly mobile, solid-fuel missile developed by China. 

One variant, the DF-21D has been called the carrier-killer because of it’s relatively high accuracy of 20 CEP, maneuverability, and range of about 930 miles. 

Growing Potential

Although China’s intercontinental strike ability is somewhat limited when compared to heavyweights like the United States or Russia, Beijing’s capabilities are growing. 

What China lacks in international reach is made up for big time in regional capabilities, especially anti-access/area denial capabilities. Regional adversaries—and U.S. Navy—should beware. 

China's 'Advanced' Type 095 Submarines: A U.S. Navy Nightmare? How do America's subs compare? by Caleb Larson

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence may have said it best, “the PLA(N) will progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity.” Sailors beware.

Despite many years as a strictly littoral force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has made steady advances in submarine design — and maybe leaving the United States behind. Here’s why.

Party Over Proficiency

For many years, China was the subject of ridicule in naval circles. The Korean War put the brakes on Chinese naval innovations (all innovations really), and the Cultural Revolution also hindered naval advancement in the name of the party.

Despite these setback, China has steadily developed its naval capabilities. Though Chinese naval advancement was initially focused on near-shore capabilities like smaller diesel submarines, shore-based missile defense, or fast littoral boats, China is now possibly capable of fielding a true blue-water submarine force.

Speaking last year at a Naval event, Captain Chester Parks, commanding officer of the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, said that foreign adversaries "are definitely catching up to us,” in the realm of submarine technology.

The Office of Naval Intelligence concurred, saying “the PLA(N) is currently transitioning from older, less reliable attack submarines like the Romeo SS, Ming SS and Han SSN to the more modern Kilo SS, Yuan SS, Shang SSN and the Type 095 SSN,” later calling the Type 095 “advanced.”

Marco

Submarines try to stay hidden when puttering around underwater. Put simply, there are two important variables at play when submarines play hide-and-seek: how loud a submarine is, and how good submarines are at detecting other submarines.

The naval expert H I Sutton detailed that ambient ocean noise is around 90 decibels, or roughly a motorcycle at 25 feet away. Submarines try to get to that noise level, or below there.

According to Sutton, western submarines made it to about the 90-decibel threshold twenty to thirty years ago. The U.S. Navy’s improved Los Angeles-class subs are near 110 decibels.

“Ten years ago the latest Chinese attack submarines were considered to be as quiet as the latest Russian Akula Class submarines” H I Sutton remarked. "Since these estimates were published in 2007, China has launched two improved variants of the Type-093 submarine. So it is a reasonable assumption that the latest Chinese boats will already be quieter.”

One commentator found it likely that the Type 095 would have electronic noise-cancellation technology, like your noise-canceling headphones, a shaftless drive, and a single hull. All of these would be a huge step forward for China’s submarine program.

The newer Type 095 submarines are just beginning to enter the water or will be able to in the near future. Would it be reasonable to assume the Type 095 would be even more advanced — that is quieter — than it’s predecessors? Absolutely.

Polo

The other factor, detection, is difficult to gauge.

Submarines use sonar to detect other subs. Sonar systems are typically trailed out behind submarines on lines. They can also be arrayed along the sides of the sub. Chinese submarines make use of both systems. How advanced are Chinese designs? Hard to say definitely — but almost certainly getting better and better.

Steady March into the Deep

While it is hard to estimate Chines submarine abilities with absolute certainty, submarine quietness trends are clear — they’re not getting any louder.

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence may have said it best, “the PLA(N) will progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity.” Sailors beware.

China's (from Russia) Kilo-Class Submarines Can Sink Just About Anything China's very own "black holes." by Caleb Larson

Chinese submarine technology has progressed in leaps and bounds, and the Kilo-class may be to thank. Even though China does seem to be more intent on projecting force farther and farther away from the Chinese mainland, the Kilo-class is nevertheless the backbone of China’s anti-access/area denial strategy at sea—especially close to home. It would be wise for surface ships in China’s backyard to be wary. 

These Soviet-designed submarines are the backbone of China’s non-nuclear submarine fleet—and are very hard to detect. Here’s how they may give China an edge in the South China Sea. 

Soviet Union Surplus

The Kilo-class was originally a Soviet-designed boat that entered service in 1980. They are relatively small diesel-electric attack submarines intended for both anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare. What makes them special is that they have reduced acoustic signatures that are hard to track, known colloquially as “black holes.” 

The Kilo-class is outfitted with anechoic tiles that adhere to the outside of the submarine’s hull. Anechoic tiles are essentially rubberized tiles that have been impregnated with air bubbles of varying size. The air bubbles are optimized for absorbing enemy sonar at different depths and can distort the returning sonar signal from enemy ships or submarines in order to make the sub harder to track. 

Because the Kilo-class uses diesel-electric propulsion, they have shorter range and endurance than nuclear powered submarines. Naval expert H. I. Sutton explained that the Kilo-class “uses heavy-duty lead-acid batteries to power the propeller. These are occasionally recharged using diesel generators, an arrangement known as diesel-electric.”

Recharging the Kilo’s batteries takes time away from missions, and requires surfacing or raising a snorkel near the surface which is risky because the sub might be detected. In addition to oxygen, other mission limitations include the crew’s food and water supplies, as well as diesel fuel for the on-board diesel generators used in battery recharging. 

Kilo-class submarines have a crew complement of fifty-two and can be out on patrol for over a month—up to forty-five days. It’s maximum dive depth is about 300 meters, or a thousand feet, and reportedly the subs have a range of 12,000 kilometers, or about 7,500 miles.

Chinese Optimum

The People’s Liberation Army Navy ordered the first Kilos from Russia in 1994 and has bought up more quite readily since, purchasing two upgraded Kilo variants in 1996, and eight more upgraded Kilos in 2002. 

China’s Kilo-class are optimized for the defense of China’s coasts and for military actions against Taiwan due to both their size and stealth. 

Because of the Kilo’s relatively small size, it can operate and maneuver in the shallow coastal waters near China, or in the South China Sea more easily than large nuclear submarines, which can struggle to maneuver at low depths. Despite having significantly less endurance than other nuclear submarines, diesel-electric submarines, especially compact hulls, can be more capable than nuclear submarines in some circumstances. 

The latest Kilo variants are among the quietest submarines in the Chinese and Russian navies. Upgraded Kilos are “slightly longer in length—the sub’s submerged displacement is around 4,000 tons—and features improved engines, an improved combat system, as well as new noise reduction technology.” Coupled with sonar-absorbent anechoic tiles, Kilos are deadly silent. 

A2/AD

Chinese submarine technology has progressed in leaps and bounds, and the Kilo-class may be to thank. Even though China does seem to be more intent on projecting force farther and farther away from the Chinese mainland, the Kilo-class is nevertheless the backbone of China’s anti-access/area denial strategy at sea—especially close to home. It would be wise for surface ships in China’s backyard to be wary. 

How AI Will Help Control the Army's Fighting Vehicles It would be a boon if it could be pulled off. by Kris Osborn

The U.S. Army wants future armored vehicles to instantly make decisions about terrain navigation, target identification, incoming enemy fire, and force positions and warfare strategy. In fact, the military wants this to happen in a matter of seconds and all without every nuance needing to be controlled or micro-managed by humans. It is a known and often discussed concept, rapidly gaining traction as new technology continues to emerge at rocket speed.

The kinds of initiatives are now taking on a newer, more advanced character as AI-enabled sensors, computers and targeting systems increasingly process and organize information more quickly, enabling ever-advancing measures of autonomy. 

Dr. Bruce Jette, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology, told TNI that weapons developers are seeking a ground vehicle “sensor fusion” to enable soldiers to make rapid decisions when faced with fast-changing combat variables. 

“Vehicle crews are seeking optimal data to understand the terrain in front of them, to decide whether or not they should drive into it. Can I activate additional sensors, whether active or passive, to discern what really is there?” Jette told TNI. 

Commercial applications of autonomy, such as those now used for driverless cars, have been advancing for quite some time, however Army developers have been taking on something quite different. Combat vehicles need autonomy not just for linear navigation but rather for an integrated series of complex, fast-changing variables such as incoming attacks, rocky terrain, air integration, and means to optimize methods of attack. 

“We don’t want Soldiers to be operating these remote-controlled vehicles with their heads down, constantly paying attention to the vehicle in order to control it. We want these systems to be fully autonomous so that these Soldiers can do their jobs and these autonomous systems can work as teammates and perform effectively in the battlefield,” Dr. John Fossaceca, Artificial Intelligence for Maneuver and Mobility Program Manager, Army Research Laboratory, Combat Capabilities Development Command, Army Futures Command, said in an Army report. 

Jette used an interesting term when describing the Army’s sought-after technological advantages, calling it a kind of “sensor fusion.” This term was not likely used by accident, as it often refers to the integrated sensor applications now operational in the F-35. Using early iterations of AI, computers on-board the F-35 are able to take otherwise disparate or stovepiped streams of combat relevant data, perform analytics on the information, organize it and present a single coherent picture for pilots to view. A single screen display, therefore, contains integrated navigational, targeting, flight details and threat information simultaneously. It merges a 360-degree camera system called Distributed Aperture System with a long-range Electro-optical Targeting System and other crucial flight variables. A ground equivalent to this kind application would seem to call upon an even greater measure of complexity, as ground autonomy must account for a wider range of variables.

The concept is aligned with ongoing research into new generations of AI being engineered to not only gather and organize information for human decision makers but also advance networking between humans and machines. Drawing upon advanced algorithms, computer technology can organize, and disseminate otherwise dis-aggregated pools of data in seconds. AI-empowered sensors can bounce incoming images, video or data off a seemingly limitless existing database to assess comparisons, differences and perform near real-time analytics. This kind of phenomenon seems to represent exactly what Jette was thinking of when he mentioned integrated armored vehicle sensors analyzing the upcoming terrain to make immediate decisions. At the speed of the most advanced computer processing, various AI systems can simultaneously organize and share information, perform analyses and solve certain problems otherwise impossible for human to address within any kind of comparable timeframe. At the same time, there are many key attributes, faculties and problem-solving abilities unique to human cognition.

Jette explained that the technology has made massive leaps forward since earlier iterations of sensor integration were pursued previously in the Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. FCS, which began to take shape more than ten years ago, built a small fleet of Manned-Ground Vehicles engineered with advanced sensors to provide a 360-degree camera view of surrounding terrain. The Army’s now-cancelled Non-Line of Sight Cannon, for instance, was built with integrated surrounding cameras, however Jette explained the system lacked the maturity to make key combat-sensitive distinctions. Jette, who participated in FCS development while at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., years ago, said the FCS “optical systems would try to figure out what they were seeing in a ‘dark spot.’ They could not tell whether it was a shadow or a VBIED (Vehicle-Borne IED). You needed multiple sensors from different angles with a more holistic view.” 

Interestingly, while cancelled more than a decade ago, the fundamental networking concept pursued for the FCS program remains largely intact, if with different and far more advanced technical systems. FCS was engineered upon the technical premise that a fleet of forces would operate in a coordinated “networked” fashion wherein otherwise disparate sensors would share information in real time. It was envisioned as a layered system of sensors. For example, the MGVs were built to be lighter weight than other comparable combat platforms due to what developers called a “survivability onion.” The concept here was that an armored combat vehicle could be faster, lighter weight and more expeditionary by virtue of having a surrounding layered sensor system with which to detect and destroy incoming enemy fire. While this basic premise, as made manifest in early MGV prototypes, was deemed insufficiently survivable and cancelled, the fundamental strategic effort to sustain survivability while optimizing lighter-weight combat vehicles, persists to this day. Moreover, it is informing many of the parameters of the Army’s more expeditionary “light tank,” the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle. 

New technologies, including active protection systems, lighter weight armored materials, new sensor applications and rapid advancements with AI are now making the initial FCS vision much more attainable. Reconciling or optimizing a seemingly contradictory balance between survivability and mobility very much informs the Army rationale for its family of Next-Generation Combat Vehicles. Given this, it is not surprising that the advent of advanced, AI-empowered computer algorithms are greatly impacting the developmental equation, as explained by Jette.

Using AI, sensor integration and integrated command and control, the Army is already demonstrating new applications for autonomous systems in combat. For instance, teams of Army robots conducted a “deep assault through a breach” during an exercise last year. The experiment was intended to prepare the service for a new kind of man-machine drone warfare.

The Army exercise, which pitted groups of unmanned vehicles or ground drones against a mock enemy “tank ditch” and “minefield,” was part of a massive service-wide modernization effort to prepare for a new generation of combat—one wherein self-navigating drones directly confront enemy fire in high-threat war scenarios while humans perform command and control at safer distances.

During the Army demonstration, which took place several months ago, there “was not a single soldier in any vehicle” conducting the initial breach, Commander of Army Futures Command, Gen. John Murray, told reporters.

Various kinds of advanced autonomy, naturally, already exist, such as self-guiding aerial drones and the Navy’s emerging “ghost fleet” of coordinated unmanned surface vessels operating in tandem. Most kinds of air and sea autonomous vehicles confront fewer operational challenges when compared to ground autonomy. Nevertheless, the concepts and developmental trajectory between air, land and ground autonomy have distinct similarities; they are engineered to operate as part of a coordinated group of platforms able to share sensor information, gather targeting data and forward-position weapons—all while remaining networked with human decision makers.

“Future military missions are going to require autonomous vehicles that can determine what the passable routes might be, calculate the best route and make assessment about what’s happening in the environment,” Fossaceca said