Why Generals Should Not Be So Political Bad for the chain of command and civilian-military relations. by Giselle Donnelly

Key Point: The Constitution exists for a reason. Generals can have opinions, but they also are subordinate to the chain of command.

Interviewed by CNN host Jake Tapper over the weekend, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was asked whether he agreed with the denunciations of President Trump issued by James Mattis and John Allen, both retired Marine four-star generals and, in Mattis’ case, Trump’s first defense secretary.

“You have to agree,” replied Powell. “I’m watching them closely, because they all were junior officers when I left, and I’m proud of what they’re doing. I’m proud that they were willing to take the risk of speaking honesty and speaking truth to those who are not speaking the truth.” Herein lies the rub: The current crisis in civil-military relations — and, regardless of how one regards Trump, the parade of partisanship on the part of the most senior, experienced, bravest, and otherwise wisest military men of the last 30 years ought to be disturbing — can truly be said to be Powell’s in the making. The model of a modern political general was cast in Powell’s image and has shaped the behavior of Mattis, Allen and their like, including Michael “Lock-Her-Up!” Flynn. This “Powell Generation” has behaved with increasing disregard for the norms of apolitical professionalism that have long constituted the ethos of the American officer corps.

Powell reminded Tapper that he’d “been out of the military for 25 years now,” so it might seem a stretch to lay such a heavy charge on Powell. But two of the signature moments of his tenure as JCS chairman are worth recalling, and can be understood at greater length by re-reading the prescient critique by Richard Kohn, the leading historian of American civil-military relations, published in The National Interest in 1994. The first telling tale is to be found Powell’s iron-fisted and manipulative grip on the planning for Operation “Desert Storm,” the Iraq war of 1991. Indeed, by Powell’s own admission, he positioned himself as the “arbiter of American military intervention overseas,” a role the Constitution reserves to civilians. Quoth Powell:

[Our] military advice was shaping political judgments from the very beginning. … We were able to constantly bring the political decisions back to what we could do militarily. And if there’s one story that is going to be written out of Desert Storm and [the invasion of Panama,] Just Cause and everything else we’ve done, it’s how political objectives must be carefully matched to military objectives and military means and what is achievable.

 When George H.W. Bush — a distinguished World War II veteran and deeply experienced diplomat — was succeeded by the young and supposedly “draft-dodging” Bill Clinton, Powell pressed his advantages. He first published an op-ed in The New York Times warning against US intervention in the Balkans, a move Clinton had pondered and would eventually make. But the subordination of civilian control to military “objectives” was brought to the point of crisis over the issue of “gays in the military.” As Kohn correctly summarizes:

Powell had for a year taken very public stances in support of the existing policy on excluding homosexuals, in spite of the comparison with earlier discrimination against African-Americans and the heat he must have taken from civil rights advocates and allies in the African-American community. General Powell must have felt very strongly indeed on this subject, for he virtually defied the President-elect, never denying publicly the rumors in November-December 1992 that he might resign over the issue, doing nothing to scotch rumors that his fellow chiefs might do the same, doing nothing to discourage retired generals from lobbying on Capitol Hill to form an alliance against lifting the ban. General Powell and the Joint Chiefs then appeared to negotiate publicly with the President at a meeting in late January 1993 – and privately through the Secretary of Defense, the press, and Congress – for the compromise finally forced on Bill Clinton last summer. On this issue, the military leadership took full advantage of a young, incoming president with extraordinarily weak authority in military affairs. Nothing did more to harm the launching of the Clinton administration than “gays in the military,” for it announced to Washington and the world that the President could be rolled.

Colin Powell was and remains an American hero, but his legacy includes a seriously corrosive effect on the trust between soldiers and statesmen that is essential for the health of civil-military relations. The great fear of Americans in the 1770s was the fear of “standing armies;” in the Declaration of Independence, King George III was excoriated for “keep[ing] among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures,” and “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.” And the singular purpose of the American Constitution was to provide the nascent nation with a military that was sufficiently powerful to defend its newly-won liberty from external adversaries, yet sufficiently republican to protect domestic liberty as well by placing the final say over the armed forces firmly in civilian hands. America’s armed forces can have no other “objectives” than those set for it by Congress and their commander-in-chief.

 

Washington Needs to Act Fast on Libya, Before It's Too Late The United States must appoint a Special Envoy for the Eastern Mediterranean to devise a negotiated solution to the Libya conflict. by Thomas Trask and Jonathan Ruhe

When the leader of Libya’s official government declared his Tripoli stronghold liberated last week, it was at a press conference in Ankara with Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan. Curiously, Erdogan’s Russian counterpart has provided much of the support for the opposing side in Libya’s civil war.

This underscores how Libya is escalating into a destabilizing proxy war, worsened by America’s often confusing and consistently hands-off approach. Increasingly, the United States can no longer afford such an attitude, which exacerbates the fighting and offers Turkey and Russia strategically valuable footholds in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is fitting that “leading from behind” was first voiced as U.S. policy toward Libya, as detailed in our new report by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. According to the U.S. embassy in Libya, Washington “is proud to partner with” the UN-backed, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj—despite it being an Islamist-dominated regime with little hope of uniting the country.

At the same time, the United States has not articulated clear policy toward the rival Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) of Gen. Khalifa Hiftar. Reflecting this equivocation, American diplomats have led no charge to address the fighting. Instead they mostly echo European initiatives for a ceasefire or, most recently, have begun coordinating policy with Turkey.

Turkey and Russia are pouring into this vacuum. Last year thousands of Russian mercenaries helped Hiftar nearly capture Tripoli, backed by weapons and airpower from France, Egypt, UAE and others. Fearing the collapse of a fellow Islamist government, Erdogan significantly boosted military support for Sarraj. In exchange, Turkey secured a bilateral pact ostensibly recognizing its vast offshore territorial claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Erdogan’s intervention has been momentous, enabling GNA forces to reverse much of Hiftar’s gains from last year. Russia and others are escalating their military support for the LNA in response.

These events are driving Libya to a strategic inflection point. As long as the United States remains aloof, the only question becomes how—not if—the conflict poses growing challenges to American interests and regional stability.

Backers on both sides could simply keep flooding reinforcements into the country, producing an ever-bloodier stalemate. By worsening the security vacuum and physical destruction inside Libya, this would enable Islamic State to regrow and worsen the spread of coronavirus countrywide—either or both of which could drive renewed refugee flows toward Europe.

Or Turkey and Russia could tacitly divide Libya between themselves. This reflects the country’s deep divisions between western and eastern halves, and could mimic the Astana process they initiated to determine Syria’s fate without U.S. input. The two already are in close contact, including discussing plans for a settlement.

Such an agreement would logically appeal to both Ankara and Moscow, in no small part because it would create so many problems for the United States and allies.

A sphere of influence in Libya would represent Erdogan’s first success in propping up the Muslim Brotherhood around the region – a policy which has threatened most every U.S. Middle East ally. Equally important, it would encourage further gunboat diplomacy by bolstering Ankara’s claims, however illegitimate, to the energy-rich waters between Turkey and Libya. This would directly threaten energy development by Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, all of whom Washington sees as helping reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas.

De facto partition of Libya could appeal to Moscow for the same reason. As with Syria, Libya also provides a valuable beachhead ringing NATO’s southern flank, especially if Russia installs advanced air defenses or other weaponry. Moreover, and unlike Syria, Libya would give Putin another potential lever over European energy.

Either outcome—stalemate or Russo-Turkish collaboration—shows the need for long overdue American leadership on Libya and the broader region.

The United States must appoint a Special Envoy for the Eastern Mediterranean to devise a negotiated solution to the Libya conflict. Among his or her top priorities would be limiting Ankara’s support for the GNA, including leveraging the option to redeploy U.S. military assets out of Turkey.

A complimentary priority is to curtail Russian support for the LNA. Diplomatic, energy and security cooperation among U.S. regional partners is crucial. By fully supporting the new Egypt-led alliance that includes Greece, Cyprus, France and UAE, as well as growing Greek and Cypriot ties with Israel, the United States can help build up its regional partners as a counterweight to both Russia and Turkey.

While increased U.S. diplomatic presence would shift the balance of influence at Ankara’s and Moscow’s expenses, the United States also should strengthen bilateral military ties with Athens, including increased U.S. rotational deployments and perhaps even permanent basing in Greece.

American policymakers will need to act quickly, however. As events of just the past few weeks show, Libya can go from afterthought to crisis before Washington takes notice.

Economic Fallout: Why Central Asia Is Still Struggling to Survive the Coronavirus So far, the medical impact of the pandemic in Central Asia appears to have been contained but there has been widespread damage throughout the country. by Kamran Bokhari

Central Asia’s fossil fuel exporting states have been struck very hard by the economic fallout from the coronavirus. There is a need for a massive infusion of cash to ensure that the domestic energy sectors remain afloat while these countries move along the path of diversifying their economies towards green growth sectors, services, manufacturing, tourism, etc. But if the region’s two largest economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, experience a serious weakening, the heart of the Eurasian landmass, will likely see a great degree of instability. In addition to international financial institutions helping out regional entities such as the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) have a key role to play in securing the regional economies and directing investors towards potentially profitable economies. 

Thus far, the medical impact of the coronavirus in Central Asia appears to have been contained. The region, however, cannot escape the adverse implications of the resulting global economic downturn. Because the financial well-being of regional states is dependent on commodity prices, Central Asia may be particularly hard-hit. Between a -5.4 percent decline in GDP and a collapse in global demand for crude oil, the five ‘stans are in for a very rough ride.

The region’s largest state, Kazakhstan, very early on kicked into high gear in order to manage the fallout. Aliya Moldabekova, deputy governor of the National Bank of Kazakhstan on April 8 said that the rainy-day reserve fund of $57.5 billion will help the country weather the economic pain caused by the global pandemic. Astana has allocated $10 billion in the fight against the contagion of another $740 million to deal with employment issues. In addition, the Kazakh government is spending $100 per month to the neediest in these most challenging of times.

But even with these measures and fiscal insulation, the Kazakhs remain vulnerable. In early March Energy Minister Nurlan Nogaev said that the government had a plan to deal with the situation arising from crude prices at $40 per barrel and below. It is highly unclear when the lockdown will be lifted and even when it is, oil prices could remain in the $20-$30 per barrel range for the remainder of the year. That said, owing to its relatively stronger economy Kazakhstan is not as vulnerable as are its other Central Asian neighbors.

Central Asian states are either reliant on energy and commodity exports (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) or foreign remittances (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). So, the threat is not just millions of unemployed people in the region but also a financial weakening of states. Thus, the pandemic situation has created not just social upheaval. Indeed, it has a direct bearing on stability and security in the region.

There is a reason why all major international lending entities have announced assistance programs. Western financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are not the only ones offering emergency aid to the Central Asians. The Eurasian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have also announced plans to help. However, the assistance that can be offered, is only a fraction of the medium-terms needs of the ‘Stans—assuming that it could be up to two years before the coronavirus situation is fully brought under control.

As Professor Gregory Gleason rightfully argues foreign cash assistance alone will not cut it and stresses the need for regional solutions. Here is where the AIFC is a potential longer-term solution to the financial woes created by the outbreak. The two-year-old entity is the region’s first state-of-the-art financial center with the goal of sustainable development in Central Asia. As its Governor, Kairat Kelimbetov, has explained, the AIFC is geared towards connecting international investors to promising ventures.

Cognizant of the critical need for dispute resolution mechanisms the Kazakhstan-based Center has employed leading British jurists to head its arbitration tribunal. It is a key step towards attracting international investments through the creation of a business-friendly environment. AIFC is trying to establish a securities market within the region’s largest economy—one that is fully integrated with the global capital markets. The center’s strategic objective is to serve as a hub for investors from both the east and the west to invest not just in Central Asia but also in the broader post-Soviet space.

In the post-coronavirus era, international asset managers are re-evaluating the best places to invest their funds there will be those who will seek the safe havens of treasury bonds of G-7 nations or acquiring shares in the world’s largest firms. But it won’t be long before there is a return to emerging or frontier markets. Here is where AIFC will be critical as it seeks to attract capital from the West as well as East Asia. In this way, it could secure the recovery and transformation of the Central Asian economies and link investors with lucrative growth opportunities.

Is North Korea Planning to Disrupt the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election? Tensions seem to be rising fast on the Korean Peninsula. What needs to happen to avoid another 2017-style showdown? by Doug Bandow

Two years ago, the improbable became the new reality when Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump met in Singapore. The dramatic opening was hobbled by the president’s lack of diplomatic acumen and his aides’ unrealistic demand that North Korea disarm before receiving any benefit for doing so. Still, opportunities never before seen seemed to beckon.

Today the possibilities appear to be closing rapidly. The U.S. went all-or-nothing at the Hanoi summit a year ago and got … nothing. Talks deadlocked. Pyongyang dismissed the Republic of Korea as a factor, since Washington refused to relax sanctions to allow joint economic projects to proceed.

As the new year dawned Kim promised to unveil a new strategic weapon. Since then the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said it plans to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Short-range missile testing has accelerated. Plans for a long-range test or even a nuclear test as well may be afoot.

As the two-year anniversary approached, North Korea’s hardline foreign minister, Ri Son-gwon publicly doubted there was a good reason to maintain the relationship between the two leaders. He complained that since the Singapore summit “Even a slim ray of optimism for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula has faded away into a dark nightmare.” In the last couple weeks, the North cut all communication channels with the South, shuttered the liaison office, called the ROK an enemy, and, more ominously, said it was turning to the military for the next step.

All of which suggests that Pyongyang plans on making a dramatic entrance into America’s presidential campaign.

So far, the administration appears ill-prepared in the extreme to deal with another Korea crisis. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said the North had “to give up their nuclear program” if “they want to have a great economy.” Kim has already decided against making that choice. As prospects for the future darkened, Washington promised unspecified flexibility, which offered nothing specific or of value that would be worth changing the DPRK’s approach.

What to do?

First, Trump and presumptive Democratic Party presidential candidate Joe Biden should informally agree not to react to DPRK provocations during the campaign. The North wants to get attention. Which is the best reason not to give Pyongyang what it wants. Rewarding extreme behavior only guarantees a repeat in the future.

Second, U.S. policymakers should recognize that peace is better than war. Any American military attack would create a very high risk of triggering full-scale conflict. Doing so is not worth the risk. Depending on the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and reach, hundreds of thousands or millions could die in any war. Washington’s essential objective should be to prevent, not trigger, such an attack.

Third, Washington should adopt a policy to reflect the fact that North Korea is a nuclear power. It possesses nuclear materials, has tested nuclear weapons, and has developed multiple means of delivery. This means the likelihood of genuine denuclearization is at best zero and probably quite a bit less.

The only nuclear power to give up its weapons was South Africa, and its circumstances were unique. Denuclearizing North Korea was never going to be easy. Alas, the Obama and Trump administrations confirmed the skepticism with which any government in Pyongyang should greet an American proposal. The former helped take out Muammar Khadafy after he yielded his missile and nuclear programs, while the latter tore up the agreement with Iran after the latter took steps to make future weapons development more difficult.

Fourth, while the next U.S. administration might formally maintain the fantasy of denuclearization, it should prepare an arms control program, with discrete proposals to limit and restrain the North’s advances in ways consistent with denuclearization, if Pyongyang ever demonstrates its willingness to move down that path.

Fifth, sanctions have value only as part of a serious diplomatic program with realistic off-ramps and serious carrots as well as sticks. The Trump administration’s approach of give us everything and then we will be nice to you, trust us!, is dead. Sanctions are especially unhelpful when the U.S. ignores the roadmap signaled by the other side. In the Singapore agreement, substantively thin though it was, Kim indicated his desire for establishing better bilateral relations and creating a regional peace regime. The U.S. has encouraged neither, instead preserving its counterproductive policy of complete isolation and maximum pressure.

Sixth, Washington should recognize that engagement is even more necessary for a threatening nuclear North Korea than a weak conventional one. The possibilities for miscommunication and misjudgment remain high yet the stakes are growing. The U.S. should push for better relations and more contact. The ban on travel to and from the North should be dropped. Official liaison offices should be established. Contacts should be regularized. Diplomatic discussions should be seen as good sense, not a reward.

Seventh, America should empower Seoul. The DPRK is an existential issue for South Korea. The former is relevant to America only because the U.S. has chosen to put itself at risk by placing military personnel within harm’s way. The North will not attack America unless the two are at war and defeat for the DPRK seems certain. So Washington should relax sanctions and allow the ROK to set policy and test approaches. The U.S. has failed. It is time for a new strategy.

Eighth, the administration should use the deadlock over the special measures agreement as the trigger for beginning to withdraw American military forces from the South. With more than 50 times the North’s GDP and twice its population, the ROK does not need conventional military support. The South should take over responsibility for its own security.

And contra common claims, the U.S. presence provides no “dual-use” advantages. No South Korean president is going to turn his or her country into a target by allowing American forces to operate from ROK soil against the People’s Republic of China in any contingency other than a Chinese attack on the South, which is plausible only if Seoul joined Washington in attacking the PRC. Nor would a U.S. army division have any serious value in such a war.

Once the election is over the winner should develop a serious diplomatic initiative that sets realistic objectives and offers the North significant benefits that would justify limiting nuclear and missile developments. The U.S. won’t know if Kim is prepared to say yes until it asks him.

We are approaching the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. No one should want a repeat. In 2017 President Trump took America uncomfortably close to a Korean Armageddon before opening up diplomatic opportunities in 2018. This time the next president should skip the war scare and move straight to the peace initiative.

Yes, the Navy Is Building Another America-Class Amphibious Assault Ship Very good. by Kris Osborn

The U.S. Navy’s America-class amphibious assault ships are steadily taking shape as the service makes new progress starting to build its 4th ship in the class—LHA 9, a vessel expected to help usher in a new era of amphibious warfare for the Navy.

The first-in-class USS America launched in 2014 and the second, the USS Tripoli, has also launched. The third, the USS Bougainville, is under construction. America-class builder Huntington Ingalls now reports that the Navy has awarded them a long-lead items procurement contract for the 4th America-class amphib, called LHA 9 at the moment. 

America-class amphibs can transport up to 3,000 sailors and marines, including elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU, designed for amphibious warfare. Amphibious technology on board the ship can include up to 60 HMMWs, Light Armored Vehicles, mortars, artillery and smaller Internally Transportable Vehicles, or ITVs, configured to drive into the back of an Osprey, Navy and Marine Corps officials described.

In total, America-Class amphibs are configured to house as many as 31 aircraft including 12 MV-22 Ospreys and the CH-53 Super Stallion, AH-1Z Super Cobra, UH-1Y Huey, F-35B fighter and MH-60 Sea Hawk helicopter, Navy officials explained.

America class ships are outfitted with a group of technologies called a Ship Self Defense System. This includes two Rolling Aircraft Missile RIM-116 Mk 49 launchers; two Raytheon 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; and seven twin .50 cal. machine guns, Navy statements say.

The LHA 9 is referred to as the second Flight 1 America-class amphib as, like its predecessor the USS Bougainville, features a well-deck for launching watercraft such as amphibious assault ships, ship-to-shore transport craft and other vessels. 

The first two America-class amphibs were built without a well-deck as a way to heavily emphasize air-power projection, particularly with the F-35B. Following the first two America-class amphibs, the Navy plans to use well-decks for the ship class, to ensure amphibious landings are possible moving into the future. The air power emphasis for the first two Americas is quite deliberate, as Navy strategies sought to leverage the additional reach and attack versatility of the F-35B, and also place a premium on longer-range attack in light of advanced, long-range weapons and sensors being used by potential adversaries. 

The 2nd America, the USS Tripoli, is 844-feet long and 106-feet wide with a weight of more than 44,000 tons. A fuel-efficient gas turbine propulsion system brings the ship’s speed up to more than 20 knots, a Huntington Ingalls statement said.

The USS Tripoli will incorporate a gas turbine propulsion plant, zonal electrical distribution and fuel-efficient electric auxiliary propulsion systems first installed on the USS Makin Island, a Navy statement said.

The F-35B, already deployed on U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships, has already begun to shift the character of amphibious attack strategy. The Navy has worked extensively on preparing the America-class to operate the F-35 by reinforcing areas beneath the flight deck and adding new materials to landing areas to ensure they do not get heat damage. 

Part of the challenge to F-35B integration is recognizing how its technologies will change concepts of operations, tactics and procedures; the F-35B is a very different aircraft than the Harrier jets it is replacing, Navy officials said. Harrier jets, which also have the ability to conduct vertical take-off-and-landings, are multi-role jets primarily designed for light attack missions—such as quickly flying over land locations where Marines are forward deployed and providing close air support.

While the F-35B can perform these missions as well, the new Joint Strike Fighter brings a wide range of new sensors, weaponry and aviation technology to the Corps.

These F-35B sensors, which include a Distributed Aperture System placing cameras around the aircraft to provide a 360-degree purview as well as Electro-Optical Targeting Systems; these sensors, among others, will allow the F-35B to perform ISR missions as well as strike and ground support.

The C5I (command, control, communications, computers, collaboration) requirements for the F-35B will be very different from how the Navy operates the Harrier.

At the same time, the return of a well deck is increasingly important as the Navy is emphasizing the development and deployment of more unmanned systems for amphibious attack to enable more dispersed, strategically complex amphibious attack possibilities. 

Why the Aircraft Carrier USS Gerald Ford Is Such a Big Deal It is closer to being ready for war too. by Kris Osborn

The Navy is launching armed attack planes from the deck of its USS Ford carrier to prepare the new ship for major warfare on the open seas, by launching F/A-18 Super Hornets and helicopters equipped with ordnance for combat missions. 

Carrier Air Wing 8 has been operating the largest air wing embarked to date for the Ford and the ship’s first ordnance movement from a lower-deck magazine using the weapons elevators. 

The exercises used 40,000 pounds of inert, or non-explosive ordnance which was transferred through an upper stage elevator before being loaded onto an aircraft. 

“We’re thrilled to be here dropping light and heavy inert ordnance; but the biggest thing as the air wing commander is to do our primary mission: war at sea, air defense, air superiority and power projection. We’re taking [Ford] from carrier qualification to a mission that focuses on combat operations,” Capt. Josh Sager, Commander, CVW 8, said in a Navy report. 

The first-in-class USS Ford has been specifically engineered for expanded air attack, being built with a larger deck space than the Nimitz-class to enable a greater sortie rate. Navy developers explain that the Ford configuration was developed to increase the air mission rate by as much as 33-percent, with a mind to creating a new dimension of air power projection. This strategy, initiated years ago, did seem to anticipate what could be described as a modern threat environment. More air power would be needed in any kind of major-power engagement, carriers need to have an ability to operate the first-of-its kind carrier-launched F-35C stealth fighter, and perhaps of equal or greater significance, modern carriers need to have longer attack reach.

Air attack assets such as an F-35C and upgraded F/A-18 fighters will have longer reach due to the upcoming arrival of the MQ-25 carrier-launched aerial refueler. This constitutes a substantial development, as it enables a carrier air wing to hold a country at risk for ranges out to 1,000 miles or more. Should an F-35C, for instance, have a 500 mile combat radius, it may need to turn around before reaching its destination. Should Chinese DF-21 carrier killer missiles, which have a reported range of up to 900 nautical miles, force carriers to operate at greater standoff distances, an aerial refueler could ensure that the Navy sustains an air attack capability. 

CVW-8 embarked seven squadrons and is operating nearly 30 fixed-wing aircraft and both of their Helicopter Sea Combat squadrons. 

U.S. General Throws Mike Pompeo’s Iran Policy Under the Bus “There's actually no military component of what's known as the maximum pressure campaign.” by Matthew Petti

The commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East said that there is “actually no military component” to the maximum pressure campaign against Iran, reversing comments made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in January.

U.S. forces killed Iranian spymaster Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani as he arrived in Baghdad on January 3, kicking off a round of direct U.S.-Iranian clashes.

Pompeo advertised the assassination as part of his signature “maximum pressure” campaign, which is aimed at forcing Iran to change a host of its domestic and foreign policies.

“It has a diplomatic component, it has had an economic component, and it has had a military component,” he told reporters on January 7, referring to the pressure policy.

But Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, pulled back Pompeo’s claims during a speech at the Middle East Institute last week.

“We actually do not directly contribute to the maximum pressure campaign,” said the four-star general, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East and Central Asia. “Instead, what our responsibility is as U.S. Central Command, is to deter Iran from taking actions either directly or indirectly against the United States or our allies and partners in the region.”

State Department officials have sold the killing of Suleimani as a way to “restore deterrence” against Iran.

McKenzie warned that Iran could act “either directly or indirectly against the United States or our allies and partners in the region” in retaliation to diplomatic and economic pressure.

But he was clear that “there's actually no military component of what's known as the maximum pressure campaign.”

Suleimani’s killing and the Iranian retaliation was the last direct confrontation between Iranian and U.S. forces. Congress voted to restrain President Donald Trump’s war powers soon after, sending a signal that the U.S. public would not endorse any further military escalation.

Iranian and U.S. forces have clashed several times since the beginning of the maximum pressure campaign, before and after Suleimani’s death.

U.S. naval forces began massing in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 2019 after several oil tankers exploded off the coast of Iran. Iranian forces shot down a U.S. surveillance drone they say entered Iranian airspace, and Trump came within minutes of ordering an armed retaliation.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were blamed for a rocket attack that killed an American translator in December 2019, causing a spiral of escalation that culminated in the Suleimani killing. Iran then launched ballistic missiles at a U.S. airbase in western Iraq, injuring over 100 troops.

The same Iranian-backed militias killed two more U.S. service members in a rocket attack in March.

Iraq’s parliament has asked U.S. forces to leave the country in light of the U.S.-Iranian clashes.

More rockets struck a U.S. base last week as Iraqi and U.S. officials met for a strategic dialogue, where the two countries agreed on the need to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq.

McKenzie, however, maintained that killing Suleimani has deterred Iran from further action.

“I would assess that right now we're in a period of what I would call contested deterrence with Iran,” he said. “I think the Iranians have had to recalculate because they did not believe that we would actually take that action.”