Mike Pompeo Defends U.S. Funding For Wuhan Virology Lab Secretary of State Mike Pompeo defended U.S. funding for the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a program “to protect American people from labs that aren’t up to standard” in a Fox and Friends interview on Wednesday. by Matthew Petti

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo defended U.S. funding for the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a program “to protect American people from labs that aren’t up to standard” in a Fox and Friends interview on Wednesday. 

U.S. officials have suggested that the 2019 novel coronavirus was initially released in an accident at the Wuhan laboratory. The institution’s coronavirus research had been supported by U.S. grants, attracting the ire of Republican politicians who blame the laboratory for the pandemic.

Rep. Matt Gaetz (R–Fla.) attacked U.S. funding for the laboratory last week, telling Fox News host Tucker Carlson that “at best, Americans are funding people who are lying to us and at worst, we're funding people who we knew had problems handling pathogens, who then birthed a monster virus onto the world.”

Democratic lawmakers have also called for confronting the Chinese government over a lack of transparency related to the coronavirus pandemic, although none have endorsed the laboratory-origin theory.

Pompeo, however, defended the research program against members of his own party.

“We spend American taxpayer dollars…to protect American people from labs that aren’t up to standard,” he said. “We try to bring our expertise from our National Institutes of Health [NIH], from our [Centers for Disease Control], to precisely prevent something like this.”

Recently-leaked State Department cables from 2018 show that U.S. officials had been concerned with safety issues at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Pompeo then addressed a Tuesday report in the New York Post pointing the finger at NIH infectious disease chief Dr. Anthony Fauci for $7.4 million in U.S. government grants to the now-controversial coronavirus research.

“I don’t know the details of the NIH grants,” Pompeo told Fox News. “Look, the United States, for a long time and continuing today, tries to help countries around the world who are conducting research on highly contagious pathogens.”

The Trump administration cut off one of the NIH grants for coronavirus research in China on Monday, stating that the NIH “does not believe that the current project outcomes align with the program goals and agency priorities.”

The research involved both collecting bat coronaviruses from the wild and running “gain-of-function” experiments aimed at determining whether the viruses could jump between species.

The NIH has defended its research as necessary for public health.

“Most emerging human viruses come from wildlife, and these represent a significant threat to public health and biosecurity in the US and globally, as demonstrated by the SARS epidemic of 2002-03, and the current COVID-19 pandemic,” the organization told Newsweek.

Fox News reported earlier in April that some U.S. officials believe that the novel coronavirus originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology and escaped in a laboratory accident.

U.S. officials have publicly dismissed this theory.

“It should be no surprise to you that we have taken a keen interest in that and we've had a lot of intelligence take a hard look at that,” Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on April 14. “I would just say at this point, it's inconclusive, although the weight of evidence seems to indicate natural [origin], but we don't know for certain.”

Pompeo, however, has leaned into allegations, demanding increased transparency from China.

“We all need to get to the bottom of what actually happened here, not only for the current instant but to make sure something like this doesn’t happen again,” he said on Wednesday. “There are still many labs operating inside of China today, and the world needs to know that we’re not going to see a repeat of this in the days and weeks and months ahead.”

Why Thae Yong-ho’s Election Isn't a Model for North Korean Defectors to Follow Not all North Korean refugees are the same and it is wrong to make them try to act that way. by Jean Do

On April 15, the constituents of Seoul’s most affluent district in Gangnam elected a North Korean defector as their parliamentary representative in a general election held at the height of the global COVID-19 pandemic. This attested to the Korean people’s unswerving commitment to democracy but underscored the persistent weight of Cold War ideology on the country’s politics which deters inclusion and diversity. A highly visible figure in the campaign for North Korean regime change (regime collapse), Thae Yong-ho served as Pyongyang’s deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom before he defected in 2016 and ran on the ticket of the opposition United Future Party (UFP). The UFP represents the most critical view of the current South Korean President Moon Jae In’s reconciliation policy, charging the government for being soft on “communism (which means the Kim family rule).” The people’s response to Thae Yong-ho’s election has ranged from amusing, unexpected, puzzling, to outright shocking. But none of these responses are warranted given the fact that his constituents in the upscale Gangnam district cast the exact ideological vote they would have cast, and have always casted, in any case, based on an anti-communism. Sadly, therefore, the election of the North Korean defector has nothing to do with the question of inclusiveness towards South Korea’s new political minority from North Korea.  

Complexities of North Korean Defector Identity Transformation

There is a danger that the election of Thae Yong-ho might validate the illusory notion of a model North Korean defector in South Korea and around the world—one who detests the Kim family rule, supports the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang, repudiates the merits of socialism, or any favorable ties to the past he or she left behind. Thae Yong-ho may be the most politically visible North Korean defector but in no way represents the truly wide variety of more than 30,000 North Korean settlers in South Korea (72% of whom are women) whose life experiences, values, and ideals differ dramatically. There are costly political and social consequences to the highly ideological approach to North Korean defectors in South Korea whose interests and identities cannot be fully represented by the likes of Thae Yong-ho whose life both before and after the defection is linked to status, power, politics, and money. 

The reality and nature of identity transformation among North Korean defectors is not that simple. In their identity transformation, multiple factors such as pre- and post-defection economic, education, marital, social status, not to mention gender and generational differences will affect their thinking and attitude towards their old and new homeland. Some might be negative toward their past and positive about South Korea; some might be positive about both and some might be negative about both. Some might choose to voice their political opinion, the most prominent of them being Thae Yong Ho, but others might choose to (or be forced to) silence themselves, and still others might just be indifferent. 

Their new identity as South Koreans, therefore, must not be confined exclusively to anti-communism and anti-North Korean sentiment. This used to work when opposing communism itself used to be sufficient as South Korea’s unification policy and anti-communism was the near-exclusive standard by which to determine one’s national qualification during the Cold War era. However, as South Korea’s democracy has matured owing to the people’s courageous struggle, the Cold War binary is progressively becoming an isolated position. Nothing makes this clearer than the unprecedented landslide victory (180 out of 300 seats) of the ruling Democratic Party (DP). South Korea is evolving into an ever-more pluralistic and diverse society in which political opinions are widely varying depending on socioeconomic and cultural factors, in addition to the generational and gender gap. People’s views about the merits and demerits of democracy and capitalism will vary, and they are demanding that these diverse views be incorporated into policy deliberation and implementation.

Democracy and True Freedom for North Korean Defectors

In this context, North Korea defectors should also be allowed to freely express their views, including lingering appreciation of “socialism”—which in the case of North Koreans is usually indistinguishable from the national—and criticism of capitalist society. It is unrealistic to expect them to conform to the standard model of a North Korean defector constructed to humiliate the North Korean regime no matter how unpalatable it is ideologically, politically, or diplomatically. 

This is because North Korean defectors may have left their origin of birth, but this does not mean that they have altogether rejected the values, morals, and lifestyles they have become accustomed to. And they still leave behind family members, friends, and colleagues whose lives are dependent on the stability of the regime and whose relatives reside in parts of the capitalist world where there are pro-North Korean communities (for example, Japan or the United States). There is no way of assuming that all ordinary North Korean people will benefit from the collapse of the Kim family regime. This is not because the regime is justifiable or tolerable (which it isn’t). The dictatorship may be imposed on an unwilling population. However, the customs, sentiments, values, and lifestyles they have become used to within the system of North Korean socialism cannot be suddenly eliminated upon their entry to South Korea. And the elimination of their past identity in socialism—which is truly diverse depending on their pre-defection socioeconomic status—cannot be the indicator of their qualification to become a good South Korean citizen. Essentially, North Korean defectors came to South Korea in search for a better life as a human being—they deserve a better life as a basic human right, not because they qualify as South Koreans strictly on being anti-communist. Their search for a better life should not be linked to any political position or policy of the government. Let North Korean defectors express themselves in their multitudes of emotions and sentiments about their past and present. This will be the true test of South Korea’s vibrant yet limited democracy.

Kim Jong-Un's Death Won't Change North Korea Unless One Thing Changes Will Pyongyang ever follow in Beijing's footsteps? by Zhu Feng

Speculations about Kim Jong-un’s death have simmered for days. But first and utmost, it matters what causes his unexpected death—failed surgical operation, a domestic coup or forced execution. Obviously entire speculations are packed up on his health and allegedly failed medical operation. There is no unpredictable domestic disarray.  

There is no doubt that Mr. Kim has genuinely suffered from his over-fattened body at his age. Thus cardiovascular bypass surgical operation is certainly required to keep him healthy. The rumor we heard of a lot was that the surgical operation failed, and he was left completely unconscious and senseless at all. If it proves to be true, it would be an unbelievable test for Nother Korea’s ruling group. It could be quite likely that one of alive Kim’s family members—his sister Ms. Kim Yo-jong, or his uncle Mr. Kim Peon-yong, would be selected as the core of a new leadership to get through this creepy hiatus. 

North Korea has been from its birthday a power-succession regime centering on Kim Il-sung’s family—a broadly propagandized as hefty, holy and destined “kings” of the country. Even with Kim Jong-un’s sudden passing, there is quite little denial of such a political establishment. At least, one of Kim’s direct relatives is more hopeful to succeed his in power. North Korea’s hereditary system will quite likely not break up with Kim Jong-un’s sudden death. As for how that inheritor would redirect North Korea into a new path, or continuously insist on Kim’s trajectory to embrace nuclear weapons while conditionally engaging Republic of Korea and the United States, we have to wait and see. 

But by all takes, it would be a watershed event for this most reclusive country in the world if Kim Jong-un’s sudden death could be fully confirmed. It could be largely history-making, and perhaps history breaking. Looking back to China’s history, there was only less three years later that Deng Xiaoping’s China inspirationally declared a “reform and open-up” policy after Mao Zedong was dead in 1976. But it seems that this can hardly take place in North Korea as long as family hereditary system prolongs. Deng was Mao’s comrade, not his family member. Deng had no necessity to safeguard Mao’s reputation and heritage. If Kim Jong-un’s sister would be eventually selected to be heiress, there is little possibility that North Korea will change significantly. 

Actually Kim’s sudden death, if confirmed at last, would happen in a quite troublesome moment. Now the COVID-19 pandemic is hard-hitting East Asia and the world. More importantly and ironically either of the two big powers—the United States and China—may squander their rare chance to reinforce cooperation and unity. Instead, the pandemic witnesses their mounting escalation of conflicts. The Trump Administration’s China-bashing and spired hostilities from Capitol Hill have tremendously compounded Beijing’s suspicions as to what the real purpose of America’s China policy is, and at least, are infuriating the Chinese in a fightback. As long as growing tensions between Beijing and Washington are concerned, any uncertainty out of North Korea might trigger a new wave of geopolitical wrestling in the region. Thus, the geopolitical ramification of Kim’s sudden death would be likely ominous. Therefore, what I am afraid of is that geopolitical competition in the Korea Peninsular might add to the tragic severity of the pandemic crisis. These prospects seem unbelievably gloomy. 

Encouragingly though, the Seoul government declared on April 27 that Kim Jong-un remains “alive and well.” President Moon Jae-in simultaneously reiterates his resolve to push for inter-Korea cooperation. Perhaps, we could have an easy breath from now on. Diplomatic and economic positivism from Seoul would be a big mitigation to any uncertainty in Pyongyang. 

Seven Questions to Ask About What Happens in North Korea If Kim Jong-Un Dies A lot of speculation out there fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the North Korean political system. by Stephan Haggard and Daniel A. Pinkston

Whether Kim Jong-un is dead, incapacitated, or recovering from a medical procedure, his absence from public view raises a series of questions about the stability of the regime and of the Korean peninsula more generally. Much speculation—that the system is potentially unstable, that there will be a power vacuum, that we are in for a period of more provocations—fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the North Korean political system. 

Question #1. Is the North Korean system stable in the absence of its leader? The short answer is “yes.” Although North Korea is a notoriously personalist family dictatorship, it also maintains a number of the institutional features of communist political systems: clearly delineated formal institutions, a top-down structure, and strong norms of loyalty and obedience. 

Question #2. How would succession work? We expect that the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party would play a pivotal role in any succession. Not only can the Politburo generate new leadership but it provides collective support from key stakeholders: from the party, the security apparatus, the military, state institutions, and the mass organizations. The Politburo may augment itself with new members, or may communicate with the party, the military, and the state through an expanded, ad hoc meeting. But the Politburo and its members are likely to be the organizational focal point for any transition. 

We focus on the Politburo because of the size of the bodies between which it is nested. In China, Xi Jinping has clearly centralized power but he still relies on the Politburo Standing Committee, with seven members. The corresponding body in North Korea, the Politburo Presidium, has precisely three: Kim Jong-un, Ch’oe Ryong-hae, and Pak Pong-ju. A body this narrow is not adequate to provide the support that will be needed to assure the succession is smooth. The Central Committee, on the other hand, is too large with about 125 members. 

The Politburo fits the golden rule of being right-sized; it has 13 members (excluding the three Presidium members and Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister and a Politburo alternate member). More importantly, it also reflects all of the core political bases. While Kim Jong-un has not proven the reformer many thought he would be, he has in fact crafted a new leadership in the Politburo, with all members except for the three Presidium members coming on board since the Party Congress in 2016. Indeed the faces on the Politburo are surprisingly fresh, with one member elected in October 2017, five coming on in April 2019, and three in December 2019. The newest member was elected in early April 2020. All of these actors share a strong common interest in assuring continuity. 

Question #3. Who is likely to lead? Scanning the biographies of the Politburo members, one individual stands out as a likely leader even if the structure looks collective: Ch’oe Ryong-hae. Ch’oe has impeccable family credentials; his father fought with Kim Il-sung in Manchuria against the Japanese, and he was tapped as one of the trusted insiders who helped Kim Jong-un navigate the succession at the time of his father’s death in 2011. His CV looks like a virtual “who’s who” of influential positions in the regime: Mangyongdae Revolution Academy, Kim Il Sung University, Socialist Youth League, party central committee, vice-marshal, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, director of the Organization and Guidance Department, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and member of the Politburo Presidium, the highest party body. No one other than Kim Jong-un has the credentials to match him, and we can’t see him being sidelined by any of the other members of the Politburo, many of whom are more siloed military commanders or state functionaries.  

Question #4. What about the family angle? A legitimate question is whether a regime of this sort can really survive without someone at the helm who is directly in the much-vaunted bloodline. With the uncles and brothers assassinated under Kim Jong-un, the only obvious candidate in this regard is Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister. We have to put some probability—even if low—that the leadership could buck its patriarchal traditions and put her at the helm. But it is more likely that she will play a pivotal role as something akin to the chief-of-staff, a role she effectively played for Kim Jong-un. 

Her power is not only familial; in such a regime, the leadership controls vast networks of foreign accounts and access to those resources—in effect the bank account numbers—are likely to be held by family. She has also worked through a number of important institutional roles. From 2018, she served as a vice-director of the party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department, an important institution that curates and controls media information and the narrative surrounding the Kim family cult. In late 2019, she appears to have assumed the role of vice-director at the party’s Organization and Guidance Department, which controls and monitors the party apparatus. These roles and her position in the family provide her extraordinary power even if she does not formally assume the position of Supreme Leader.  

Question #5. Will North Korea respond to an internal crisis by continuing its recent provocations or even escalating them? There is some sliver of logic to the argument that we might see an uptick in provocations, but we generally find this line of argument puzzling. The reason is simple: there are only two outside actors who could possibly exploit the circumstances to take the regime down and those are the United States, perhaps acting in consort with South Korea. But Trump is disinterested. He has more or less openly stated that he did not place a high priority on solving the North Korean issue before the election, and in any case the administration is tied down by the pandemic. We can expect to see the North Korean military and internal security apparatus go on high alert if Kim Jong-un has in fact died or is incapacitated. But we find it unlikely that the regime would draw any more attention to itself than it needs to.  

Question #6. What about China and South Korea? South Korea’s Moon Jae-in has long sought to improve North-South relations and will extend sympathies and offers of help even if they are declined. But China is the key player in the end, and we saw their response to a succession in 2011: complete and total support for the regime, few questions asked. China has absolutely no interest in seeing the regime implode, and may even act as a lender of last resort if there are signs of economic or financial panic. There is an important implication: maintaining the sanctions regime—which is already leaking—will likely be difficult. 

Question #7. Could COVID-19 scramble the logic of a smooth succession? The short answer is “yes.” On the one hand, North Korea did attempt to reach out for external support and has followed its socialist cousins in the region—China and Vietnam—with tough top-down measures to contain spread if not limit it entirely. For example, North Korea moved relatively quickly to close the border with China and although it has still admitted no COVID-19 cases, there is ample evidence it is taking the virus seriously. 

On the other hand, the risks of an absolutely catastrophic spread in the country are nontrivial. As many as a third of the population is undernourished, the health system is underfunded, and numerous institutions and facilities—including packed military barracks—are highly vulnerable. If the leadership were to be preoccupied with succession and take its eye off of the virus, then North Korea could easily become a humanitarian disaster of the first order. But the regime has weathered these disasters before, and it is not clear that a significant death toll would derail the regime. 

Former Head of U.S. Marines in Pacific: What Would Happen if Kim Jong-un Died Suddenly? "If he dies, we will get the succession wrong. North Korea is the hardest hard target for our intelligence community. Even countries with embassies in Pyongyang operate in an information desert." by Wallace C. Gregson

It’s not clear that Kim is at death’s door. Uncorroborated reports are clearly not dispositive.   

If he dies, we will get the succession wrong. North Korea is the hardest hard target for our intelligence community. Even countries with embassies in Pyongyang operate in an information desert. 

When Kim Il-sung died, the common opinion was that his son, an insecure playboy, would never be equal to the task. We made a similar assumption when Kim Jong-un moved up. He was too young to be effective, and accustomed to a luxurious life overseas. His matriculation at Swiss schools led to hopes that he would liberalize North Korea. His brutal and public assassination of Jang Song-thaek, a senior official in his father’s administration and an official assumed to be China’s most effective contact, put “paid” to that thought.

We assume the regime has about one million core supporters. They live very well by North Korean standards. Their goal is to maintain their position. That means an orderly succession with order and security.  “Opening up” is off the table, as that road risks the International Court of Justice at the Hague or Chinese suzerainty. 

It means keeping their nuclear weapons. Their arsenal was a three-generational effort, beginning with Kim Il-sung in the 1960s. North Korea and Pakistan’s A Q Khan collaborated and took nuclear proliferation to an entrepreneurial level. North Korea would enjoy even less interest from the rest of the world if they did not have nuclear weapons. 

U.S. guarantees will not be much help. Kim has watched the collapse of Libya and the killing of Muammar Ghaddafi on the news. We have abandoned other international agreements lately, so any promise of non-interference in Korea’s future, specifically including their status as a nuclear weapons state, would be suspect. There will be no trade of condos on the beach for their weapons. 

The Kim family is supported by a global criminal network. It involves everything that can make money, and nuclear proliferation is likely a big profit center. Other illicit ventures include high-quality counterfeiting, apparently majoring in U.S. $100 bills. Our treasury goes to some great lengths to defeat it. Narcotics trade is another favorite. Many North Korean businesses operate legally across Asia and the world, others operate clandestinely. 

Recall the murder of Kim Jong-nam in the Kuala Lumpur Airport. That attack featured very sophisticated deployment and employment of a weapon of mass destruction – VX nerve agent – delivered by two allegedly unwitting young ladies. Not only did North Korea deploy VX outside of their country, they employed it in a crowded airport. They killed the target of the operation with a lethal crowd-killer but harmed no one else, not even the ladies involved. It’s likely that this was more than a revenge killing of the half-brother. It also served eloquent notice to all nations of South East Asia that the Kim Family Business had the ability to execute damaging attacks on any authorities that pressured any North Korean expatriates operating openly or clandestinely in their country. UN sanctions called for nations to send the expatriates home.  That’s not likely to happen under any new leader, it’s simply too profitable to shut down. Kim Jong-nam was reportedly under Chinese protection. So much for North Korean worries about China. 

What might change for the better is the unofficial North Korean market economy, growing with expanding North Korean cell phone usage. Technically illegal, it operates with the tacit permission of the state for one reason – profit.  The core supporters benefit. As with many other things that appear upside down in North Korea, a capitalist shadow economy supports a brutal dictatorial regime. 

Here's What the Research Says Might Happen If Kim Jong-Un Died External pressure might actually make things worse. by Timo Kivimäki and Sungwon Lee

A sudden exit by Kim Jong-un could lead North Korea to a more democratic and peaceful government, but it could also lead the country in the opposite direction. In addition to domestic changes, a dramatic transition in North Korea could lead to an exodus of people, while changing North Korea’s approach to nuclear weapons policies and international engagement.  

If we look at Polity 5 data on the 30 greatest year-to-year leaps towards democracy after the Cold War, we can see that none of these changes have been triggered by the death of an autocrat. Rather, in almost one-third of the cases of democratization, the trigger has been the ending of a conflict. Political chaos or foreign threat, perhaps including destabilizing foreign speculation on the health of Kim Jong-un, could, therefore, strengthen the hand of the country’s autocrats.

The ending of foreign support for an autocrat has contributed to historical change, in another third of cases. This was the case in Eastern Europe with the fall of Soviet support. In North Korea, Chinese influence and Beijing’s example has encouraged greater international openness and political responsiveness even if not liberal democracy. Thus, the ending of Chinese support would not help North Korea’s democracy the same way as ending Soviet influence helped in Eastern Europe. 

In the remaining third, the leap to democracy took place when domestic popular pressures made the country ungovernable. Leaders made democratic compromises to secure their own positions in what they considered to be an inevitable transition to democracy. While securing their individual political survival, the entire political elite glided into the slippery slope to democracy. Indonesia and Myanmar are perfect examples of this: those generals who endorsed democracy first, survived politically. 

North Korea has not seen significant protests or acts of civil disobedience. Thus, the elite has not started sliding towards democracy, yet. If Kim Jong-un died suddenly, the best hope for a more democratic future would be with a successor who is more willing to allow the development of civil society and who is less paranoid about security. If the political elite sees that the main challenge for the country is related to security, they will likely select a leader from the security establishment. However, if the main challenge is economic development, a more economically-oriented person will stand a chance. Any foreign manipulation or bullying to help the North Korean people is, therefore, likely to be counterproductive. An absence of such foreign behavior gives the developmentalist elite a better chance. 

North Koreans, who have had to endure prolonged poverty and political oppression while witnessing economic prosperity and political freedom in neighboring countries, may be in a state of involuntary immobility. North Korea is currently like a tap that is about to burst. Once the valve opens, whether it is hot or cold, water will flow. From data on refugees and regime transitions, we can see that chaotic transition in an autocratic state will increase opportunities for people to flee to seek a better life, even if the transition was in a more democratic direction. If the regime is seized by those who are even more autocratic, but not yet equipped with as powerful control, an exodus is still likely because there will be more motives and opportunities for North Koreans to attempt desperate escapes from the country. 

Consequently, humanitarian progress and the national interest of neighboring countries would side with an incremental rather than drastic, chaotic change in North Korea.

Kim Jong-un Is Probably Alive (But What Is North Korea's Plan If He Isn't?) The new leader would have to be a Kim unless the regime wants to risk its legitimacy. by John Nilsson-Wright

Unconfirmed rumors surrounding the poor health of Kim Jong-un, and a possible botched heart operation that may have left him fatally ill, in a coma, or already deceased have prompted speculation about the consequences of the death of the North Korean leader.  

Given the unreliability of similar such stories in the past, it would be wise not to lend them too much credence at this early stage, especially since U.S. and ROK officials are increasingly skeptical that they are well-founded. Satellite evidence of what seems to be Kim’s train at Wonsan on the East Coast, suggests that Kim is more likely to have simply retreated from public view, possibly because of generic worries about his health and fear of being exposed to COVID-19. Kim’s weight, his smoking habits, and his family history of diabetes all represent underlying conditions that would make him especially vulnerable to the risk of infection, and so it would be logical to assume that Kim would be especially concerned to practice his own form of social distancing. There had been speculation earlier in February, in some foreign government circles, that already Kim has been limiting some of his public appearances out of fear of infection—and the current low profile may represent more of the same. 

Wonsan as a destination may also have been attractive to Kim perhaps because of its proximity to missile testing sites on the East Coast. After all, publicly bolstering the North’s military deterrent capabilities is likely to have been increasingly important to the Kim at a time when COVID-19, the continuing deadlock over talks with the United States, and the persistence of sanctions make him especially keen to appear strong and resilient at a time of potential increased national vulnerability. Wonsan may equally be attractive given the existence of the Wonsan-Kalma tourism development project and where there is construction work underway that was scheduled to be completed by April. Tourism is a core element in the government’s economic (and political) strategy and ensuring that this continues on track is personally important to the leadership.

If despite the denials from ROK and U.S. sources, Kim has in fact died, then attention immediately turns to the question of a possible successor. Of the possible replacements, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong has been touted as a leading candidate, given the importance of family ties in the North’s system of de facto hereditary rule—the so-called Mount Paektu bloodline. Responsible for state propaganda and public relations and having accompanied her brother for his summits with Presidents Trump and Moon, she is clearly a trusted member of the country’s senior leadership. This is especially true since she has just been reappointed to the Politburo this April, following her temporary removal in the wake of the failure of the February 2019 Hanoi summit. Proximity to power, however, is not necessarily a sign of actual authority. Her age (31) and gender (in a society that retains a traditional chauvinistic bias in favor of male leadership) are likely to count against her. 

Alternative successors include Kim Pyong-il (Kim Jong-il’s half-brother) and even Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-un’s one surviving older brother, since Kim Jong-nam’s 2017 assassination. Kim Jong-chul is a long shot given his alleged “effeminacy” and rumored unsuitability; Kim Pyong-il, has age (65) and experience (having served as ambassador in Eastern Europe) on his side and a reputation for being self-effacing and politically low profile. (Although that might count against him in wielding power in a regime where brutality and decisiveness are part of the leadership job description.) Some sort of collective leadership and temporary interregnum, perhaps with Choe Ryong-hae, the nominal head of state and number two in the official hierarchy, playing a key role, has also been discussed. But this would be unprecedented and would also interfere with the dynastic narrative that is so important in the North Korean “theatre state” where symbolism, nostalgia and historicized authenticity are key.

Kim’s death, in the first instance, will require the regime to bolster its military preparedness, establish a clear narrative of political continuity and avoid any social or economic disruption. The government, whoever is nominally in charge, is likely to be fearful of potential threats at home and abroad, unreceptive to immediate negotiations with foreign powers, and more focused on the ceremonial and symbolic aspects of ensuring the appearance of an orderly leadership transition.