Coronavirus: Researchers No Longer Need Consent to Access Your Medical Records You may not know it, but if you live in the UK and have contacted the NHS with any coronavirus-related health concerns, your data is now being used for research. by Simon Kolstoe

You may not know it, but if you live in the UK and have contacted the NHS with any coronavirus-related health concerns, your data is now being used for research. This is regardless of whether you have previously tried to stop this happening by requesting to use the national data opt-out service.

Data being used may include your medical records or anything collected by healthcare providers in relation to your care. Researchers in universities, government and also private companies are using it to scrutinise the way the virus is transmitted, how the disease progresses, and to help analyse which treatment options are most effective.

Using this data during a time of public emergency may seem reasonable to many people. But this does not avoid the fact that most of us view our medical records as private. So people will rightly be concerned that their data is being shared without their knowledge or consent.

There are two main laws that dictate how healthcare data privacy in the UK is handled: the European-wide General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and an additional UK-specific protection called the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality.

Due to the coronavirus pandemic, this second legal duty has been quietly relaxed and the authority of an important review body suspended to allow researchers unprecedented access to patient data.

GDPR and your data

In the UK, the Data Protection Act 2018 turns the principles outlined in the EU’s GDPR into national law.

GDPR is helpful because it provides a definition of personal data and special category personal data, which includes healthcare records.

The legislation also provides details of how such data should be handled and safeguarded, including the importance of identifying the lawful basis under which the data is to be stored and processed. There are six possibilities for such a basis:

One thing to note with GDPR is that all six legal bases are equal. As a result, although most of us think that we should be asked to provide consent for our data to be used, it is perfectly legal under GDPR to access personal data, including healthcare records, without consent so long as an alternative legal basis is declared.

Duty of confidentiality

Alongside GDPR, the UK has a second legal mechanism designed to protect confidential patient information. The origins of the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality are complex and relate to a number of different acts and regulations, but can be summed up by the phrase “no surprises”. In other words, patients should never be surprised by how their confidential information is being used.

Typically this means that regardless of the legal basis being used under GDPR, patients must still be asked to provide consent for their identifiable data to be used for research.

But, the law also recognises that sometimes it might be important to use confidential patient information without consent. Under a section of the Health Act 2006, the secretary of state for health and social care can provide approval for what might otherwise be a breach of the common law duty of confidentiality. Approval is based on advice from a special committee called the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG).

This is a committee that I usually sit on and which meets twice a month to consider applications from researchers who want to use identifiable patient data without consent. Although the committee itself does not approve applications, it does give detailed advice that normally must be followed for applications to be approved.

However, in emergency circumstances the regulations also allow the secretary of state to suspend even this safeguard, essentially bypassing CAG. This is precisely what was announced on March 20, 2020 allowing, in the wording of this control of patient information notice:

NHS Trusts, Local Authorities and others to process confidential patient information without consent for COVID-19 public health, surveillance and research purposes.

 Additionally, and so long as the purpose is COVID-19 related, the notice allows the use of data from people who had previously opted out of their data being used for purposes beyond their direct clinical care.

Why is this a problem?

The relaxation of these rules has largely gone unnoticed by the public, but it does make a difference. While all projects involving NHS patients or facilities must still be reviewed by a research ethics committee, the parallel specialist CAG review has now been replaced by informal advice that does not necessarily need to be followed.

What’s more, as CAG review is no longer a legal requirement, coronavirus projects using healthcare data conducted by a variety of other organisations may no longer need to use the NHS review process at all.

As a research ethics committee chair, I have already been concerned by a couple of examples of researchers seemingly “covidising” their projects to take advantage of expedited review processes. Similarly, trying to justify rapidly constructed projects and their prioritisation with little more than “because of coronavirus” is not appropriate.

Patient data is an extremely valuable research resource which now, more than ever, must be handled appropriately. Prioritising research is the right thing to do in order to find answers to the coronavirus pandemic, but any relaxation of rules can lead to people taking advantage. While many researchers can be trusted, history shows there are good reasons for having robust ethics and governance processes in place, and these should not be removed lightly.

Police Officers Accused of Brutal Violence Often Have a History Misconduct Complaints Similarly, officers who are the subject of previous civilian complaints pose a higher risk of engaging in serious misconduct in the future. by Jill McCorkel

As protests against police violence and racism continue in cities throughout the U.S., the public is learning that several of the officers involved in the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis and Breonna Taylor in Louisville share a history of complaints by citizens of brutality or misconduct.

Decades of research on police shootings and brutality reveal that officers with a history of shooting civilians, for example, are much more likely to do so in the future compared to other officers.

A similar pattern holds for misconduct complaints. Officers who are the subject of previous civilian complaints – regardless of whether those complaints are for excessive force, verbal abuse or unlawful searches – pose a higher risk of engaging in serious misconduct in the future.

A study published in the American Economic Journal reviewed 50,000 allegations of officer misconduct in Chicago and found that officers with extensive complaint histories were disproportionately more likely to be named subjects in civil rights lawsuits with extensive claims and large settlement payouts.

In spite of this research, many law enforcement agencies not only fail to adequately investigate misconduct allegations, they rarely sustain citizen complaints. Disciplinary sanctions are few and reserved for the most egregious cases.

Complaints, lawsuits – but few consequences

Derek Chauvin, the ex-officer who has been charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter for killing Floyd, is no stranger to situations in which deadly force has been deployed.

During a 2006 roadside stop, Chauvin was among six officers who, in just four seconds, fired 43 rounds into a truck driven by a man wanted for questioning in a domestic assault. The man, Wayne Reyes, who police said aimed a sawed-off shotgun at them, died at the scene. The police department never acknowledged which officers had fired their guns and a grand jury convened by prosecutors did not indict any of the officers.

Chauvin is also the subject of at least 18 separate misconduct complaints and was involved in two additional shooting incidents. According to The Associated Press, 16 of the complaints were “closed with no discipline” and two letters of reprimand were issued for Chauvin related to the other cases.

Tou Thao, one of three Minneapolis officers at the scene as Floyd pleaded for his life, is named in a 2017 civil rights lawsuit against the department. Lamar Ferguson, the plaintiff, said he was walking home with his pregnant girlfriend when Thao and another officer stopped him without cause, handcuffed him and proceeded to kick, punch and knee him with such force that his teeth shattered.

The case was settled by the city for US$25,000, with the officers and the city declaring no liability, but it is not known if Thao was disciplined by the department.

In Louisville, Kentucky, at least three of the officers involved in the shooting death of Breonna Taylor while serving a no-knock warrant at her home – allowing them to use a battering ram to open her door – had previously been sanctioned for violating department policies.

One of the officers, Brett Hankison, is the subject of an ongoing lawsuit alleging, according to news reports, harassing suspects and planting drugs on them. He has denied the charges in a response to the lawsuit.

Another officer in the Taylor case, Myles Cosgrove, was sued for excessive force in 2006 by a man whom he shot seven times in the course of a routine traffic stop. The judge dismissed the case. Cosgrove had been put on paid administrative leave as his role in the shooting was investigated by his department, and returned to the department after the investigation closed.

Patterns of misconduct and abuse

I am a scholar of law and the criminal justice system. In my work on wrongful conviction cases in Philadelphia, I regularly encounter patterns of police misconduct including witness intimidation, evidence tampering and coercion. It is often the same officers engaging in the same kinds of misconduct and abuse across multiple cases.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that across the nation fewer than one in 12 complaints of police misconduct result in any kind of disciplinary action.

And then there is the problem of “gypsy cops” – a derogatory ethnic slur used in law enforcement circles to refer to officers who are fired for serious misconduct from one department only to be rehired by another one.

Timothy Loehmann, the Cleveland officer who shot and killed 12-year-old Tamir Rice, resigned before he was fired from his previous department after they deemed him unfit to serve. A grand jury did not indict Loehmann for the killing, but he was fired by the Cleveland Division of Police after they found he had not disclosed the reason for leaving his previous job.

In the largest study of police hiring, researchers concluded that rehired officers, who make up roughly 3% of the police force, present a serious threat to communities because of their propensity to re-offend, if they had engaged in misconduct before.

These officers, wrote the study’s authors, “are more likely … to be fired from their next job or to receive a complaint for a ‘moral character violation.’”

The Newark model

The Obama administration’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended the creation of a national database to identify officers whose law enforcement licenses were revoked due to misconduct. The database that currently exists, the National Decertification Index, is limited, given state level variation in reporting requirements and decertification processes.

Analysts agree that this is a useful step, but it does not address underlying organizational and institutional sources of violence, discrimination and misconduct.

For example, in the aftermath of the police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the Department of Justice found that the department had a lengthy history of excessive force, unconstitutional stop and searches, racial discrimination and racial bias.

The report noted that the use of force was often punitive and retaliatory and that “the overwhelming majority of force – almost 90% – is used against African Americans.”

One promising solution might be the creation of independent civilian review boards that are able to conduct their own investigations and impose disciplinary measures.

In Newark, New Jersey, the board can issue subpoenas, hold hearings and investigate misconduct.

Research at the national level suggests that jurisdictions with citizen review boards uphold more excessive force complaints than jurisdictions that rely on internal mechanisms.

But historically, the work of civilian review boards has been undercut by limitations on resources and authority. Promising models, including the one in Newark, are frequently the target of lawsuits and harassment by police unions, who say that such boards undermine the police department’s internal disciplinary procedures.

In the case of civilian review board in the Newark, the board largely prevailed in the aftermath of the police union lawsuit. The court ruling restored the board’s ability to investigate police misconduct – but it made the board’s disciplinary recommendations nonbinding.

Weapons Of Last Resort: How India's Nuclear Arsenal Keeps China And Pakistan At Bay India has built its own “triad” of land, sea and air forces, all equipped with nuclear weapons. by Kyle Mizokami

Today India is estimated to have at least 520 kilograms of plutonium, enough for, according to the Arms Control Association, “between 100 and 120 nuclear devices.” New Delhi describes this a “credible minimum deterrent” against neighboring nuclear powers China and Pakistan.

India, the world’s most populous democracy, occupies a unique strategic position flanked by powerful adversaries. As a result, its 1.3 billion people are guarded by an arsenal of approximately one hundred nuclear weapons deployed on land, at sea and in the air. Despite its status as a Cold War holdout, the country was forced to develop its own nuclear weapons.

India’s nuclear program dates back to 1948, just one year after independence. The Nehru government looked to nuclear power as an inexpensive energy source for the young country. An Indian Atomic Energy Commission was created that year to oversee the country’s nuclear efforts. Due to a lack of uranium on Indian territory, the country naturally gravitated towards using plutonium instead. India’s first nuclear reactor, Apsara, was built with help from the United Kingdom and went critical in August 1956.

New Delhi originally considered building nuclear devices, not as weapons, but as what were then called “peaceful nuclear explosives” capable of building harbors, excavating for natural gas, and other large construction and mining projects. While functionally identical to nuclear weapons, the plan demonstrated that India was not yet convinced it needed an actual nuclear deterrent—yet. As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India was a bystander to the feverish pace of the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union.

The 1962 war with China, however, changed that. The limited attack on Indian territory could have been much worse had the two countries engaged in all-out war, particularly if Pakistan and China had paired up together. Furthermore although China was not yet a nuclear power, its nuclear status was considered an inevitability and a nuclear Beijing could blackmail India into territorial concessions—at the risk of atomic annihilation. New Delhi’s nuclear race was on.

India’s first nuclear test was conducted on May 18, 1974, at the Pokhran Test Range in the Rajastan desert. The device, nicknamed “Smiling Buddha,” had an explosive yield of between six and fifteen kilotons (the Hiroshima device is generally estimated at sixteen kilotons). The test was conducted in an underground shaft to contain radiation. India described the test as peaceful in nature but China’s nuclear status, achieved in 1964, meant that it was almost certainly designed to be a weapon.

The test propelled India into the so-called “Nuclear Club” that had previously consisted of the United States, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. India refrained from nuclear testing for another twenty-four years, until detonating three devices on May 11, 1998, and another three on May 13. Most of the devices had low yields, between two hundred and five hundred tons, suggesting they were designed to be tactical nuclear bombs, but one device was a thermonuclear device that failed and reached a yield of only about forty-five kilotons.

Today India is estimated to have at least 520 kilograms of plutonium, enough for, according to the Arms Control Association, “between 100 and 120 nuclear devices.” New Delhi describes this a “credible minimum deterrent” against neighboring nuclear powers China and Pakistan. By comparison, China—which must also contend with nuclear rival the United States—has enough fissile material for between 200 and 250 devices. Pakistan is thought to have an arsenal of 110 to 130 devices. India has a firm No First Use policy with regards to nuclear weapons, vowing to never be the first to use them in any conflict and only use them to retaliate in kind.

As a result India has built its own “triad” of land, sea and air forces, all equipped with nuclear weapons. The first leg to develop was likely tactical nuclear devices for strike aircraft of the Indian Air Force. Today, India possesses more than two hundred Su-30MK1 twin-engine fighters, sixty-nine MiG-29s and fifty-one Mirage 2000 fighters. It is likely at least some of these aircraft have been modified and trained to carry nuclear gravity bombs to their targets.

The land-based missile leg of the triad consists of Prithvi tactical ballistic missiles. First produced in the late 1990s, Prithvi initially had a range of just ninety-three miles, but future versions increased their range to 372 miles. Despite this, Prithvi is still firmly a tactical weapon, while the Agni I-V series of missiles, with ranges from 434 to 4,970 miles, are strategic weapons with the ability to hit foreign capitals—as well as all of China.

The third leg of the triad is new, consisting of nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Arihant class. Four submarines are planned, each with the ability to carry twelve K-15 Sagarika (“Oceanic”) short-range ballistic missiles with maximum range of 434 miles, or K-4 medium-range ballistic missiles with a 2,174 mile range. Using the Bay of Bengal as a bastion and protected by assets such as India’s carrier INS Vikramaditya, the Arihant SSBNs can just barely reach Beijing.

India’s nuclear buildup has been relatively responsible, and the country’s No First Use policy should act to slow escalation of any conventional conflict into a nuclear one. As long as India’s nuclear deterrent remains credible, it should cause rational adversaries to think twice before edging to the nuclear threshold. Still, the country’s volatile relationship with Pakistan, which has no such policy, as well as its “Cold Start” blitzkrieg plan of action against its neighbor, means nuclear war cannot be ruled out.

Japanese Nukes? Here's How It Could Happen Don't underestimate a country's desire to protect itself. by Kyle Mizokami

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrence. If Japan felt it needed them to protect itself, then it would quickly build them.

It is perhaps China’s and even North Korea's greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal.

To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option.

At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here.

Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan,the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes.

What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in.

We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses.

Land-based missiles: 

Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient.

Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers.

This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack.

Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would make their positioning more predictable.

Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network.

Strategic bombers

Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission.

A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons.

Geography also makes strategic bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously vulnerable.

Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air, but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. The cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive.

Ballistic Missile Submarines: 

This is the most attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself.

Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine, missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline, Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile.

In a sea-basing scheme Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads.

There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128 warheads would be available.

Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.

Ten Reasons Why Renewable Energy Is the Future In an ideal world, all sectors of the economy – transport, agriculture, manufacturing and others – would pull in the same direction to cut emissions. by Andrew Blakers

Australia’s latest greenhouse gas figures released today show national emissions fell slightly last year. This was by no means an economy-wide effort – solar and wind energy did most of the heavy lifting.

Emissions fell 0.9% last year compared to 2018. The rapid deployment of solar and wind is slashing emissions in the electricity sector, offsetting increases from all other sectors combined.

Renewables (solar, wind and hydro) now comprise 26% of the mix in the National Electricity Market. In 2023, renewables will likely pass black coal to become the largest electricity source.

In an ideal world, all sectors of the economy – transport, agriculture, manufacturing and others – would pull in the same direction to cut emissions. But hearteningly, these figures show the huge potential for renewables.

Here are 10 reasons why renewable energy makes perfect sense for Australia.

1. It can readily eliminate fossil fuels

About 15 gigawatts of solar and wind farms will probably start operating over 2018-2021. That’s on top of more than 2 gigawatts of rooftop solar to be added each year.

It averages out at about 6 gigawatts of additional solar and wind power annually. Research from the Australian National University, which is under review, shows the rate only has to double to about 12 gigawatts to eliminate fossil fuels by 2050, including from electricity, transport, heating and industry.

Fossil fuel mining and use causes 85% of total national emissions – and doubling the renewables deployment rate would eliminate this.

The task becomes more than achievable when you consider the continual fall in renewables prices, which helped treble solar and wind deployment between 2017 and 2020.

2. Solar is already king

Solar is the top global energy technology in terms of new generation capacity added each year, with wind energy in second spot. Solar and wind energy are already huge industries globally, and employ 27,000 people in Australia – a doubling in just three years.

3. Solar and wind are getting cheaper

Solar and wind electricity in Australia already costs less than it would from new coal and gas plants.

The price is headed for A$30 per megawatt hour in 2030. This undercuts most existing gas and coal stations and competes with gas for industrial heating.

4. Stable renewable electricity is not hard

Balancing renewables is a straightforward exercise using existing technology. The current high voltage transmission network must be strengthened so projects in regional areas can deliver renewable electricity into cities. And if wind and sun is not plentiful in one region, a stronger transmission network can deliver electricity from elsewhere. Electricity storage such as pumped hydro and batteries can also smooth out supplies.

5. There’s enough land

To eliminate all fossil fuel use, Australia would need about 60 square metres of solar panel per person, and one wind turbine per 2,000 people. Panels on rooftops take up no land, and wind turbines use very little. If global energy consumption per person increased drastically to reach Australian levels, solar farms on just 0.1% of Earth’s surface could meet this demand.

6. Raw materials won’t run out

A solar panel needs silicon, a glass cover, plastic, an aluminium panel frame, copper and aluminium electrical conductors and small amounts of other common materials. These materials are what our world is made of. Recycling panel materials at the end of their life adds only slightly to larger existing recycling streams.

7. Nearly every country has good sun or wind

Three-quarters of the global population lives in the planet’s sunbelt (lower than 35 degrees of latitude). This includes most developing countries, where most of the growth in energy consumption and greenhouse emissions is occurring.

8. We will never go to war over sunshine

Solar and wind power make energy systems much more robust in the face of a pandemic, disasters or war. They are difficult to misuse in any significant way for military, terrorist or criminal activities. And it is hard to destroy billions of solar panels spread over millions of square kilometres.

9. Solar accidents and pollution are small

Solar panel accidents pale in comparison to spilled radioactive material (like Fukushima or Chernobyl), an oil disaster (like BP’s Deepwater Horizon), or a coal mine fire (like Hazelwood in Victoria). Wind and solar electricity eliminates oil imports, oil-related warfare, fracking for gas, strip mining for coal, smokestacks, car exhausts and smog.

10. Payback time is short

For a sunny country like Australia, the time required to recover the energy invested in panel manufacture is less than two years, compared with a panel lifetime of 30 years. And when the world is solar powered, the energy required to produce more panels is non-polluting.

The future is bright

While COVID-19 triggered a significant fall in global emissions so far this year, they may bounce back. But if solar and wind deployment stay at current levels, Australia is tracking towards meeting its Paris target.

The Reserve Bank of Australia says investment in renewables may moderate in the near term, but “over the longer term, the transition towards renewable energy generation is expected to continue”.

But there are hurdles. In the short term, more transmission infrastructure is needed. Electrifying transport (with electric vehicles) and urban heating (with electric heat pumps) is straightforward. More difficult is eliminating fossil fuels from industries such as steel and fertilisers. This is a task for the 2030s.

But it’s clear that to get to net-zero carbon emissions by mid century, solar and wind are far and away Australia’s best option.

These 5 Weapons Would Help Japan In A War With North Korea As North Korea ruthlessly forges ahead with nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technology, the threat to Japan has crystallized: the country once again faces the prospect of nuclear attack. by Kyle Mizokami

Japan has long prided itself on maintaining the bare minimum defense capability. The country spends 1 percent of GDP on its military, just half the amount recommended to NATO member states. It has also eschewed offensive weapons, preferring to mount a purely defensive posture. The prospect of North Korean nuclear attack, however, may force the country to abandon both policies. 

A country oriented towards pacifism and having disavowed war as an instrument of national policy, Japan is about as dissimilar from North Korea as one can get. Unfortunately for Tokyo, the two are separated by as little as 336 miles of water, and Pyongyang frequently threatens to attack its former colonial master. Now, as North Korea ruthlessly forges ahead with nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technology, the threat to Japan has crystallized: the country once again faces the prospect of nuclear attack.

South Korean intelligence believes the North has mastered the technology to place a nuclear weapon on the Nodong medium-range ballistic missile, a weapon that can reach Japan. Although Japan has a two-layered ballistic-missile defense consisting of the Aegis combat system and Patriot missiles, it may find it necessary to add a third, controversial layer: eliminating nuclear-tipped missiles at the source. Here are five weapons systems, both defensive and offensive, that would help Japan deal with the North Korean missile threat.

1. Aegis Ashore: 

The land-based version of the Aegis combat system that powers both U.S. and Japanese ships, Aegis Ashore would be useful in preventing North Korean missile warheads from falling on Japan. While Japan already has the Aegis ballistic missile defense system on its Kongo-class guided-missile destroyers, there are only four of them. Permanent Aegis Ashore bases would be available 24/7, freeing up the Kongo destroyers for traditional surface-warfare roles. Such a system would also be much cheaper than purchasing new destroyers.

Aegis Ashore, specifically the latest Baseline 9 version equipped with SM-3 Block IB interceptors, is effective against short- and medium-range missiles—both of which North Korea currently wields against Japan and other targets. Aegis Ashore would also bolster defenses against mass missile attacks from China, which has large inventories of medium-range ballistic missiles.

2. Global Hawk: 

Japan is currently planning to purchase three RQ-4 high-altitude long-endurance drones from the United States, almost certainly with North Korea in mind. It’s not enough. In the event of war, North Korea’s rocket forces—and possibly its nuclear weapons—will scatter to avoid detection. While Pyongyang’s missile routes are somewhat predictable—the country has only five hundred miles of paved roads—the new Pukkuksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile is based a on a tracked chassis and has some capability to travel offroad. This will drastically expand the necessary search area for any country attempting to hunt down North Korea’s mobile missiles.

An antimissile campaign against North Korea would involve multiple, simultaneous operations each requiring its own Global Hawk. Purchasing more of the high-altitude drones would allow the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to conduct multiple search, tracking and bomb-damage assessment operations at once across the length and depth of North Korea. Additional drones would also be useful as spares and to cover other regional contingencies.

3. KC-46 Pegasus tankers: 

Japan has four KC-767J midair refueling tankers. Although capable aircraft, they are too few in number to support a sustained anti-ballistic-missile campaign. Japan selected the U.S. Air Force’s KC-46A Pegasus tanker in 2015. In the event of war, Japan will need to be able to conduct combat air patrols over the Sea of Japan, intercepting enemy aircraft as far away from the Home Islands as possible.

Tokyo will also need tanker support for its F-35A Joint Strike Fighters flying air-defense suppression missions and even strike missions deep inside North Korea. This sort of constant coverage will require up to a dozen or more KC-46A tankers.

4. MQ-9 Reaper drones: 

Once Japanese ISR assets detect North Korean mobile launchers in the wild, they will have to be quickly destroyed. The urgency of the antimissile campaign means that North Korean air defenses may not be adequately suppressed, making missions over the country risky. MQ-9 Reaper medium-altitude long-endurance drones could fly such missions instead, taking off from Japan loaded with fuel and munitions and flying long patrols over North Korea.

Reaper drones, brought up to the “Reaper Extended Range” standard with wing-mounted fuel tanks, would cross the Sea of Japan and divide North Korea into a grid-like pattern consisting of “kill boxes” to which one or more drones are assigned. Equipped with Hellfire missiles, GBU-12 five-hundred-pound bombs or GBU-38 Joint Directed Attack Munitions, the Reapers could quickly and accurately eliminate North Korean missile convoys.

5. Tomahawk cruise missiles: 

In the event Japan decides to launch a preemptive attack on North Korea, it would need a weapon to “kick in the door,” destroying air-defense radars, known surface-to-air missile sites, and missiles identified as nearing launch status. Flying at low altitude, the missiles would evade North Korea’s aging air defense network, destroying their targets with a thousand-pound high-explosive warhead. Japan’s forty-two F-35A Joint Strike Fighters could then conduct follow-up strikes to continue to degrade Pyongyang’s radar network and missile air defenses.

Japan has long prided itself on maintaining the bare minimum defense capability. The country spends 1 percent of GDP on its military, just half the amount recommended to NATO member states. It has also eschewed offensive weapons, preferring to mount a purely defensive posture. The prospect of North Korean nuclear attack, however, may force the country to abandon both policies.