China’s Art of War in Sri Lanka China’s amplified efforts to bolster relations with Sri Lanka have shifted the global order and left the United States grasping for straws to maintain its global prestige and relationship with the island nation. by Patrick Mendis and Dominique Reichenbach

Sri Lanka received another round of Chinese-made face masks and medical equipment to combat the coronavirus in mid-June, which is further evidence that Sri Lanka is a major target of Beijing’s foreign policy and “donation diplomacy.”

China’s continued Indo-Pacific expansion and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promotion, culminating in the launching the “Health Silk Road,” have caused a swell in U.S.-China tensions. Sri Lanka, referred to as an important piece of “real estate” by U.S. Ambassador Alice Wells for its strategic location in the Indian Ocean along major maritime shipping routes, has been a flashpoint for these New Cold War-causing tensions over recent months.  

China’s amplified efforts to bolster relations with Sri Lanka have shifted the global order and left the United States grasping for straws to maintain its global prestige and relationship with the island nation.

Escalating Tensions and Playing Political Favorites

Prior to 2019, Sri Lanka’s administration was pro-Washington and favored striking political deals with the United States. For example, in 2017 the pro-American Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration happily renewed its Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the United States for another ten years. The ACSA allowed the transfer and exchange of logistics supplies, support, and refueling services which benefited U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific region.

A mere two years later, however, the pro-Beijing Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration has refused to cooperate with U.S. initiatives, exemplifying that Sri Lanka is now actively choosing a partnership with China instead of the United States. Recently, the United States failed to renew its Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Sri Lanka, even after pledging $480 million in development aid via the Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC). The United States and Sri Lanka spent months debating the MCC compact which promised infrastructure development projects, much like China’s BRI projects within Sri Lanka’s borders; however, the Colombo administration ultimately declined to sign the strings-attached MCC offer and refused to renew the SOFA.

The SOFA negotiations instigated some political tension and debate amongst Sri Lanka’s political class who called the SOFA a “very serious infringement on the country’s sovereignty.” In the wake of these June 2019 tensions, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo canceled a trip to Sri Lanka during his tour of the Indo-Pacific region. Though the US claimed the cancelation came due to “scheduling conflicts,” many Sri Lankans speculated that it had more to do with rising local anti-American sentiments as the US attempted to establish a new military base in Sri Lanka as part of its, now failed, SOFA agreements. In retrospect, it seems that this trip cancelation and rising local sentiments against American influence in Sri Lanka foreshadowed the decline in U.S.-Sri Lankan partnership in favor of China.  

Money Makes the World Go ‘Round 

It is no wonder that Sri Lanka has shifted its alliance, as the coronavirus proved that China has the undeniable power of the purse. After the outbreak of the coronavirus in Sri Lanka, the Colombo administration sent an urgent request to the Chinese government for foreign aid to manage its current financial debts and combat the virus.  

Just days later, the Chinese government responded by extending a ten-year $500 million concessionary loan to Sri Lanka, stating that the two countries have enjoyed a “long history of friendship” and that the Chinese government is committed to “continuously providing necessary assistance to the Sri Lankan government and people within our capacities for the country’s economic and social development.” 

In addition to the concessionary loan, China has also provided several planeloads of medical supplies to Sri Lanka, the most recent being in early June, as well as a detailed report on the measures China took to control the spread of the coronavirus.  

In comparison, to help Sri Lanka mitigate the pandemic crisis, the United States only provided a $5.8 million grant, a tiny fraction of the Chinese $500 million commitment. Juxtaposed against China’s overgenerous donation diplomacy, it appears that there is virtually no benefit for Sri Lanka to choose a partnership with the United States in place of China, suggesting that Beijing is successfully shifting the world order.

New Partnerships

Sri Lanka became famous for exemplifying the dangers of the BRI and its “debt-trap diplomacy” tendencies when it surrendered the Hambantota port and fifteen thousand acres to China for ninety-nine years in 2017, giving China a strategic foothold along major commercial shipping routes.  

Despite this “debt trap,” Sri Lanka’s BRI partnership with China has only continued to flourish. Days ago, Sri Lanka and China established the “China-Sri Lanka Belt and Road Political Parties Joint Consultation Mechanism,” which met for the first time on June 11, 2020.  

The meeting confirmed that the “Communist Party of China stands ready to cooperate with political parties of Sri Lanka to promote bilateral cooperation” and promised “exchanges on governance” to expand BRI cooperation and economic development. At the meeting, Sri Lankan political leaders emphasized their “deep feelings” and gratitude towards China for its valuable epidemic prevention support and economic development initiatives.

Amidst the backdrop of the coronavirus, it is clear that China has maintained an agenda of vying for international leadership to the detriment of both the United States’ global reputation and U.S.-China relations. Remembering the Sun Tzu quote, “If an enemy has alliances, the problem is grave and the enemy’s position strong; if he has no alliances, the problem is minor and the enemy’s position weak,” it seems that China has taken to weakening strategic U.S. alliances throughout the Indo-Pacific region, most notably in Sri Lanka.

A 'Post-Policy' World: Do Facts Matter? (Not In Today’s Republican Party) Do facts matter? Not to today’s Republican Party, argues Steve Benen, the Emmy Award-winning producer of The Rachel Maddow Show, in his essential new book, “The Imposters: How Republicans Quit Governing and Seized American Politics.” by Joseph Cirincione and Zack Brown

Do facts matter? Not to today’s Republican Party, argues Steve Benen, the Emmy Award-winning producer of The Rachel Maddow Show, in his essential new book, “The Imposters: How Republicans Quit Governing and Seized American Politics.” 

“The current iteration of the GOP is indifferent to the substance of governing. It is disdainful of expertise and analysis,” he writes. “It is hostile toward evidence and arithmetic. It is tethered to few, if any, meaningful policy preferences. It does not know, and does not care, about how competing proposals should be crafted, scrutinized, or implemented.” In the process, they have transformed from a governing party into what he calls a “post-policy party.” 

Donald Trump is not an aberration in the party, as John Bolton claims in his new book. For Benen, Trump is the culmination of a shift that began a decade earlier. When Democrats won the White House and expanded their majorities in Congress in the 2008 elections, party leaders moved to oppose  “whatever Barack Obama was for, even when the White House agreed with Republicans,” said Brennen in an interview on the podcast, Press The Button.

Then-Congressman Mike Pence (R-IN) helped lead the charge, Benen writes. Pence told his colleagues “to start getting rid of legislative staff,” and “start hiring aides who would focus exclusively on the media.” 

“The goal was to basically start over. It was no longer important to find people who had expertise in drafting policy and writing laws,” Benen explained.  

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) agreed. “The Senate GOP leader wasn’t concerned with defying the will of the electorate by killing popular legislation; instead, he focused on making popular legislation less popular by trying to kill it, without regard for merit or public interests,” writes Benen. “McConnell’s plan was predicated on the idea that if he could just turn every debate into a partisan food fight, voters would be repulsed; Obama’s outreach to Republicans would be perceived as a failure; progressive ideas would fail; and GOP candidates would be rewarded for their obstinance.”

U.S. foreign policy quickly felt the impact. During the New START Treaty debates in 2010, the Obama administration faced unexpectedly high levels of resistance among Senate Republicans. The White House did not understand why. 

They “approached the New START fight as a policy dispute,” Benen writes, marshalling an impressive array of national security leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and scores of former top officials from both parties.  It didn’t matter. “The GOP’s old guard cared about the details of the treaty and the security consequences of failure, while the party’s far-right senators cared about saying no to Barack Obama.” Though the treaty passed the Senate with 71 votes, Republican senators voted against the accord by a measure of two-to-one. 

Similarly, the GOP response to negotiations to stop Iran’s nuclear program a few years later “was a classic example of ‘post-policy’ politics.” Republicans, who “had spent years arguing that diplomacy with Iran was folly,” recognized that “if Obama’s initiative proved to be a triumph, it would mean Republican orthodoxy on one of the world’s most important national-security challenges had it backward,” Benen writes. 

And so, in an attempt to derail diplomacy between Washington and Tehran, a group of 47 Senate Republicans led by Tom Cotton (R-AR) wrote an open letter to Iran warning its leaders not to trust the United States. “This was extraordinary,” Benen explained, saying the Republican Party had tried “to sabotage their home country.” Even the Senate Historian’s Office admitted the episode was unprecedented - it “could not find a comparable example” in the institution’s history. 

The Iran deal survived the Senate letter only to be threatened again by Donald Trump, who claimed during his campaign that it would “lead to a nuclear holocaust.” As president, Trump told his staff “to provide him with a pretense to abandon the policy he did not like for reasons that he could not explain,” Benen writes. When his top security advisors all said no, Trump “had a bit of a meltdown,” and violated the accord anyway, despite entreaties by American allies to stay in the agreement. 

“The problem, of course, was that the pitch was predicated on the idea that the American president cared about the substance of the debate and would be swayed by appeals built around responsible governance,” said Brenen. “That is not how Republicans work anymore. It's not about whether your arguments are better or whether your ideas work. It's about whether or not it satisfies a political goal.” 

The Republican Party can become a governing party again, argued Benen. But it will take losses at the ballot box to spark reform. “Major parties overhaul their tactics and perspectives not after victories but in the wake of multiple defeats,” he writes. “With this in mind, the Republican Party is likely to become a governing party again when American voters tell the GOP it has no other choice.” 

But are Democrats also becoming “post-policy” by, for example, backing huge Pentagon budgets unjustified by any credible national security need because they are fearful of taking votes that might jeopardize some candidates in swing districts?

“I argue in the book that the Democrats are not always right. They're not. I give them credit for, in general, approaching their governing responsibilities seriously,” Benen said.

“But you know, there's no denying the fact that post-policy politics has a certain appeal because it's easy for people who are lazy, for people who are frustrated by the difficulties of governing. I can understand why it'd be easier to not worry about congressional hearings and not worry about white papers and not worry about details. It’s so much easier to play pundit as opposed to policymaker.” 

“Democrats have to be careful not to fall into the same traps.” 

Why U.S. Stealth Bombers Must Be Able to Attack from Any Angle. by Kris Osborn

It’s called “Direct Attack”, or the ability of a stealth bomber to penetrate heavily defended enemy territory and drop bunker-busting weapons, hit moving targets, pinpoint small targets for close-in destruction and carry larger amounts of smaller-bombs for what’s called “Stand-In” attack. 

Interestingly, despite the necessary and much-discussed technical emphasis now placed upon developing long-range, precision-guided “Stand-Off” weapons, “Stand-In” operations for “Direct Attack” are still very much in need, given the set of specific advantages they provide, according to a recent study released by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. 

The report, called “Long-Range Strike: Resetting the Balance of Stand-in and Stand-off Forces,” makes a specific and decided point of stating that a carefully calibrated mix of both approaches is what a fast-evolving modern Air Force needs. The study points to a series of significant variables with which to make this point, such as size, shape, scope and timing of attacks. 

Long-range attacks, such as cruise missiles launched from more than 500 miles, can at times take up to one hour to arrive, making it more difficult to destroy moving or relocating targets; direct attacks focused on penetrating operations can often use “on-board sensors and other capabilities to complete the entire kill chain against time-sensitive targets,” the study states. 

Also, closer-in penetrating aircraft can carry larger numbers of smaller bombs, something which enables longer-dwell time and an ability to track and hit newly emerging targets. More bombs would likely be needed in a heavily defended area to overcome the many countermeasures expected to thwart, disable or intercept attacking weapons. Hitting penetrating targets, also, can be a tactical advantage somewhat specific to Stand-in weapons attacks conducted by stealthy, penetrating aircraft, the study explains. 

“B-2s can deliver 5,000-pound direct attack “bunker buster” weapons and even the 30,000-pound GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator on hardened targets,” the study states.  

Within this same logical framework, the study goes on to say that longer-flying stand-off weapons might be more vulnerable to being detected and intercepted, simply because they are likely to be larger and spend more time traveling through the air. Citing the extent to which Russian, China, Iran and others have been developing more and more advanced countermeasures, the study explains that U.S. precision strikes will continue to face a growing number of serious challenges, when it comes to pinpointing targets:

”[C]ountermeasures include developing layered air defenses that can intercept incoming weapons; fielding increasingly mobile ground-based weapon systems to make it harder for U.S. ISR systems to locate and track; and hardening/deeply burying important installations to make them more difficult for weapons to destroy. Weapons destroyed or otherwise defeated by enemy air and missile defenses can increase the total number of weapons needed to kill a set of targets,”.... The study writes. 

Despite all these factors, there of course remains a pressing and immediate need for “Stand-Off” attacks as well, given fast-emerging technical progress with enemy air defenses. The study makes the point that stand-off weapons are particularly useful at the beginning of a campaign because, naturally, they involve less risk to humans and can target key fixed infrastructure such as heavily defended command and control centers. Also, the advent of stealthier, more precise weapons, such as the Air Force’s Long-Range Stand-Off weapon cruise missile, promise to bring highly sought after tactical advantages to warfare. Advanced in-flight sensors and guidance systems are increasingly enabling long-range weapons to elude enemy air defenses. In addition, long-range weapons of this kind can both conduct ISR in some instances and also “test” enemy air defenses for soon to arrive closer-in attackers.

For example, newer Maritime variants of the Tomahawk missile are now better able to reconfigure trajectory in-flight to destroy moving targets. Also, it goes without saying that air defenses over territory controlled by an advanced adversary are likely to pose a very significant risk to human pilots working to penetrate the vicinity. Nonetheless, the need for effective “Stand-In” attacks are expected to justify the added risk, while of course considering that maximum risk-reduction measures would be put into effect. 

What much of this clearly points to is that, while of course a mix of both stand-off and stand-in attacks are necessary, stealth is not going anywhere. Essentially, there will remain a clear and pressing need for attacking forces to retain an ability to penetrate heavily fortified and defended areas to successfully optimize offensive operations. This fundamental concept is why attack plans often follow a certain logical sequence, beginning with stand-off weapons to soften air defenses, to be followed by stealth bombers intended to achieve air supremacy to open a crucial “air corridor” through which less stealthy, fast-maneuvering fighters can attack. Finally, on this point, the Air Force is not only engineering a new generation of stealth with its B-21, but also making progress adding advanced, air-defense detecting sensors to its B-2. 

This U.S. Missile Can Kill Any Target on the Planet (In Less Than an Hour) Meet the Common Hypersonic Glide Body. by Caleb Larson

The United States Navy and Army are working together to develop and eventually field a hypersonic glide body in the early- to mid-2020s. The missile, called the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, or C-HGB, differs from other glide vehicles that are being designed by DARPA or other military branches.

Unlike other glide bodies, the C-HGB is conical rather than wedge-shaped. The cone shape is seen as a more conservative design compared to wedges, which are still under development, though both missiles operate in a similar fashion. Using a rocket to get up to optimal speed and altitude, the glide vehicle separates from the rocket body and glides toward a target hundreds or even thousands of miles away at supersonic speeds.

Though cone designs are a less risky choice from a design standpoint, they are considered less maneuverable and therefore less survivable during their terminal flight phase when maneuvering around or through enemy missile defenses.

Testing, 1, 2, 3

In March, the Department of Defense announced a successful C-HGB test near Hawaii. The test built upon data gathered during an earlier 2017 flight test and was more strenuous than previous testing. 

Talking about the recent test, the lead designer for the C-HGB program said that during the test “we put additional stresses on the system and it was able to handle them all, due to the phenomenal expertise of our top-notch team of individuals from across government, industry and academia.”

While the Army plans to mate the C-HGB to road-mobile missile launchers, the Navy plans to use the hypersonic missile to equip several submarines. Block V Virginia-class submarines, a few of the Navy’s Ohio-class guided missile submarines, and the problematic Zumwalt-class of guided-missile destroyers are slated to onboard the C-HGB once it reaches operational capability.

The U.S. Air Force had also been a part of the development program but dropped out, opting to further develop their Air-Launched Rapid Response hypersonic weapon instead.

One of the advantages of a conventionally-armed hypersonic missile capability would be to reduce the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict. The preemptive capability afforded by hypersonic speeds could allow high-value targets to be taken out with conventional explosives sooner than would be possible with nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles, potentially reducing the severity of a future nuclear conflict.

Postscript

Although the C-HGB program is being jointly tested by the Army and Navy, it is apparently intended to be used by every service, with “individual weapon systems and launchers tailored for launch from sea or land.” Stay tuned for more.

Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88G AARGM-ER Missile Is Nearly Ready for War Last year, the Navy was fast-tracking the new air-to-ground missile that was engineered to destroy an enemy’s air defenses and communications from farther distances than existing weapons. by Peter Suciu

Last week, aerospace giant Northrop Grumman has successfully passed a critical design review (CDR) for its AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile–Extended Range (AARGM-ER), which is under development for the United States Navy. 

The CDR followed a successful design verification test of the program’s key component.

Last year, the Navy was fast-tracking the new air-to-ground missile that was engineered to destroy an enemy’s air defenses and communications from farther distances than existing weapons. The weapon, a new variant of the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), extended the attack envelope from 60 miles to 120 miles, vastly changing the engagement equation for attacking forces. It was intended to track and destroy enemy radar used for air-defenses by using a “dual-mode” sensor; the seeker uses millimeter wave technology, inertial navigation systems and GPS guidance. 

The extended-range variant borrows many components from the classic AARGM and has added a new rocket motor that increased its range, while a warhead has increased its destructive capabilities. For lift, it also has a short strake along its length, instead of the predecessor’s mid-body wings.  

The service completed the design verification tests of the missile platform’s motor and warhead, and also included a critical design review of subsystem and system-level performance.

“Rocket motor design verification tests represented a significant knowledge point and milestone for engineering and manufacturing development,” said Gordon Turner, vice-president of advanced weapons with Northrop Grumman, as reported by Flight Global. 

“These tests were important to informing the critical design review and verifying performance of the missile,” Turner added. “With our government partners, we are aggressively focused on achieving speed to fleet while holding to program cost objectives.”

Jane’s also reported that this latest milestone came days after the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) announced the first captive-carry test of the AARGM-ER aboard a Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet combat aircraft. That test took place at Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River in Maryland on June 1.

The AARGM-ER can also be integrated on the Boeing EA-18G Growler, while the U.S. military has announced plans to eventually integrate it onto all three variants of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  

In March of 2019, the aerospace firm had been awarded a $322.5 million contract with the U.S. Navy for the engineering and manufacturing development program of the AGM-88G AARGM-ER. The service has also announced plans to award a low-rate initial production contract to Northrop Grumman in the third quarter of the fiscal year 2021 to being manufacturing of an undisclosed quantity of the missiles.  

This is just the latest test of military hardware produced by Northrop Grumman for the U.S. Navy. Last month, the company manufactured and tested its Very Lightweight Torpedo for the service. The Navy has sought to develop new torpedoes that would significantly reduce cost without sacrificing operational performance.

Russia's Su-33 Fighter vs. China's J-15: Who Wins? Let's take a closer look at these platforms. by Charlie Gao

 Both of these are good planes. However, the J-15 is a copycat of the formidable Su-33.

Back in 2018, Sputnik International put out a piece bashing China’s based J-15 carrier-based fighter jet, describing it as having problems with its flight-control system. But the J-15 is itself a derivative of the Russian Su-33 Flanker. Is the Chinese jet really that inferior to the Russian one? Or are the problems shared, and the article an attempt to distract from the Russian fighter’s own failings?

More From The National Interest: 

The beginning of the article begins with a criticism of the J-15’s weight and ski-jump launching mechanism. As the jet is heavier than its western counterparts, and relies on a “ski-jump” at the end of the runway to get airborne, it can carry fewer armaments and fuel. But this was the original Soviet design concept for carrier operations.

The Liaoning (originally the Soviet Varyag) was designed with the ski-jump because it was designed to support the Su-33 and MiG-29K fighter aircraft, which weren’t designed to be catapulted off the deck. This made carrier operation simpler, albeit with the aforementioned disadvantages. Sputnik’s criticism rings hollow: the PLAN is simply utilizing the carrier as it was designed: by the Russians.

The PLAN is even planning to improve this aspect, and catapult-launched versions of the J-15 are reported to be in development. Photos have been seen of J-15s with modified nose gear that could be used with catapults.

The second, more valid criticism is that the J-15 is an underdeveloped version of the Su-33. Since China bought only the prototype of the Su-33, the T-10K3, they had to reverse-engineer this airframe. China then subsequently attempted to acquire Russian Su-33s in 2006 and 2009, but these negotiations appear to have fallen through, resulting in China pushing forwards with the indigenous J-15 program.

The Russian experts criticism of the J-15 as being immature in development are mostly valid. Most of the problems with the J-15 stem form its underdeveloped indigenous WS-10 engines. The inability to produce satisfactory domestic engines has been a perennial thorn in the side of the Chinese aerospace industry, which has been reliant on Russia for engines for its Flankers.

That being said, the criticism often cites the many crashes of the J-15 as evidence of the fighters deficiencies. Operating fighters from a carrier isn’t easy even in ideal conditions, and the original Su-33 design also crashed multiple times in 2016 when the Admiral Kuznetsov was deployed to support Russian troops in Syria.

The Su-33 itself hasn’t even seen that many upgrades since the early 1990s, only undergoing light upgrades. Russian naval aviation appears to be more focused on procuring the newer MiG-29KR, a lighter airframe. The Su-33 only has one semi-multifunctional display in its cockpit, limiting its ability to employ precision guided munitions and use modern navigation techniques. Upgrades have not changed this, only adding new bombing systems and giving the pilot a digital kneepad in lieu of a cockpit refit.

China on the other hand, has built the J-15 to its latest standards of cockpit design and ergonomics. A picture of the J-15’s cockpit show multiple MFDs in the cockpit, and an F/A-18-inspired control panel under the hold.

They also have been more aggressive in developing improved variants of the J-15 for other roles, including the J-15D electronic-warfare aircraft to match the US Navy’s EA-18G “Growler”. Dual cockpit variants of the J-15 have also been developed.

Overall, while the Su-33 is probably superior to the J-15 in reliability and engine power, the J-15 is simply a more modern aircraft and is integrated with modern ergonomic design concepts. China’s effort in tearing down the airframe and (even imperfectly) understanding how it works has allowed them to thoroughly modernize it and develop new variants of it. This has allowed them to build a modern carrier-based fighter, while Russia’s Su-33 remains stuck in the 1990s with analog instruments and a simple HUD.

Even Sputnik’s expert, Vasily Kashin, states at the end of the article: “By spending some more time and money, the Chinese will apparently solve the problems they now have and will get a fairly reliable and powerful carrier-based fighter.”

John Bolton: Tales of a Disgruntled and Disgraced National Security Advisor Bolton was silent when the world needed to hear from him and when it mattered. Now, as a disgruntled former employee, it is hard to credit his account. by Ahmed Charai

Donald Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton, will not go down in history alongside President Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, President  George H. W. Bush’s advisor, Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, President Barack Obama’s Marine Corps Gen. James Jones, or President Carter’s Zbigniew Brzeziński.

Unlike his famous forebears, he didn’t end a war, nor did he negotiate a peace, sound the alarm on a gathering threat, or make any deep mark on diplomacy. Timing and presidential temperament create these historic opportunities; Bolton either didn’t see or seize them or the nature of the Trump White House did not allow an advisor to act alone on the team sport of U.S. foreign policy. This sense of disappointment is the background music of his book.

Bolton, though an honorable man, carries nothing into history with his name on it—except a book that breaks new ground in allegedly exposing state secrets and presidential confidences. And the book appears not only during the current presidential term but some 135 days before a close-fought presidential election. Other advisors had waited until a president was safely past reelection or a president had left office altogether. So, the one historic precedent that Bolton has set will bring him little honor.

The Trump campaign and its surrogates will tirelessly remind the public of Bolton’s championing of the Iraq War, which the president sees as a costly misadventure. Less partisan minds may admit that it is too soon to judge a war that did create a rough, multi-party democracy and enjoy a near tripling of its economy’s size since 2003, according to the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). If Iraq withers into a Teheran-led puppet state or succumbs to extremism on its own, then the war’s critics will be right. If Iraq soldiers on, peacefully changing parties in free elections and finding its economic feet, then it’s critics will seem small. It is, from my perspective as an Arab publisher living in Casablanca, simply too soon to say.

The real goods on Bolton lie elsewhere and in four parts. First, there is his tenure as national security advisor. Second, is the completeness of the record he presents in his book and interviews. Third, there is his history as a partisan critic of presidents, especially Obama. Finally, there is the likely foreign-policy fallout of his book, which undermines an administration he was once sworn to uphold.

 

While Bolton had few accomplishments, there are several cases where his ardent advocacy might have been dangerous if followed. Consider how he urged the president to bomb Iran, which Trump veered away from only hours before the bombers were set to fly. Or consider his hawkish advice regarding North Korea, which might have reignited the Korean War.

How complete is Bolton’s record of history? It is hard to say since he refused to testify under oath during the U.S. House’s impeachment inquiry when it might have changed history. In his book, he has much to say about the Ukraine matter. But when the world needed to hear it and he might have imperiled his White House post, he was silent. Now, as a disgruntled former employee, it is hard to credit his account. His words might have once been seen as brave honesty but now they seem peevish and vengeful. Timing tends to color perception.

Bolton’s criticism of Trump, though based on personal experience, is soft compared to his criticism of Obama as “inattentive and terribly naïve. He has taken the path of least resistance abroad and the Russians have moved in and filled the strategic background.” This March 2014 criticism, and many others like it, is broadly similar to what he now says about Trump. Maybe no president is tough enough for Bolton.

Yet his criticism of Obama set up a chain of circumstances that led to his hiring by  Trump. It is hard to escape the idea that Bolton, at least partly, criticizes presidents for personal advantage.

Finally, consider how Bolton’s book may affect U.S. foreign policy, especially with China and Israel.

Chinese state-run news services immediately disputed Bolton’s published contention that its trade negotiations were designed to help Trump win reelection. At the very least, Bolton’s book has complicated trade talks when U.S. farmers are desperate to export food to China and recover from the coronavirus.

As for Israel, Bolton’s account in casting Trump as an unreliable friend of Israel is at odds with the president’s own actions: He moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, formally recognized Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, and supported it’s right to build new settlements in the West Bank. It is hard to imagine a more pro-Israel president. Bolton doesn’t say—and it is hard to imagine—what significant policies remain unchecked off of Jerusalem’s list.

Bolton’s only substantive complaint is about his frequent antagonist in the West Wing, Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law. It was Kushner who wisely asked Israel to limit its construction in the Jordan Valley since it could topple the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, which has a large Palestinian population. Destabilizing the Middle East is simply unwise and failing to further antagonize the Palestinians is no flaw.

On balance, Bolton’s book makes the Trump White House look wiser for not heeding his advice.