Is North Korea Planning to Disrupt the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election? Tensions seem to be rising fast on the Korean Peninsula. What needs to happen to avoid another 2017-style showdown? by Doug Bandow

Two years ago, the improbable became the new reality when Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump met in Singapore. The dramatic opening was hobbled by the president’s lack of diplomatic acumen and his aides’ unrealistic demand that North Korea disarm before receiving any benefit for doing so. Still, opportunities never before seen seemed to beckon.

Today the possibilities appear to be closing rapidly. The U.S. went all-or-nothing at the Hanoi summit a year ago and got … nothing. Talks deadlocked. Pyongyang dismissed the Republic of Korea as a factor, since Washington refused to relax sanctions to allow joint economic projects to proceed.

As the new year dawned Kim promised to unveil a new strategic weapon. Since then the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said it plans to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Short-range missile testing has accelerated. Plans for a long-range test or even a nuclear test as well may be afoot.

As the two-year anniversary approached, North Korea’s hardline foreign minister, Ri Son-gwon publicly doubted there was a good reason to maintain the relationship between the two leaders. He complained that since the Singapore summit “Even a slim ray of optimism for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula has faded away into a dark nightmare.” In the last couple weeks, the North cut all communication channels with the South, shuttered the liaison office, called the ROK an enemy, and, more ominously, said it was turning to the military for the next step.

All of which suggests that Pyongyang plans on making a dramatic entrance into America’s presidential campaign.

So far, the administration appears ill-prepared in the extreme to deal with another Korea crisis. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said the North had “to give up their nuclear program” if “they want to have a great economy.” Kim has already decided against making that choice. As prospects for the future darkened, Washington promised unspecified flexibility, which offered nothing specific or of value that would be worth changing the DPRK’s approach.

What to do?

First, Trump and presumptive Democratic Party presidential candidate Joe Biden should informally agree not to react to DPRK provocations during the campaign. The North wants to get attention. Which is the best reason not to give Pyongyang what it wants. Rewarding extreme behavior only guarantees a repeat in the future.

Second, U.S. policymakers should recognize that peace is better than war. Any American military attack would create a very high risk of triggering full-scale conflict. Doing so is not worth the risk. Depending on the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and reach, hundreds of thousands or millions could die in any war. Washington’s essential objective should be to prevent, not trigger, such an attack.

Third, Washington should adopt a policy to reflect the fact that North Korea is a nuclear power. It possesses nuclear materials, has tested nuclear weapons, and has developed multiple means of delivery. This means the likelihood of genuine denuclearization is at best zero and probably quite a bit less.

The only nuclear power to give up its weapons was South Africa, and its circumstances were unique. Denuclearizing North Korea was never going to be easy. Alas, the Obama and Trump administrations confirmed the skepticism with which any government in Pyongyang should greet an American proposal. The former helped take out Muammar Khadafy after he yielded his missile and nuclear programs, while the latter tore up the agreement with Iran after the latter took steps to make future weapons development more difficult.

Fourth, while the next U.S. administration might formally maintain the fantasy of denuclearization, it should prepare an arms control program, with discrete proposals to limit and restrain the North’s advances in ways consistent with denuclearization, if Pyongyang ever demonstrates its willingness to move down that path.

Fifth, sanctions have value only as part of a serious diplomatic program with realistic off-ramps and serious carrots as well as sticks. The Trump administration’s approach of give us everything and then we will be nice to you, trust us!, is dead. Sanctions are especially unhelpful when the U.S. ignores the roadmap signaled by the other side. In the Singapore agreement, substantively thin though it was, Kim indicated his desire for establishing better bilateral relations and creating a regional peace regime. The U.S. has encouraged neither, instead preserving its counterproductive policy of complete isolation and maximum pressure.

Sixth, Washington should recognize that engagement is even more necessary for a threatening nuclear North Korea than a weak conventional one. The possibilities for miscommunication and misjudgment remain high yet the stakes are growing. The U.S. should push for better relations and more contact. The ban on travel to and from the North should be dropped. Official liaison offices should be established. Contacts should be regularized. Diplomatic discussions should be seen as good sense, not a reward.

Seventh, America should empower Seoul. The DPRK is an existential issue for South Korea. The former is relevant to America only because the U.S. has chosen to put itself at risk by placing military personnel within harm’s way. The North will not attack America unless the two are at war and defeat for the DPRK seems certain. So Washington should relax sanctions and allow the ROK to set policy and test approaches. The U.S. has failed. It is time for a new strategy.

Eighth, the administration should use the deadlock over the special measures agreement as the trigger for beginning to withdraw American military forces from the South. With more than 50 times the North’s GDP and twice its population, the ROK does not need conventional military support. The South should take over responsibility for its own security.

And contra common claims, the U.S. presence provides no “dual-use” advantages. No South Korean president is going to turn his or her country into a target by allowing American forces to operate from ROK soil against the People’s Republic of China in any contingency other than a Chinese attack on the South, which is plausible only if Seoul joined Washington in attacking the PRC. Nor would a U.S. army division have any serious value in such a war.

Once the election is over the winner should develop a serious diplomatic initiative that sets realistic objectives and offers the North significant benefits that would justify limiting nuclear and missile developments. The U.S. won’t know if Kim is prepared to say yes until it asks him.

We are approaching the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. No one should want a repeat. In 2017 President Trump took America uncomfortably close to a Korean Armageddon before opening up diplomatic opportunities in 2018. This time the next president should skip the war scare and move straight to the peace initiative.

Yes, the Navy Is Building Another America-Class Amphibious Assault Ship Very good. by Kris Osborn

The U.S. Navy’s America-class amphibious assault ships are steadily taking shape as the service makes new progress starting to build its 4th ship in the class—LHA 9, a vessel expected to help usher in a new era of amphibious warfare for the Navy.

The first-in-class USS America launched in 2014 and the second, the USS Tripoli, has also launched. The third, the USS Bougainville, is under construction. America-class builder Huntington Ingalls now reports that the Navy has awarded them a long-lead items procurement contract for the 4th America-class amphib, called LHA 9 at the moment. 

America-class amphibs can transport up to 3,000 sailors and marines, including elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU, designed for amphibious warfare. Amphibious technology on board the ship can include up to 60 HMMWs, Light Armored Vehicles, mortars, artillery and smaller Internally Transportable Vehicles, or ITVs, configured to drive into the back of an Osprey, Navy and Marine Corps officials described.

In total, America-Class amphibs are configured to house as many as 31 aircraft including 12 MV-22 Ospreys and the CH-53 Super Stallion, AH-1Z Super Cobra, UH-1Y Huey, F-35B fighter and MH-60 Sea Hawk helicopter, Navy officials explained.

America class ships are outfitted with a group of technologies called a Ship Self Defense System. This includes two Rolling Aircraft Missile RIM-116 Mk 49 launchers; two Raytheon 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; and seven twin .50 cal. machine guns, Navy statements say.

The LHA 9 is referred to as the second Flight 1 America-class amphib as, like its predecessor the USS Bougainville, features a well-deck for launching watercraft such as amphibious assault ships, ship-to-shore transport craft and other vessels. 

The first two America-class amphibs were built without a well-deck as a way to heavily emphasize air-power projection, particularly with the F-35B. Following the first two America-class amphibs, the Navy plans to use well-decks for the ship class, to ensure amphibious landings are possible moving into the future. The air power emphasis for the first two Americas is quite deliberate, as Navy strategies sought to leverage the additional reach and attack versatility of the F-35B, and also place a premium on longer-range attack in light of advanced, long-range weapons and sensors being used by potential adversaries. 

The 2nd America, the USS Tripoli, is 844-feet long and 106-feet wide with a weight of more than 44,000 tons. A fuel-efficient gas turbine propulsion system brings the ship’s speed up to more than 20 knots, a Huntington Ingalls statement said.

The USS Tripoli will incorporate a gas turbine propulsion plant, zonal electrical distribution and fuel-efficient electric auxiliary propulsion systems first installed on the USS Makin Island, a Navy statement said.

The F-35B, already deployed on U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships, has already begun to shift the character of amphibious attack strategy. The Navy has worked extensively on preparing the America-class to operate the F-35 by reinforcing areas beneath the flight deck and adding new materials to landing areas to ensure they do not get heat damage. 

Part of the challenge to F-35B integration is recognizing how its technologies will change concepts of operations, tactics and procedures; the F-35B is a very different aircraft than the Harrier jets it is replacing, Navy officials said. Harrier jets, which also have the ability to conduct vertical take-off-and-landings, are multi-role jets primarily designed for light attack missions—such as quickly flying over land locations where Marines are forward deployed and providing close air support.

While the F-35B can perform these missions as well, the new Joint Strike Fighter brings a wide range of new sensors, weaponry and aviation technology to the Corps.

These F-35B sensors, which include a Distributed Aperture System placing cameras around the aircraft to provide a 360-degree purview as well as Electro-Optical Targeting Systems; these sensors, among others, will allow the F-35B to perform ISR missions as well as strike and ground support.

The C5I (command, control, communications, computers, collaboration) requirements for the F-35B will be very different from how the Navy operates the Harrier.

At the same time, the return of a well deck is increasingly important as the Navy is emphasizing the development and deployment of more unmanned systems for amphibious attack to enable more dispersed, strategically complex amphibious attack possibilities. 

Why the Aircraft Carrier USS Gerald Ford Is Such a Big Deal It is closer to being ready for war too. by Kris Osborn

The Navy is launching armed attack planes from the deck of its USS Ford carrier to prepare the new ship for major warfare on the open seas, by launching F/A-18 Super Hornets and helicopters equipped with ordnance for combat missions. 

Carrier Air Wing 8 has been operating the largest air wing embarked to date for the Ford and the ship’s first ordnance movement from a lower-deck magazine using the weapons elevators. 

The exercises used 40,000 pounds of inert, or non-explosive ordnance which was transferred through an upper stage elevator before being loaded onto an aircraft. 

“We’re thrilled to be here dropping light and heavy inert ordnance; but the biggest thing as the air wing commander is to do our primary mission: war at sea, air defense, air superiority and power projection. We’re taking [Ford] from carrier qualification to a mission that focuses on combat operations,” Capt. Josh Sager, Commander, CVW 8, said in a Navy report. 

The first-in-class USS Ford has been specifically engineered for expanded air attack, being built with a larger deck space than the Nimitz-class to enable a greater sortie rate. Navy developers explain that the Ford configuration was developed to increase the air mission rate by as much as 33-percent, with a mind to creating a new dimension of air power projection. This strategy, initiated years ago, did seem to anticipate what could be described as a modern threat environment. More air power would be needed in any kind of major-power engagement, carriers need to have an ability to operate the first-of-its kind carrier-launched F-35C stealth fighter, and perhaps of equal or greater significance, modern carriers need to have longer attack reach.

Air attack assets such as an F-35C and upgraded F/A-18 fighters will have longer reach due to the upcoming arrival of the MQ-25 carrier-launched aerial refueler. This constitutes a substantial development, as it enables a carrier air wing to hold a country at risk for ranges out to 1,000 miles or more. Should an F-35C, for instance, have a 500 mile combat radius, it may need to turn around before reaching its destination. Should Chinese DF-21 carrier killer missiles, which have a reported range of up to 900 nautical miles, force carriers to operate at greater standoff distances, an aerial refueler could ensure that the Navy sustains an air attack capability. 

CVW-8 embarked seven squadrons and is operating nearly 30 fixed-wing aircraft and both of their Helicopter Sea Combat squadrons. 

U.S. General Throws Mike Pompeo’s Iran Policy Under the Bus “There's actually no military component of what's known as the maximum pressure campaign.” by Matthew Petti

The commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East said that there is “actually no military component” to the maximum pressure campaign against Iran, reversing comments made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in January.

U.S. forces killed Iranian spymaster Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani as he arrived in Baghdad on January 3, kicking off a round of direct U.S.-Iranian clashes.

Pompeo advertised the assassination as part of his signature “maximum pressure” campaign, which is aimed at forcing Iran to change a host of its domestic and foreign policies.

“It has a diplomatic component, it has had an economic component, and it has had a military component,” he told reporters on January 7, referring to the pressure policy.

But Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, pulled back Pompeo’s claims during a speech at the Middle East Institute last week.

“We actually do not directly contribute to the maximum pressure campaign,” said the four-star general, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East and Central Asia. “Instead, what our responsibility is as U.S. Central Command, is to deter Iran from taking actions either directly or indirectly against the United States or our allies and partners in the region.”

State Department officials have sold the killing of Suleimani as a way to “restore deterrence” against Iran.

McKenzie warned that Iran could act “either directly or indirectly against the United States or our allies and partners in the region” in retaliation to diplomatic and economic pressure.

But he was clear that “there's actually no military component of what's known as the maximum pressure campaign.”

Suleimani’s killing and the Iranian retaliation was the last direct confrontation between Iranian and U.S. forces. Congress voted to restrain President Donald Trump’s war powers soon after, sending a signal that the U.S. public would not endorse any further military escalation.

Iranian and U.S. forces have clashed several times since the beginning of the maximum pressure campaign, before and after Suleimani’s death.

U.S. naval forces began massing in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 2019 after several oil tankers exploded off the coast of Iran. Iranian forces shot down a U.S. surveillance drone they say entered Iranian airspace, and Trump came within minutes of ordering an armed retaliation.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were blamed for a rocket attack that killed an American translator in December 2019, causing a spiral of escalation that culminated in the Suleimani killing. Iran then launched ballistic missiles at a U.S. airbase in western Iraq, injuring over 100 troops.

The same Iranian-backed militias killed two more U.S. service members in a rocket attack in March.

Iraq’s parliament has asked U.S. forces to leave the country in light of the U.S.-Iranian clashes.

More rockets struck a U.S. base last week as Iraqi and U.S. officials met for a strategic dialogue, where the two countries agreed on the need to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq.

McKenzie, however, maintained that killing Suleimani has deterred Iran from further action.

“I would assess that right now we're in a period of what I would call contested deterrence with Iran,” he said. “I think the Iranians have had to recalculate because they did not believe that we would actually take that action.”

Why U.S. Army Bases Should Be Stripped of Statues With Confederate Roots The Confederates for whom bases are named are not heroes nor do they present a “history of Winning, Victory and Freedom.” In fact, they never have. by Mark Perry

Retired Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling was famous once, at least in the military. Back in 2007, Yingling, who served as an active-duty officer with the U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, penned an article for the Armed Forces Journal that arrived with all the subtlety of the shells he’d once fired from his regiment's tanks. Describing the war in Iraq as a “debacle,” Yingling blamed the military's senior leadership for America's military failures in the Middle East. His assessment was blunt, painful and controversial: “America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy,” Yingling wrote.

“A failure of generalship” made national headlines and spurred a predictable response from Yingling’s superiors—many of whom quietly signaled to Yingling that his military career was over. As Yingling later described it, there was “absolute silence from the top.” But in the Pentagon’s E-Ring, where the U.S. military plans America’s wars, Yingling’s article was passed hand-to-hand, talked about and debated—ceaselessly. And over the years, the charge sheet detailed in the Armed Forces Journal article has not only begun to take hold, a chorus of senior military officers regularly defend Yingling's views. Meanwhile, Yingling himself retired to teach high school social studies and coach youth baseball in Colorado.  

Now, Yingling is at it again. In an article that appeared in the June 9 issue of Defense One, Yingling and two retired U.S. Army officers (John Nagl, a celebrated retired Army lieutenant colonel and Mike Jason, a well-known retired combat colonel) urged the Army leadership, and specifically Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, to rename U.S. military bases—substituting celebrated combat leaders and soldiers for "the names of Confederate officers who took up arms against the United States." Yingling and his colleagues identified ten army bases they believe should be renamed (Forts Benning, Bragg, Hood, Lee, Polk, Gordon, Pickett, A. P. Hill, and Rucker—as well as Camp Beauregard), while recommending suitable substitutes: from Sergeant First Class Alwyn Cashe of Thompson, Georgia to Sergeant Henry Johnson, a Medal of Honor recipient from North Carolina.

Speaking from his home in Colorado, Yingling laid out the reasons behind his team’s recommendations. “We identified three criteria,” Yingling told me in an extensive telephone interview. “The person had to be in the home area of the base, had to be a person of color, and had to be a junior or enlisted officer.” When I offered that perhaps it might be appropriate to honor Gen. James Longstreet, a southern officer who broke with the Lost Cause and actually commanded an integrated militia during Reconstruction (resulting in his branding as a “scalawag”—a turncoat, by his former Confederate commanders), Yingling sighed. “Can’t do that,” he said. “And for a very simple reason. He was a Confederate.”

The Defense One article did not have the explosive power of Yingling’s 2007 Iraq essay, but its impact was immediate. The Yingling-Nagl-Jason proposal circulated in the upper echelons of the military, whose senior officers largely endorsed its recommendation. “This move is long overdue,” a senior retired military officer told me within hours of the article’s publication, adding that many in the military had been thinking along the same lines—some of them for many years. Predictably, however, Trump opposed the move, in a tweet-powered condemnation aimed at solidifying his standing with his base, while tying him to the uncertain history of a generation of confederate generals who have seen their names emblazoned on Army bases from Virginia to Texas. “These Monumental and very Powerful Bases have become part of a Great American Heritage, and a . . . history of Winning, Victory, and Freedom,” Trump tweeted. “The United States of America trained and deployed our Heroes on these Hallowed Grounds, and won two World Wars. Therefore, my administration will not even consider the renaming of these Magnificent and Fabled Military Installations.”

Of course, though this should go without saying, Trump had it wrong. The Confederates for whom the Army bases are named are not only not heroes (except perhaps in some areas of the Old Confederacy), they do not present a “history of Winning, Victory and Freedom.” And never have. A handful of examples will suffice: Fort A. P. Hill is named for Virginian Ambrose Powell Hill, a Corps Commander in Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, who was killed by Yankee gunners at the Battle of Petersburg. The problem with Hill, who sported a red “battle shirt” in combat, was that he was sick, and absent, during most of Lee's major engagements—suffering, it is said, from syphilis. At Gettysburg, when Lee needed him most, he was rarely found. Then there’s the famed George Pickett, who commanded Lee’s charge at Gettysburg, only to be dismissed by Lee himself in the war’s last days, when Pickett’s division was overwhelmed at the Battle of Five Forks. Pickett himself was behind the lines with his buddies, enjoying a “shad bake.” Lee was enraged. On the eve of Appomattox, Lee spotted him nearby: “Is that man still with this army?” he asked. Finally, there is General Braxton Bragg, for whom North Carolina’s Fort Bragg is named. Bragg is arguably one of the worst commanders in American military history (Grant’s army humiliated him at Chattanooga) and was loathed by his subordinates, who plotted endlessly to replace him. After Chattanooga, Jefferson Davis, who might have been his only friend, relieved him, made him his military assistant—and regularly ignored his advice.

Nor should we forget several others, better battlefield commanders than Hill, Pickett or Bragg, though of suspect morals and political beliefs: John Brown Gordon became Governor of George after the Civil War—and reputed head of the state's Ku Klux Klan, while Brigadier General Henry Benning, an ardent secessionist and racist (the “white race” he told the Virginia legislature, is “superior in every respect”), went on to become a respected lawyer in Columbus, Georgia. The Benning family, it is said, became the model for the O’Hara’s in Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind. The regularly occurring and predictable question is not why these men’s names should be replaced by the names of those who are true heroes, but why they were so honored in the first place. Yingling provides an answer, pointing out that many of the bases were named in the thirty-year period from 1890 to 1920 when the myth of the Lost Cause was at its height—and the United Daughters of the Confederacy were a formidable lobbying organization. “The army was not strategic about their culture at the time,” he notes, “but southerners were. They were well-organized, outspoken.” Yingling points to the U.S. Air Force as a model of how bases should be named. “If you visit Edwards Air Force Base,” he says, “you will notice that all of the streets are named for fighter pilots who lost their lives in their service. It's exactly right, a reminder of the sacrifice that Air Force pilots made. It's deeply affecting, and very sobering.”

The Yingling-Nagl-Jason proposal has gained support inside the U.S. military, and in Congress, despite President Donald Trump’s opposition. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy has said that he is open to considering renaming those bases named for Confederates, while a Pentagon spokesperson has said that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper “supports the discussion.” The announcement reverses the Army’s traditional position on the issue. And in the wake of the Defense One article, the Senate Arms Services Committee adopted Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s (D-Mass.) amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act which would force the Pentagon to remove the names of monuments and paraphernalia honoring the Confederacy from military bases over the next three years. “This issue is already decided,” the senior retired military commander with whom I spoke says. “It is a non-debate.”

If there is a last stand here, then this former senior military officer notes, it is likely to be over the renaming of Fort Lee in Virginia. It is at least notionally true that Robert E. Lee stands alone, for unlike Gordon or Benning, the celebrated southern commander remained nearly silent in the wake of his defeat, counseling his fellow commanders to accept the verdict of the war. The issue over which the debate had raged, he believed, had been decided on the battlefield—and Lee accepted the verdict in silence. Then too, and inarguably, Lee was an innovative, brilliant and tenacious enemy commander whose legendary campaigns are studied and restudied. But then there’s this: would you have sent 12,500 of the cream of your army for nearly a mile across an open field and into the teeth of the most formidable array of artillery ever deployed in North America?

Me neither.

Why America's V-22 Osprey Just Keeps Getting Better A powerful and useful aircraft. by Kris Osborn

The U.S. military services have now received as many as 400 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, a milestone which speaks to the multi-year operational effectiveness of the well-known aircraft, in use by the Marine Corps, Navy and U.S. Special Operations.. 

The 400th Bell-Boeing built Osprey was delivered to U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command to support a wide range of mission sets to include troop transport, resupply and long-range infiltration.

The Osprey has supported land and maritime combat and land war for many years since its arrival more than 10 years ago; its mission success has inspired the Pentagon to continually upgrade the aircraft for service as far as into the 2050s and beyond. 

The longevity and expected service-life of the Osprey has, for many years, been supported by a wide range of sustainment and modernization efforts including aerial refueling and advanced digital networking. There is also the possibility of further arming the platform and the Navy has been working to engineer and deploy its own variant of the Osprey. The CVM-22B Navy variant, in development now for several years, is intended to replace the current role of the carrier-launched C-2 Greyhound aircraft. 

The military services who operate the Osprey have, over the years, added a Digital Interoperability technology to network the aircraft, its crews and other air and ground nodes to transmit combat crucial real-time intelligence information. 

Due to its tiltrotor configuration, the Osprey can hover in helicopter mode for close-in surveillance and vertical landings for things like delivering forces, equipment and supplies—all while being able to transition into airplane mode and hit fixed-wing aircraft speeds. This gives the aircraft an ability to travel up 450 nautical miles to and from a location on a single tank of fuel, Corps officials said.

The Pentagon concept with future Osprey variants is to build upon the lift, speed and versatility of the aircraft’s tiltrotor technology and give the platform more performance characteristics in the future. While few specifics were yet available, this will likely include improved sensors, mapping and digital connectivity, even greater speed and hover ability, and better cargo and payload capacity. Other upgrades will probably see next-generation avionics and new survivability systems such as defenses against incoming missiles and small arms fire.

The Osprey is, among other things, known for its ability to reach speeds more than 250 knots and achieve a much greater combat radius than conventional rotorcraft. Upgrades to the Osprey better facilitate an Osprey-centric tactic known as “Mounted Vertical Maneuver,” wherein the tiltrotor uses its airplane speeds, helicopter hover and maneuver technology to transport weapons such as mobile mortars and light vehicles, supplies and Marines behind enemy lines for a range of combat missions—including surprise attacks. 

Over the years, the Naval Surface Warfare Center and various industry partners have explored the possibility of more fully arming the Osprey with new weapons, giving its fast expanding combat roles. At one point, various services were exploring requirements along those lines, however the status of such an initiative is, at the moment, unclear. At one point in recent years, industry experimented with firing 2.75 folding fin Hydra 70 laser guided rockets to support the aircraft’s mounted guns. 

Adding weapons to the Osprey would naturally allow the aircraft to better defend itself should it come under attack from small arms fire, missiles or surface rockets while conducting transport missions; in addition, precision fire will enable the Osprey to support amphibious operations with suppressive or offensive fire as Marines approach enemy territory.

Is the U.S. Naval Buildup in the Pacific a Warning to China? Beijing had better believe it. by Peter Suciu

Even as China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier Shangong began its sea trials this month, and conducted air sorties near Taiwan, Beijing was put on notice that the United States remains the only nation in the world that could deploy a three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) to the Pacific simultaneously.

Last week the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) Carrier Strike Group, CSG-11, which is part of the U.S. Navy’s 3rd Fleet and coordinates with the U.S. 7th Fleet to conduct missions, began its deployment. U.S. Navy officials have declined to say where the 45-year-old nuclear-powered carrier and its warships were headed but it was just one of three CSGs now operating in the region.

Just as CSG-11 was steaming westward from San Diego, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) left its homeport in Yokosuka, Japan to begin a CSG patrol in the region. The carrier embarked with Carrier Air Wing 5 based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and was joined by unspecified escorts from Destroyer Squadron 15 according to USNI News.

CVN-76 had completed its annual repair in April and held sea trials in May before beginning its most recent patrol deployment. The warships’ 5,000 sailors and airmen had undergone a 15-day restriction of movement (ROM) period and were tested for COVID-19 before embarking as an effort to create a “protective bubble” to keep the ship free from the highly infectious virus.

USS Nimitz had undertaken similar precautions. This followed the outbreak of the novel coronavirus on USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), which had been sidelined since late March after nearly a third of its crew were impacted from the disease. That had allowed China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to have the unique distinction of having the only operational carrier in the region. However, USS Theodore Roosevelt has now returned to duty after is crew recovered from the COVID-19 outbreak.

The deployment of three carriers comes as U.S. national defense strategy sees China as a top security concern. As The Associated Press, via the Navy Times reported, the Pentagon has been working to shift more resources and military assets to the Pacific and South East Asia to address Beijing’s growing economic influence and military might in the region.

Simply put, carrier strike groups remain a symbol of American naval power and while China could soon have two carriers in the PLAN’s fleet—the U.S. Navy still possesses 11.

In addition, the U.S. Navy operates eight amphibious assault ships (LHA), which is as large in size as many of the actual carriers operated by foreign navies, including China, and has plans to build a 4th America­-class LHA. The versatile warships can transport up to 3,000 sailors and marines and house as many as 31 aircraft including the Marine Corps’ F-35B, which can make vertical takes and landings and thus doesn’t require a catapult.

In April, USS America (LHA-6) took part in a drill in the South China Sea as a show of force while the USS Theodore Roosevelt was in Guam.

It isn’t just the U.S. Navy that is serving notice to the Beijing either, as the U.S. Air Force has been flying B-1B bombers and Global Hawk drones in the Sea China Sea in recent weeks. Despite COVID-19 and distractions including protests across the United States, the U.S. military’s flexing of its muscles should serve as a reminder to Beijing—as well as Moscow and Tehran—not to underestimate America’s resolve.