India And America Have Plans To Keep China's J-20 Stealth Fighter From Ruling The Skies The stealth wars are raging. by Sebastien Roblin

The J-20’s short-range capabilities naturally lead to the question—what exactly happens when two stealth fighters clash? If their stealth qualities are robust, both aircraft may only be able to detect each other within 50 miles or less—at which point air combat maneuvers could prove important. As U.S. stealth aircraft are one of the chief military threats to China, it seems reasonable to assume the J-20 would be designed to have a fighting chance against them.

In January 2011, the maiden flight of a large, dagger-like grey jet announced that China had developed its first stealth aircraft—the Chengdu J-20 “Mighty Dragon.” Six years later, after several substantial revisions, J-20s entered operational service with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force.

As radar-guided missiles from fighters and ground-based launchers threaten aircraft from dozens, or even hundreds of miles away, stealth capabilities are increasingly perceived as necessary for keeping fighter pilots alive on the modern battlefield.

But just how good is the J-20? And what is its intended role? After all, America’s first stealth fighter, the F-117 Nighthawk, was not even really a fighter and lacked any air-to-air capability whatsoever.

The PLA has, true to custom, kept its cards close to the chest, and has not shared performance specifications to the public. Thus, there are broad estimates of the J-20’s top speed (around Mach 2), and considerable-seeming range (1,200 to 2,000 miles), but those remain just that—estimates. For years, analysts even over-estimated the aircraft’s length by two meters. It’s broad but relatively shallow weapons bay can accommodate four to six long-range missiles or bombs, though not munitions with especially heavy warheads.

International observers generally concluded the large twin-engine jet possessed high speed and long operational range, but that the Mighty Dragon lacked the maneuverability necessary to prevail in close engagements with enemy fighters. Relatively modest aerobatic displays in the Zhuhai 2016 and 2018 airshows (you can see some of the latter here) reinforced the narrative in certain quarters that the J-20 isn’t optimized for gut-wrenching air combat maneuvers.

Given the above premises, observers mostly speculate the J-20 would either serve as long-range supersonic strike plane, or a hit-and-run interceptor used to slip past fighter screens and take out vulnerable supporting tanker and AWACS planes.

However, Rick Joe of The Diplomat argues these theories of the J-20’s supposedly specialized role might be a case of group-think, ignoring both design features and statements by Chinese sources suggesting the J-20 was intended as a multi-role fighter with “competitive” dogfighting capability.

For example, a brochure distributed at Zhuhai 2018 explicitly stated the J-20 was capable of “seizing & maintain air superiority, medium & long range interception, escort and deep strike.” In other words, a multi-role fighter.

 “A commonly insinuated premise is that the Chinese aerospace industry was not capable of producing a fifth generation air superiority fighter, and would have to “settle” for a less technically challenging interceptor or striker instead,” Joe argues.

He points out that the lengthy J-20 is still shorter than the Russian Su-35 Flanker-E, one of the most maneuverable jet fighters ever designed. He further cites a 2001 study by Song Wecong, mentor of the J-20 designer Yang Wei, which you can read translated here. Wecong wrote that stealth aircraft “must have the capability to supercruise and perform unconventional maneuvers such as post-stall maneuvers.”

Song concluded the ideal stealth fighter would incorporate canards (a second, small set of wings close to the nose of the plane), leading-edge root extensions (or “strakes,” a thin surface extending where the wing emerges from the fuselages), and S-shaped belly intakes, in order to balance stealth, speed and maneuverability. These are all design characteristics evident in the J-20.

While details on the J-20’s radar remains elusive (presumably a low-probability of intercept AESA radar), it also mounts arrays of electro-optical and infrared sensors with 360-degree coverage, reportedly designed to fuse sensor data to form a common “picture” and even share it with friendly forces via a datalink—technology seemingly modeled on the advanced sensors found on the American F-35. Such sensors could be particularly useful for detecting radar-eluding stealth aircraft.

J-20 pilots also are equipped with helmet-mounted sights that allow them to target high-off-boresight PL-10E heat-seeking missiles within a 90-degree angle of the plane’s nose simply by looking at the target. The short-range missiles are stored in small side-bays but can be cunningly rotated outside prior to launch, as depicted here.

These by no means unprecedented capabilities nonetheless suggest that the J-20 may be designed to hold its own in a close-range encounter, not just sling long-range hypersonic PL-15 missiles from its fuselage bay from dozens of miles away. Particularly when engaging agile fighters, short-range missiles (which might still threaten targets over a dozen miles away) have a much higher probability of a kill—by some estimates, up to 80 percent.

Chinese designers have also expressed interest in incorporating vector-thrust engines in the J-20. These have moving exhaust nozzles to assist in pulling off tight maneuvers. The PLAAF recently acquired Su-35 fighters from Russia with vector-thrust engines, and also reportedly tested domestic vector-thrust turbofans on a J-10B two-seat fighter.

Despite the awesome maneuvers enabled by vector-thrust engines, they are far from being automatically included in modern fighters. This is because they significantly add to weight, cost, and difficulty in minimizing radar cross section (RCS). Moreover, when vector-thrust engines are over-used in combat, they can bleed off energy rapidly, leaving the aircraft sluggish and vulnerable to enemy fighters (as occurred in one exercise in Nevada pitting U.S. F-15s against Indian Air Force Flankers). For this reason, few Western fighters incorporate vector-thrust technology, the F-22 being a notable exception. China’s interest in thrust-vectoring again suggests it sees relevance in agility.

The J-20’s short-range capabilities naturally lead to the question—what exactly happens when two stealth fighters clash? If their stealth qualities are robust, both aircraft may only be able to detect each other within 50 miles or less—at which point air combat maneuvers could prove important. As U.S. stealth aircraft are one of the chief military threats to China, it seems reasonable to assume the J-20 would be designed to have a fighting chance against them.

While the J-20 would likely remain outclassed by the F-22, it could potentially prove a dangerous adversary to the F-35, which is not as optimized for within-visual-range engagements. However, both the F-22 and F-35 are believed to have a significantly lower all-around RCS than the J-20, though the Chinese fighter still appears to be significantly stealthier than the Russian Su-57.

A 2011 analysis by Australian aviation expert Carlo Kopp concluded that J-20 probably had strong stealth from a frontal aspect, but a larger radar cross section (RCS) when scanned from the side or rear—a limitation also found in the Russian Su-57 stealth fighter.

But as the extent and type of the radar-absorbent materials used affect RCS, visual analysis alone cannot determine how stealthy an aircraft is. This has not dissuaded the U.S. Marine Corps from a building a full-scale mock-up of a J-20 in Georgia for study and training purposes. The Indian Air Force has boasted its Su-30 Flankers have tracked J-20s on radar, but as stealth fighters often employ emitters called “Luneburg Lens” to enlarge their RCS on routine flights, and thus conceal their true capabilities, it’s difficult to infer much from this either.

Another issue confusing analysis of the J-20 is that it doesn’t yet have the high-thrust WS-15 turbofans the PLAAF envisioned for them, and are making do with Russian AL-31F engines instead. Even China’s fourth-generation jets have been frustrated by deficient jet engines. The WS-15 generates 23 percent more thrust than the AL-31FN, and would enable the J-20 to super-cruise, or sustain supersonic speeds without resorting to fuel-gulping afterburners. Thus, certain more aggressive projections of J-20 performance, such as a top speed of Mach 2.5, may be premised on engines that have yet to be fully developed.

As long as the PLAAF has only a few dozen J-20s in service, it may make sense to reserve them for hit-and-run tactics and special deep strikes. But as the article in the Diplomat points out, there’s ample evidence the J-20 may be intended to grow into a capable all-rounder that can hold its own in a dogfight.

BANG! Five Israeli Weapons Russia Wishes it Had Israel stands at the technological frontier, while Russia has struggled to keep its national innovation system vital and healthy. by Robert Farley

Moscow and Jerusalem have substantially stepped up their military cooperation in recent years, a trend that has made the United States somewhat nervous about the technology it exports to Israel.

In many ways, Israel and Russia have taken opposite approaches to providing for national security. Israel stands at the technological frontier, while Russia has struggled to keep its national innovation system vital and healthy.  Moreover, over the years Russian arms have populated the armies and air forces of Israeli’s enemies.

Nevertheless, Moscow and Jerusalem have substantially stepped up their military cooperation in recent years, a trend that has made the United States somewhat nervous about the technology it exports to Israel. Israeli drones have flown in Russian service in the war in Ukraine, and Israeli electronics have helped improve Russian systems in other ways.  Here are five Israeli defense capabilities that Russia would like to have:

Missile Defense:

Although the Soviet Union helped pioneer the first anti-ballistic missile systems, Russian technology has fallen behind the West, and especially the Israelis. The United States and Israel (often in collaboration) have committed immense resources to developing system to defend against a variety of ballistic projectiles.  On the US side, the effort has concentrated mostly on medium and long range ballistic missiles; on the Israeli, it has focused on the entire array of threat, including low cost, low technology rockets.

Ballistic projectiles do not pose an overwhelming threat to Russia at the moment, but if Moscow’s efforts to improve its air defense network continues to succeed, such missiles may again come to represent the central plank of NATO’s deterrent.  If so, anti-ballistic missiles systems will again become a key component of Russia’s defense strategy.

SPIKE:

Russia boasts some excellent anti-tank munitions, including the 9M133 “Kornet” missile, designed to kill main battle tanks such as the Merkava, Abrams, and Challenger II. A laser guided missile, Kornets damaged several Western tanks in the early days of the Iraq War, and in the 2006 Israeli War against Hezbollah.

The Israeli SPIKE family of missiles has capabilities that many variants of the Kornet lack, however.  This includes “fire and forget” and top attack profiles, which allow the SPIKE to hit enemy tanks at their most vulnerable. Moreover, the SPIKE has proven remarkably flexible in deployment, serving on board a wide variety of different Israeli delivery platforms.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR):

The experience of several wars in Gaza, not to mention the 2006 conflict against Hezbollah and the ongoing Occupation of the West Bank, has given the Israeli national security state an unparalleled ability to integrate information into its frontline operations. This integration has an administrative component (the various organizations that constitute Israeli national defense have become strikingly efficient at sharing and operationalizing information) but also a technological aspect.

Using a variety of electronic and tactical aviation systems, Israel has developed an unparalleled capability to create an image of the battlespace. These system including biometric storage networks, UAVs, and advanced optical systems, among others. Surveillance and intelligence fusion systems of this nature could serve Russia well in Syria, Chechnya, Ukraine, and elsewhere.

Conscription:

Russia has many excellent, professional soldiers.  Russia does not, however, have a functional system of conscription that can identify and train the most capable potential soldiers from within its population. The Russian system of conscription has become a disaster, with many of the most capable potential recruits finding ways to escape service, and a training experience that has become increasingly brutal.

Israel’s system of conscription, on the other hand, remains one of the healthiest in the world. Despite a few notable problems (objections to service in the Occupation, objection from religious minorities), the Israeli national service program continues to effectively harness the country’s best human capital. Israel obviously cannot export the foundation of this system to Russia, but it could assist with administrative reforms designed to improve Russian performance.

Avionic Systems:

Russia’s air force consists of a wide array of generation 4 and 4.5 fighter aircraft, mostly upgraded from Cold War models. The degree of upgrade, however, has proven very uneven.  Moreover, the Russian electronics industry has struggled to provide advanced, reliable avionic upgrades.  In Syria, for example, Russian system of targeting, detection, and discrimination have trailed their Western counterparts, a gap that has had both military and diplomatic costs.

With an electronics industry tightly connected to the military aerospace sector, Israel has specialized in the kind of upgrades that Russian aircraft could definitely use. These include advanced radars, sensor fusion systems, and sensor pods necessary for the targeting of precision-guided munitions.  Tighter collaboration between Israel and Russia could make Russian fighters and bombers far more lethal.

The Final Salvo:

As Israel has sought to expand its diplomatic base beyond the United States and Western Europe, it has increasingly developed positive connections with Russia and points east. This effort has included both commerce and diplomacy; Israeli technology has already found its way into various militaries around the world, including Russia.

At the same time, the Russian military industry requires consistent infusions of technology in order to complete the transition from the post-Cold War doldrums.  Notwithstanding the longstanding strains between the two countries (Iran, the future of the Assad regime) the Moscow-Jerusalem relationship may prove fruitful for both countries in the next decades.

The Vaccine Nationalism of COVID-19 Governments have been clamouring to secure their own supplies of a vaccine, and making opaque deals to do so. by Duncan Matthews

The University of Oxford recently published promising news about the results from the phase one/two trials of the vaccine it is developing for COVID-19. The clinical trials, involving 1,077 volunteers in the UK aged 18-55, showed that the AZD1222 vaccine appeared to be safe and generated the all-important dual antibody and T-cell immune response. 

Yet as encouraging as this is, the public-partnership that underpins the project is a concern. Much of the funding came from the UK government, which announced a £65.5 million grant to the University of Oxford in March. Other funding had already come from outside the UK, including from the German Centre for Infection Research (DZIF) and the Oslo-based Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) so this was not solely a UK initiative. 

Also in March, Oxford reached a licensing agreement with AstraZeneca to commercialise and manufacture the vaccine. But despite this work being largely paid for by the public purse, very little is known about the details of this partnership. There is a lot we don’t know about who will own the intellectual property, how it will be shared and at what price it will be sold. The same is equally true of numerous other public-private partnerships to develop a COVID-19 vaccine. 

And while this global pandemic surely demands a globally coordinated response, governments have instead been clamouring to secure their own supplies of the vaccine. 

Vaccine nationalism 

If the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine proves successful, the company has undertaken to manufacture up to 30 million doses that will be available for people in the UK by September. This is part of an agreement to deliver 100 million doses in total that would be made available to other countries, but the UK will get access first. 

In the same vein, the UK has placed advance purchase orders for two other vaccine prospects: 30 million doses for the one being developed by Pfizer and BioNTech, and 60 million for another from Valneva of France. Again, these agreements lack transparency. We don’t know, for example, whether the taxpayer will still pay if the drugs don’t work. 

We are seeing the same kind of approach elsewhere. In May, the US reached its own supply agreement with AstraZeneca for AZD1222. The Americans are investing US$1.2 billion (£942 million) in return for a 30,000-person vaccine trial in the US, and the manufacturing capacity to produce at least 300 million doses, with the first doses to be delivered as early as October. Similarly, the US has a supply deal with the Pfizer/BioNTech project. 

Elsewhere, AstraZeneca has agreed to supply 400 million doses of AZD1222 to Europe starting from the end of the year through the Inclusive Vaccines Alliance (IVA), set up by Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 

When Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, unveiled the EU vaccine strategy days later, reportedly to ensure that the union was not left behind in the vaccine race by big spenders like the US, she hailed the IVA as an important step towards joint action between the member states. Tellingly, there was no mention of access to AZD1222 for countries outside the EU. 

For other countries, AstraZeneca announced a US$750 million agreement in June with CEPI and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, to make, procure and distribute 300 million doses of AZD1222 with delivery starting at the end of the year. AstraZeneca also signed an agreement with the Serum Institute of India to sub-license AZD1222 to supply 1 billion doses to low- and middle-income countries, with a commitment to provide 400 million by year end. In all cases, little is known about the terms of the agreements. 

One important aspect of this lack of transparency concerns pricing. For example, the deals with the IVA and CEPI/Gavi say AstraZeneca will supply the vaccine at no profit during the pandemic. This leaves open the prospect that “no profit” will cease to apply if the World Health Organization declares that this is no longer a pandemic. Because the terms of these agreements have not been fully disclosed, we just don’t know. 

Alternatives 

Without doubting the commitment of AstraZeneca to its stated objective of broad and equitable access to this vaccine, these opaque agreements raise concerns about precisely how publicly funded research, conducted by publicly owned universities, is being privatised. 

Other approaches are possible. Along with the UK funding package for the University of Oxford, the government also allocated £18.5 million to Imperial College London for a different COVID-19 vaccine project. Having completed clinical trials, Imperial announced on July 17 that it was proceeding to the next trial phase, involving 105 participants aged 18-75. 

Imperial has formed a new social enterprise, VacEquity Global Health, to rapidly develop this vaccine and distribute it as widely as possible in the UK and overseas, including to low- and middle-income countries. This is in partnership with Morningside Ventures, a fund based in Hong Kong that invests in companies for the public good. 

Rather than partnering with one company, the Imperial model envisages links with multiple manufacturers and waiving royalties and charging a modest amount for its vaccine. Agreements to purchase, manufacture and distribute the vaccine are still being negotiated. 

It remains to be seen whether this social enterprise approach proves more successful in achieving equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines in the longer term, but it seems more in line with how we should be tackling this crisis. 

Public money invested in publicly funded institutions should be treated as a public good, not as private intellectual property rights to be licensed and traded by private companies without full and proper public scrutiny. The vaccine nationalism that we have seen in the past couple of months only encourages this. At the very least, these agreements need to be fully transparent to address these concerns. 

Is Coronavirus Surging Because States Are Opening Too Fast? Not Exactly. The number don't show that. by Alan Reynolds

"How Coronavirus Cases Have Risen Since States Reopened" in The New York Times July 9 claimed, "Florida and South Carolina were among the first to open up and are now among the states leading the current surge. In contrast, the states that bore the brunt of cases in March and April but were slower to reopen have seen significant decreases in reported cases since. Average daily cases in New York are down 52 percent since it reopened in late May and down 83 percent in Massachusetts" (which reopened May 18)

The purpose of this note is to question whether or not it is accurate to simply attribute the "current surge" in cases or deaths to the "states first to open up."

The New York Times article showed the percentage changes in cases since reopening – the date when states "lifted order to stay at home or allowed major sectors such as retail, restaurants and personal care services to reopen either statewide or in most areas." Eight states "first to open up" reopened before May 1, twenty more before May 15, and twenty-two states were "slower to reopen" from May 15 to May 29.

Unfortunately, the author's main example – saying Florida was "among the first to open up" on May 4–puts that state into his middle group (May 2 to May 14). To keep 70% of Florida in the narrative (Southeast Florida remained closed), my Table defines early reopening as May 4 or earlier. I redefine late reopening to mean ten states (including D.C.) that reopened after May 20, because the author's May 15 definition of late is not much later than May 4. Reopening dates are from the New York Times article. Statistics on new cases per day from a recent 7 day average and on total deaths per 100,000 residents from the beginning were in nytimes.com on July 23.

About a third of the 23 states that opened by May 4 (four with Democrat Governors) did see relatively high daily numbers of new cases over the 7 days ending July 22, famously including Texas and Florida but not Arizona (which reopened May 8).  About 15 of the early-reopening states have notseen a significant "surge" of new cases.  California had such a surge, but was one of the last states to reopen.

What all of the early reopening states have in common is not how many positive cases they've had tested in the past two weeks, but how few deaths they have had since the virus began. Unusually low death rates in all 23 states explain why so many reopened early. Conversely, very high death rates in states with densely-populated cities explains why they reopened late – such as the NY/NJ/CT corridor, Chicago, Detroit and Washington D.C. 

On July 17 another New York Times article, "After the Surge in Coronavirus Cases, Deaths Are Now Rising Too," claimed daily deaths per million in 18 states over a 7-day span were higher than on June 1. Any detected rise in a state's daily deaths, however small, was again blamed on "the reopening and relaxing of social distancing restrictions in some states."  But that is not what that article's statistics showed.

Increases in daily deaths were expressed as percentage changes, not numbers. Oklahoma deaths were up by less than one person per million, yet that was labeled a 19% increase. A map highlighting 20 "States where deaths have increased [in percentage terms] since June 1" includes Hawaii with only 24 deaths since the virus began, and Alaska with only 17. Aside from Alaska and Hawaii, only 18 other states had any rising deaths, which means most states had falling deaths. Contrary to the "early reopening" theme, eight states with falling deaths were among the earliest reopening states– Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, Maine, Indiana and Colorado­­. The last five early-opening states saw COVID-19 deaths fall by 60-70% since June 1, according to the same article. 

Without careful cherry-picking among the 23 states that opened early, the date of reopening can't explain which states have recently experienced rising cases, much less rising deaths. California proves that reopening late does not by itself protect a state from a surge in new cases. Yet California is a rare state that reopened late despite few deaths (Washington may look like another, but Seattle had the first big nursing home crisis).  

On the other hand, differences in death rates almost always explain which states opened early or late. Those with relatively few deaths (16 per 100,000 in Texas compared with 123 in Connecticut) have experienced almost flat epidemic curves – that is, cases and deaths did not rise sharply and then fall but instead remained low and little changed until recently.

By contrast, having suffered unusually high numbers of infections and deaths by April as late-openers did reduces today's odds of another big bout of community spread. Former super-hot spots like the NY-NJ-CT Metropolitan area have now acquired sizable pockets of COVID-19 resistance ("immunity") with previously-infected people now acting as a buffer to reduce contagion risk for their neighbors.

Could Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei give up on 5G to keep the company alive?

• Huawei’s short term strategy has been to stockpile chips from its key silicon supplier TSMC
• The company’s carrier business, which includes 5G, is about one third of total company revenue.
• Huawei Technologies founder Ren Zhengfei told the Post earlier this year that he 

  hopes to be forgotten

   after retiring from the company.

  “My biggest wish is to drink coffee in a cafe unnoticed,” said the 75 year old.

  But standing between Ren and those anonymous visits to coffee shops is probably the biggest decision of his career.

  In May, the Trump Administration announced a new direct product rule (DPR) that effectively blocks Huawei's access to advanced semiconductors – the brains inside all of its products. While Huawei was able to survive Washington’s first attempt to deny it access to US core tech in May last year, this time it has no wriggle room left.

  Huawei’s short term strategy has been to take advantage of a two month grace period to stockpile chips from its key silicon supplier TSMC. After September, TSMC and other companies that use US chipmaking equipment (including China’s SMIC) will need a waiver from Washington to supply Huawei.

• A Jefferies report earlier this week said Huawei has enough inventory of 5G base station chips to last until the end of next year, but after that the situation was “highly uncertain”.

  If Huawei is hiring lawyers and consultants to find loopholes in the new ruling it is very likely wasting money. “We reaffirm that we will implement the rule aggressively and pursue any attempt to evade its intent,” US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross was quoted as saying by Reuters last month.

• So what is the long term solution for Huawei? There has been speculation that it could find an alternative wafer fabrication partner to TSMC – one that can supply chips made using equipment from Europe and Japan instead.

• Even if that were feasible, it is unlikely Japan, The Netherlands and Germany – the main suppliers of non-US chip making gear – would openly defy Washington by making it possible for Huawei to continue buying 5G chips.

  Earlier this year Dutch company ASML was blocked from shipping the latest generation EUV lithography machine to Chinese foundry SMIC under pressure from Washington.

  With its 5G chip stockpile set to run out sooner or later, Huawei doesn’t have many options. It could take a decade or more to come up with a viable alternative to US chipmaking technology, and the billions of dollars Beijing has vowed to spend to upgrade China’s domestic chip industry may not help either because in many instances that needs US equipment, so is still subject to the new ban.

  But there is one way Ren might be able to save his company.

• Although Huawei’s relationship with the US has soured over a 

  host of issues dating back many years

  , 5G is at the core of the current confrontation. And Trump is winning.

  The tide has turned against Huawei in the international 5G markets, especially after Boris Johnson’s decision earlier this month to ban the company from Britain’s 5G roll out. However, this is all moot because when its stockpile of 5G base station chips runs out, Huawei won’t be able to provide the same products anyway – including to its domestic Chinese telco customers.

  By that stage, Huawei's other products would also be starved of semiconductors. That is, unless Ren cuts 5G loose and refocuses on his other businesses, such as smartphones, where it is No 2 behind Samsung Electronics.

  Huawei’s carrier business, which includes 5G, is about one third of total company revenue. Walking away from 5G would be a bitter pill to swallow – not just for the loss of revenue. Huawei is viewed by the Chinese government as a global tech champion and bulwark against US dominance in tech.

• Amid deteriorating relations with Washington last year, Ren himself offered to share Huawei’s 5G technology with a major western company for a one-time fee. His motive seemed to reflect a preference to battle a US competitor in the market than fight the US government.

  If US-China relations were not so toxic, such an offer might have helped, but not now. In the current geopolitical environment, any Chinese tech company with perceived links to Beijing is a target, with ByteDance’s TikTok short video app also in the Trump Administration’s cross hairs. There has been media speculation that ByteDance could sell TikTok to a buyer to head off its problems.

• If Huawei withdrew from the 5G business altogether it would still earn royalties from its patents. Or the company could consider selling its 5G patent portfolio outright, which might provide a face saving exit for Ren.

  This is, assuming Washington hardliners don't want to kill Huawei outright – regardless of what business it operates in.

  Since he founded Huawei more than 30 years ago, Ren has fought many battles in the marketplace. The former PLA engineer likes to invoke military slogans to motivate the company troops, especially during difficult times.

• That mindset has alarmed some in Washington, including FBI director Christopher Wray. In a widely reported speech on China to the Hudson Institute on July 7, Wray was perturbed after reading 

  the military language used by Ren

   in a speech to employees, as reported in The Wall Street Journal last month.

  “He reportedly told employees that to ensure the company’s survival, they need to – and I quote – ‘surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood’,” Wray said. “He’s also reportedly told employees that Huawei has entered, to quote, ‘a state of war’.”

  It doesn't sound like Ren intends to mount a tactical retreat on 5G so he can live to fight another day. But Huawei will soon run out of “ammunition” in the form of 5G chips. And that could mean the loss of thousands of highly skilled jobs.

  After this battle is over, Ren may find it even harder to go unnoticed in coffee shops in retirement.