Time to Revisit India Inc.’s International Strategy India doesn't just need a strong military and economy. It needs strong diplomats, too. by Archish Mittal and Nicholas Sung

 

As tensions rise in South Asia, India Inc. is back into the spotlight. Calls to revisit India’s international strategy, however, have mainly focused on bolstering the Indian army and air force to defend India’s land border, and domestic economic reforms—especially Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s grand vision for a self-reliant India, or Atmanirbhar Bharat. Yet, New Delhi is missing an opportunity to reform India to genuinely become more self-reliant and position itself as a major power on the international stage. In this regard, two areas have been overlooked: India’s “Act East” policy and the Indian Foreign Service (IFS).

Time to “Act East”

The recent skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control emphasize how Sino-Indian relations will play a critical role in Indian foreign policy as New Delhi increasingly asserts itself internationally. Although India’s rise does not come at China’s expense, Indian policymakers must carefully consider how their Chinese counterparts might react to a more assertive India. India’s relations with South Asian neighbors are influenced by China: New Delhi views Beijing’s “Encirclement Strategy”—in which China entices South Asian governments with favorable economic, diplomatic, and military relations in order to build a strategic buffer around India—as a direct threat to Indian interests. The Belt and Road Initiative is a prime example of how Chinese loans and investment bring India’s neighbors, like Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to China’s sphere of influence.

To counter Beijing’s strategy, New Delhi must expand upon its “Act East” policy to tactfully build upon its existing economic, military, and diplomatic ties with countries which share India’s commitment to a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Although the Indian economy is expected to grow at record-levels in the coming decades, its economic growth is not preordained. India must enhance relations with advanced economies like Australia and South Korea, and bolster political and economic connections with Southeast Asia—a region collectively positioned to be the fourth-largest economy by 2050. In addition, India should strengthen its military capabilities by expanding on its recent security partnerships and military drills with strategically-aligned nations beyond the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. India has not traditionally looked ‘East of Malacca’, but its “Act East” policy demonstrates India’s resolution to ensure economic growth, prosperity, and peace in the region.

India has an understaffed diplomatic corps—less than 1,000 foreign officers represent the second most populous country in the world. In comparison, China has approximately 7,000 diplomats and the U.S. State Department has 14,000 foreign service officers. India cannot raise its global profile without diplomats who can effectively represent and defend Indian interests abroad. The Modi administration recognizes this need: in February, the Ministry of External Affairs began to restructure. But, recruitment still remains low as less than forty candidates are admitted annually to the elite IFS.

Many will maintain that the IFS should remain “lean;” but, if India is to translate its foreign policy ambitions into tangible deliverables abroad, it needs more diplomatic manpower. Its training and development of IFS officers is not in question—its diplomatic corps is respected around the world. Yet, India must recruit a higher number of envoys to strengthen its global clout. This is not a novel concept: criticism of an understaffed IFS and calls for more foreign service officers have been raised for years and decades. If India truly wants to become a major player in geopolitics, it must fully staff its diplomatic corps.

Overlooked Sectors of India Inc.’s International Strategy

This is not to argue that economic or military reforms are unimportant. For India to be a consequential, global player, it will require a robust economy to support its foreign policy ambitions. Moreover, New Delhi has neither developed its military capabilities nor strategic alliances to prevent Chinese territorial aggrandizement. Yet, far too little attention has been paid to India’s “Act East” policy and its foreign service.

India should direct resources to ensure “Act East” is realized, and expand the IFS to spearhead this initiative and other foreign policies which aim to increase India’s power projection. As the Covid-19 pandemic continues to spread and conflict has erupted along India’s border in the past few months, New Delhi has revisited India Inc.’s international strategy through an economic and military lens. This is a strategic mistake: by deprioritizing the “Act East” policy and the expansion of the IFS, New Delhi is missing an opportunity to increase India’s long-term influence in the region and raise India’s global profile.

Top Seven World Powers Of All-Time (Hint: America Doesn't Top the List) Staying power matters. That kept the likes of Napoleonic France and dominions of Alexander the Great from making this list, even though those regimes left their mark on the world. by James Jay Carafano

 

A superpower isn't just a conqueror, but a state that leaves its mark on the entire world system.

What kind of cruel, evil-minded editor would ask any self-respecting scholar to risk all with a list of the top world powers? It’s an assignment fraught with peril, guaranteed to ensure offense to the living and the dead. After all, as President Obama said, “Every nation thinks it’s exceptional.”

And here, the criteria for picking the top contenders can be as ambiguous and debatable as selecting the final four for the NCAA football playoffs. Here’s hoping the ranking system I came up with passes your personal “ha-ha” test.

For starters, I focused on the top competitors of their time: the powers most successful in mastering the world system of their age. That limits the list to those that competed on the world stage. It rules out some great regional powers—like the Egyptians, the Song Dynasty, Mayans, Incas and the Iroquois nation—that never really pressed their power beyond their own neighborhood.

Also, the list is limited to recorded history. Archeologists are free to compile their own lists of prehistoric powers.

Further, staying power matters. That kept the likes of Napoleonic France and dominions of Alexander the Great from making this list, even though those regimes left their mark on the world.

Finally, this list is simply chronological. Trying to compare power across time and world makes no sense, so presenting a ranked roster of all-time all-stars is ultimately arbitrary. Unlike baseball fanatics who relish unending debates over who’s better, Babe Ruth or A-Rod, I’m just not going there.

And so, without further ado…the envelope please!

7. Pax Romana:

Seriously, who would question Rome’s right to head the list? The republic-turned-empire lasted 500 years and pretty much invented global reach. At its greatest extent, parts of Africa, Europe and the Middle East fell under Rome’s dominion. With a population estimated at upwards of 60 million, Rome was boss of about one-quarter of the world’s population. And talk about strong—it was even able to survive leaders like Caligula and Nero.

6. Barbarians at the Gate:

With the collapse of Rome, globalization hit the pause button. The Dark Ages were, after all, pretty dark. Still, Germanic Norse seafarers got around more than most. Though they might not have represented a single political entity, in their day, the Vikings exploited the existing world system better than anyone else. From the High North to the New World to the Mediterranean littoral, from North Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, Vikings logged more frequent rowing miles, garnered more wealth and exerted more influence than most.

5. The Golden Horde:

It is not just a fascination with the Netflix series “Marco Polo.” Mongols were the power of the day. At the height of its influence and dominion, every corner of the old world knew of and wondered at the great empire of the Khans. Counting the vassal states and allies that paid tribute or swore allegiance to the throne, the empire incorporated over one-quarter of the world’s land mass. The influence of the Mongol Empire spanned generations. It waged some of the most destructive wars in recorded history, but “Pax Mongolica” also facilitated an unprecedented exchange of people, goods and ideas across Eurasia.

4. Babur’s Empire:

Mughals are not Mongols—though their rulers claimed to be descendants of the great Mongol Emperor Genghis Khan. Established by Babur, a Central Asian ruler who set up shop in the Indian subcontinent, this 17th- and 18th-century empire spanned the space between Europe and Asia, a territory of over one million square miles. It governed more of the world's population than any other power of its day.

3. The Sun Never Sets:

Does anyone seriously want to argue that Britain mastered better than the rest the race to build the modern nation-state? What really distinguished Britain as a power was its unprecedented access to global markets and capacity to move people, goods, services and ideas across the global commons. From 1815 to 1914, the British Empire was the envy of the modern world.

2. America the Beautiful:

Henry Luce was right. It really was America's century. The United States built the largest, most productive economic engine in human history. The pivotal power in World War II, the United States saved the nation-state system from catastrophic disaster. And no nation benefited more from the postwar system that was built on the combination of sovereign nation-states and relative freedom of the commons.

1. Oh Canada: The United States may have been the chief architect of the current world system, but others now leverage the system far better than we do. Today it's hard to find an objective "Top 10" list of positive attributes of modern life that doesn't include Australia and Canada. Last year, for example, Australia was number three in the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal “Index of Economic Freedom.” Canada was number six. Here, Canada nudges ahead because it has the added advantages of: nestling under NATO, the world's best military alliance; access to the emerging opportunities in the Arctic and tremendous energy resources. It also has the advantage of sitting right next to door to one of the world’s best marketplaces: the United States.

Whether Canada can keep its competitive advantages over time and hold on to the top spot remains to be seen. Whether the world system of relative peace and respect for the nation-state and freedom of the commons, which allows states like Canada to rise to the top endures—well that’s an open question as well. Only time will tell.

Could Electric Car Batteries Feed Power Back Into the Grid? This is known as vehicle-to-grid technology and is seen as the future as we move towards more electrification of transport and a smart grid. by Alan Brent

 

Technically it is possible. You could charge your electric vehicle (EV) with solar photovoltaic panels (or any other means), and if the EV is not used, the stored energy could be pushed back into the grid, especially during hours of peak demand for electricity when market prices are high.

This is known as vehicle-to-grid technology and is seen as the future as we move towards more electrification of transport and a smart grid.

But manufacturers of electric vehicles have been reluctant, at first, to allow the bidirectional flow of power, for two reasons.

First, it could accelerate the degradation of batteries, which means they would need to be replaced more often. Second, the EV has to connect to the grid in the same way a solar photovoltaic system does, complying with standards to protect line operators and maintenance personnel working on the grid.

Such advanced bidirectional charge controllers come at an additional cost. Nevertheless, EV manufacturers such as Audi and Nissan have now taken steps to enable vehicle-to-grid connection with some of their models.

For EV models that do not have onboard inverters (to convert the DC electricity in the electric car to AC electricity we use in our homes), there are now bidirectional inverters available to connect any electric car. But the issue of battery life remains.

The continual charging and discharging through a 90% efficient converter shortens the life of the battery, and depending on brand and model, it may need replacing every five years. At more than NZ$5,000, this is a significant price tag for “energy prosumers” – people who both produce and consume energy.

Economic and practical considerations

There are other considerations that are very context-specific. These relate to the additional charges for enabling the export of electricity from households, which vary between lines companies and retailers (or local authorities), as well as the buy-back rate of the electricity, which again depends on the purchaser of the electricity.

At the moment, these specific circumstances are seldom favourable to justify the additional cost of the infrastructure needed to connect an electric car to the grid.

There are also practical considerations. If the EV is used for the morning and evening commute, it is not at the home during the day to be charged with a solar system. And if it is (hopefully) not charged during peak demand hours, but mostly in off-peak hours at night, then the vehicle-to-grid route makes less sense.

It only starts to make sense if an EV is not used daily, or if EVs are available to a larger network than just one household. There are major opportunities for EVs to be used in communities with microgrids that manage their own generation and consumption, independent of the larger grid, or if large smart grid operators can manage distributed EVs remotely and more efficiently.

Investigations are ongoing to make this a more practical reality in the near future.

How Open Data Rules Could Rein In Big Tech Data openly and freely available under a strict regulatory environment would likely be a better way to tame Big Tech’s power than breaking them up. by Patrick Leblond

 

On July 29, the heads of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google testified (virtually) in front of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee to defend their dominant market positions in advertising (Facebook and Google), in e-commerce (Amazon) and in applications (Apple).

The hearing was part of the subcommittee’s 13-month investigation of Big Tech’s market power and anti-competitive practices.

Remarkably, the next day, the four companies announced stellar quarterly financial results, beating analysts’ expectations. While the economy tanked because of the pandemic, the four companies reported a combined profit of US$28.6 billion in the second quarter.

As a group, their market value is now around US$5 trillion, making them the most valued companies in the world.

Traditional antitrust measures are not a feasible solution for taming Big Tech’s market power in the data-driven economy. This is because they do not address the source of these firms’ power: data.

An effective way to create a more competitive data-driven economy is to make user data easily accessible to anyone with a legitimate purpose. Data usage may be controlled by a strict regulatory regime modelled on securities regulation that protects the integrity and anonymity of publicly available data.

Bigger, Richer, More Powerful

The networks these firms provide and the data they collect make them the best at selling access to consumers. If all your friends are on Facebook, you have to be on the platform if you want them to see what you’re doing and thinking and vice versa. If Amazon is where you can find the most products to buy online, that’s where you’re going to shop.

It’s also where merchants are going to want to sell their products to you. You want to search for something on the web, you go to Google, because everyone uses Google.

As the number of people using online products and services grows, companies collect larger amounts of data about them, their preferences and their behaviour. This translates to a more tailored experience to meet people’s specific needs, wishes and interests, which leads to more people joining the network and further data generation.

More people and data mean more money, which means more acquisitions of potential competitors or their technology, thereby adding further people and data to a network.

Taming Big Tech’s Power, Restoring Competition

Traditional antitrust approaches such as breaking up Big Tech firms and preventing potential competitor acquisitions are never-ending processes. Even if you break them up and block their ability to acquire other, smaller tech firms, Big Tech will start growing again because of network effects and their data advantage.

And how do we know when a tech firm is big enough to ensure competitive markets? What are the size or scope thresholds for breaking up firms or blocking mergers and acquisitions?

A small startup acquired for millions of dollars can be worth billions of dollars for a Big Tech acquirer once integrated in its ecosystem. A series of small acquisitions can result in a dominant position in one area of the digital economy. Knowing this, competition/antitrust authorities would potentially have to examine every tech transaction, however small.

Not only would this be administratively costly or burdensome on resources, but it would also be difficult for government officials to assess with some precision (and therefore legitimacy), the likely future economic impact of an acquisition in a rapidly evolving technological environment.

Open Data Access, Level the Playing Field

Given that mass data collection is at the core of Big Tech’s power as gatekeepers to customers, a key solution is to open up data access for other firms so that they can compete better.

Anonymized data (to protect an individual’s privacy rights) about people’s behaviour, interests, views, etc., should be made available for free to anyone wanting to pursue a commercial or non-commercial endeavour. Data about a firm’s operations or performance would, however, remain private.

Using an analogy from the finance world, Big Tech firms act as insider traders. Stock market insiders often possess insider (or private) information about companies that the public does not have. Such individuals then have an incentive to profit by buying or selling shares in those companies before the public becomes aware of the information.

Big Tech’s incentives are no different than stock market insiders. They trade on exclusively available private information (data) to generate extraordinary profits.

Continuing the finance analogy, financial securities regulators forbid the use of inside or non-publicly available information for personal benefit. Individuals found to illegally use such information are punished with jail time and fines.

They also require companies to publicly report relevant information that affects or could significantly affect their performance. Finally, they oblige insiders to publicly report when they buy and sell shares in a company in which they have access to privileged information.

Transposing stock market insider trading regulation to Big Tech implies that data access and use should be monitored under an independent regulatory body — call it a Data Market Authority. Such a body would be responsible for setting and enforcing principles, rules and standards of behaviour among individuals and organizations in the data-driven economy.

For example, a Data Market Authority would require firms to publicly report how they acquire and use personal data. It would prohibit personal data hoarding by ensuring that data is easily portable from one platform, network or marketplace to another. It would also prohibit the buying and selling of personal data as well as protect individuals’ privacy by imposing penalties on firms and individuals in cases of non-compliance.

Data openly and freely available under a strict regulatory environment would likely be a better way to tame Big Tech’s power than breaking them up and having antitrust authorities approving every acquisition that they wish to make.

Pompeo Wants to Cut Off China’s Access to America’s Internet Mike Pompeo, State Department, China, Cyber, Elections by Matthew Petti

The Trump administration is rolling out a new initiative to create a global Clean Network free of Chinese influence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on Wednesday. 

The United States has accused China of data theft and other malign cyber activities as tensions rise between the two global powers. Pompeo gave a preview of likely U.S. moves to reduce Beijing’s reach into American networks. 

“We’re protecting Americans’ most sensitive information, and our businesses’ most valuable intellectual property,” he said. “We call on all freedom-loving nations and companies to join the Clean Network.” 

The initiative will focus on keeping American users off Chinese cloud services or cellular carriers, Chinese apps off of American app stores, American apps off of Chinese app stores, and Chinese companies away from undersea cable projects. 

Pompeo’s announcement comes after lawmakers and the Trump administration successfully pressured Chinese tech giant ByteDance to sell the popular U.S.-based social media network TikTok to an American company. 

The Secretary of State also offered a $10 million reward for information on foreign-backed hackers or cyber-warfare officers working to undermine U.S. elections under the Rewards for Justice counterterrorism program. 

“The State Department's Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of any person, who, acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, interferes with U.S. elections by engaging in certain criminal cyber activities,” he said. 

Pompeo first began offering bounties for high-level government actors in September 2019, when his State Department issued a $15 million bounty for disrupting Iranian military finances. 

The program issued another $15 million bounty in December for Brig. Gen. Abdul Reza Shahla’i, an Iranian military commander accused of attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. U.S. forces attempted to kill Shahla’i in Yemen the next month. 

The State Department expanded this bounty program to include cyber-warfare in April 2020, when it offered up to $5 million for information on North Korean hackers threatening the United States or the international financial system. 

Pompeo said that the latest bounty for election interference was one of the ways that the Trump administration “has worked continuously to secure our democracy.” 

He accused China of a wide-ranging campaign to undermine democracy both at home and abroad, from cracking down on the Uyghur minority to issuing warrants for U.S.-based activists. 

“Freedom-loving nations must come together to confront the [Chinese Communist Party]'s aggressive behavior, and the good news is, the tide is absolutely turning,” he said. “The central idea of distrust and then verify, I think, the world is coming to see, is the right approach.” 

Yes, China Is Practicing Air and Amphibious Assaults. Taiwan needs to keep its guard up. by Kris Osborn

The Chinese military is demonstrating the ability to conduct multi-domain amphibious attack operations for a “potential military operation on the island of Taiwan,” by landing Z-10 helicopters on amphibious assault ships. 

A report in the Chinese government-backed Global Times specifically cites analysts referring to a possible attack on Taiwan.

“The combination of Army helicopters and Navy warships can significantly boost the PLA’s amphibious, vertical landing capability and will play a vital role in potential military operations on the island of Taiwan,” the report says.

The exercise was described as a “sea-crossing assault” drill intended to prepare the People’s Liberation Army for new tactical amphibious assault capabilities. The helicopters took off from a land base, according to the paper, before landing on the flight deck of a Chinese Type 071 amphibious assault ship. 

The report says the Z-10s bring attack options and fire support that China’s Navy Aviation Forces does not have. 

The PLA Army attack helicopters can also provide low-altitude air cover for advancing amphibious forces by providing covering fire and forward reconnaissance for approaching ship-to-shore forces. In addition, the Z-10s increase the number of helicopter assets potentially available for amphibious attacks. 

If several ship-based helicopters are in flight, new aircraft arriving from land can descend onto the amphibious assault ship, refuel and rearm before rejoining the attack mission. 

Cross-domain operations massively escalate the potential scale of an amphibious attack. Should Z-10s land on the deck of an amphibious assault ship, it would indeed massively increase the kinds of air-attacks potentially available during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 

Interestingly, the assault drills included what the U.S. Army calls air assault, something often performed by Army Rangers. 

“On arriving at the designated areas, the soldiers aboard the helicopters rappelled down the helicopters and initiated the attack,” the report says. 

The U.S. military has been practicing these kinds of cross-domain maneuvers for many years already, and it would be accurate to say that the United States may be well ahead of these kinds of maneuvers demonstrated by China. 

Existing U.S. multi-domain strategy has already involved numerous Army-Navy task forces in the Pacific aimed at refining cross-domain attacks, and the services have begun to explore a variety of new inter-service combat tactics. In fact, U.S. Army helicopters have operated from Navy ships on many occasions. 

For example, Army weapons developers have explained that there is no reason land-based rockets or artillery could not be used to attack enemy surface ships. It is also conceivable that previously land-based weapons, such as rockets, guns or missiles, could be integrated to fire from the deck of Navy ships. 

Despite the apparent success of this exercise, it seems clear that the true merits of multi-domain operations may likely reside in advanced networking. This is a huge focus for the Pentagon, which is now advancing Joint Multi-Domain Command and Control initiatives. 

The idea is to enable air, surface, undersea and land platforms to share information in real-time, a technical capability designed to optimize attack options available to commanders. Integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), it could be said, offers the true margin of difference regarding the application of cross-domain operations, particularly with respect to amphibious assault. 

For instance, missile defense detection can instantly be linked with ground-based interceptors and surface ships can better attack land targets. Moreover, airborne stealth fighter jets can network targeting data with Navy ships and Army ground forces. 

Whether Chinese forces can approach this kind of networking so far remains unclear. However, the relevance of the assault drills, it seems, hinges upon the extent to which land-launched attack helicopters can receive and execute targeting information from air and surface assets. The circumstance invites many questions, such as whether Chinese Z-10s can control unmanned systems from the cockpit in a manner similar to what the U.S. Army can do. 

The Pandemic's Global Geopolitical Aftershocks The world will be very different after the pandemic. by Mohan Malik

The triple crises of geopolitical power shifts, the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic disasters that flow from it will shape global politics, restructure global supply chains and bring an end to unregulated globalisation. The post-pandemic world is yet to take shape, but it’s likely to be as divided and bifurcated as occurred after World War II.

We are entering a new cold war with eyes wide open, not sleepwalking into it as some would argue. The vast Indo-Pacific region from the western Pacific to the western Indian Ocean is its ground zero.

Every crisis has winners and losers. China emerged as a winner after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis. The world’s worst pandemic will also have winners and losers. China could emerge bruised and much weakened in a post-Covid-19 world that is fragmented and has a more regulated style of ‘guided globalisation’.

China’s economy is particularly susceptible to declines in foreign investment, technology controls and export markets. A prolonged economic slowdown caused by the pandemic, war or natural disasters, potentially made worse by the exodus of multinational corporations (aka Chiexit), could even threaten the stability of China’s one-party regime.

After spending so much building its military capabilities and war-fighting doctrines, China may well be tempted to try them out, perhaps on a weaker neighbour. Manufacturing disputes where none exist is an old tactic, and China’s new territorial claims on tiny Bhutan’s eastern border illustrate the point.

While Chinese leader Xi Jinping appears keen to lock in China’s geostrategic gains, the ‘Quad’ democracies (the United States, Japan, India and Australia) and other like-minded nations want the Indo-Pacific to remain multipolar with Chinese power balanced by a continued US presence and by the power of other Asian states.

China’s vision of a power-and-hierarchy-based order clashes with the law-and-order-based vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Western, Japanese and other multinational corporations will aim to reduce their dependence on China. China’s mercantilism, its worldwide quest for resources, markets and bases, and its attempts to carve out a Sinosphere of influence will now face intense opposition from US allies and partners.

The world is transitioning from globalisation to regionalisation of trade. Rival trading and technology blocs will emerge through which governments will try to regulate the flow of goods, services, finance and labour in strategic sectors to safeguard their national interests. As economic issues get mired in domestic politics, trade and technology can become contentious and even explosive issues. Economic polarisation will sharpen political differences.

Tech wars over artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, biotech and 5/6G could result in a bifurcation of the global economy or usher in ‘one world, two systems’. Two separate blocs—driven primarily by national security concerns and economic or commercial interests—could create a fragmented world of conflicting visions and rules in the political, economic, technological, maritime, space and cyber domains.

The forces of geopolitics, ideology, nationalism and economic and technological competition will strain relations among nations. Countries big and small will be forced to choose sides. Fence-sitting will be difficult. To avoid coercion or collateral damage, most countries would prefer to trade with economies with which their interests and values converge.

Historically, small states are the first to feel the impact of major shifts in global geopolitics. Small and middle powers will find their room for manoeuvre severely constricted and the troubled waters extremely difficult to navigate.

The contest for the allegiance of small island states, from Samoa and Solomon Islands in the Pacific to Sri Lanka and the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean, is part of a bigger Indo-Pacific power game. The intense jockeying for influence and forward presence among major maritime powers seeking control of ports, logistical facilities and other pieces of critical infrastructure along the vital sea lanes will create new friction points. With the world’s largest navy, China would want to become a resident power in the Indian Ocean and beyond, just as Britain, France and the US became resident powers in the 19th and 20th centuries.

As partnerships and allegiances among states shift, new strategic balances, new institutions and new norms will emerge. Pressure will grow to reform old institutions such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization, and to form new ones.

The US leads an informal ‘Quad Plus’ group to coordinate responses to the pandemic. It includes India, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand. The G7 is likely to turn into a D10—a concert of 10 democracies. The BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa might fall apart and be replaced by a Pakistan–Russia–Iran–China axis.

The world will be very different after the pandemic. The days of ‘Chimerica’, ‘responsible stakeholder’, ‘Chindia’, ‘South–South Cooperation,’ ‘Asian century’, ‘Asia for Asians’, and unregulated globalisation are over. With Cold War 2.0 intensifying, ‘Chindia’ and ‘Chimerica’ on a war footing and decoupling economically, the much-touted Pacific century will not be pacific, or Asian.

It may well turn out to be just another bloody century.